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Approaching 'America':

Is There an Anthropology of Pro-Americanism and an Anthropology of Anti-Americanism?

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The topic of this exploration is relevant to our contemporary world, and indeed to the overall question of "Contemporary Human Conditions and Anthropologies," highlighted by the 2014 joint conference of the Taiwan Society for Anthropology and Ethnology (TSAE) and the World Council of Anthropological Associations (WCAA).[1] For one thing, it addresses a large and powerful country that it is hard to ignore. For another, it addresses attitudes towards that country, and the wide variety of views, opinions, labels, and feelings it engenders around the world today. How to approach this topic, what the topic might really entail, and how an anthropologist could (or even should) engage it are, therefore, the tough but important questions I tackle here.[2]

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1 I thank Huang Shu-min, the Taiwan Society for Anthropology and Ethnology (TSAE), and the Department of Ethnology of National Chenchi University for inviting me and hosting me at this event. I also thank the leadership and members of the World Council of Anthropological Associations (WCAA) for having its WCAA meeting in Taipei, jointly with the TSAE, and including me in my role as Chair of the WCAA Task Force on Advocacy and Outreach Activities. I explicitly wish to thank Michal Buchowski, then Chair of the WCAA, and Vesna Vucinic Neskovic, now Chair of the WCAA, for their able and committed leadership of the WCAA.

2 I wish the topic were not so relevant, so eye-catching, or so provocative. But it is, and I have no doubt that it warrants close examination. In discussions since early October 2014, I have interestingly been asked why I pose this in such a binary way, and whether what I present is useful or even novel to scholars. As I hope this essay will show, I do not consider the issue binary at all, but I acknowledge that those who participate in talk about "anti-Americanism" (and even "pro-Americanism") tend to do so. I find the query about its potential usefulness or novelty more puzzling. Since there is little scholarly discussion of this topic (with few examples at the moment, although I acknowledge the existence of the 2004 volume edited by Andrew Ross and Kristin Ross and published by NYU Press), I never know whether the question is an effort to devalue exploration of this phenomenon as a scholarly topic or a way of ignoring the topic itself in favor of a type of analysis it favors. I actually wonder if the topic is not in many ways embarrassing both to many U.S. scholars and to many

The words in my title seem clear enough, or at least promise referential directness, yet a great deal here—from "America" to "pro-Americanism," "anti-Americanism," and perhaps even "anthropology"—has a deceptive veneer of clarity. These are objects of discourse, and they carry meaning as objects of all discourses of which they a part. It is well worth contemplating what those meanings might be, and how to spot them, analyze them, and even engage with them. Putting it differently (and perhaps more simply), when people say "America" they are most often referring to the United States of America (despite many millions of others in the Western Hemisphere being annoyed at a country that has monopolized a name that should refer to the entire region). And when people say "anti-American" and "anti-Americanism," they refer to attitudes, statements, policies, and actions they see as critical of the U.S.A. Not as many people say "pro-American" or "pro-Americanism," although it is not difficult to find these terms online and, when they do show up, they are meant to describe positive attitudes, statements, policies, and/or actions toward the U.S.A. And then, of course, there are the feelings that accompany these terms and their usage, feelings that may or may not be shared but are definitely experienced; those feelings in turn lead to one thing or another being called "anti-American" or "anti-Americanism," "pro-American" or "pro-Americanism."

I approach this topic as a social anthropologist who pays close attention to language, especially to language as used, invoked, heard, and situated at specific moments of time and in social contexts that give it meaning. So I am not trying to say that the terms at issue here name nothing of significance or that they lack meaningfulness, even if they lack referential clarity. Indeed it is precisely because they are heard as intelligible, legible, understandable, and meaningful that they exist and are invoked. Because they are simultaneously referential and polysemic, they exist, serve as resources, and matter. In many senses they resemble witchcraft accusations—yes indeed, witchcraft accusations. They name something (or someone) in ways that make sense to the speakers and listeners, they carry meaning that may not prove correct and yet generates palpable feelings and possible consequences. These consequences are at times lethal but, even when they are not, they at the very least frame an issue, a phenomenon, a situation, a person, an action, or even a place in a particular way (often so strongly that they make it close to impossible to employ a different frame of understanding).

scholars in locations in which feelings about the U.S. are highly palpable. I hope the approach I take here can answer some doubts about its scholarly merit, inspire others to take the topic seriously, and even apply my framework to other phenomena involving critique, praise, and controversy.

This is a meaningful, if difficult, issue not only for me, but for others as well. We were, after all, meeting in Taipei, not in a U.S. city, but also not in Beijing, Rio de Janeiro, London, or Lagos. I am a U.S. citizen, and I primarily live and work in the United States. What did it mean for me to broach this topic in Taipei? And what did it mean for me to broach it at a joint meeting of the TSAE and the WCAA? While Taipei participants may have thought of the U.S. in a particular way (either on its own or in relation to China, Japan, Australia, or Russia), the WCAA participants came from many corners of the planet and did not necessarily share a particular sense of the world, what Edward Said called a particular "imagined geography." That variety no doubt applied to the expressions "anti-Americanism" and "pro-Americanism"—whether as topics or fears, rhetoric or feelings, things seen as foreign to the anthropological community but not to the society/ies in which anthropologists live and work, or as even things seen as not foreign to the anthropological community itself.

Yet the difficulty extended beyond knowing that the audience lived and worked in many different places around the world, and is (or was) understandably exposed to multiple ways of talking and feeling about the United States. The difficulty was also closer to home. I know, for example, that at least some of the WCAA leadership fears that it is seen by some as anti-American, and that it has had to address that question to varying degrees. While I do not really know how widespread those discussions are, I do know that WCAA leaders have worried about the accusation, that they do not just treat it as mere feeling, an unacceptable delusion, or "just rhetoric." In a multinational network of anthropologists, the question is very real, and it can be a difficult issue to deal with even interpersonally and multinationally.

I do not presume to know whether general Taiwanese attitudes, policies, feelings, or actions toward the United States make at least some anthropologists in Taipei uncomfortable. But I would be surprised if, as anthropologists, colleagues in Taiwan did not also grapple with tacit, latent, sub-rosa, or even open engagement with U.S. things and people that are difficult to address or even acknowledge.

There is, to be sure, much variety in the ways people around the world think about, relate to, or engage with the U.S., not all of it obvious. Consider the following recent poll results from the Pew Research Center, whose Global Indicators Database explores "public opinion in countries around the world on a range of issues and attitudes." The Spring 2014 Global Attitudes Survey came up with one list of countries as the "top 10 critics" of the U.S. and another as the "top 10 fans." Note that these do not refer to views of the U.S. president, government, military actions, or economic institutions, but rather to more general views of the U.S. The top 10 critics are Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Russia, the Palestinian territory, Greece, Pakistan,

Lebanon, Tunisia, and Germany. On the list of top 10 fans are the Philippines, Israel, South Korea, Kenya, El Salvador, Italy, Ghana, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Tanzania, and France. An anthropologist might ask what these lists are based on or object to the polling methodology, but the fact of a broad diversity in views of the U.S. around the world is what I mean to point out here. The questions asked (and interpreted) got respondents to indicate whether they hold a favorable or an unfavorable view of the United States. The results were then collected and presented by country/nation. Of course, as an anthropologist, I would want details about respondents' socioeconomic class, education or cultural capital, their gender and sexuality, location, speech community, and political or ideological beliefs, and I would want to see how stable these views are in people's everyday lives. Nonetheless, that enormous percentages of those polled in Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and Russia held unfavorable views (85%, 85%, 73%, and 71%, respectively) should interest us just as much as the fact that enormous percentages of those polled in those nations comprising the "fan base," including even France, held favorable views (from a high of 92% to a low of 75%).

How this data is presented and framed matters as well. In a July 15, 2014 article, published online for the Pew Research Center, Bruce Stokes opens with a striking framing statement: "Sacre bleu! France makes the list of top 10 fans of the U.S. and Germany makes the list of the top 10 critics." First, I would ask, why is this noteworthy? Second, why are these both Western/Central European countries? And, third, why should this evoke surprise?

Stokes goes on to give the statistics I just quoted, but before doing so, he interprets the issue as one of changing degrees of anti-Americanism. This is a revealing observation. He writes:

> A decade ago anti-Americanism was on the rise around the world, in large part thanks to public opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Today, despite recent revelations of U.S. National Security Agency spying on foreign leaders and global opposition to U.S. drone strikes, there is little evidence of profound anti-Americanism except in a handful of countries, according to a new Pew Research Center survey…of 44 nations. Foreigners' love affair with the United States remains strong in Africa and most of Asia, Europe and Latin America. But who likes Uncle Sam, who doesn't and whose affections are evolving paints a pretty accurate road map of the overseas challenges facing Washington in the years ahead.

Note that the phenomenon could have been framed as one of pro-Americanism or even more specifically of "pro-U.S." attitudes, but it was not. Note as well that the phenomenon could have been framed as one of changing images or attitudes,

but it was not—at least not in the opening statements or the article's title ("Which Countries Don't Like America and Which Do"). That the author does acknowledge some of the complexity and change only becomes obvious if one reads deeper into the article. And we must ask why the frame for understanding here is firmly centered on anti-Americanism—not pro-Americanism, not gray areas, and not change, even though Stokes had all that data in front of him, and more.

For example, with respect to Egypt, Stokes observed that "those not-so-warm feelings for America have fallen 17 percentage points" since 2009 and 13 percentage points in Jordan for the same period, a period he characterizes as "the first year of the Obama administration, when there appeared to be some hope in those nations that Uncle Sam would pursue policies more to their liking." And later Stokes noted that the image of the U.S. was down 28 points in Russia since 2013, which he interprets as "a casualty of Washington's opposition to Moscow's intervention in Ukraine." He acknowledged that the favorability rating had fallen 13 points in Germany since 2009, though he offered no explanation for that decline.

That the countries of South, Southeast, and East Asia ("Asia") were lumped together in his analysis is also noteworthy, but perhaps to U.S.-watchers not all that surprising. There is an enormous amount of present-ism in the way he addressed attitudes across the Pacific. Late in the article he notes, "Asians are also pro-American. In fact, the Filipinos are the biggest fans of the U.S.; 92% express a positive view. South Koreans (82%), Bangladeshis (76%) and Vietnamese (76%) also agree. Even half the Chinese give Uncle Sam a thumbs-up."

The forty comments added between the July 15, 2014 posting date and when I accessed it in September (prior to presenting the Keynote Address to the conference in Taipei) are, of course, interesting and varied, even though I must be cautious about who or what they represent. Yet, some of the points made by these commentators are worth mentioning since I believe they are part of the discourses at issue here, the affect that produces invocations of so-called pro- and anti-Americanism, and the phenomena to which those are seen as connected.

Below are examples of particular interest:

(1) "North Korea and Iran should be on this list."
(2) "I'm surprised Vietnam is a fan."
(3) "So stop giving them foreign aid and see how they react."
(4) "Germany is far more anti-American than most people realize. Germans have let the past few years go to their heads and now have a massive moral superiority complex."
(5) "It's never a surprise to see just how easily American writers reproduce the national propaganda of officialdom. That statement completely erases US intervention in

Ukraine, which provoked the Russians to act, rendering the US as a disinterested, neutral, and innocent bystander. But then, isn't it always?"

(6) "Pew probably missed some of most pro-American states. I bet Albania and Kosovo would be right on top with the Philippines."

(7) "Interestingly, since 2009, it is amazing to me that any former admirer of the USA remains. Admiration usually requires some measure of honesty and trustworthiness on the part of heads of state. America's present 'leaders' display neither of these."

(8) "I lived and worked in several of the countries listed. I can't imagine how they came up with this list! It is way off to us expats that live or have lived in these countries. Example: South Korea, Italy and France fans of the US? Boy cannot believe that! I was in SK when they were attacking American fast food restaurants and protesting US troop on thier [sic] soil or the forgiener [sic] we are watching you campaign in Dague. I love to see the method used to come up with this list!"

(9) "Most of the highly educated and rich people of the world. Whichever country may be from, their first choice to emigrate is USA."

(10) "What I would like to see are the favorability/unfavorability ratings for the USA given the amount of per capita foreign aid given to countries like Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, African countries, South American countries, etc. It would tell us how much it is costing us to buy their friendship, in many cases."

Obviously, people's notions about countries, including the United States, are shaped by a variety of experiences, political positions, understandings, and conversations with others.[3] Some people trust their own experiences more than a statistical survey or a public opinion poll. And quite a few believe that positive results are not to be trusted, since they may be the result of money thrown at them.

I cannot tell how many of the respondents to the Stokes article were residents in the U.S., but it is clear that at least some were. Yet it is also evident that many of the commentators believed the issue is not simply one of analysis. While there must be people for whom the question is a scholarly or scientific one, it is also quite clear that in most cases the issue involves affect—and the questions arise: (1) Does "it" entail

3 Clearly some historians and anthropologists have sought to tackle this variety over time and place, and they, too, are worth reading, as different kinds of approaches to this variety, even if not quite in this second decade of the 21st century. Here I recommend three such works: (a) Walter LaFeber's 2002 book titled *Michael Jordan and the New Global Capitalism*; (b) Richard Pells' 1997 *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II*; and (c) James (Woody) Watson's 1997 *Golden Arches East: McDonald's in East Asia*.

me? and (2) If I have a pretty positive view of the country (the U.S.), why don't others see what I see?

One Approach: Labels and Invocations

Over a number of years I have developed an approach that helps me understand similar processes and patterns, and this strikes me as a good opportunity to share it. I choose to think of the issue more as one of invocations than a set of political, economic, or military characteristics that one could define and then apply to different societies. I recognize that some might prefer the latter, but as an anthropologist I am first and foremost concerned with figuring out what a phenomenon is and whether we can identify it discursively, as well as what happens when we explore it as a form of naming (invocation) and how we might think about it productively from that perspective.

Without evidence of the existence of something, we have no social phenomena to track or study. That evidence could take different forms, but I am here especially interested in the existence of "some thing" in discourse. There may be ineffable unnamed things, of course, but I am more interested in patterns of naming, patterns of invocation, and the consequences of the emergence of something as a discursive object. That people find invocation meaningful is important, because they are then likely to participate in the affirmation of a given term/thing's "reality" and then extend it. That reality is clearly social and requires recognition, even if some of us might critique what the discourse says, claims, or pronounces. As philosophers of language and linguistic anthropologists have taught us for many years (cf. Austin 1962, Peirce 1991, Searle 1969, Silverstein 1976), meaningfulness is what matters, and identifying the group/community/network for which something is meaningful is part of our analytic task. That is my approach here and, hopefully, I will offer a productive and necessary analytic step that can address the thorny issue of both criticism and praise for the United States, both of which exist, both of which must be taken as meaningful, and both of which are widespread, contemporary ways of "approaching 'America.'"

Let me start by asserting a keystone principle, namely, that both criticism and praise are best seen as forms of speech that are meaningful, social, and discernible as behavior.[4] Let me extend this further, because it has analytic consequences:

(1) Criticism or praise must have meaning for the critic or the fan. It must therefore be *thinkable*. It must arise from the verbal or non-verbal experience of the critic or

4 It can be useful to think about the terms criticism and critique and their relation to public as well as academic work. One source I have found useful is, in fact, the *American Heritage Dictionary's* 2001 entry on criticism.

fan, for whom its references and alternatives are clear. It must consist of discursive objects already in play in the critic or fan's daily life and world, and it must make sense within the logics of those contexts.

(2) For criticism or praise to be social, it must have an intended audience, however that speech or visual community may be construed. It must be *legible to others*, whether or not they agree with the stated or implied approval or disapproval. It must therefore be in a language spoken and/or written by others—and by language here I mean a set of signs and symbols recognized and at least partly used by others for the purposes of intentional communication, whether or not the majority of the world's language and literature experts recognize its existence.

(3) And for criticism or praise to be discernible behavior, it must be recognized *as an act and not just as a thing*. It must have a doer—i.e., a person, an embodied subject of the verbs "to criticize" or "to praise." It must be locatable in time and place. It must be something alternative to other behaviors, and it must have some embodied effect at least for the critic or fan and his or her immediate surroundings.

Consider, then, some of the implications of this. Let us ask ourselves what we count as signs of criticism or praise. Is it flag-burning or flag-waving? Is it a blog post telling us that "anti-Americanism" is in evidence? Is it the number of tickets sold when a NBA (National Basketball Association) team plays outside the U.S.? Is it the number of people who work at McDonald's restaurants around the world (cf. Watson 1997)? When we are told that something is a sign of "anti-Americanism" or "pro-Americanism," do we tend to view it as evidence of those things? What happens if we apply my basic principle here?

Consider the importance I place on (1) naming/framing, (2) legibility (to an audience), and (3) willing participation in a particular speech community. How consequential are accusations (or praise) if they are not readily legible? I submit that they are not very consequential. This does not mean that blatant framing is necessary, but it does mean that the speaker must include enough sign-posting to participate effectively in discourses that are for, and by, particular speech communities.

Consider the following example. On December 13, 2004, Ipsos-Public Affairs released the results of a poll it had undertaken in eight countries, including the United States, between November 19 and November 27 at the request of the Associated Press. The AP story is available online and was widely picked up by newspapers across the U.S. (and in a number of different parts of the world), including in fairly small metropolitan areas like the Cedar Rapids/Iowa City area in Iowa where I lived at the time, a micro-metro area with a population of about 400,000. My then local newspaper's headline read, "Poll: Many Europeans Cool

Toward Bush, Americans," and in smaller print it added, "Americans fare slightly better than their president in polls conducted in several countries." If readers missed the "orange alert" signs indicating evidence of criticism, the first sentence of the AP text brought it into sharp focus. "International resentment of the Bush Administration," it said, "has spilled over to include bad feelings for the American people, too—at least in three European countries that opposed U.S. policies in Iraq." The countries named were France, Germany, and Spain. The fact that the same poll showed 80% of those polled in Canada, 69% of those polled in Australia, 60% of those polled in Britain, and 56% of those polled in Italy reporting favorable opinions of Americans (i.e., people in the U.S.A.) was not mentioned at all in the text. These figures appeared on a chart next to the text, which is how I know them, but they were clearly not seen as the newsworthy items.

Instead the AP story interpreted the data as signaling a rift that was worsening. It was characterized as "the most serious in years," and it involved "long-time allies France and Germany." The piece added that "relations with Spain have been particularly frosty since Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodrigues Zapatero withdrew Spanish troops from Iraq" in April 2004. It commented on President George W. Bush's pledge on November 2, 2004, "that he would work 'to deepen our trans-Atlantic ties with the nations of Europe'" and observed, somewhat editorially, that "the president, and Americans generally, have plenty of work to do to win over Europeans."

The only direct mention of anti-Americanism appears toward the end of the piece, in a quote by a Belgian named Gilles Corman, identified as director of public affairs for Ipsos-Inra of Belgium. He is reported to have said that "the polling suggests an increasing lack of European understanding of Americans rather than a surge of anti-Americanism." Yet the mere mention of the word "anti-Americanism" makes this story a part of an existing discourse about anti-Americanism, even though the data showed strong signs of pro-Americanism alongside weak approval of President Bush in several countries (Canada, 80% vs. 32% approvals; Britain, 60% vs. 30%; Australia, 69% vs. 40%). And even in countries where the majority of those polled reported unfavorable opinions of Americans, there was still a marked distinction in the percentages reporting favorable opinions of Americans generally versus those for the president (e.g., in France, 41% vs. 19%; in Germany, 41% vs. 17%; and in Spain, 35% vs. 19%).

Was this news story then evidence of anti-Americanism or did it just report evidence of anti-Americanism? We were told that it did not constitute such evidence, yet it discursively participated in that discourse by putting the notion of anti-Americanism as a discursive object in readers' heads. It used language that

was understandable and legible, and it was rhetorically addressed to the American public. I (or we) might ask to look more closely to see who and where the enemies or friends of Americans might be and whether there is actually enough information to reach conclusions, but how many readers, whether they consume online or in print, read that actively and suspiciously? How legible, I ask, would the issuing of approval ratings (as signs of criticism) be without framing and commentary?

Would we not wonder about variation by country? Or how favorable "favorable" was, and how unfavorable "unfavorable" was? Or, exactly what questions were asked? Or how these percentages compared to those five, ten, or twenty years earlier? Indeed it is possible to notice some ambiguities by looking carefully at the reported polling results, yet the key message to be consumed was clearly that even old, long-time friends were critical of "us" and could no longer be trusted. There is no ambiguity there. The article clearly highlighted criticism, which was discursively tied to anti-Americanism, despite the weak disclaimer.

It is useful here to remember the statement I made earlier about how it becomes more interesting to think of criticism and praise not just as expressions of disapproval or approval but rather as "meaningful social behaviors." Doing so forces us to highlight things that we may tacitly know but may not be stressed enough in the heat of discussion (and affect) regarding evidence of anti-Americanism, namely, (1) that this poll was meaningful in a discourse and a discourse community within which the terms used and fears expressed were thinkable and understandable—and that it is evidence of the existence and objects of that discourse, even if it is not evidence of anti-American thoughts, feelings, or actions; (2) that the release of the story about the poll was a locatable, traceable behavior—a social act aiming to have an effect—and that those who produced it, released it, and handled it are part of, and point to, a discourse (speech) community that thereby calls attention to its existence, whether or not it is right to believe it has proof of the existence of anti-American thoughts, feelings, or actions outside the U.S.; and (3) that this news story may be found legible and meaningful by people without regard to citizenship or geographical place of residence. While the majority of readers of U.S. newspapers printing the story were likely to have U.S. citizenship or at least to live within the fifty states of the U.S. or in overseas U.S. territories, basic legibility really only required knowledge of English up to the 8th or 9th grade level (in the U.S., about 13-15 years of age). It is not hard to understand that this story reported data that the writers saw as critical of Americans.

But this is also a terrific example of why we need to learn to differentiate discourse communities—and their "anti-" and "pro-" discourses—and why we need to do so by the extent to which they are communities of production or communities of reproduction and maintenance of these concepts, invocations, or frames of

understanding. We all need to ask exactly who is developing and who is maintaining these discourses, and what is entailed in doing so. And we need to look closely at the framing practices that often get in the way of clarity and analysis, both in the public at large and in scholarly analysis. Not doing so leads to comparing apples and oranges, to missing important complexity, and to exaggerating the breadth and scope of either "pro-Americanism" or "anti-Americanism."

A Classification That May Help

In my own work I have considered different types of data and, perhaps even more than the material itself, I have focused on what each discourse community seems to be doing with the material. I am especially interested in three analytic types and want to argue that it is useful to think of them separately, rather than together. One kind of data consists of discourse communities that believe in the existence of rampant anti-Americanism and reproduce and maintain what they see as evidence for this, even when the actual words do not get invoked. A second kind of data consists of verbal or visual/verbal/semiotic criticisms that include criticism of something connected to the U.S. but which the critics do not frame as anti-American, so their audience(s) might or might not read it that way. The third type of data consists of verbal/visual-verbal/semiotic criticisms of something connected to the U.S. that a discourse community openly frames as anti-American—deliberately leaving little room for any other reading. Each of these types, I argue, is an example of behavior intended as a social behavior whose meaningfulness is identifiable and indeed differentiable and specific to that type of social behavior.

I like to share the following with my students at the beginning of a course I teach titled "'America' in the World: Contextualizing the Lure and Rejection of the U.S." Sometimes they laugh, sometimes they stare blankly at the screen, and sometimes they get very depressed, but I think that it is an excellent example of what I call "reproducing 'anti-Americanism' as belief and evidence." It was a small story on the travel page of the *AARP Magazine* (January-February 2005), a magazine issued by the increasingly powerful American Association of Retired People, that actually targets a pre-retirement population as well, from age 50 on up. The lead article reads: "GOD BLESS AMERICANS: Five Countries Where the U.S. Is Feted—Not Hated." The words "anti-American," "anti-Americanism," "pro-American," and "pro-Americanism" appear nowhere in the article, but the suggestion that the U.S. is hated in many places around the world looms large. Not only does the word "hate" appear prominently, but the absence of large or even medium-sized countries on this list is striking and, I argue, functions as evidence (i.e., is legible as evidence) of

widespread anti-Americanism. The five "countries" named are…(1) the Northern Mariana Islands, where reportedly "locals even celebrate the Fourth of July (when U.S. troops secured Saipan from the Japanese)"; (2) Grenada, which reportedly "celebrates Thanksgiving on October 25 to mark the American overthrow of the socialist government in 1983"; (3) Belize, which reportedly has "a growing British and American expat population [that] has buoyed the economy of Central America's only English-speaking country"; (4) Andorra, because reportedly "the U.S. is a primary trade partner of this picturesque kingdom in the Pyrenees sandwiched between Spain and France [and since] tourism fuels the local economy, the natives rarely talk politics"; and (5) Luxembourg, because reportedly "the U.S. liberated this tiny country twice—in 1918 and 1944—and the people haven't forgotten." While the article never says that the rest of the world hated the U.S. in 2005, the silence on other places seems to imply that one has to look long and hard to find places free of hatred for the United States.

There are, by the way, plenty of examples from outside the U.S. of something rhetorically similar—that is, examples that report on images of the U.S. but do not discursively refer to anti-Americanism. To the likely surprise of many people in the U.S., this includes journalistic coverage from Iran as well as from the Philippines. In one case, also from 2005 and in response to a poll, an online article that originated in Manila cited the negative U.S. image abroad as "among the country's [the U.S.] top global problems, behind only the Iraq War and terrorism." In the Iranian case, the framing of a new survey focusing on "the evolution of U.S. public opinion on foreign policy," found that "Americans [are] anxious about U.S. relations with the Muslim world and puzzled about their nation's image in the international community."

In all of these cases, the explicit reference is to American anxiety about hostility abroad. Anti-Americanism is not specifically mentioned and, of course, neither is pro-Americanism. Yet all instances (both inside and outside the U.S.) that participate in this discourse clearly reproduce anti-Americanism as belief and evidence. These articles may not explicitly endorse the view that there is anti-Americanism in their own discourse or in their discourse communities, but they nevertheless produce and sustain the terms of that discourse and thereby the conditions for its reproduction.

But there are also other types of semiotic data we must consider—types I mentioned above, namely, invocations that produce criticism of something connected to the U.S. without obviously participating in the "anti-" or "pro-" discourses and invocations that openly and explicitly frame their criticism as anti-American. The most obvious examples of the second type may come from the U.S. itself—from critiques of the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to critiques of then President George W. Bush's proposal to create personal investment accounts

for young workers as a way to revamp and sustain the U.S. Social Security system. Criticism of things connected to the U.S. is widespread in the U.S. and from many quarters—including the current critiques of most politicians, including President Obama, criticism of the handling of the U.S.-Mexican border, and outrage at the miserable treatment of war veterans by the U.S. Veterans Administration. But this type of critique also originates outside the U.S. and, interestingly, is often ignored or made legible, I think mistakenly, by those *hunting for evidence* of "anti-Americanism."

It is clear, if we are careful and cautious, that there is danger in assuming that any critique of something associated with the U.S. is evidence of anti-Americanism, just as much as assuming that any praise for something associated with the U.S. is evidence of pro-Americanism. If any critique of a U.S. president were evidence of this, would it not mean that a majority of Americans could be seen as anti-American, especially in the latter stages of the Bush Administration or even now in the Obama Administration? According to the Gallup polling organization, President Obama's highest approval rating (69% within the U.S.) came in late July 2009, shortly after he became president. But it has been much lower in recent years, and definitely below 50%. Gallup tells us that the approval ratings for U.S. presidents since 1938 have averaged 54%, which means that close to half of those polled have disapproved of a sitting president's performance (and not just those who did not vote for the winning candidate). The bigger point here is that criticism within the U.S. itself is not inconsiderable, and that, too, needs to be noted. Of course, one could (and should) ask about what gets criticized and what does not, what gets praised and what does not, and even what goes unseen/unremarked/unspotted. But do these constitute evidence of anti-Americanism or pro-Americanism? I contend that it would be a mistake to think so, though there are times when someone, some group, or some organization chooses to read criticism that way and labels it "anti-American."

Accusations are never a good thing. They are intended as treachery or near-treachery or even treason. But those who participate in framing domestic criticism do not resort to such terminology all that often, and they rarely do so with reference to their own criticisms of things in the U.S., including the president. Let me cite an example of this kind of critique from the required readings of my course "'America' in the World." It is not uncommon for my undergraduate students to be surprised or even shocked by it. In a post-9/11 article still available online, U.S. college professors are labeled "anti-American" (Tracinski 2001). The author himself is in and of the U.S., but he never sees his own criticism as anti-American, even when he categorically indicts many, many thousands of his fellow citizens as "anti-American." It is put forward as a way to delegitimize and discursively treat as foreign and untrustworthy any views seen as critical and issued by anyone on the faculty of a U.S. institution of

higher education.

There are, of course, examples of criticism that frame themselves as anti-American and there are as well clear examples of praise (often in defense of the U.S. against such critics) that frame themselves as patriotic if in the U.S., or as pro-American if outside. We must acknowledge those, too, of course, though I prefer to think of them as examples of producing criticism (or praise) and framing it as anti-American (or pro-American). The point here is the framing, not the criticism or the praise: Who participates in such discourse and who reproduces it to (or for) different discursive communities? It seems to me that the more visual the example, the more likely the press is to run it, as in an AP photo that I included in a 2007 ACOMA essay about protestors in Lahore, Pakistan. The photo, from early June 2005, shows large numbers of men on a street with posters in Arabic/Urdu and one large banner in English whose visible words include "the wild American army on [des]ecration of Holy Quran. The caption in my local newspaper read: Pakistani Muslim protestors hold anti-American rally Wednesday to condemn the alleged desecration of Muslims' holy book, the Quran, at the U.S. prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in Lahore, Pakistan" (ICP-C 5B). The protestors' banner was indeed openly critical of a key U.S. institution, the U.S. army, and the U.S. media readily labeled it "anti-Americanism."

So it is significant that this kind of discourse can be produced and maintained by a U.S.-based discourse community that sees itself as deeply critical, embattled, and afraid of it. The concern in this case is not with ambiguity. Participants in this speech/discourse community are especially interested in drawing clear lines that identify friends and enemies, whether inside or outside the U.S., and they do so not according to expected racial, religious, or ethnic divisions. The battle is ideological and anti-Americanism here becomes something to name and deploy in that battle.

Conclusions

It is important to ask what all this means, what it suggests. For one, there is a lot less anti- or pro-Americanism in the world than many people think, especially those who fear the one or the other. A second answer is that criticism and praise are themselves not really the issue; framing is the real issue. Since that is the case, our task as anthropologists should be to identify the participants in any discourse/speech community that frames criticism or praise for U.S. things as anti- or pro-American. And, of course, we should also study those words, forms of participation, feelings, and fears that lead to such blatant framing.

Are such discursive communities only outside the U.S.? I have argued here that clearly they are not.

And would such discursive communities be wrong? I argue that that question should not be our focus.

I am reminded of an exchange I overheard years ago in Israel, in the middle of a group discussion about anthropological research and people's projects (I do not recall that there were any Palestinians in the room, and indeed I might have been the only non-Jew). A North American visitor participating in this conversation said, in a heated moment that I have never forgotten: "Any time there is even one Jew who thinks that something is anti-Semitic, then it is anti-Semitic." I have never forgotten that statement nor that colleague's vision. I remember thinking it could not be true, that it gives too much power to one person's experience and assumes that a label or accusation has clear referential meaning, as if any of us exists outside an ideological, social, or cultural framework of understanding. But I have also never forgotten the exchange, perhaps because I have wondered at some level if it was true or at least partly true, and if so, what its consequences might be? To this day it reminds me that people *feel* things and that, as a result, they often participate (perhaps unintentionally) in the reproduction of discursive phenomena. If we were to apply this insight to our topic here, the question would then be whether anti-Americanism and pro-Americanism do not *both* exist because there are people who think they do, and whether that discursive existence does not, in fact, rely on *both* U.S. and non-U.S. participants *together* framing criticisms and defense of things as anti- or pro-American.

Here—and, of course, throughout the Keynote Address that I delivered in Taipei in 2014—I urge all of us to look and listen, differentiate and identify audiences, participants, meaningfulness, and forms of sociality that can shed light on the more blatant forms of criticism and praise that produce and reproduce anti- and pro-American discourses. That some people inside the U.S. fear rampant anti-Americanism in much of the world is noteworthy, but not because there may be criticism somewhere of this or that seen as connected to the U.S., but because those people, perhaps unknowingly, participate in a discourse that has named, framed, and identified negative views of the U.S. as (1) existing, (2) widespread, and (3) threatening their existence and lives. And, along the way, they exaggerate the extent of negative views of the U.S. in the world, hunt for evidence of those who resist such views, and tend not to see all the other discourses within and outside the U.S. that do not make a point of producing and reproducing anti-Americanism or its counterweight—pro-Americanism.

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