

Institute of Ethnology
Academia Sinica
Monograph Series B No. 15

THE CHINESE FAMILY
AND ITS RITUAL BEHAVIOR

CONTRIBUTORS

Chung-min Chen

Chuang Ying-chang

Myron L. Cohen

Chu Hai-yuan

Bernard and Rita Gallin

Hsieh Jih-chang

Francis L. K. Hsu

David K. Jordan

Li Yih-yuan

William H. Newell

Burton Pasternak

Tang Mei-chun

Wang Sung-hsing

Arthur P. Wolf

David Yen-ho Wu

THE CHINESE FAMILY AND ITS RITUAL BEHAVIOR

Edited by
HSIEH JIH-CHANG
and
CHUANG YING-CHANG

Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica

1985

Third Printing

2002

©1985 by the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica
2002 Third printing

All rights reserved,
no part of this publication
may be reproduced or transmitted
in any form or by any means without permission
in writing from the publisher.

Printed in Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China

Preface

There have been many anthropological studies of Taiwan since the late 1950s. Influenced by these studies by foreign scholars, the Institute of Ethnology also started stressing the study of Han Chinese in Taiwan in the 1960s. Historically the study of the family and its ritual behavior has been one of the topics given the most attention. It is also one of the topics which has produced the most lively debates.

The Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica decided that it was time to take stock of what has been accomplished, debate its significance and try to arrive at some consensus as to what future avenues of research might prove most fruitful. An international conference sponsored by the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica was duly held at our campus in Nankang between the 17th and 19th of June, 1982. Sixteen essays were presented by Chung-min Chen, Chu Hai-yuan, Chuang Ying-chang, Myron Cohen, Bernard Gallin, Rita Gallin, Hsieh Jih-chang, Francis L.K. Hsu, David K. Jordan, Li Yih-yuan, John McCreery, William H. Newell, Burton Pasternak, Tang Mei-chun, Wang Sung-hsing, Arthur P. Wolf, David Y.H. Wu and Yuan Chang-rue. Ruey Yih-fu, Ch'en Ch'i-lu, Wen Ch'ung-i, Liu Ping-hsiung, Martin Yang, Ch'iao Chien, Shih Lei, Yang Kuo-shu, Wu Ts'ung-hsien, Ch'iu Ch'i-ch'ien, Alexander Yin, Hsio Hsin-huang, Hsu Chia-min and Huang Wei-hsien also attended the conference as session chairmen or discussants. After the conference, a committee decided to publish fourteen of these essays in English in a volume to be edited by Hsieh Jih-chang and Chuang Ying-chang. The editors agree with Burton Pasternak's request to replace his conference essay with a new one. Essays originally written in Chinese were translated by Ray Dragon, Timothy Lane, James Martin, and James Wilkerson, and the translations revised by their authors. James Wilkerson was asked to process the volume for publication, and Clive Gulliver was asked to perform the final language editing.

The Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica sponsored the conference on The Chinese Family and its Ritual Behavior and is publishing this book with the intention of stimulating scholarly exchange and enhancing the understanding of Chinese culture and society. We decided to publish in English also so that some of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica authors would have the opportunity to present the results of their studies to the international scholarly community.

The editors have had much valuable help in preparing this book for publication. In addition to thanking former Institute of Ethnology director Wen Ch'ung-i and current director Liu Ping-hsiung, we wish to thank in particular Francis L.K. Hsu for his keynote address at the conference, Arthur P. Wolf for his introduction prepared after the conference, Bernard Gallin for his gentle prodding, and James Wilkerson for taking time out from fieldwork to see the volume through publication. We wish to also thank Ch'in Kuo-lung of North Wind publishers and Shen Yen, Chung I-fang, Lin Sheau-ling, Hwang Ling-ling assisted in checking the Character List, References Cited and Index. Ts'ai Mei-feng for help with typing. David Shih of Yung Foong Universal, Inc. for technical help with publishing this volume. As with all such volumes, the opinions expressed by the authors in this volume do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica.

H. J. C.
C. Y. C.

Contents

Contributors	ix
Introduction: The Study of Chinese Society on Taiwan <i>Arthur P. Wolf</i>	3
PART ONE Rethinking the Study of the Chinese Family	
Field Work, Cultural Differences and Interpretation <i>Francis L. K. Hsu</i>	19
Chinese Family Size: A Myth Revitalized <i>Arthur P. Wolf</i>	30
On the Household and Family in Chinese Society <i>Wang Sung-hsing</i>	50
PART TWO Rights and Duties	
Equal Right and Domestic Structure <i>Tang Mei-chun</i>	61
Meal Rotation <i>Hsieh Jih-chang</i>	70
Structural Conflicts within the Chinese Family <i>William H. Newell</i>	84
PART THREE Structural Flexibility and Inflexibility	
Matrilateral and Affinal Relationships in Changing Chinese Society <i>Bernard and Rita Gallin</i>	101
Dowry and Inheritance <i>Chung-min Chen</i>	117
Family Structure and Reproductive Patterns in a Taiwan Fishing Village <i>Chuang Ying-chang</i>	128

PART FOUR Lineages	
The Disquieting Chinese Lineage and Its Anthropological Relevance <i>Burton Pasternak</i>	165
The Conditions of Development and Decline of Chinese Lineages and the Formation of Ethnic Groups <i>David Y. H. Wu</i>	192
Lineage Development and the Family in China <i>Myron L. Cohen</i>	210
PART FIVE Religion and Ritual	
The Impact of Different Religions on the Chinese Family in Taiwan <i>Chu Hai-yuan</i>	221
Sworn Brothers: A Study in Chinese Ritual Kinship <i>Dvaid K. Jordan</i>	234
On Conflicting Interpretations of Chinese Family Rituals <i>Li Yih-yuan</i>	265
Reference Cited	287
Notes	309
Character List	315
Index	319

Contributors

Chung-min Chen (Ch'en Chung-min) studied anthropology at National Taiwan University and Michigan State University, where he received his Ph. D. in 1975. He has done fieldwork in Taiwan, Malaysia, and China, his research focusing on rural Chinese society and overseas Chinese communities. He is currently Chairman and Associate Professor of Anthropology and Director of the East Asian Studies Center, Ohio State University and Adjunct Research Associate at the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica. He is the author of *Upper Camp: A Study of a Chinese Mixed-Cropping Village in Taiwan* (1977).

Chu Hai-yuan (Ch'u Hai-yuan) is Research Fellow of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica and Professor in the Department of Sociology at National Taiwan University. He received his Ph. D. in sociology from Indiana University. Chu Hai-yuan's research focuses on religion and social change in Taiwan.

Chuang Ying-chang received his M.A. from National Taiwan University in 1971, and has been a visiting scholar at the Harvard-Yenching Institute, Harvard University in 1974-75, and again in 1978-79. He has been a Research Fellow at the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica since 1982, and Deputy Director since 1983. He is editor of the humanities and social sciences journal *Ssu yu yen* (Thought and Word). His past field studies include a Hokkien fishing village in southern Taiwan and a Hokkien farming village in central Taiwan. He is currently engaged in a long term regional and historical study of Hakka lineages in Hsinchu county, Taiwan. In addition to authoring many articles on lineages, the family, and gender, he is also author of *Lin I-p'u—I-ke T'ai-wan shih-chen ti she-hui ching-chi fa-chien shih* (Lin I-p'u—The Socioeconomic history of a Taiwan township).

Myron L. Cohen is professor of Anthropology at Columbia University, where he received his Ph. D. in 1967. He has done extensive field work in southern Taiwan and is the author of articles dealing with Chinese social organization and of *House United, House Divided: The Chinese Family in Taiwan* (1976). The focus of his current writing and research is Chinese society during the late traditional period.

Bernard Gallin was educated at the City College of New York and at

Cornell University where he received his Ph. D. in 1961. He is Professor of Anthropology at Michigan State University where he teaches and serves as department chairman. He is best known for his book, *Hsin Hsing, Taiwan: A Chinese Village in Change* (1966), and, during more recent years, for his numerous articles on issues of socioeconomic development and change, and on rural-urban migration in Taiwan.

Rita S. Gallin received her Ph. D. in sociology from Michigan State University where she teaches in the College of Nursing and directs the Office of Women in International Development. In addition to articles on rural social organization and socioeconomic change in Taiwan, she has published on the impact of development on the roles and status of women.

Hsieh Jih-chang [Chester] (Hsieh Chi-ch'ang) studied anthropology at National Taiwan University and Washington University, St. Louis, where he received his Ph. D. in 1978. He is currently a research fellow of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica and professor of anthropology at National Taiwan University. He has done intensive and extensive field work among Chinese and Aborigines in Taiwan. His current research focuses on aging, and social and cultural change. During academic year 1984—1985 he was a visiting research scholar in East Asian Institute, Columbia University. Hsieh Jih-chang is author of *Structure and History of a Chinese Community in Taiwan* (1979) and *Yang-chih ts'un ti chia-tsu tsu-chih* (Chinese Family in Yang-chih Village) (1984).

Francis L. K. Hsu (Hsu Lang-kuang) is Professor-Emeritus of Anthropology of Northwestern University where he was also its Chairman of the department for nearly twenty years. He was born in a village in Liaoning Province. After grade and middle schools he attended the University of Shanghai where he received his B.A. in Sociology. After working four years as a medical and then a psychiatric social worker at the Peking Union Medical College Hospital he went to Britain as a Sino-British Boxer Indemnity Foundation scholar and received his Ph. D. in Cultural Anthropology from London University. He returned to unoccupied China in 1941 and taught at National Yunnan University until 1944 when an invitation from Columbia University brought him and his wife to the United States. He has done field work in North Central China, 1935–6; southwestern China, 1941–42 and 1942–43; Hawaii, 1949–50 and 1970–71; India, 1955–57; Japan, 1964–65; and Hong Kong, 1975–76. Hsu's research emphasis is not on areas as such, but on the unifying psychological factors (testable or inferable) underlying the behavior patterns in each culture which make them predictable and which

distinguish one culture from another. He characterizes his work as "Grammar of Culture." He was President of the American Anthropological Association (1977-78) and a member of Academia Sinica.

David K. Jordan received his Ph. D. from the University of Chicago in 1969. Since that time he has been on the Anthropology faculty of the University of California, San Diego. His books include *Gods, Ghosts, and Ancestors: The Folk Religion of a Taiwanese Village* (1972) and *The Flying Phoenix* (forthcoming, with Daniel L. Overmyer), which deals with small-scale Chinese religious societies. He is also the co-author (with Marc J. Swartz) of a general anthropology textbook (1976, 1980). His published papers have dealt with religion, language and folklore of Hokkien speakers in southern Taiwan, and with the international language Esperanto.

Li Yih-yuan (Li I-yuan) studied at National Taiwan University and then Harvard University, where he received his M.A. in 1960. Former Director of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica and Professor of Anthropology, National Taiwan University, he is currently Dean of the College of Humanities and Social Sciences, National Tsing-hua University, and Research Fellow at the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica. Author of six books and over a hundred essays, his writings and research focus on religion, mythology, social change, theory, and the history of anthropological and ethnological thought in China. He has conducted fieldwork both in Taiwan among aboriginal and Han populations, and with overseas Chinese in Malaysia. Li Yih-yuan was voted a Member of Academia Sinica in 1984.

William H. Newell attended the University of New Zealand (M.A.), Oxford University (Dip. Anth.) and West China Union University (Dip. Chinese), and received his Ph. D. from Manchester University. He has taught at universities in Malaysia, India, Britain, Japan and Australia. He has been Associate Professor at the University of Sydney since 1969. He has conducted fieldwork in Malaysia, north India, Okinawa, Britain and China. His major research interests include religion, law and industrial sociology. In addition to articles and translations, William H. Newell is author of *Treacherous River, A Study of Rural Chinese in North Malaya* (1962) and editor of *Ancestors* (1976).

Burton Pasternak, Professor of anthropology at Hunter College, City University of New York, received his Ph. D. from Columbia University in 1967. He has done extensive field research in rural Taiwan, focusing primarily on social organization and social demography. Most recently he pursued these interests in an urban context (Tienjin, China). Professor Pasternak is the author of a number of articles and of several books

including *Kinship and Community in Two Chinese Villages* (1972), and *Guests in the Dragon: Social Demography of a Chinese Rural District, 1895-1946* (1983).

Tang Mei-chun studied anthropology at National Taiwan University, University of California, Berkeley and Columbia University, where he received his Ph.D. Former chairman and professor of anthropology at National Taiwan University, he is author of *Urban Chinese Families: An Anthropological Field Study in Taipei City, Taiwan* (1978). Professor Tang died in 1983.

Wang Sung-hsing did his undergraduate work at the National Taiwan University and received his M.A. and Ph. D. from the University of Tokyo. He has also studied at the London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London. He has been affiliated with the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, and has taught at the National Taiwan University and the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He is currently Professor at the Department of Comparative Cultures, Chubu University. His main interest is the comparative social structure of China and Japan.

David Y. H. Wu (Wu Yen-ho) studied anthropology at National Taiwan University, the University of Hawaii, and then at Australian National University, where he received his Ph. D. He has been a Research Associate at the East-West Center in Hawaii since 1974, and is also currently an affiliate Professor of Anthropology and Associate Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Hawaii. He has done field work in Taiwan, mainland China, Hawaii, Papua New Guinea, Singapore and other Southeast Asian countries. His research interests include overseas Chinese, ethnic minorities, child socialization and mental health. In addition to his many articles, he is also author of *The Chinese in Papua New Guinea: 1880-1980* and *Ethnicity and Interpersonal Interaction: a Cross Cultural Study*, and editor of *Chinese Culture and Mental Health: an Overview*.

Arthur P. Wolf is currently a Professor of Anthropology at Stanford University, having previously taught at Cornell University, The London School of Economics and Political Science, and National Taiwan University. He is the editor of *Religion and Ritual in Chinese Society*, and (together with Chieh-shan Huang) the author of *Marriage and Adoption in China, 1845-1945*. He is now working on a book which will sum up a twenty-five year study of Taiwanese marriage practices under the title *Childhood Association, Sexual Attraction, and Sibling Incest*.

INTRODUCTION

The Study of Chinese Society on Taiwan

Arthur P. Wolf

The conference for which the papers collected in this volume were written marked a new stage, if not a turning point, in the history of the study of Chinese society on Taiwan. Not only did the conference convene at the Institute of Ethnology in Taiwan rather than at a conference center in the United States or Europe, but the participants included Chinese and foreign scholars in almost equal numbers. Readers not familiar with Taiwanese studies may regard this as only natural and appropriate, as indeed it is, but they should know that such has not always been the case. Until fifteen or at most twenty years ago, the Chinese and foreign anthropologists studying Taiwan practiced a strict division of labor. The Chinese studied the aborigines, and the foreigners studied the Chinese. The two groups exchanged reprints and dinner invitations, but when they went to the field they went in different directions to study different problems.

The extent to which this pattern has changed in the past few years is clearly evident in the present collection. Not only has a younger generation of Chinese scholars launched a highly successful program of research on the development of Chinese society on Taiwan, but the interests of the Chinese and the foreigners have converged on a limited set of problems which they approach in terms of shared concepts. One might say that the two groups have formed a higher order lineage by taking Maurice Freedman as their stipulated ancestor. By rough count, Freedman is cited by name in these papers 145 times. The papers by Li Yih-yuan, Burton Pasternak, David Wu, and myself begin and end as debates with Maurice Freedman; those by Myron Cohen and Bernard and Rita Gallin take as their point of departure concepts developed by Freedman; the papers by Tang Mei-chun, David Jordan, and Chung-min Chen cite Freedman as a significant source of inspiration; and the papers by William Newell and Hsieh Jih-chang show Freedman's influence even if he is not mentioned

by name. Only the papers by Chuang Ying-chang and Chu Hai-yuan deal with problems that fall outside of the Freedman paradigm. The Freedman cited frequently by Chuang is the demographer Ronald Freedman.

To appreciate Maurice Freedman's contribution to the study of Chinese society one must realize that the concepts with which he shaped the field were transported from Black Africa. The sources of his inspiration were not *Peasant Life in China* (Fei 1939) or *Chinese Family and Society* (Lang 1946); they were *African Systems of Kinship and Marriage* (Radcliffe-Brown and Forde 1950) and *African Political Systems* (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940). The measure of Freedman's genius lies in the fact that in transporting to China concepts developed for the study of lineage organization and ancestor worship in such egalitarian societies as the Tallensi and the Nuer, he did not for a moment lose sight of China's status as a sharply stratified society with a long tradition of state authority. Without ever making a point of the originality of his effort, Freedman deftly translated the native African tongue of social anthropology into Chinese. In doing so he spared us a long, tedious, and unproductive debate about the application of African models to the China coast (see Barnes 1962: 5-9).

This point is made in a different way by Burton Pasternak whose paper discusses Freedman's analysis of the Chinese lineage and the debates stimulated by that analysis. One of these debates concerns the question of what a Chinese lineage is and how it differs from a clan, a debate that is taken up in the papers published here by Li Yih-yuan and David Wu as well as by Pasternak. To avoid muddling further what is already a muddled controversy, we must trace Freedman's conception of the lineage back to its African ancestry. In his classic 1953 paper, "The structure of unilineal descent groups," Meyer Fortes writes:

The most important feature of unilineal descent groups in Africa brought into focus by recent research is their corporate organization. When we speak of these groups as corporate units we do so in the sense given to the term 'corporation' by Maine in his classical analysis of testamentary succession in early law. We are reminded also of Max Weber's sociological analysis of the corporate group as a general type of social formation, for in many important particulars African descent groups conform to Weber's definition (Fortes 1953: 25).

Fortes also notes, pithily, that a lineage "might be described as a single legal personality—'one person' as the Ashanti put it. (*ibid.*, p.26)

In discussing agnatic organization above the level of the local lineage,

Freedman appears to define the lineage in terms of property and thus to limit the use of corporate to corporate property. "The difference," he tells us,

between a system of physically dispersed segments of a single corporation and a network of historically—or at any rate genealogically—related but independent lineages turns upon the maintenance of common property and the ritual obligations and privileges entailed in that property. (Freedman 1966: 21)

But despite this statement, it is clear that Freedman did not define the lineage as a property-holding corporation. For him, as for his mentors in African studies, the lineage was a kinship corporation, common property being only one of many possible corporate activities and interests. Any doubts we may have about this are immediately quelled when we turn to his famous discussion of A and Z type lineages. An essential characteristic of lineage type A is that the members "own no common property except for a plot of land which is the grave site of the founding ancestor" (Freedman 1958: 131).

I think, then, that Morton Fried, in his 1970 paper, and Li Yih-yuan and David Wu, in their papers in this volume, are all mistaken when they conclude, in Li's words, that for Freedman, "Descent groups which hold property are lineages," whereas "those that do not are clans." What Freedman means in the passage cited above is that as a matter of ethnographic fact lineages only emerge at the higher levels of agnatic organization when corporate estates are established. The point is descriptive, not definitional. Pasternak recognizes this when he says that for Freedman, the distinction between lineage and clan is "based on corporation (lineage) or lack of it (clan)"; but he immediately throws away the insight by arguing that there is "some merit" in Fried's insistence that there is no point in "distinguishing two types of agnatic groups when they are doing pretty much the same thing" (Fried 1970: 27). Freedman's view was that clans did not, by definition, do anything.

Although Fried distinguishes lineages and clans in terms of what he calls "demonstrated" and "stipulated" descent, the rationale of his distinction is not really genealogical validity, but the social use to which genealogical information is applied (*ibid*, p.33). One might say that in Fried's view, lineages are all about property, whereas clans are all about politics. The essence of his distinction is between agnatic groups that use descent to restrict rights to property and agnatic groups that use descent to recruit members for political purposes. As he puts it in the conclusion

of his 1970 paper,

Lineages limit membership in the attempt to exclude competitors for scarce resources. Clans recruit as widely as possible in order to fulfill different social functions among which the attempt to gain a measure of collective security is immediately apparent. (Fried 1970: 33)

One is reminded of the way descent and group structure are manipulated for political advantage in the New Guinea Highlands.¹

Freedman suggests that

...once we get above the level of any agnatic unit we call a lineage we are in the realm of clanship, where lineages of like surname may be tied together genealogically but are not members of an enduring group with common interests and activities. (1966: 21)

Thus Freedman's distinction between lineage and clan cuts the hierarchy of Chinese descent groups horizontally at the point at which corporate solidarity gives way to merely conceptual construction. Fried's distinction, in contrast, cuts vertically, setting on one side of the divide groups that use descent to limit access to property and on the other groups that use descent to enhance political power. Since the principles that underlie both distinctions are of obvious importance, I see no point in trying to choose between them. Instead, I suggest that we think of Chinese descent groups in terms of the typology set out in Figure 1. What we call the groups assigned to each of the cells is not important so long as we agree to use the same terms. The terminology I suggest assumes that non-corporate groups are never exclusive. It leaves Freedman's clan as "clan" but divides his lineage into "alpha lineages" and "beta lineages," the latter being the equivalent of Fried's clan (see Figure 1).

Figure 1 Typology of Chinese Descent Groups

Use of Descent Principle	Organization	
	Corporate	Non-corporate
Exclusive	Alpha lineage	—
Inclusive	Beta lineage	Clan

The limitations as well as the advantages of this typology (which, I should note, was suggested by my reading of Pasternak's paper) become readily apparent when we turn to the paper by David Wu. In essence,

he asks us to consider two questions: What is the relationship between the clan (surname) associations found in overseas Chinese communities and lineage organization in China proper? And, what is the relationship between lineage organization and groups organized on the basis of ethnicity? The basic thrust of his argument, if I understand it correctly, is to assimilate both clan (surname) associations and ethnically defined communities to the lineage/clan class. In so far as these organizations are in fact corporate and do employ a descent ideology to define membership, Wu's point is well taken, there being a categorical resemblance between these organizations and what I have labeled beta lineages. However, to say that the two kinds of organization resemble one another in important ways and ought, for certain purposes, to be classified together is not to say that they are the same thing and ought not, for other purposes, to be distinguished. As Freedman pointed out, "What defines the whole class of local lineages, great and small," is not just that they are corporate groups of agnates but also that they are "living in one settlement or a tight cluster of settlements" (1966: 20). An urban clan association that utilizes the ideology of descent for organizational purposes but that is residentially dispersed does not exhibit the same social dynamics as a community of agnates living in close physical proximity.

This point is assumed by Myron Cohen in his discussion of the relationship between lineage organization and the family. Building on Freedman's distinction between A and Z type lineages, Cohen argues that in the weak A type lineages there was a "blurring" of what in the strong Z type lineages "was a very clear demarcation between the family on the one hand and the wider society on the other." Since it was in the nature of Z type lineages for a large proportion of productive land to be held in lineage estates, it is true by definition that families in Z type lineages enjoyed less autonomy than families in A type lineages. What I find stimulating in Cohen's argument is the further suggestion that dependence in the economic realm was paralleled (and perhaps even gave rise to) dependence in other realms. Cohen mentions as examples of the family's loss of autonomy in Z type lineages restrictions on adoption, constraints on the conduct of affinal relations, and the partial removal from the family of its young male members. On James Watson's authority, we might add to the list a prohibition on uxori-local marriages. After noting that "uxori-local marriage is strictly prohibited in Kwang-tung's dominant lineages," Watson argues that "the reason for such strict controls on recruitment... is that every new member constitutes one more claim on the profits of the ancestral estates" (1982: 598-9).

The principles on which Cohen's argument is based seem self-evident, but I am not convinced that his conclusions are correct. In 1980-81 I spent eleven months interviewing elderly women in seven widely separated mainland communities in which, prior to the land reform campaigns of the early 1950's, lineage organization covered the entire A to Z range. In southern Fukien, where the community in which I worked had been totally dominated by Z type lineages, uxori-local marriages accounted for 26.4 percent of all first marriages among women aged 55 and over, whereas in the three communities I visited in Shantung, Shensi, and Szechwan, where lineage organization was important but of the A rather than the Z type, uxori-local marriages were unknown because they were strictly prohibited by lineage rules. What is more, the evidence of mourning dress argues that it was in the A type lineages, not the Z type, that agnates of the same generation were treated as an undifferentiated category. Since the evidence Cohen cites contrasts A type lineages in Taiwan with Z type lineages in Hong Kong, it could be that the correlation he finds between lineage organization and family autonomy is an artifact of cultural differences. Another possibility is that because A type lineages are small, residentially compact, and relatively egalitarian, under certain conditions they develop a solidarity that leaves the family less autonomy than it enjoys in large, residentially dispersed, stratified lineages. We cannot assume that because a lineage is poor in property it is also weak in social solidarity.

Whatever judgment the evidence eventually pronounces on Cohen's hypothesis, his suggestion that affinal ties lose "much of their significance in a type Z lineage community" provides an interesting perspective on the paper by Bernard and Rita Gallin. The Gallins' feeling that their colleagues have neglected the significance of matrilineal and affinal ties may be related to the fact that Hsin Hsing, the village in which the Gallins have conducted most of their research, is a community in which lineage organization barely rises to the A level of Freedman's continuum. Consequently, it could be that they are more impressed with the significance of non-lineage ties because these ties are in fact more important in Hsin Hsing than in most communities. What is more, it could be that the rising prominence of matrilineal and affinal ties over the past twenty-five years is partly a consequence of a further weakening of what was never a very strong form of lineage organization. In suggesting this, I do not mean to deny the importance of the economic and political changes emphasized in the Gallins' analysis. My point is rather that while these changes have acted on matrilineal and affinal ties directly by

enhancing their utility, they may also have acted indirectly by further weakening the constraining influence of already weak lineages.

Chung-min Chen's paper may be read as a response to the Gallin's call for more intensive studies of non-lineage ties, and it may also be read as a dissenting comment on Tang Mei-chun's discussion of the role of the state in promoting female inheritance. To put Chen's own paper in perspective, however, we must call again on Maurice Freedman. One of the seeming anomalies of Chinese society is the presence of both segmentary lineages and sharp social stratification. Another is the coexistence in the same society of brideprice and dowry. Where Jack Goody attempts to deny the existence of this self-canceling exchange by labeling the Chinese brideprice "indirect dowry," Freedman takes the view that China has both brideprice and dowry because it has both unilineal descent groups and sharply defined social strata (Goody 1973: 1-58). Like the Nuer and the Tallensi, the Chinese pay a brideprice to compensate a woman's natal group for certain rights; and like Renaissance Italians, the Chinese endow their daughters as a means of pulling themselves up the social ladder. As Stanley Tambiah puts it in an appreciative commentary on Freedman's view, dowry was "a superb pawn to use in the formation of marriage alliances and in pursuing the status game of hypergamy" (Tambiah 1973: 72).

Where the Gallins regret their colleagues' neglect of non-lineage ties in favor of lineage ties, Chen regrets our neglect of dowry in favor of brideprice. Perhaps our neglect of dowry is but another facet of our neglect of matrilineal and affinal ties, which in turn is best explained by the predominance of lineage communities among our field sites. But it could also be that what now appears to be a lacuna in our work would not have appeared in the same light twenty years ago. The single most striking change in rural Taiwan in the years since World War II has been a sharp rise in the standard of living, which means that people have increased means (and perhaps also increased desire) to play "the status game of hypergamy." Thus it could be that our fault, if we want to consider it such, is that we have fallen behind the times. John Lossing Buck's (1937) survey data indicates that in the 1930's the ratio of brideprice to dowry rose sharply as one ascended the social hierarchy.² What I am suggesting is that as income has risen in rural Taiwan the brideprice/dowry ratio has also risen, with the result that what once appeared to be a relatively unimportant consideration now appears a neglected major one.

On this interpretation of the evidence presented by Chen and the Gallins,

one could argue that the social structure of the countryside has not really changed. People just have more money to play old games. But Chen claims that the change has been more fundamental, and it is this claim that links his paper to Tang Mei-chun's contribution. Where, in Freedman's words (1966: 55), it was once the case that people provided their daughter with a dowry, "not because the girl [had] any specific economic claim on them, but because their own status [was] at stake," Chen argues that dowry should now be considered a form of female inheritance. In other words, he claims that daughters take a share of their parents' estate in the form of dowry as a matter of right. What, then, is the source of this change? Is it the moral pressure exerted by the contribution daughters now make to their natal family's income, as Chen suggests? Or is it the legal pressure generated by Article 1138 of the Civil Code, as Tang argues? In other words, is the source of women's improved lot economic change at the bottom of the system or legal change at the top of the system? Or is there some other aspect to the problem that neither Chen nor Tang have considered?

The changing character of non-lineage ties is also an important aspect of Chuang Ying-chang's study of reproduction in Nan-ts'un, a fishing village near Tainan. One of Chuang's many intriguing finds is that "the more intensely a respondent participates in outside activities, the greater the likelihood of a high frequency of gifts of money to and from the wife's parents, and the lower the likelihood of a high frequency of gifts of money from the husband and his brothers to their parents." Thus it could be that as social and economic change draws women out of the domestic realm, they are becoming less dependent on their husband's kin and better able to maintain ties with their own kin. But this is not the only possibility, for Chuang also notes that the women who engaged in more outside activities impressed him as "more independent and self-determined." Consequently, it could be that women who engage in outside activities and maintain strong ties with their parents are just independent women. In other words, the crucial variable may be personality rather than social structure. Moreover, it may be that women who maintain strong ties with their parents become more involved in outside activities for this reason rather than vice versa.

Chuang's data also shows that women who participate in outside activities do not show as strong a preference for male children as women who are confined to their homes. His explanation is that being less subject to the control of their husband and his kin, these women suffer less discrimination and consequently have a higher regard for females. But

might it not be that these women are more independent and less prejudiced against their sex because they are generally more confident of themselves as women? Or might it not be that having successfully rebelled against their traditional role, these women have rejected the traditional androcentric view of the world? Although Chuang's data is not adequate to decide between these alternatives, his study is nonetheless important because it demonstrates the need to treat women as active agents in the production of Chinese society. Chung-min Chen and the Gallins should consider the possibility that the rising significance of matrilineal and affinal ties may be better explained in terms of the strategies pursued by women than the strategies pursued by families.

The need to pay more attention to the changing position of women can be highlighted by returning briefly to the papers by Tang Mei-chun and Chung-min Chen. Why is it that after nearly forty years women on Taiwan are now beginning to make use of the leverage provided by Article 1138? Is it because the government is actively promoting women's right to inherit equally? Or is it because women have reached the point at which at least some of them are actively claiming that right? And why is it that, as compared with twenty years ago, rural women are now taking a larger share of their parents' estate in the form of dowry and even claiming this as a right? Is it because the parents feel that they owe a larger dowry to a daughter who contributes to the family income before marriage? Or is it because young women have gained the confidence needed to demand something in return for their labor? I do not pretend to have answers to these questions. I only raise them to make it clear that until we understand what is happening to women on Taiwan we will not understand what is happening in the society as a whole. As Michelle Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere put it in the introduction to *Woman, Culture, and Society* (1974: 2),

Today, it seems reasonable to argue that the social world is the creation of both male and female actors, and that any full understanding of human society and any viable program for social change will have to incorporate the goals, thoughts, and activities of the 'second sex'.

The topic of the family in the sense of the domestic group is touched upon in most of the papers in this volume, but only comes fully into its own in the papers by Wang Sung-hsing, Hsieh Jih-chang, and myself. One of the questions raised by these papers is the perennially vexed question of how to classify and label the great variety of family forms

found in China. This has always been a problem for anthropologists, but has become an acute problem as new family forms have emerged in response to changing socioeconomic conditions. Since Wang Sung-hsing does an admirable job of explicating the new terms introduced into Taiwanese studies in the past few years, I will pass over this aspect of these papers with only one suggestion. Chuang Ying-chang's choice of the term "federal family" to refer to a domestic unit that continues to hold common property but is residentially dispersed strikes me as particularly apt, calling to mind an organization whose members have agreed to submit to a central authority in certain areas of common interest. My suggestion is that he substitute for "federal" the word "federated." Since Chuang views this form of the family as a transformation of the extended family (or what I prefer to call the "grand" family), "federated" seems the more appropriate word because it suggests a consciously instituted compromise.

The great value of Wang Sung-hsing's paper lies in his demonstration that the problem of classifying families is not merely taxonomic. It is also a problem of interpreting the evidence employed in categorizing cases after a taxonomy has been established. Drawing on his highly regarded study of a fishing village on Kuei-shan Island, Wang shows us that the villagers represented the composition of their families one way when they registered for religious festivals and another way when they contributed to the cost of refurbishing the village temple. Thus it could well be that some of the variation we find in our data is a product of the context in which the data were compiled. I am particularly conscious of this problem because my own data are drawn from household registers and may reflect the contingencies of the registration system. Comparison of the household registers with land tax registers indicates that the family found in the household registers is the property-holding unit, there being a close correspondence between household division as recorded in the household registers and property division as recorded in the tax registers. But did the people who held common property normally live in the same house? And if they lived in the same house, did they eat food prepared on the same stove? Given that the Japanese household registers are the best source of evidence we will ever have for studying family composition in late traditional China, one of our research priorities must be to discover how people interpreted the term "family" when registering with the Japanese police.

Although I present my paper as an evaluation of Maurice Freedman's claim that the family cycle varied as a function of wealth, my primary

purpose is to discover a more adequate way of describing the family cycle. I therefore want to say that the solution I offer is at best only a partial solution. The way in which the data are deployed in my paper tells us the stages through which the typical family passed in the course of its development, but it does not tell us how fast it moved or how long it took to complete a cycle. In short, the time dimension is missing. Freedman's models, like those of most anthropologists, assume that the typical family completes a cycle once every generation. Given an average age at marriage of twenty, this predicts a cycle of about twenty-five years. Was this in fact the case? Was the family cycle regular as regards schedule as well as regards route? Until we have the techniques for answering these and similar questions, we cannot produce adequate descriptions of the family cycle, let alone adequate analyses of the causes of variation.

As Wang Sung-hsing notes in discussing family typologies, a major contribution of Taiwan's native anthropologists has been the investigation of newly emerged family types. This interest is evident in Wang's own paper and also in Chuang Ying-chang's, but it is given its fullest treatment in the paper by Hsieh Jih-chang. Hsieh describes in detail what is variously known as "meal rotation by lots," "eating meals by lots" and "eating provided meals." This is the arrangement by which adult sons fulfill their filial duties by providing meals for their elderly parents in rotation. What impresses me most about Hsieh's analysis is his awareness that the proportion of all families involved in meal rotation is the product of a complex chain of causation. He points out that while rising life expectancy increases the number of families involved in meal rotation because the elderly live longer, falling fertility decreases the number of families involved in meal rotation because fewer people have two or more sons. Thus we are led to see that the prominence of the meal rotation system in Taiwan today is probably a by-product of the demographic transition. We have not seen in the past and will probably not see in the future a succession of several generations in which most people reared two or more sons and lived to a ripe old age.

I hasten to add that even though Hsieh emphasizes demographic factors in his analysis, he does not neglect cultural considerations. He makes it perfectly clear that while the frequency of participation in the meal rotation system is best explained in demographic terms, the institution itself is a product of the traditional obligation of children to nurture their elderly parents, an aspect of Chinese culture that also emerges as a central theme in Li Yih-yuan's analysis of family rituals. In fact, Li's central point is that in transplanting African models to Chinese soil, Maurice

Freedman failed to take account of the fact that the Chinese conception of ancestor worship has as much to do with nurturance as it does with authority. More generally, Li's argument is that where ancestor worship among such people as the Tallensi is, in the words of Meyer Fortes, "a representation or extension of the authority component in the jural relations of successive generations," Chinese ancestor worship is multi-dimensional, involving not only an authority component but also what Li terms a "sentiment component" and a "descent component" (Fortes 1965: 133). On this basis, Li develops the view that many of the debates over the nature of the Chinese ancestors are misconceived because they fail to take account of the possibility that these components "manifest themselves in differing mixtures across the wide range of contrasting social contexts in China." For example, evidence that the ancestors are punishing in one community but benevolent in another does not necessarily mean that one or the other researcher is mistaken; it may simply mean that the balance of the sentiment and authority components varies from community to community. The strong implication is that we should spend less time debating the nature of the Chinese ancestors and more time comparing communities with varying conceptions of how to deal with the dead.

It is impossible to take the space here to do justice to an argument that is both original and complex. I will, however, urge Li to reconsider his terminology. What he terms the "sentiment component" would, I believe, be better termed the "nurturance component," since the primary elements are "caring" and "offering." Furthermore, I think that Li's "descent component" and "authority component" would be more appropriately if less succinctly labeled the "parental authority component" and the "corporate authority component." What he now labels the "descent component" refers to "jural authority between kin of successive generations and their respective rights and duties in the inheritance of property," while the "authority component" refers to "politico-jural authority in fission, fusion, competition and opposition within and between kin groups and their members." Since both components are based on authority, the difference being that one is concerned with the authority of parents and the other with the authority of family and lineage elders, what is needed is terminology that both links and distinguishes the two components. I also feel that because Li's "descent component" involves the same social complex as Fortes's "authority component" confusion can be avoided by changing the term as little as possible.

The only paper other than Li's that takes religion as its topic is that

by Chu Hai-yuan. Where Li urges us to compare Chinese religion across communities, Chu makes a strong case for comparing Chinese across religions, including in the scope of our analyses Christianity and agnosticism as well as the traditional religions of China. Because the data available to him make it impossible for Chu to control the effects of education, some of his conclusions must be treated as tentative, as he is well aware.³ Nonetheless, the paper does open up a neglected aspect of the study of religion in China, an aspect that thoughtful researchers are certain to pursue in the future. I was particularly fascinated by Chu's discovery that while Christians and adherents of Taiwanese folk religion hold very different views about certain aspects of family life, they agree that the Chinese family system is superior to the American family system. We are thereby forcefully reminded that Chinese who become Christians remain Chinese. What, then, we must ask ourselves, is the impact of their conversion? Does it cause a rethinking of beliefs that are not ordinarily assigned to the realm of religion? Though Chu's data do not entirely justify his conclusion that Christians hold a different view of family life because they are Christians, his argument deserves attention because it suggests a strategy for studying the relationship between religion and family life. The assumption that the traditional folk religion upheld a particular view of the family would be greatly strengthened if it could be shown that conversion to Christianity precipitated a change of views.

Religion is also an important topic in William Newell's paper, but the paper is by no means confined to religion. The theme is conflict and variety in a wide range of institutions, which Newell develops in a peripatetic survey that encompasses Japan, Malaysia, and the Ryukyu Islands as well as various sites on Taiwan. Since most anthropologists are now convinced that Chinese society is as varied in expression as the Chinese language, Newell is preaching to the converted and might better address himself to the heathen historians who still insist on treating China as though it had the internal consistency of rice pudding. Consequently, what I find most interesting in Newell's paper are the views of Chinese society from such unusual perspectives as those of Malaysians and Ryukyuan. I was particularly fascinated to learn that Newell's Ryukyuan informants were appalled by the Chinese insistence that girls have no right to a mortuary tablet in their natal home, the Ryukyuan view being that 'any member of the community should be eligible from birth to permanent membership in his or her house after death.' Such glimpses from outside set in bold relief the basic structure of Chinese society, and they suggest that before it is too late we should document the Taiwanese aborigines'

views of their Chinese neighbors.

David Jordan's study of sworn brotherhood also offers us a chance to examine one aspect of Chinese society from an unusual angle. In addition to extensive data collected in the course of his field research in southern Taiwan, Jordan bases his analysis on Russian translations of two contracts drawn up in the Su-ch'ang and Iman River Valleys in Manchuria at the turn of the century. These documents, in the form of oaths of sworn brotherhood taken by the elders of two communities, comprise, in Jordan's words, "an entire 'Code of Hammurabi' for the conduct of village affairs." What appears to have happened is that with both the Russian and the Chinese empires disintegrating around them, the elders seized upon the idea of taking sworn brotherhood as the ideological basis of village government. Why did the elders choose this model rather than the descent model preferred in the overseas associations discussed by David Wu? The question cannot be answered, but it raises other questions, which can be answered. Why did the settlers of the overseas communities organize themselves in terms of the descent model rather than the brotherhood model? Or were both models in frequent use in the overseas communities? And if they were, why did some groups choose one model and some the other? Answers to such questions as these would greatly enhance our understanding of brotherhood and descent as cultural constructs.

In a paper entitled "What social science can do for Chinese studies," Maurice Freedman remarked, "The social scientist gives most when he systematizes and analyzes" (1979: 403). From this perspective, one can justly say that the authors of the papers collected in this volume have given a great deal. There is no lack of facts in these papers, but there is a great deal more as well. The authors have all arranged their facts into a system that makes them amenable to analysis and thus relevant to questions that far transcend the study of Chinese society on Taiwan. The conclusions drawn will be debated, and the system itself will be modified and eventually replaced, but this does not take away from the value of these efforts. Truth is not a relative state, as some iconoclasts would have us believe, but neither is it an absolute state. It is a progressive process to which each of these papers makes its contribution.

Part One

RETHINKING THE STUDY
OF THE CHINESE FAMILY

Field Work, Cultural Differences and Interpretation

Francis L. K. Hsu

I am very happy to have been invited to this conference and to deliver the keynote address. I vaguely remember once having read a sociological study which concluded that the average participant in a conference takes away about 27% of what has gone on in it. I certainly hope I will take away more than that from this conference. In addition I also hope to meet many of you that I have not had the pleasure of meeting before.

Role and Affect

In approaching human affairs, in contrast to animal or material studies, I hold the distinction between Role and Affect to be fundamental. Role involves skills and knowledge. We know role in terms of the performance of tasks, whether it be carpentry or teaching, leadership or merchandising, investment or expertise in archery. Affect involves feeling. We know affect in terms of love, hate, loyalty, sympathy, betrayal, aspiration or despair. While skills and knowledge are essential to the performance of tasks, affect determines our judgement as to what skill and knowledge we want to acquire, for what purpose they are to be used, and how much satisfaction we derive from the results of such endeavor.

Anthropologists have long known that there are numerous universals in culture. In a 1945 publication entitled "The Common Denominators of Culture" George Peter Murdock gave a long list of them, which includes such items as marriage and meal times, calendar and funerals (Murdock 1945). We can add to or subtract from that list as we proceed, but its core remains constant so long as human beings live not as isolated individuals, but as members of societies, each of which maintains a cultural tradition.

Socialization and the Supernatural

However, the way in which the members of each society perform such universals, appreciate them, and judge their importance is entirely dependent upon whether they have been socialized by way of their social organization (family, school, peer group, etc.) to feel more strongly about some universals than others.

Take domesticated animals such as dogs and cats for example. Americans treat such animals with the utmost consideration and love. Animal clinics and hospitals are big business. Pet food and accessories are even bigger business. Other associated phenomena include dog and cat shows, animal protection societies, dog and cat training schools, and dog and cat lovers' organizations. The frequency of dog and cat food advertising on television is equalled only by that for pain killers and stomach upset remedies. The Chinese have nothing to match this. In fact it was symbolic of the relatively non-affective relationship with dogs that a communist government could order the elimination of dogs and cats together with sparrows and flies. For to the Chinese, with few exceptions, dogs are for guarding the house against burglars and cats are for catching mice. This is why, while dog and cat breeding in the West is also a good business, and Western thoroughbred dogs are legion, most Chinese dogs are mongrels. Left to themselves dogs do not choose who they mate with and mongrelization is inevitable.

Yet Americans do not look upon all animals with equal favor. Recently (May, 1982) two old bears in a Ukiah (California) zoo were put to death while their cage was being enlarged and remodelled with public donations. The director of the zoo did it to save the expense of transposing and boarding the two old bears somewhere else during the construction. New and younger bears would replace them anyway. Upon hearing the news there was such a public hue and cry that the zoo official was suspended from duty. From this incident we might conclude that Americans love to save all animals. And we would be wrong. For the shooting of harmless wild ducks and graceful wild deer is a legally accepted and socially esteemed sport, enthusiastically enjoyed by hunters. In other words, the same society may accept the killing of some kinds of animals for pleasure but violently oppose the elimination of others.

Likewise the Western approach to the supernatural presents a vast contrast to its Chinese counterpart. The Inquisition, in which millions of Europeans died at the stake, was not merely instituted by those who wanted to persecute others for differences in belief from the orthodoxy

of the moment. It could not possibly have existed and flourished for several centuries were it not also for those who wanted to be persecuted for their faith. Modern Freudians would say that the latter were suffering from masochism. But that is not my point. My point is that the Inquisition could not have existed in China precisely because, although the Chinese invoke deities to help them in distress, few of them had strong affective attachment to any gods to the extent of being willing to die for them. For parents, yes, quite a few. For the emperor, yes, occasionally. But for gods, no. That was why the sage Confucius, whose philosophy has dominated China for 2,000 years and is still important, replied to a disciple who asked about gods and ghosts, "Respect gods and ghosts but keep them at a distance."

Not understanding this characteristic of Chinese cultural heritage, some anthropologists have done strange things in interpreting their data. Michael Saso's work on Taoism in Taiwan is one such example (1972). With the great excitement of a scholar who has made important new discoveries, Saso announced that there are in Taiwan many sects of Taoist priests (he names five of them). He did so, he said, by gaining access to "private documents" and "rubric manuals" not seen by others before (Saso 1972: 85-93).

What Saso does not realize is that these "discoveries" are pointless as far as the Chinese who attend or otherwise make use of Taoist services are concerned. Saso obviously saw the Chinese facts through Western psycho-cultural filters. Western Christians have separated themselves into denominations on the basis of far smaller differences in theological details, methods of baptism or minor variations in liturgy. In fact some Western Christian and other denominations have been created on the basis of contrived differences. And those Western Christians who so separated themselves into distinct groups did not as a rule conceal their differences for some foreign anthropologist to discover. They openly flaunted them and took the often serious consequences. For example, from the 7th to the 19th centuries the Russian Christians were divided into Old Believers and the Reformed. The differences between them were no more than such things as making the sign of the cross with three fingers or two fingers, shaving of beards or not, and correcting the corrupted parts of the liturgy in the prevailing Slavonic version by going back to its original Greek form. For such totally marginal differences the Old Believers suffered exile to Arctic Siberia or even execution, as did Archpriest Avaakum and his friends, Epiphanius, Lazarus and Theodore. Such is the spirit of true Western monotheism.

But such a monotheistic spirit is absent among the Chinese in Taiwan or anywhere else. In their typical Chinese inclusiveness, the scriptural ritual or the differences buried in the priests' private documents have no significance at all. They have no more significance to a majority of the Chinese than most of those scientific discoveries and inventions buried deep in old Chinese books and manuals which had to await the monumental work of Joseph Needham to come to light. Individual Chinese could make revolutionary inventions and discoveries in theology as well as in science and technology. But the all-important yardstick for measuring their significance in the affairs of Chinese society (as in any other society) is their acceptance or neglect by the majority.

The Ford Motor Company once offered the Edsel to the American public with a blitz of advertising. But it did not sell at all. The so-called five sects of Taoism "discovered" by Saso were not even Edsels, for the Chinese priests never offered them to the public.

Had the Chinese believers been Western in their outlook, they not only would have known of the five sects but would also have used the five (or more) variations in ritual to divide themselves into five (or more) denominations of Taoists, each of which would have been irreconcilable and at war with the others. They would have been only too eager to explain their uniqueness by means of printed literature, sermons, radio and television, or even Peanuts comics, as does the Rev. Robert L. Short, an American Methodist minister. Short is the author of two books, one of which is entitled *The Gospels According to Peanuts* (as reported in The Honolulu Advertiser, Aug. 23, 1980).

Field Data and Problems in Interpretation

I have dwelt on this subject at some length because, while field data are the beginning of a science of human beings, interpretation of their meaning by members of the society where they are collected is paramount.

I do not make light of data collection. Data collection is a highly complex matter in itself. Arthur Wolf's dyachronic survey of Chinese family membership over time is a great improvement over what anthropologists (including myself) have done earlier. William Newell provides us with great detail on the organizational variations of the Chinese family. Tang Mei-chun's chronology of the tangled state of the Ling family's inheritance problem and its eventual resolution is fascinating. It is a typical instance of conflict between old custom and new law, between a pattern of behavior to which mother Ling had affective attachment and

one to which she did not.

There are some phenomena for which we need no resort to "modernization" for explanation. John McCreery's (1982) statement that there is far higher female than male participation in *chhit niu-ma si* ritual (the annual reunion of the Cowherd and the Weaver Maid) because "declining overall popularity in a modernizing context reflects increasing confinement to the realm of women's activities" seems unnecessary. For that ritual activity has always been confined to women and children—even during my youth in a small town in Liaoning province.

These are but a few of the fascinating contributions to this conference. However, there are three important aspects to the study of any kinship system. First, its historical development. Second, its organization and internal variations, both synchronic and dyachronic. Third, its effect on patterns of behavior of individuals raised in it. While most of the contributions to this conference seem to deal with the second aspect, I would like to devote the last portion of my presentation to the third, namely, the relationship between Chinese kinship and Chinese patterns of behavior.

I realize that the pattern of Chinese behavior has been viewed by some students as even more varied than Chinese kinship organization. But I believe the emphasis on diversity is overdone and, at least in part, due to the failure to see the forest for the trees. Superficially for example, McCreery's description of participation in what he terms "annual", "occasional" and "miscellaneous" rituals seems varied enough according to sex, age and location, both in kind and in frequency (1982). In fact, except for the Chinese Lunar New Year festival, the Chinese spring ritual called "Sweeping the Ancestors' Graves" and the observance of deceased ancestors' death anniversaries, all the others have to do with a collection of similar Chinese gods and spirits without any clear distinction (not to speak of tension) between their adherents or practitioners. Their general purpose is to ensure health, safety and a rosy future.

The *siu-kia* (ritual to ward off frights), a ritual most widespread in all parts of China, was one well known to me when I was a youngster in Chin Chow, Liaoning. A child suffered from insomnia. It cried a lot at night. It lost appetite. It developed dark circles around its eyes and was cranky and weak all day. Such a child was supposed to have been frightened somewhere and left its soul (or part of its soul) where the frightening event occurred. The mother would ask some able person to write out a long prayer according to tradition, requisitioning the help of certain gods and spirits with several amulets on a long sheet of yellow

paper. After the child momentarily fell asleep the mother would burn this document with incense and paper money near the child's bed, while repeatedly calling the child by name to "come home." As a lad of twelve, I became such an expert in writing this paper with its prayers and commands that mothers in our neighborhood frequently enlisted my services.

At various times I performed on my own, or as a representative of my father, or as a participating witness, at four of the "annual" festivals, four of the "occasional" rituals and three of the "miscellaneous" rituals listed by McCreery. It made no difference to me if my parents or some relative or an elderly neighbor asked me to be part of some other ritual in addition to the ones I did, or to omit doing any of the ones I did as a matter of routine.

I submit that all this is sound evidence in support of the behavioral attributes of inclusiveness, continuity and authority which I have outlined elsewhere (Hsu 1971: 3-30).

The Chinese approach to ritual behavior is inclusive because denominational differences are unimportant or lacking. Their approach to ritual behavior is characterized by continuity because few Chinese in history have ever started a new religion, or a new sect of an old creed, or accepted conversion to any new cult or been born-again to express their *total* break with the past. And finally it is a rare Chinese who would espouse some religion in flagrant violation of the wishes of his or her elders.

These characteristics are equally applicable to David Jordan's description of ritual kinship in Taiwan. Sworn brothers are always found in multiples such as three, five or seven, never dyadic or in twos, I would like to find out if "school boys and girls in Taiwan today cannot, like their American brothers and sisters, have other "best friends." I doubt it; and I certainly know that Chinese parents in Taiwan and elsewhere do not experience the same kind of segregation from their children's friends, the kind commonly experienced by their American counterparts. In other words, friends of Chinese sons and daughters tend to have no objection to associating with their friends' elders, and Chinese parents tend also to find it natural to know and be on friendly terms with their youngsters' friends. Is all this not evidence of the Chinese characteristic of inclusiveness? The hierarchical nature of sworn brotherhood exemplifies the Chinese characteristics both of inclusiveness and authority. Chinese sworn brotherhood has always been encapsulated in the names of the three men of *The Three Kingdoms* fame of the third century A.D., and in the fact that the relationship always implies life-long commitment.

In addition to such pseudo-kinship alliances as sworn brotherhood, one more general phenomenon must be mentioned. This is that most Chinese groupings outside the primary kinship sphere are either closely related to kinship such as the matrilinear and affinal liaisons described by the Gallins, or the multiple surname organizations such as Liu Kuan Chang Chao and T'an T'an Hsu Hsieh.¹ Beyond these groupings are the locality organizations such as *t'ung hsiang hui*, which have been mistaken by many scholars for voluntary associations. The truth is that truly voluntary associations, even of the teetotaler or vegetarian variety, have always been rare, and certainly a minor phenomenon, among the Chinese anywhere. Most Chinese have never combined themselves under the banner of abstract or distant causes such as human rights and better treatment of prisoners or new ways of worshiping some old god or a more equitable method of taxation. Even the antifootbinding movement did not begin until the coming of the West, with Western missionaries playing a leading role in it.

David Wu is the only one who has posed the question: Why is ancestor worship so closely tied up with Chinese family lineage and clan? And he has rightly pointed out that this question has so far been avoided by anthropologists studying Chinese society, excepting myself (Wu, 1982: 15).

Chinese Versus Western Patterns of Behavior

In any attempt to link two or more variables (for example A-B), we can go about our task in two ways. We can either proceed from variable A, gradually demonstrating how it generates or is correlated with B, or we can begin in the opposite direction and ask ourselves the question: given B, what must the A be like?

If what I have said about Chinese patterns of behavior is not a figment of my imagination, and since that pattern is not so multifarious as some scholars would have us believe, what are the common denominators in the Chinese kinship system which are responsible for these behavioral characteristics?

In my Dominant Kinship Dyad hypothesis (Hsu 1965), I proposed that the Chinese kinship system is one in which the father-son relationship is elevated above all else, in contrast to that in the United States, where the husband-wife relationship is supreme. When I examined this dichotomy and its permutations in conjunction with my hypothesis on Psychosocial Homeostasis (PSH) (Hsu, 1971), a vast array of social and

cultural manifestations led me to propose, for social science purposes, the term *jen* to designate the individual in place of the current term "personality." But the comparative merit of these terms is not my immediate concern here. In the present context I wish merely to extend my analysis of Chinese behavior by brief excursions into two other areas.

All Chinese probably know the Chinese folklore *Mu Lien chiu mu* (The Monk Mu Lien rescues his mother). Mu Lien's mother did not lead a virtuous and kind life. Her misconduct included "beating monks and reviling priests" and "professing to be a vegetarian while eating meat". Hence her soul was consigned to great suffering in hell. Being a monk with vast spiritual powers, Mu Lien descended to hell (the Chinese hell was supposed to consist of eighteen successively lower levels), searched all over for her soul among the countless victims of punishment, and eventually found her and succeeded in getting her out of her misery.

This is one of the most popular stories in China. It is immortalized in operas, in local ballads, in shadow plays, and in stories told and sung at temple fairs throughout the country.

Its Western counterpart is the myth of Orpheus, who was the son of either the Thracian king Oeagrus or Apollo, and a Muse. He took part in the voyage of the Argonautics. After his wife Eurydice was bitten by a serpent Orpheus, grieving over her death, went down to Hades to get her back. The infernal deities, touched by his music, allowed her to return, provided that she walked behind Orpheus and that he would not look back. He violated this condition and she turned into a ghost once more. Orpheus now refused to have anything more to do with women and consequently the Thracian women set upon him during a Dionysiac orgy and tore him to pieces.

To the best of my knowledge, I know of no Western legend of the Mu Lien variety and no Chinese legend of the Orpheus variety. The Orpheus story, too, enjoyed great popularity in Medieval Europe and is the theme of an opera still performed in continental Europe.

May I conclude this tale with another Chinese-Western contrast: What does the individual do to justify or find meaning in his/her condition when face to face with utter humiliation or death? Viktor E. Frankl is an Austrian psychiatrist of Jewish origin. He was consigned to a succession of Nazi concentration camps. Only the Allied victory saved him from the crematorium, but by then almost his entire family had been wiped out. He is now in New York City, the leading proponent of a form of psychiatric treatment called Logotherapy, for counseling terminally ill patients. The central theme of his therapy: "...everything can be taken

from a man but one thing: the last of the human freedoms—to choose one's own way" (Frankl 1963: 104).

Logotherapy gives this meaning to the terminally ill American individual: I am going to die because I *choose* to die.

Contrast Frankl's way of finding meaning with that of Ah Q in *Ah Q Cheng Chuan* (The true story of Ah Q) by Lu Hsun. Lu Hsun's book was a satire on the Chinese mentality, but what he satirized was very close to the Chinese view of meaning in life.

In one particular episode Ah Q was beaten up by a bully much stronger than himself. There was nothing Ah Q could do to reverse the situation or to wreak vengeance on his enemy. So, after the bully was gone, Ah Q said something like this to himself: The world has turned upside down. Sons are beating their fathers!

Whether or not they have read *Ah Q Cheng Chuan*, my fellow Chinese will at once understand Ah Q's psychological defense of his dignity. But in case my Western colleagues think Ah Q's behavior was unique, let me amplify a little. While I was in grade school in Chin Chow, the small town in eastern Liaoning province referred to before, a sure way among my school mates and I of angering each other was to manipulate ourselves verbally into the spurious position of being our adversary's father or grandfather. A mild form of it went this way. The first child would say to some second one in conversation: "My Dad went out of town today." But at the word "Dad" a by-stander third child would call out, "Yes, what do you want?", thus making it appear that the speaker was addressing him. There were more nasty expressions of this game that my Chinese friends and I all know and understand, but some of my Western friends may find baffling. But this getting-the-better-of-our-adversary game we played in our schools some 60 years ago is still being played in Taiwan today. A recent true family episode was printed in the humor column of *Chung yang jih pao fu k'an* (Supplement to the Central Daily News, 1981).

"My father takes care of himself well. So although he is nearing 50 he still looks like a young man. One day he said proudly to my mother; 'Other people all say I am younger than you.' But my mother responded, 'Yes, that's so true. People all say you are my son!'"

After reading this I discovered a short note in a recent issue of *T'ien sheng chou pao*, a weekly Chinese paper in San Francisco (June 6, 1981) about the famous Ch'ing dynasty scholar Chin Sheng-t'an. Chin was executed because he incurred the displeasure of the emperor. At the execution ground he handed the execution supervisor an envelope which

the latter presumed was intended for the doomed man's family. But when the official opened it after the execution, as Chin knew he would, it turned out to be only a frivolous message addressed to the official beginning: "My dear son, chew a mouthful of soya beans and pickled vegetables together; they taste like walnut. If this recipe becomes popular, I die without regret." Reportedly, the crestfallen official remarked to his subordinates: "Master Chin really knew how to make a fool of others (or get the better of others) even when he was about to die." Most Westerners, even when faced with conditions over which they have lost all control, find mental victory by reciting the incantation of individual freedom. Faced with similar circumstances, most Chinese seek satisfaction by contriving a situation of superiority among kinfolk.

Understanding Chinese Patterns of Ritual

Once we have understood this, the characteristic Chinese approach to the world of humans, gods and things, which must have its roots in the Chinese family and kinship system, we can also understand the Chinese pattern of ritual. In fact we should mention both ceremony and ritual. Ceremonies are symbolic acts among humans: the public display of dowries, university commencements, the swearing in of judges and other officials, retirement parties, etc. are all examples. Rituals are symbolic acts vis-a-vis the supernatural, such as Western Easter sacraments, Chinese tomb sweeping, cholera epidemic prayer meetings (*ta chiao*), the celebration of mass in the Catholic church, etc. The two often overlap but the proportion of their overlap may differ. And their relative importance may differ even more.

Take weddings for example. A wedding (*chieh hun*) is often also referred to in Chinese as *pai t'ien ti* (the worship of heaven and earth). In fact the two terms *chieh hun* and *pai t'ien ti* can be used synonymously. But the act of "worshiping heaven and earth" is only a very minor part of any Chinese wedding. The Chinese event does not include the notion or the recitation to the effect that 'what god has sanctified let no man pull asunder.' No Chinese religious belief has ever forbidden divorce, as does the Catholic church. Instead the focal point of any Chinese wedding is the ceremonial introduction of the bride to her husband's ancestors' and often to his relatives, both living (parents, grandparents, aunts, uncles, etc.) and dead (remote ancestors, before the ancestral altar of the groom's family). In fact, the introductions to the living relatives and to the dead are often carried out together in front of the same ancestral

altar with the help of a mistress of ceremonies. Chinese weddings are nowhere conducted by religious functionaries, except among Christians and Moslems.²

Conclusion

May I conclude my presentation by reciting my translation of a poem which the Southern Sung poet Lu Yu (1971: 691) composed on his death bed? At that point in time, the reader will remember, the northern half of China was under the control of the Tungusian tribe which had established itself as the Chin dynasty, and the original Sung domain was reduced to territories south of the Yangtze River.

Shih Erh

*I have no illusions about death,
which nullifies all relations and rank.
My only regret is
That I cannot witness
The reunification of our land.
The day after our imperial forces
Have pacified the North,
Don't forget to report it,
At the next family worship
To your old man.*

I consider this poem to express the essence of most of the Chinese behavioral characteristics which should be noted by all students of Chinese society and culture. The poet had no illusions about gods and spirits. He obviously knew that the soul was a possession of the living. But he also knew that family ritual for deceased ancestors would continue to be performed by his descendants yet to come, as he had performed it in his own time for his forbears. And he wanted his son to inform him, even though he would be in no position to be informed, just as his father or grandfather must have done in their time for their ancestors.

Lu Yu's regret and concern about the country earned him fame in Chinese history as a "patriotic" poet. But his sense of the inexorable continuity of the generations, of unquestionable paternal authority, and of the interests and perceptions common to successive generations has been shared by most Chinese for centuries past.

Chinese Family Size: A Myth Revitalized

Arthur P. Wolf

In 1958 Maurice Freedman noted that,

....it has become almost customary during the last decade to begin discussions of the Chinese family system with a round denunciation of the older view that the 'large' or 'joint' family is the typical family of China. (1958: 19)

In his opinion,

The point has by now been well enough made for writers on Chinese society to pass quickly over it. The statistics of household size should by themselves be sufficient indication that complexity of structure is not likely to characterize the domestic institutions of peasant China. (*Ibid.*)

The new view was that the large, complex family described in the older literature was only to be found among the elite. As John F. Fairbank put it in the fourth edition of *The United States and China*,

The large joint family of several sons with many children all within one compound, which has often been regarded as typical of China, appears to have been the ideal exception, a luxury which only the well-to-do could afford. (Fairbank 1979: 26)

My purpose in this paper is to demonstrate that while this view of the Chinese family may hold for some parts of China, it does not hold for all of China. In other words, I will show that what Francis L.K. Hsu (1943) termed "the myth of Chinese family size" is not a myth at all, at least not for all Chinese. This is important not only as an antidote to current views of the Chinese family, but also as a counteractant to the contention that complex families are rare in human experience in general. In the preface to his influential *Household and Family in Past Time*, Peter Laslett declares,

It is simply untrue as far as we can yet tell, that there was ever a time or place when the complex family was the universal background to the ordinary lives of ordinary people. (1972: xi)

Though Laslett has since retreated from this extreme position in recognition of evidence from Eastern Europe, the view that complex households are exceptional is still widely held. In his review of *Household and Family in Past Time* Marion J. Levy writes:

We can say definitely that while there have been people who have expressed a great preference for large extended families, and while some of those existed, almost all of those that existed existed for the elite members of the societies concerned: they were never generalized to the population as a whole. (1974)

My evidence is drawn from household registers compiled in nine districts (*li*) in northern Taiwan in the years 1905–45. Since these communities have already been described in considerable detail elsewhere (see, for a start, Wolf and Huang 1980: Chapter 3), all that need be noted here is that their inhabitants were definitely not members of the Chinese elite. The great majority were tenant farmers and farm laborers who mixed sweet potatoes with their rice because they could not otherwise fill their bowls or their stomachs. The wealthiest among them lived in red brick houses with tile roofs, but most had to rest satisfied with mud and thatch. In 1905, 84.4 percent of the household heads were either farmers or laborers. The remaining 15.6 percent included 44 boatmen, 16 camphor workers, 12 tea merchants, 9 shopkeepers, 9 carpenters, 7 border guards, 6 bamboo craftsmen, 5 landlords, 3 masons, 3 dyers, 3 fishermen, 2 Taoist priests, and 28 people pursuing sundry occupations. The next forty years brought a modest rise in living standards and a gradual shift away from agriculture, but these changes did not transform the economy or the society. Both remained within the bounds set by traditional forms until after World War II.

The Taiwan household registers have also been described elsewhere and need not detain us here (see Wolf and Huang 1980: Chapter 2). The reader who is not familiar with these magnificent records need only know that in taking the family as the basic unit of the registration system, the Japanese did not impose their conception of the family on their Chinese subjects. After experimenting with a system that took the physical house as the basic unit, the Japanese settled on the *chia* ("family") as the basic unit and wisely left it up to the natives to define the term. All that was

required of people was that they register as members of one and only one *chia*. Thus we may be confident that the family preserved in these records is a product of Chinese custom and not an arbitrary creation of the Japanese colonial bureaucracy.

Though it has an attractive simplicity at first acquaintance, the question of whether the Chinese family was typically large or small is not easily answered. The fact that, say, three-fourths of the families living in a community are small in size and simple in structure can be interpreted in different ways. One possibility is that the majority of the population never experience life in a complex family, the exceptions all belonging to a segment of the community whose circumstances allow them to realize an ideal beyond the grasp of their neighbors. Alternatively, it could be that the large families in the community represent a phase through which most families pass in the course of their development, the larger proportion of small families indicating only that the complex phases of the cycle are shorter than the simple phases. On the first interpretation, the evidence says that large families are exceptional; on the second, it says that most families pass through a complex phase every generation.

Though such data will not tell us whether large families were known to the majority of the population or only to a privileged minority, I will begin by reporting the distribution of family types at five year intervals. This is necessary because most of the evidence from other Chinese communities derives from surveys and is cast in this form. I will then turn, first, to the place of complex family forms in the developmental cycle, and, second, to their appearance in the experience of individuals. Before proceeding, however, we must pause to deal with the vexing question of how best to categorize families of varying composition. To rephrase Maurice Freedman (1979: 239), the problem is to refresh reality without blotting it out.

The most widely employed system for classifying households is that introduced by E.A. Hammel and Peter Laslett (1974: 79-109). This scheme takes as its basic unit of analysis the "simple family," a term covering what others variously call the nuclear family, the conjugal family, or the biological family. "This consists of a married couple, or a married couple with a child or children, or of a widowed person with a child or children" (*ibid.*, p. 92). When two or more of these units are present the group is termed a "multiple household" and is assigned to one of several classes distinguished in terms of the relationship between the unit containing the head of the household and the other units, e.g.,

secondary units up, secondary units down, secondary units lateral, etc. Thus a family consisting of a married couple and their married son may fall into one of two bins depending on whether the son or the father is the head.

Though there are obvious advantages in using a system applied by others, I have decided to forego those advantages for two reasons. First, the emphasis Hammel and Laslett place on the conjugal link distorts what I take to be the reality of the Chinese family. To qualify as a simple family a group must contain at least two individuals connected by a conjugal link or a relationship arising directly from a conjugal link. A widow or widower with a child qualifies, but a never-married man or woman with a child does not. Consequently, a group consisting of a married couple living with their widowed daughter-in-law and her child is accepted as a multiple household, while a married couple together with their daughter and her illegitimate child is rejected. Since Chinese families that fail to raise a son commonly perpetuate their line through a daughter and her illegitimate children, this distorts our view of family composition by underestimating the proportion of complex families in the population. Worse yet, it biases our comparison of social strata by recognizing the social forms available to the rich while denying those most likely to be forced upon the poor.

Second, I feel that classifying complex households with reference to the head complicates unnecessarily the task of explaining variation in family composition. Schemes that look to composition alone and ignore the headship produce distributions that can be largely explained in terms of four variables—age-specific fertility, age-specific mortality, age at marriage, and the timing of family division. When the identity of the head is taken as an additional criterion, however, one must also consider the many forces that influence succession and its timing. In any case, the Taiwan registers preclude the use of a scheme that requires identifying the head. Though the Japanese let Chinese custom define the family and the various forms of marriage and adoption, they followed Japanese custom in designating the head of the household. When a head died or retired the headship was passed to his eldest sons regardless of whether or not the family included the former head's brothers. Since the Japanese must have known that Chinese custom favors brothers over sons, my guess is that primogeniture was introduced as a clerical convenience. Because the registers listed family members in terms of their relationship to the head, they had to be rewritten every time the headship changed hands,

and this would occur far more frequently under lateral succession than under lineal succession.

Like Hammel and Laslett, I see households as built up out of basic units that may be combined in various ways, the primary difference being that I accept as a basic unit any two individuals linked as parent and child. In other words, I accept the groups listed above and add to that list an unmarried person and his or her child or children. A household that fails to qualify as a basic unit I classify as *solitaire* or *sub-elementary*; one that contains a single basic unit I designate *elementary*. Though the great variety displayed by the more complex forms of the Chinese family invites elaborate classification, I will be satisfied for the present with three classes—stem, grand, and *frèréches*. “Stem” says that a family contains two or more basic units linked by filial ties; “grand,” that a family contains a minimum of three units two of which are in the same generation and descended from the third. As I use the term, *frèréches* is a catchall class. It says that the family contains two or more units but does not qualify as stem or grand. The label is appropriate because the most common type is a family made up of two or more married brothers, but the class is not limited to units bound by fraternal ties.

Since the family types created by this scheme have a long history, I should say that they were not adopted because they come recommended by convention. I chose them because the distinctions drawn reflect my view of what matters most in the evolution of a Chinese family. In the usual case an elementary family becomes a stem family with the marriage of the eldest son; a stem family expands to a grand family when a second son marries; and a grand family is reduced to a *frèréches* with the death of the senior generation. Each change disrupts existing relationships and moves the family one stage closer to dissolution. The first introduces in the role of daughter-in-law a woman whose only hope of personal autonomy lies in division of her husband's natal family; the second makes division a tangible possibility by providing the younger brother with the means of establishing an independent household; and the third removes the people best able to hold divisive tendencies in check.

We are now ready to address the question with which we began: was the Chinese farm family universally small? Or were there times and places in which farmers formed large households of the kind that have been frequently cited as typically Chinese? Although the data presented in Tables 1–3 were assembled to facilitate comparison with the results of the many field surveys conducted in China in the 1920s and 1930s, they

TABLE 1 Distribution of Families by Family Type at Five Year Intervals, 1906-46
Percent of families by family type

Year	Number of families	Solitaire	Subelem.	Elem.	Aug. elem.	Stem	Grand/frères
1906	917	1.3	1.1	34.4	8.7	31.2	23.3
1911	992	2.8	1.1	33.9	6.5	29.0	26.7
1916	1,146	4.1	1.9	36.0	4.9	30.7	22.4
1921	1,211	4.5	1.7	33.9	4.1	32.2	23.5
1926	1,272	3.9	1.7	31.2	3.2	32.7	27.3
1931	1,355	3.9	0.6	30.0	2.8	33.3	29.4
1936	1,432	4.7	1.3	27.7	2.5	34.4	30.0
1941	1,550	3.5	1.7	28.5	2.3	34.7	29.4
1946	1,749	3.1	1.9	31.4	3.9	31.6	28.1

TABLE 2 Distribution of Population by Family Type at Five Year Intervals, 1906-46
Percent of Population by family type

Year	Number of people	Solitaire	Subelem.	Elem.	Aug. elem.	Stem	Grand/freres
1906	6,018	0.2	0.5	22.0	6.9	29.9	40.6
1911	7,074	0.4	0.3	21.6	4.8	26.3	46.6
1916	7,689	0.6	0.7	23.9	4.1	30.2	40.5
1921	8,402	0.6	0.6	21.2	3.0	30.6	43.9
1926	9,354	0.5	0.6	19.7	2.3	29.4	47.5
1931	10,478	0.5	0.2	18.0	1.9	28.6	50.8
1936	11,733	0.4	0.5	16.7	1.8	28.9	51.7
1941	12,948	0.4	0.5	17.2	1.6	29.3	51.0
1946	14,154	0.4	0.7	20.1	2.8	28.0	48.0

TABLE 3 Average Family Size by Family Type at Five Year Intervals, 1906-46
Family type

Year	Solitaire	Subelem.	Elem.	Aug. elem.	Stem.	Grand/freres	All families
1906	1.00	2.80	4.21	5.16	6.29	11.41	6.56
1911	1.00	2.09	4.56	5.25	6.45	12.45	7.13
1916	1.00	2.32	4.47	5.59	6.60	12.12	6.70
1921	1.00	2.57	4.34	5.08	6.59	12.94	6.94
1926	1.00	2.55	4.63	5.32	6.61	12.81	7.35
1931	1.00	2.75	4.63	5.18	6.65	13.37	7.73
1936	1.00	2.84	4.94	5.69	6.89	14.09	8.19
1941	1.00	2.37	5.06	5.64	7.07	14.51	8.35
1946	1.00	2.85	5.19	5.79	7.18	13.84	8.10

also serve to refute Marion Levy's insistence that "the family which time and time again has been described as *the traditional Chinese family*" was "never the actual family of any except for a small proportion of the members of that society" (1965: 9). Since the phrase "small proportion" appears to refer to the elite of Chinese society, we ought not find, if Levy is right, any large families among the poor peasants living in our nine districts. Yet Tables 1 and 2 show that *frèrèches* and grand families accounted for nearly 25 percent of all families and more than 40 percent of all family members. The irregular but nonetheless substantial rise in the frequency of these complex forms after 1925 can probably be attributed to declining mortality and a rising standard of living, but this does not justify setting our results aside as the product of special circumstances created by the Japanese occupation. In 1906 the area under study was as typical of rural China as any other area of comparable size.

When students of Chinese society speak of "complex families," they are usually referring to the class labelled *grand/frèrèches* in Tables 1-3. In European studies, however, this term is commonly employed to refer to all families that include a person who is not related to the head as spouse or child. I have therefore divided what I term elementary families into "simple elementary" (equivalent to my basic unit of analysis) and "augmented elementary (consisting of a simple family plus one or more related persons). This allows us to calculate a second useful measure of family complexity by simply summing the three columns on the right side of Tables 1 and 2. Again we find that family complexity increased during the forty years covered by our records, but the change is not nearly as striking as the fact that simple families were a minority from the beginning. In 1906 complex families accounted for 63.2 percent of all families and 77.4 percent of all family members.

To support the view that "complexity of structure is not likely to characterize the domestic institutions of peasant China," Freedman cites the average family size found in the twelve Fukien and Kwangtung localities included in John Lossing Buck's famous surveys. The figures given are 4.9, 5.0, 5.2, 5.5, 5.5, 5.5, 5.7, 6.0, 6.4, 6.7, 7.2, and 7.6 (1958: 19). The reader should note these numbers and compare them with those displayed in Table 3. Though average family size in our nine districts stood well above the average for the twelve mainland communities, all but the most recent Taiwan figures are within the range set by the mainland data. This is important for two reasons. On the one hand, it means that data cited as evidence of simple families may actually indicate the presence

of complex families; on the other, it suggests that the communities covered by our records were not unusual in having large, complex families. We will return to these points after we have examined more carefully what these figures mean when viewed in terms of the domestic cycle and the experience of the individual.

Like most of the ideas that motivate current research on the Chinese family, the idea that small families grow larger and large families smaller was first developed by Maurice Freedman. The inspiration came from Meyer Fortes' classic account of the Ashanti family, but Freedman did more than apply an African model to Chinese material. He recognized immediately that "a single model of what is now often called the domestic developmental cycle will not do for China (or for any other highly differentiated society)." In his view, "two models"—later dubbed "the rich and poor versions of the Chinese family"—"can represent the range of reality" (1979: 239).

A poor family might in the extreme be unable to raise a son to marriageable age and ensure that he stay at home to recreate the domestic unit. The chances were that at most one son would marry and continue in the same house. As soon as this son begot a child three generations were present, but the senior generation, represented by the elderly parents, were very unlikely to see a fourth emerge. As soon as these parents died a two-generation family appeared again. The process was repeated: elementary family grew to stem and was reduced once more to elementary. Even though there might be two married brothers at any stage in the evolution of a family, they rarely lived together, with the consequence that no joint family appears in the typical cycle.

A rich family produced several sons and retained them, perhaps adding to their number by adoption. The sons remained in an undivided family as long as the parental generation survived. And since these sons married young and the seniors might live long, a joint family of four generations could appear. When the senior generation had gone, the family was partitioned among the men in the next generation. One of these men might then already be in a position to preside over a joint family of his own, having two married sons living with him. Another might become the head of a stem family. A third, being most recently married, might form an independent family along with his wife and children. But if high social status was to be maintained, then the stem and elementary families resulting from the division of the joint family would in turn grow into joint families as quickly as possible. It follows that the elementary and stem families in this 'rich' cycle are temporary stages in the development of joint families. In contrast, the elementary and stem families in the 'poor' cycle are repetitive and final: they cannot broaden out into more complex units. (Freedman 1966: 44-45)

The labels "poor" and "rich" aside, it is clear that Freedman felt that the very great majority of all Chinese families could be subsumed under the first of these two types. "The typical (usual) family," he wrote, "is small and morphologically either elementary or stem; the ideal family is 'joint'—and rare." Given then that most of the families living in our nine districts were headed by tenant farmers and farm laborers, all of whom were poor, did they conform to Freedman's poor version of the Chinese family? The fact that more than twenty percent of these families were either grand or *frèrèches* at any point in time suggests that they did not, but it could be that this indicates extraordinary household complexity among the communities' wealthiest members. To discover whether or not the typical developmental cycle included a complex phase we must add a temporal dimension to our analysis. We must look to the way families changed as well as to the forms they achieved.

Though the idea that domestic groups develop in a regular and repetitive fashion is widely employed by both anthropologists and historians, there are not as yet accepted means of discovering the domestic cycle that best characterizes the family histories of a particular population. Beginning with data describing the distribution of family types at a point in time rather than actual family histories, most scholars have inferred a cyclical process rather than actually eliciting it from the evidence. Thus I have been forced, willy-nilly, to invent my own procedures. My method is probably best described as answering the question: Given that a family is type A (or B or whatever), what is the probability of its becoming B, C, D, or E? In other words, I look at transitions and calculate their relative probability, the result being a matrix that describes the likelihood of movement between each pair of family types. The cycle characteristic of the population emerges as the series of probabilities that mark the most likely course of development.

Not all families survive to take on a new form. Some are extinguished by their members' deaths; others are consolidated or absorbed; and still others splinter into their elements. To allow for these possibilities I have included in my analysis four outcomes in addition to transitions between the family types defined earlier. These are extinction by death, extinction by consolidation, division, and separation. The distinction between division and separation turns on the relationship between the members of the emerging units. When two or more of these units contain adults who belong to the same descent line and therefore share rights in property, I term the event division; when the adults of the emerging units belong

to different lines and are therefore differentiated as regards property, I call the event separation. Though the distinction is not critical to the argument developed in this paper, it is critical to an understanding of the Chinese family cycle. Where division strikes at the core of the family by separating agnates and dissolving their estate, separation leaves this core intact and may even strengthen it by relieving the family of superfluous members. The castoffs are affines who have accompanied an in-marriage women, daughters and their illegitimate children, and, most commonly, uxori-locally married men who have fulfilled their contracts or outlived their usefulness.

Table 4 summarizes in the form of transition rates the histories of all the families living in our nine districts in the years 1906-46. The striking fact is that despite their poverty, these families follow a cycle that looks very like Freedman's rich version of the Chinese family. This is most clearly evident in the diagram presented in Figure 1. Though there is a path leading down from elementary to sub-elementary and solitaire and thence to extinction, the route taken by the great majority of all elementary families leads upwards to stem. A substantial number of the families that arrive at stem go no further, returning directly to elementary, but the route taken by most climbs the next stage of complexity to grand. From grand one road leads to division and thence back to elementary, while another, almost as well-travelled, leads to *frèrèches* and thence to division and a return to elementary.


TABLE 4 Transition Rates by Family Type/State
Probability of transition to specified type/state

Initial type state	Number of trans.	Sol	Sub	E	S	G	F	Div	Sep	Xd	Xc
Sol	273		.007	.348	.011	—	.004	—	—	.326	.304
Sub	104	.442		.442	.010	—	—	.048	.010	—	.048
E	1,367	.086	.061		.696	.002	.088	.016	.019	—	.032
S	1,284	.001	.018	.352		.542	.015	.041	.030	—	.002
G	733	—	—	.006	.111		.341	.450	.093	—	—
F	375	.003	—	.157	.040	.016		.643	.141	—	—
Div	1,571	.059	.007	.517	.260	.106	.051		—	—	—
Sep	391	.143	.021	.491	.233	.067	.046	—		—	—

Abbreviations: Sol (Solitaire), Sub (Sub-elementary), E (elementary), S (stem), G (grand), F (frèrèches), Div (division), Sep (separation), Xd (extinction by death) Xc (extinction by consolidation).

Note: The analysis excludes transitions that move a family from one type to another and then back to the original type within 24 months. The purpose is to reduce the influence of unstable marriages, the birth and rapid disposal of illegitimate children, and other short-term, non-directional fluctuations.

Figure 1: The Domestic Cycle



Note: Diagram shows all probabilities larger than 0.050.

The elementary and stem families in Freedman's poor cycle are repetitive and final: "they cannot broaden out into more complex units." It is in the rich cycle that elementary families and stem families "grow into joint families as quickly as possible." Clearly, then, the families described in Table 4 belong in the rich camp despite their poverty. Having achieved the status of a stem household, they were far more likely to expand than to contract. The probability of expansion to grand or *frèresches* was .557, while the probability of contraction to elementary, sub-elementary, or solitaire was only .371. Though many of the families that passed from stem back to elementary rather than upwards to grand appear to have oscillated between these two forms, there were many others for whom this was only a temporary diversion from the rich cycle. Of 234 families whose histories I can trace at least ten years beyond the downwards transition, 78 (33.3 percent) had recovered their momentum and moved on to grand or *frèresches* by 1946.

We can gain another perspective on the family cycle by rearranging the data in Table 4 to display the probability of different precedents. In Freedman's poor cycle elementary families are always preceded by stem families, but this is not the sequence found in our nine districts. In these communities the great majority of all elementary families were produced by the breakup of complex families rather than by the reduction of stem families. Table 5 says that the probability of precedence by a stem family was only .272 as compared with .605 for the probability of precedence

TABLE 5 Precedents of Family Types/States
Probability of precedenece by specified type/state

Present type state	Number trans.	Sol	Sub	E	S	G	F	Div	Sep
Sol	315		.146	.375	.003	—	.003	.295	.178
Sub	128	.016		.656	.180	—	—	.086	.063
E	1,660	.057	.028		.272	.002	.036	.489	.116
S	1,551	.002	.001	.614		.052	.008	.263	.059
G	897	—	—	.002	.776		.007	.186	.029
F	448	.002	—	.246	.039	.512		.164	.037
Div	650	—	.008	.034	.080	.508	.371		—
Sep	187	—	.005	.139	.209	.364	.283	—	

Abbreviations: Sol (solitaire), Sub (sub-elementary), E (elementary), S (stem), G (grand), F (frêrèches), Div (division), Sep (separation).

Note: The analysis excludes transition that move a family from one type to another and then back to the original type within 24 months. The purpose is to reduce the influence of unstable marriages, the birth and rapid disposal of illegitimate children, and other short-term, non-directional fluctuations.

by division or separation. Since the table also says that division and separation were events in the lives of grand families and *frereches*, it is obvious that while they may not have enjoyed any of the other prerogatives of high status, the residents of our nine districts did at least enjoy the luxury of a rich family cycle.

Readers who have followed the argument this far may feel that the methods employed do not warrant such a strong conclusion. In focusing on transitions I have necessarily given special weight to changeable families. Might it not be that many of the farm laborers in these villages were born, married, and died as members of elementary families, never experiencing anything so complex as a stem family let alone a grand family? If so, they are not represented in the figures displayed in Tables 4 and 5. Consequently, it could be that the family cycle appears rich because the rich contribute more transitions than the poor. The objection is reasonable but cannot rest on logic alone, for it could be that the truth lies in exactly the opposite direction. The cycle may actually be richer than it appears because the very wealthy resist division and therefore experience fewer transitions than their less affluent neighbors.

My solution to this problem is to include in my list of outcomes the possibility that a family may endure unchanged for twenty years. In other words, I treat no change as though it were a form of change. The result is the familiar but nonetheless surprising matrix of probabilities shown

in Table 6. Comparing these figures with those displayed in Table 4, we find only small changes in absolute magnitude and almost no change in relative magnitude. The surprise comes when we focus on the figures listed in the column labelled "no change." They say that the probability of an elementary family's enduring unchanged for twenty years was only slightly greater than the probability of persistence by a complex family. Indeed, contrary to my expectations, the most durable family form was not the elementary but the *frères*. We can therefore be assured that our conclusion does not ignore the existence of a large number of persistently small families. Though some families endured unchanged for as long as twenty years, this was not common and was as likely to occur among complex families as among simple families.

There is, however, another version of the same objection. Though the great majority of the families included in our analysis can be traced from 1906 through 1946, some families are lost through migration and others simply disappear from our records. Since it is probable that the families of propertyless farm laborers were more likely to move or disappear than those of rich peasant farmers, it could be that the small families of the itinerant poor are under-represented in our analysis. Being small and remaining small, they do not contribute to the transition rates displayed in Table 4, and, being itinerant, they do not appear in the measure of durability shown in Table 6.

TABLE 6 Transition Rates Revised to Include Probability of No Change
Probability of transition to specified type/state

Initial type state	Number of trans.	Sol	Sub	E	S	G	F	Div	Sep	Xd	Xc	Nc
Sol	290		.007	.328	.010	—	.003	—	—	.307	.286	.059
Sub	104	.442		.442	.010	—	—	.048	.010		.048	—
E	1,567	.075	.054		.608	.001	.077	.014	.017		.027	.128
S	1,445	.001	.016	.313		.482	.013	.036	.027		.001	.111
G	820	—	—	.005	.099		.305	.402	.083		—	.106
F	439	.002	—	.134	.034	.014		.549	.121		—	.146

Abbreviations: Sol (solitaire), Sub (sub-elementary), E (elementary), S (stem), G (grand), F (frères), Div (division), Sep (separation), Xd (extinction by death), Xc (extinction by consolidation), Nc (no change in twenty years).

Note: The analysis excludes transitions that move a family from one type to another and then back to the original type within 24 months. The purpose is to reduce the influence of unstable marriages, the birth and rapid disposal of illegitimate children, and other short-term, non-directional fluctuations.

Until thirty years ago villagers who moved usually remained within the catchment area of their local market town. Thus as the compass of my

study expands to include other villages and the towns, I will gradually recover the histories of all but the most mobile segment of the population. But fortunately we do not have to wait until that work is complete to decide whether or not the family cycle was as rich as is indicated by the data shown in Tables 4 and 6. Of all the families that entered the arena covered by the records used in this paper, only 79 remained for less than twenty years. We may therefore be satisfied that there was not a large peripatetic population of small families that escaped analysis. There were families that moved too often to be caught by our measure of durability, and they were probably small, but there were not very many of them.

I turn now from the family to the individual's experience of the family. Having already seen that the family cycle led from elementary to stem and stem to grand, we know that the considerable majority of the population passed at least a few years of their lives as members of complex families. But we need more precise information to decide whether or not we are dealing with a time and a place in which "the complex family was the universal background to the ordinary lives of ordinary people." The answer is not easily achieved because it depends on knowing the extent to which families followed the same course generation after generation. If families that failed to rise above the elementary level of complexity in one generation tended to fail again in the next, a sizable minority of the population would never experience life in a stem or grand family. But if failure to achieve a complex form of organization in one generation was commonly followed by success in the next, the experience of life in a complex family might be very nearly universal. Given that most families completed one cycle in twenty to twenty-five years, people who lived a full life had three chances at membership in a complex family. Those who missed the opportunity in their youth might succeed as young adults, and those who missed the experience as young adults might finally win their goal in old age.

The questions these considerations raise would be best answered by following a birth cohort through their full life cycle. We could then calculate precisely the percentage of the population experiencing life in a complex family. Unfortunately, this is impossible because our records begin in 1906 and end in 1946, but our curiosity need not go unsatisfied as a result. Though our evidence is limited to the first forty years of their lives, the histories of 467 men born into our nine districts during the first three years of the registers (1906-09) say that almost every one experienced life in a complex family. Of a total of 242 men who survived the first

forty years of life and remained living in one of our nine districts, only one did not experience life in something more complex than an elementary family. More striking still, Table 7 says that 89.7 percent of these men passed at least part of their first forty years as members of a grand family or a *frèrèches*.

TABLE 7
Men Born 1906-09 by Years of Observation and Most Complex Family Type Experienced by 1946
Percent of men for whom specified family type was most complex type experienced


Years of observation	Number of men	Elementary	Stem	Grand/frèrèches
0-4	467	7.3	15.2	77.5
5-9	352	3.4	12.2	84.4
10-14	328	2.4	12.5	85.1
15-19	318	1.9	11.6	86.5
20-24	300	1.3	12.0	86.7
25-29	285	0.7	11.9	87.4
30-34	256	0.4	10.9	88.8
35-39	242	0.4	9.9	89.7

Were there no other information available, one could argue that these figures are biased against the view that Chinese peasants lived out their lives in small families. The argument would be that because small families are poorer and hence more mobile than large families, their members are under-represented among the men remaining in our districts for forty years. But in fact admitting all men who can be traced a minimum of ten years from birth does not substantially alter our conclusions. Table 7 says that of a total of 352 such men, only 3.4 percent did not know life in anything more complex than an elementary family, while 84.4 percent had personal knowledge of life in a grand family or a *frèrèches*. When we take into account the possibility that many of these men experienced life in a complex family in later years, the inescapable conclusion is that if life in a complex family was not a universal experience it was very nearly so.

Since the phrase "universal experience" suggests a high degree of uniformity, it is important to note that people's experience of the different forms of domestic organization varied widely. Though almost everyone saw their family grow into a complex form at some point in their life, both the timing and the duration varied. In part this was due to differences in the family cycle, which may have been linked to wealth, and in part

it was because people were born at different stages of the cycle. I have shown elsewhere that the domestic careers of men born early and late in their mothers' lives followed markedly different courses (Wolf 1984). Where the proportion of early-borns living in elementary families began at 11.6 percent at ages 0–4 and rose sharply to 31.4 percent at ages 15–19 (see Figure 2), the proportion of late-borns in elementary families started at 42.0 percent at ages 0–4 and fell abruptly to 14.0 percent at ages 15–19. After age 20 the figures for early-borns declined to the low level found among late-borns, but the convergence at ages 25–29 was short-lived. Immediately thereafter the figures for late borns began a steep ascent, rising to 30.8 percent at ages 30–34, 41.8 percent at ages 40–44, and finally 44.8 percent at ages 50–54. Meanwhile the figures for early-borns also rose but only after a five year delay and to only half the height. In fact, the experience of men born early and late in their mothers' reproductive careers did not converge until after age 55 when both groups were found in complex rather than elementary families.

Figure 2: Proportion of Men in Elementary Families by Mother's Age at Birth



By now most readers will be impatient to know how I reconcile the evidence presented in this paper with those "statistics of household size" that Freedman took to be "sufficient indication that complexity of

structure is not likely to characterize the domestic institutions of peasant China." Were the families described here unique among the peasantry? Were they the products of conditions that occurred elsewhere but only rarely? Or do they represent a significant proportion of all peasant households the complexity of which has somehow been overlooked? Though I believe that the third alternative is the correct one, I doubt if sceptics can be convinced on the basis of present evidence. I will therefore postpone that argument and confine myself to showing that the first alternative is false. At least this will serve to reopen the question of whether or not Chinese peasant families were generally small in size and simple in structure.

Consider first the evidence from northern Taiwan. Sun Te-hsiung's study of Pa-tou-tzu, a fishing village near Keelung, suggests that the families of fishermen were small, but this was not true of the families of farmers (n.d.: Table 1, p.3). The average size of the 148 farm families included in Okada Yuzuru's 1936 survey of Shih-lin, a town near Taipei City, was 10.6 (1949: 4). Admittedly, these families were far wealthier than the average Taiwanese farm family, but wealth was not a prerequisite of large family size in northern Taiwan. In 1935 an agricultural technician by the name of Kajiware Michiyoshi conducted a broad-gauged survey of social conditions in nine farm villages, one from each of the nine administrative districts comprising what was then known as Taipei *chou* (1941). Since his information on family size and composition was drawn from the household registers, it covers all the families living in these nine communities at the time of his survey, not just the wealthy or the socially prominent. The results, shown in Table 8, prove that the families recorded in our household registers were not unique. Indeed, they were more or

TABLE 8 Average Family Size in Selected Rural Districts in Taipei *chou* in 1935
Average family size

District	Number of families	Including co-residents	Excluding co-residents
Ch'i-hsung	122	8.44	7.92
Tan-shui	98	6.91	6.63
Chi-lung	67	9.70	9.01
I-lan	93	8.51	8.11
Lo-tung	88	8.55	8.27
Su-ao	100	7.03	6.70
Wen-shan	102	7.40	7.12
Hai-shan	72	7.26	6.54
Hsin-chuang	97	6.63	6.20

Source: Kajiware michiyoshi, *Taiwan nōmin seikatsu kō* (An examination of the life of Taiwanese peasants; Taipei: Ogata Takezo, 1941), Table 4, pp. 181-83.

less typical of farm families in northern Taiwan. Assuming that most of the people Kajiwarra classifies as co-residents were relatives and should be counted as family members, we see that average family size in five of his communities falls short of the 8.19 found in our nine districts in 1936, while the average reported for four of his communities exceeds the average of our districts by a substantial margin.

Grant that a native of northern Taiwan would not have noticed anything unusual about family size if he had settled in one of our nine districts. Doesn't this just force us to the conclusion that northern Taiwan was a very special place? Certainly there is no escaping that conclusion if we accept at face value the results of the many rural surveys conducted on the China mainland in the 1920s and 1930s, particularly the results obtained by John Lossing Buck's famous survey of 38,256 farm families. But like Li Ching-han, who expressed his doubts many years ago, I am of the opinion that many of these studies "were not done carefully and are not reliable" (Li 1930: 5). Unless great care was taken by the interviewer, farm families frequently failed to report infants, female children, adopted daughters-in-law, and family members temporarily absent, and there is reason to suspect that the interviewers employed by many of these projects were not always as careful and conscientious as the task demanded. Before even attempting an analysis of Buck's population survey, Frank Notestein rejected the data from 18 of 119 localities on the grounds that "the birth or death rates appeared unbelievably low" (Buck 1937: 359).¹

There is also the fact that where most of the extensive surveys conducted on the mainland report an average family size of approximately five, several of the more intensive (and presumably more reliable) field studies report averages of six to seven. According to Li Ching-han (Li 1933: Table 29, pp. 138-9), the average of the 515 farm families that were the focus of the very intensive Ting *hsien* study was 6.93. One could argue that this is better attributed to Ting *hsien*'s favored status as a model community than to the care taken by Li Ching-han and his colleagues, but this objection will not explain away the results of Jean Dickinson's 1924 study of Chien-ying, a village located about fifty miles east of Peking and somewhat nearer Tientsin. Though Chien-ying was manifestly poor and had suffered the depredations of warlord armies to boot, the average size of the 82 families included in Dickinson's study was 6.7 souls (Dickinson 1924: 17; and Table 3, p. 41).

Of all the mainland studies that cover an area larger than a single village

or a small neighborhood, only Feng Tzu-kang's 1931 survey of Lan-ch'i *hsien* appears to rival the quality of Li Ching-han's Ting *hsien* study (Feng 1935). Consider then the evidence presented in Table 9. When the 2,045 farm families included in Feng's survey are classified in terms of their relationship to their land, we see that the most numerous are cultivators who own at least part of the land they till. This is not surprising. These are precisely the people we have in mind when we speak of China as a country of small, independent farmers. The surprise comes when we look at the figures reporting average family size. Instead of the five-plus we are led to expect by Buck and most of the rural surveys, we find an average family size of something more than seven.

TABLE 9 Economic Status and Family Size in Lan-ch'i in 1931

Economic status	Number of families	Persons per family	Persons per household
Landlords who are not cultivators	30	5.23	5.37
Landlords who are cultivators	163	7.86	10.45
Cultivators who own all of their land	665	7.01	7.88
Cultivators who rent part of their land	652	7.35	7.83
Tenants who do not sell their labor	410	5.67	5.75
Tenants who do sell their labor	101	5.60	5.63
*Laborers who neither own nor rent land	24	4.63	4.63

Source: Feng tzu-kang, *Lan-ch'i nung-ts'un tiao-ch'a* (Rural survey of Lan-ch'i *hsien*; Kuo-li Che-chiang Ta hsüeh, 1935), Tables 48-49, pp. 62-65.

The reader may be relieved to know that I do not claim that the average Chinese farm family was as large and complex as the families that are the focus of my own work. My view is rather that while there were many communities in which the typical family was small and simple in structure, there were many others in which it was large and complex. I think this is important because it says that the potential for large size was present everywhere and needed only the slightest encouragement to realize itself. How little it took to completely transform the family is clearly evident in data collected by Chiao, Thompson, and Chen in the course of their experimental study of Kiang-yin *hsien*. Table 10 shows that the families they classified as "rich" averaged 6.8 members, while those they classified as "well-to-do" and "poor" averaged 5.7 and 4.1 members. One might see in these data evidence that only the rich could achieve large families, but that is not the correct interpretation. The authors classified as rich "those families which had sufficient food to eat and sufficient clothes to wear," as well-to-do "those families which had a doubtful sufficiency

of food and clothes,” and as poor “those families which had very insufficient food and clothes” (Chiao *et al* 1938: 13).

TABLE 10 Economic Status and Family Size in Kiang-yin in 1932

Economic status	Number of families	Persons per family	Persons per household
Rich	198	6.8	8.4
Well-to-do	1,242	5.7	5.8
Poor	3,139	4.1	4.1

Source: C.M. Chiao *et al* (1938: Table 2, p.13).

In sum, all it took to make a family rich as regards size and structure was “sufficient food to eat and sufficient clothes to wear.” The difference between the rich cycle and the poor cycle was not the difference between the gentry and the peasantry; it was just a matter of an adequate as against an inadequate standard of living. The Japanese occupation of Taiwan did not make farmers wealthy or greatly enhance their status, but it did relieve them of the heavy burden of poverty carried by most of the Chinese peasantry, and that was all that was needed to make a poor cycle a rich one. My contention is that Chinese farm families were potentially large everywhere and actually large wherever material conditions were somewhat better than miserable.

On the Household and Family in Chinese Society

Wang Sung-hsing

Before discussing the Chinese family, it is first necessary to face up to the work of revising the definition of "family," as scholars have failed to reach any consensus on this question. The discussion in this article takes the most recent definitions as the starting point.

Hsieh Jih-chang has recently (1981) proposed a multi-level operational definition of the Chinese family. The families defined as being at a low-level, equivalent to Lang's "*chia*," are called households:

A family is an economic unit which is organized by a group of people having kinship relations and is a unit whose members are co-resident in a single dwelling. They have the rights and obligations of descent and inheritance. (Hsieh 1981: 65)

One other high-level family is called the "dispersed extended family," i.e.,

...large families in which the father and (or) the mother still survive. Originally a single family or household, the constituent "parental families" (also called small family units) later dispersed to form independent households of their own. (Hsieh 1981: 65)

When Daniel Kulp (1925) researched Phoenix village, he observed a division and delimitation of Chinese families into different levels and, using his data, provided an explanation of the respective functions possessed by families at different levels. According to Kulp, the "natural family," which is a nuclear family including parents and children and is a biologically defined group, includes the following types of units of family structure (equivalent to the aforementioned "parental families"): First, there is the "economic family," a co-resident group of people which is based on cognatic and affinal relations. This is an economic unit. It may

be a "natural family" or composed of certain "natural family" groups which have not yet divided the ancestral estate. Second, there is the "religious family," a communal worship group which constitutes a high-level family. Third, there is the "conventional family," a group which is surname exogamous.

The stratified categories of Hsieh and Kulp both demonstrate the need for researchers to establish a multi-level definition of the Chinese family before they can begin to determine the true nature of its functions. This is so because the Chinese family system is established upon two mutually contradictory foundations. One, expressed in the process of family division, is the tendency toward fission. The other, conversely built up from strong patrilineal ideology, is the tendency toward fusion. This latter tendency is expressed in the extension of the "dispersed extended family," the "religious family" and the "conventional family." Phenomena of fission and fusion will be employed below to analyze the developmental dynamics of the Chinese family system. Examples of families on Kuei-shan Island, with which the author is most familiar, are used as objects of analysis. Last, the fundamental structural distinctions between "household" and "family" will be defined.

Extended Families

"Extended families" did not exist among the families of Kuei-shan Tao in 1965, when I did fieldwork there. Those who could have formed extended families—e.g., older parents and their already married sons (two or more)—instead formed individual "conditional nuclear families" and "conditional stem families." The reason I add the word "conditional" is because these families were still not completely independent and separate. In other words, although the older parent-based family had already disintegrated, a relationship of rights and obligations still existed among the divided shares, i.e., the newly established families of the sons, because of support and financial aid given to elderly parents.

Scholars researching the Chinese family system, especially native scholars, have made many attempts to determine domestic arrangements within potential extended families which divide into independent units after the sons' marriage. When Taiwan anthropologists began to research Han Chinese society in the 1960's, they were first attracted by the practice of eating in rotation (*chih-huo-t'ou*) (see Li Yih-yuan 1967). However, the question of how to categorize the families which implement eating in rotation—whether, in the end, the family form ought to be considered

nuclear, stem, or extended—was not resolved. My categories of family forms on Kuei-shan Tao, i.e., the definitions of “conditional nuclear” and “conditional stem,” were subsequently considered to provide a standard for classifying families which eat in rotation. Use of this classification was then continued in certain discussions of family research (e.g., Chuang Ying-chang 1981).

In 1970, when Chuang Ying-chang studied the families in the farming village of She-liao, he proposed the separate concept of a “federated family.” He explained that farm village youths have moved in large numbers to the cities in recent years because of industrial and commercial development. Although these youths individually organize their own small families after marriage, the families of their elderly parents are not completely dissolved. The small families still revolve around a federated family formed with the elderly parents at the center. It is not necessary that each small family be co-resident, but close contact is maintained. They participate in and are responsible together for rural social and religious activities in subordination to their elderly parents. Although the federated family is not necessarily economically inclusive, it still allows for mutual financial assistance. The function of the parents is to coordinate, to unite, and especially, to serve as the family’s emotional focus. In Chuang Ying-chang’s view, the federated family is a transformation of the extended family. It follows upon industrial and commercial development, and the former is replacing the latter (Chuang 1972).

Next we come to the multi-level definition of the family as proposed by Hsieh Jih-chang. The definition of the low-level family is equivalent to the “family” (*chia*) or household in the sense generally used by scholars in the past. The high-level “dispersed extended family” (or “household group family”) expresses in a more advanced form the concept of the “federated family.” According to Hsieh Jih-chang, the “dispersed extended family”:

...is a transformation of the “extended family.” Thus, it is formed after eliminating the co-resident characteristic of the “extended family.” Because the relationship is maintained by the older generation parents, the households within the “dispersed extended family” (or “household group family”) still maintain close relations expressed through mutual assistance, emotional ties and religion.... Because the households organized in this type of family are not co-resident, it is possible that the family has already been divided or that the process of family division has already begun.... The so-called “federated family” and “meal rotation family” are both included within this definition. (Hsieh 1981: 62-63)

The principal difference between this explanation and the "federated family" proposed by Chuang Ying-chang lies in the scope of the extension. The dispersed extended family (or household group family) includes households which have already divided the family. In other words, it indicates those groups of members with the potential of organizing an extended family, the result being the integration of dispersed independent households. Thus what these two authors both term the "federated family" and the "dispersed extended family" (or "household group family") are variations of the "extended family."

However, it is obviously very difficult to describe these extended family variants as domestic units. They are more or less conceptual units, and thus cannot be placed on an equal footing with such other real domestic units as nuclear and stem families. The case of Kuei-shan Island is used below to take a look at these two kinds of stratified families and how the islanders differentiate between them in actual life.

Kuei-shan Island

During the period of the author's investigation of a fishing village on Kuei-shan Island, not a single example of an extended family existed. This point is often quoted in explanation by anthropologists engaged in comparative research (Horie 1981; Wolf 1980). However, variants of the extended family mentioned above can of course be found.

A concrete example is seen in the name list for the "population tax" (*ting-k'ou-sui*) in island religious activities. Island residents use this list when casting divining blocks at the temple every year to select the *lu-chu* (Master of the Incense Burner). The chores of the *lu-chu* are many, and so families short on labor are not very willing to serve. Consequently, there is a tendency for households to lump themselves together as much as possible when paying the "population tax." Brothers who have quite clearly already divided the family will, at this time, give the father's name as the household head and will note below it the number of people in the brothers' households. The households of two or more families are completely amalgamated in order to reduce the possibility of being selected (Wang 1967: 98). In other words, the units which are formed at this time are "household group families" or "federated families." Residents of the island have no real objection to the practice of amalgamation, since some of the older members of the community actually aspire to work for the deities and the public while they are still alive and use every available means to strive for the position of *lu-chu*. Hence their approach is quite

different; they divide their sons into several independent households in order to increase the chance of being selected.

Under certain circumstances, however, the islanders do not allow low-level domestic units and high-level families to intermix. This situation occurred in 1966 when there was a dispute over the order of names on a list of contributors to the reconstruction of the Kuei-shan Tao temple. When the richest man on the island, M44:67, discovered that M67:42 and his younger brother M67:30 held the top two places on the posted list of contributors' names he was quite upset. At the time, the elder brother M67:42 had made a contribution of NT\$8,200 and his younger brother M67:30 had contributed NT\$8,000, while the youngest brother M68:18 had only contributed NT\$2,000. M44:67 indicated that he was willing to contribute NT\$8,600 in order to secure first place on the list of names. The other islanders protested strongly against this, however; they felt that M44:67 should not include the households of his four sons under his own name since the latter had already divided the family and formed independent domestic units. The same situation occurred with another wealthy man, M74:63, who wanted to contribute NT\$6,000, but the islanders raised objections because his three sons had already divided the family. M74:63 had no alternative but to reduce his contribution to NT\$5,600, while his three sons each contributed a further NT\$200. The total of NT\$6,200 was only NT\$200 greater than the original amount. The islanders all agreed that this was a reasonable method and wanted M44:67 to follow this example. Initially M44:67 did not accept this view, but he was finally induced to consent. Besides his own contribution of NT\$8,600, he contributed a further NT\$250 in the name of each son.

This decision did not actually end the competition for first place. When the brothers M67:42 and M67:30, the original holders of the top two places on the list, learned that the "head names" (*t'ou-ming*) had been carried off by M44:67, the three immediately readjusted the amount of their contributions. Although there was no overall change in the total, M68:18's contribution was reduced from NT\$2,000 to NT\$700, while NT\$600 of the excess NT\$1,300 was added to the contribution of the eldest brother, thus increasing M67:42's contribution to NT\$8,800. The other NT\$700 was transferred to the second brother M67:30, whose contribution thereby increased to NT\$8,700. The two brothers still occupied the first two places on the list of names. It should be mentioned in passing here that the father of the three M67:42 brothers had already died and that their mother was still alive, but the names of the wives never appeared on this list of names. The youngest brother was in school and

still single at the time.

In summary, the residents of Kuei-shan Tao discriminated strongly on this occasion against the dispersed extended family (or household group family) on the list of contributors' names for the reconstruction of the temple. The older men who had no savings in hand and whose sons had already married and divided the family naturally had no place on the list of contributors' names for the reconstruction of the temple. The older men who had no savings in hand and whose sons had already married and divided the family naturally had no place on the list of names. Conversely, however, the fathers of "natural" (single-son) stem families were included on the list of names under their own names even though it was their sons who had put up the contributions.

The foregoing demonstrates that special attention should be given to two areas when researching the Chinese family system. One is the existence of households (*chia-hu*) which are domestic units formed as a product of fission. The other is the tendency for domestic units to fuse together into household group families.

Family Division as a Process

The preamble for a family division document will often include one of the following sentences: "A big tree spreads its branches; it has always been thus" or "Is there a tree which, once big, does not spread its branches?" These sentences neatly express how the characteristics of the Chinese family were originally built on a foundation of reproduction and fission. The reasons for family division which are given in such documents are nothing more than the final turning points in the course of family division. For example:

1. It is difficult to live together because the number of people has multiplied.
2. There are too many fingers being pointed! Household chores are vexing and petty; one person is hard put to manage them.
3. Different people eating together in the group have different standards of diligence.
4. Because our parents are getting on in years, we do not wish to trouble and weary them.
5. Daily life is becoming more and more difficult to bear because the number of people in the group is so great.

A concrete reason for family division is that, "Brothers do not get along; sisters-in-law do not get along; father and son do not get along;

mother-in-law and daughter-in-law do not get along; life is difficult." In fact, these reasons are nothing more than the symptoms of fission which were mentioned above (Uchida 1956: 36-83).

Freedman pointed out that there is economic competition or a strongly competitive relationship between brothers. Because all have equal rights to family property they are wary of each other, even to the point of fearing that their individual rights may be encroached upon by others. While the authority of the father remains supreme and family property is under his firm control, intense competition is only latent. During this period the competitive relationship between brothers is acted out principally by sisters-in-law who have married in. However, as soon as the authority of the father disappears the competitive relationship surfaces, and once family fission arises it cannot be put aside (Freedman 1958).

Margery Wolf advanced the following analysis of the position and roles played by women in Chinese patrilineal society: after a woman marries into an all-embracing and vigorously patrilineal household, her natal family is no longer her own family. She can only establish a bridgehead in the home of her husband by forming a "uterine family" which is centered around her and comprises only herself and the children which she bears; her husband is not included (Margery Wolf 1972: 32-41). Margery Wolf holds that the existence of multiple "uterine families" within a patrilineal descent group is a factor leading to family fission (*ibid.*: 166). We can buttress Margery Wolf's point of view by noting the custom that the woman's natal family is considered responsible for supplying the new family with a stove and cooking utensils when the commensal group is divided.

Horie (1981) summarizes the explanations of Freedman and Margery Wolf by making the following comparisons:

	<i>Uniting Factors</i>	<i>Fissive Factors</i>
Freedman	Paternal authority	Economic competition between brothers
Margery Wolf	Male culture	Economic competition in the uterine family

However, just as the words "Is there a tree which once big does not spread its branches?" indicate, family fission should be seen as an organic or natural phenomenon in family development rather than as an abnormal state of affairs. Competition between brothers is one result of this organic phenomenon. The "uterine family" is a new cell of the family itself; it

is a wellspring of life which promotes the longevity of the family. In other words, the factors leading to fission raised by Freedman and Margery Wolf are essentially different and cannot be directly compared.

Thus the Chinese family contains the seeds of fission from the beginning in what Margery Wolf calls the "uterine family." If the husband is included, then in a strict sense it is a *fang* or Kulp's "natural family" or Hsieh's "parental family." Family division is a result of the growth of fissionable nuclei and should not be regarded as being in any way surprising. There is a point which ought to be clarified here: I see the phenomenon of family division in the Chinese family system not as an event which occurs at a certain fixed time but as a process which takes place over a long period of time. The process of family division comprises a series of events. The first is divided cooking and independent family budgets; the next is division of family property, and the final stage is represented by separately written ancestral tablets. Family property in particular is not wholly divided at one stroke. For example, parents reserve fields to work during their old age; just prior to death or after the funeral the group of sons divides these fields equally.

In addition to the characteristic of fission mentioned above, the Chinese family system also has a tendency to fuse together. The "authority of the father" spoken of by Freedman is admittedly an important factor in large family formation. However, family unification always tends towards the extended family. The "male culture" spoken of by Margery Wolf can perhaps explain this phenomenon of unification. In other words, the basis for family unification is patrilineal descent which takes males as the principals. Even though households may have completely divided the family, the function of unification still exists because of patrilineal descent ideology. For example, the concurrent use of ancestral halls and adoption can occur between two already separate and independent patrilineal families, including between patrilineal parallel first and second cousins. Kulp's "religious family" and "conventional family" as well as the "common estates," which include household groups and lineage and are peculiar to Taiwan, are all subsumed under the heading of family unification.

Conclusion

At this point in the article I wish to remind the reader of a perennial question in the social anthropological research of family systems: How should a "domestic unit" and a "family" be distinguished? As

regards the Chinese family system, domestic units are formed through the tendency to fission and may include nuclear, stem and extended families, although the range is fixed. In another respect, a social group which is formed through the tendency to unite is a family. Various groups such as the federated style family and the dispersed extended family (or household group family) mentioned above are thus families. The Chinese "*chia*" as referred to by Fei Hsiao-t'ung can be small or large; what he referred to should be called the family and not the domestic unit.

A New Chinese Dictionary (1979) gives definitions for two words whose meanings appear to be very close to the words "domestic unit" and "family":

Domestic Unit (*chia-t'ing*): An organization of social life which is formed on the natural foundations of affinity and consanguinity. Generally includes the kinsmen of father, mother, husband, wife, son and daughter.

Family (*chia-tsu*): A social organization which is founded and formed on the basis of affinal and blood relations. It is formed attendant upon private rights over property. Ancient China long retained a patrilineal large family or a patrilineal family head system. The family head enjoyed great authority over family members and economic life.

These definitions and the sense of what I mean by "domestic unit" and "family" are about the same.

In summary, when researching the family system of China, in addition to analyzing the household, a unit of life formed because of the tendency to divide, we ought to pay more attention to the "family," which is based upon patrilineal descent and is a product of the phenomenon of fusion.

Part Two

RIGHTS AND DUTIES

Equal Right and Domestic Structure

Tang Mei-chun

Introduction

This essay discusses a newly emerging tension over inheritance among siblings of different sexes in contemporary Taiwan. In so doing, I hope to call attention to the fact that in China the judiciary has interfered with the family system ever since the early imperial era. This reiterates my argument that serious attention must be paid to relevant legal factors when researching the variables affecting Chinese family type (see Tang 1978a: 138-154; 1982).

I have shown elsewhere that one of the unique characteristic of traditional Chinese law is its stipulation of many aspects of family and kinship behavior in legal codes (Tang 1976). The main reason for having such a legal code was because the government cared greatly about the structure and function of the basis from which the politico-philosophical ideology of Imperial China stemmed (see Tang 1978b). In ancient China there was, in fact, a process of Confucianization of the Chinese legal system (Tang 1978a: 141). As a result, the norms and modes of family and kinship had a major influence on the legal code. This tradition was not just continued, it was actually picking up momentum as the imperial era drew to a close. The climax of this tradition is manifest in the last imperial code (see Niida 1967: 5-19).

In an attempt to modernize the nation and abolish the so-called right of extraterritoriality, the Chinese legal system underwent a series of drastic revisions in the early years of this century. These efforts to recast China's legal codes were, in my view, but another in a series of efforts to regulate the family by legal means, and as such expressive of an underlying Chinese cultural continuity.

The first revision of the Civil Code was drawn up in 1911 in the last year of the Ch'ing dynasty (see Valk 1939: Chapters 5-11; Hsieh 1948:

849ff). This was the first of a total of four revisions of the Civil Code that took place over the course of twenty years. The fourth revision of the modern Civil Code, which is the draft currently in force in Taiwan, was first promulgated in mainland China in 1931.

Many difficulties had to be overcome in this first modern draft of the modern Civil Code in order to reconcile it with prevailing custom. It was many years in the making. But as Freedman notes, the Civil Code

...turned out to be far less revolutionary than a superficial impression would convey. As scholars have pointed out, the provisions of the Code are rather conservative in the compromise reached between the needs of tradition and the call for modernism. Yet for all its conservatism, it marked a major step in Chinese history. (1979a: 247)

As announced in the first draft, four principles were adopted as guidelines for creating the new Civil Code. The principles were: 1) to form a law which conformed as much as possible with the laws generally in use in other countries in order to facilitate foreign trade, emigration and dealing with aliens; 2) to make the new Civil Code and judicial system better adapted to the current social situation; 3) to codify matters of family marriage law and inheritance in accordance with custom; and 4) to make the law conducive to the progress of the country.

The first draft of the new Code fell far short of satisfying either conservatives or progressives. The major difficulty lay in the third principle; it contradicted the spirit embodied in the other three principles. The draft as a whole attempted to modernize the Ch'ing Civil Code, yet the conservatives who viewed the old family system as the essence of the nation were most reluctant to see this part of the Civil Code changed. They wielded the third principle as a shield against the progressive threat posed by the other three principles.

The second (1915) draft of the Civil Code came four years after the Nationalist revolution. Influenced by the prevailing revolutionary mood, the draft represented a clear breakthrough in the regulation of family life. Individual rights and the spirit of equality between the sexes were introduced. The ancient legal system was only nominally upheld. Individual rights and equality gained even further ground in subsequent drafts. The third (1925) draft incorporated many ingredients from European codes. In this revision elements hostile to the old family system were adopted. The fourth (1928) draft, known also as the first Nanking draft, contained definite provisions concerning equality between the sexes,

the rights of juniors, freedom of marriage and procedures for divorce.

Thus the Civil Code promulgated in mainland China and in force in Taiwan since the war is the end product of a long process of legal modernization. The 1931 revision nearly completed the work of separating the law from Confucian norms (*li*). Nevertheless, and despite the fact that it adopted many statutes from different Western civil codes, the 1931 Civil Code not only continued to make compromises with the old legal system, but it also never quite reconciled differences between those elements which were adopted from the Anglo-American code and those parts which were borrowed from the Continental code (see Valk, *ibid*).

A wide gulf also separated the Civil Code from customary law. The discrepancies between legal stipulations and traditional norms were blatant, and particularly so when it came to domestic practice. The gap between law and custom surely made the new law less effective. As a result, the laws governing domestic structure were not exactly mirrored in the life of Chinese people in the early period following its promulgation. In fact, the existence of many of these laws was irrelevant for the great majority of Chinese. They married, divorced and disposed of their property according to established custom (Freedman 1979b: 145), though the degree to which the customary settling of family disputes outside the framework of the legal system varied by class (Freedman 1979c: 129).

This essay is concerned primarily with Article 1138 of the Code. Article 1138 is concerned with inheritance. Based upon the spirit of equality between the sexes, it grants daughters, whether married or not, the same rights of inheritance as their brothers. Generally speaking, in the 1930s and 1940s the inheritance of parental property was still carried out according to established custom. Legal disputes between brothers and sisters over inheritance were few and far between, and in those cases that did arise public comment ran against the claims of daughters. In fact, such legal disputes occurred only among very rich urban families. For ordinary people, and especially for those living in the countryside, inheritance was generally conducted according to local custom, while relevant laws on inheritance were viewed as mere empty words.

The weight of tradition notwithstanding, the 1931 Civil Code has been gaining ground in the degree to which it intervenes in family life on Taiwan. Since the 1950s, daughters have been expected to yield to public consensus and to surrender their rights of inheritance. Practice varies, however. The legal right in question has gradually become an issue which creates tension between siblings of different sexes in many families. Although the ethnographic case I present below is by no means representa-

tive of all the forces of change at work in Taiwan, it does reveal much about the subject.

The Ethnographic Case

The ethnographic case is of a dispute over inheritance among brothers and sisters of a family I will call the Ling family. It first came to my attention in November, 1969. This was during the third month of my fieldwork studying urban Chinese families in Taipei. I had the opportunity to follow the development of the dispute until its final resolution in the spring of 1982.

The Ling family has six sons and five daughters ranging between 23 and 40 years of age. By 1969, all of them were married and each had their own respective nuclear family. Three of the nuclear families were still in their home town in Taipei's suburbs. The old family home was occupied by the third son, the youngest daughter and their respective families. The youngest son and his family lived in a rented apartment a few doors away. The other nuclear families had left the home town.

Descendents of Fukien emigrants, the Lings have lived in the town for generations. The deceased father presided over a joint family until his death in 1963. He had both a Japanese and Chinese education, and in his later years held a managerial position in a government corporation. The bulk of the family property was accumulated through his efforts. This estate, registered in the father's name, consisted of the old house, a piece of residential land large enough to build six houses (according to the elder Ling's plan, there was to be one parcel for each son) and six acres of city land which could be exploited for construction. The total value of these properties was about NT\$30 million dollars in 1982 (equivalent to about US\$800,000 dollars). There was in addition a fairly large amount of stock which the father had already divided into six equal portions. Each portion was in the name of one of the six sons. Although I do not know the value of these stocks, I do know that their 1969 dividends came to a total of NT\$200,000 dollars.

The father died of a heart attack in 1963. His widow, though illiterate, was a capable and domineering woman. Although her eldest son was already approaching fifty years old, the mother nevertheless succeeded her husband as family head. Mother Ling did not want to see the family divide while she was still living. She did permit the sons and their families to disperse residentially outside the old home. However, she wanted the family property to remain undivided, under her control, and in her

deceased husband's name. The stocks mentioned above, which were in the sons' names, also stayed in her hands.

Mother Ling was well aware of the possible complication the daughters' legal rights posed should they exercise them. According to Article 1144 of the Civil Code, the inheritance should have been shared equally by her eleven children. Mother Ling still thought that daughters, particularly married ones, should not have the right to inherit property from their parents. She was quoted as saying, "The law of inheritance was made by educated fools. Daughters give birth to children who carry the surnames of others; they are outsiders once they are married. They will inherit the property of their husbands' families, not that of their natal families."

Mother Ling wanted both to delay division of the family estate until after her death and to insure that the five daughters relinquished their legal rights of inheritance while she was still alive. She asked her daughters to do this voluntarily; in exchange she was willing to give each of them NT\$10,000 dollars in cash. In order to nudge the daughters toward agreement and to lend the added weight of a public occasion, the money was given by the mother to her daughters while at the side of their father's corpse during his funeral. The presentation was made in such a way that it was as if the daughters were personally being given the money by their father. This was witnessed by the relatives and friends who had come to mourn the deceased.

It was mother Ling's understanding and expectation that when the funeral was over the daughters would legally renounce their claims on the family estate. To her disappointment, however, the daughters ganged together and refused to comply with their mother's wishes. They had no intention of yielding their legal rights of inheritance. They deliberately avoided touching on the subject and once even indicated indirectly that the amount of money they were given in exchange for renouncing their legal rights was not large enough. A war of nerves between mother and daughters ensued.

The daughters' strategy was to passively resist their mother's request that they relinquish their rights of inheritance; they refrained from taking such steps as openly confronting their mother or going to court. Social pressure derived from patrilineality and filial piety ruled out any other alternative. On the other hand, neither could mother Ling pressure the daughters into giving in. After all, the right in question was supported by the legal code. She would surely have lost the case if the daughters

were compelled to take legal action. The only channel left open to mother Ling was negotiation, but the absence of a suitable mediator frustrated even this alternative.

Mother Ling died in April, 1969. A few days before her death, she made a final effort to settle the dispute over inheritance. She tape-recorded a deathbed injunction in the hope that her daughters might, moved by filial sentiments when listening to the last words of their dying mother, act according to their mother's wishes. Mother Ling's last efforts were, however, to no avail.

The relationships between the brothers and sisters deteriorated drastically after their mother passed away. The family lacked a head. From then on the concerned parties, i.e. the sisters and brothers, confronted each other on an equal footing. Nevertheless, there was no open conflict. The tactic the sisters used was one of non-cooperation. Because the sisters were doing well financially, they were in no hurry to sell short their rights of inheritance. They were certain that their brothers could not have the sisters' part of the inheritance without prior consent. The sisters could thus wait indefinitely and hope that the brothers might become impatient and begin to yield. The only concrete step the sisters took to signal their intent to exercise their inheritance rights was to have the youngest sister and her family occupy the front part of the old home and assert that she would not move out until the sisters' rights of inheritance were recognized.

In fighting for their cause, the sisters' solidarity was much stronger than the brothers. The brothers, while insisting that the family property should be handed down in accordance with their mother's wishes and as dictated by custom, were also jealous of each other because of perceived inequities in the allocation of family resources on the part of the mother during her control of family funds. With the exception of the youngest, each of the brothers held a portion of the larger family's common property. This money had been given to them as capital for the family's diversified economic activities. After the mother's death, each brother tried to conceal the extent of the family holdings under his control. There were hard feelings and mistrust among brothers and, in particular, between their wives. The situation clearly affected the collective strength which the brothers were able to bring to bear against their sisters.

All of the brothers but the youngest were doing well in business and had no urgent need for access to the inheritance. They responded to the sisters' policy of non-cooperation with an attitude of indifference. The situation remained stalemated for eleven years, during which time there

was but infrequent and brief contact between the sisters and brothers on ceremonial occasions. Their relations fell far short of the level called for by social norms.

The case was finally settled in the spring of 1982. One of the sisters who lived abroad died. Her husband was willing to surrender his deceased wife's right of inheritance. The fifth brother, the best educated of the brothers, had married a foreigner and become a naturalized citizen in his wife's native county. He also expressed a willingness to abandon his right of inheritance. The youngest brother, on the other hand, was in his middle thirties and not as well off as the others. His only hope of getting a good start in business centered on the inheritance. Hence it was mostly by appeals on his part to his brothers and sisters that the matter in question finally reached a conclusion. A legal agreement was made which stipulated that the family's fixed estate, namely the old house and the land, would be divided equally among all siblings or their descendants. Money and stock belonging to the family but in the name or under the physical control of the individual brothers were not treated as part of the inheritance and were left under the control of those brothers.

Discussion

The 1931 Civil Code was the culmination of a push to codify and "modernize" family law that began in earnest during the early Republican era. The original aim was to reweave the fabric of Chinese society, particularly in the sphere closely related to domestic institutions. The essential character of the Civil Code is the result of the selective grafting of Western legal principles onto China's age-old patrilineal society. Two of the major Western features are the introduction of a spirit of equality between the sexes and the removal of "unjust discrimination" between men and women in a society which has a long and firm tradition of male superiority.

Along with other statutes, the law of equal right among siblings over inheritance is based on such a spirit. Chinese society, however, continues to be patrilineal and the Civil Code itself is skewed towards patrilineality, even though it adopts a bilateral tone. Securing for daughters a right of inheritance equal to that of sons is still neither easily accomplished nor readily accepted.

Tai Yen-hui (1970: 19) indicates that the patrilineal characteristics of the Civil Code are as follows: 1) In the organization of the council of kinsmen, both parents' consanguinity is included, yet the order of

membership is in favor of the relatives on the father's side (Article 1131). 2) In regulating the incest taboo in the marriage of closely related relatives, marriages between first cousins of the same surname, i.e. the patrilineal parallel cousins, are forbidden. Nevertheless, marriages between both matrilineal parallel and cross-cousins are permitted (Article 983). Legally speaking, all first cousins are ego's kinsman of the fourth grade, yet the relation between patrilineal cousins is interpreted as being closer than that of matrilineal ones. 3) An unequal principle is also employed in recognizing the affinal relatives of the spouse. A remarried widower is regarded as still being the affinal kinsman of his deceased wife's relatives. But the reverse is not the case. A remarried widow ceases to be an affinal relative of her dead husband's relatives (Article 971). 4) Polygyny is tolerated by implication in the legal definition of marriage (Article 1122): a man may keep other women if his wife fails to raise a speedy legal objection (Article 1053). 5) A man has the right to have legal children born out of wedlock (Article 1065). As Freedman notes, "Monogamy is established, but it is a monogamy which, given the tacit consent of the wife, allows a man to set up permanent relationships with other woman from which legally recognized children may issue" (cf. Freedman 1979a: 248).

Tai Yen-hui also criticizes some parts of the Civil Code for wavering between the individualism of Anglo-American law and familism of Swiss law. According to him, there are inconsistencies in the Civil Code regarding the distribution of domestic rights and duties among the members of a family. The stipulation which gives married daughters equal rights over inheritance is one example (Tai 1970: 348).

In *emic* terms the Civil Code has created a wide discrepancy between legal prescriptions and customary practice in family life. The code is so broad in some aspects that discrepancies still remain after fifty years. The extended ethnographic example given in this essay is a case in point. To the author's knowledge, few parents, especially those belonging to the older generation, are willing to give both married and unmarried daughters a share of the inheritance equal to that of the sons. Although the right of equal inheritance is legally recognized in Taiwan, it is more often than not subverted in practice when daughters' yield to the twin pressures of parental authority and the desire to maintain good relationships with their brothers.

Nevertheless, the daughters' right to equal inheritance is generally acknowledged in one of three different ways during the process of family

division. Perhaps the most prevalent is the way daughters are directly or indirectly persuaded while the parents are still alive to give up their inheritance in favor of their brothers. In such cases compensation in the form of a certain amount of money or property is provided to daughters. In this way, at least the letter of the law of inheritance is respected, and normal relations can then be maintained both between parents and daughters and brothers and sisters. Another way is for a parent, usually the father, to adopt the strategy of transferring all the family estate to the sons. There may simply be no inheritance when he passes away (cf. Freedman 1958: 14, 22; Hsu 1963: 290; Lang 1946: 26-27; Tang 1978a: 148-154; Yang 1945: 81; and Articles 1223 and 1225). Finally, the daughters may actually retain their claim to part of the family estate until after the death of their parents. If the relationship between brothers and sisters is extremely good and the sisters are doing well, the sisters may simply voluntarily surrender their rights or settle for smaller portions. The case of the Ling family which is described in this essay represents one of the less amiable ways of handling inheritance due to poor mother-daughter and sister-brother relationships.

Thus we see that half a century after having been brought into force, and even if not completely effective, the equal inheritance law is now exerting at least some limited pressure upon Taiwan society. Although not followed to the letter, the law of the right of equal inheritance of family property by all children regardless of sex is almost always taken into consideration in the course of settling inheritance. It certainly has become an important variable in enhancing the general status of female family members. It has helped shift the balance of the daughter-parent relationship and sister-brother relationship more in favor of the daughters and sisters. As a result, differences in patterns of socialization between children of different sexes are diminishing. Examples of the effect of law on Chinese family life in Singapore (Freedman 1979b: 140-141) and in mainland China (Marriage Laws of 1950 and 1981) serve as good comparative examples of similar, though more drastic, trends.

In conclusion, and to return to a point stressed at the start of my essay, I wish to point out that studies of Chinese domestic organization have to do a better job of taking the legal dimension into consideration. Legal intervention in the family is not unique to China; it is common to many if not all societies. The difference is one of degree and kind, and what such interference reveals of the relation between family life and the legal system.

Meal Rotation

Hsieh Jih-chang

Meal rotation is common among Taiwan's Chinese families. Generally speaking, it involves married sons taking turns according to a fixed schedule in the provision of meals for their parents. In other words, it is a mean whereby parents are supported by their adult male heirs.

In addition to the term "meal rotation" (*lun huo-t'ou*), this institution has also been called "eating provided meals" (*ch'ih huo-t'ou*), "meal rotation by lots" (*lun huo-ch'iu*) and "eating meals by lots" (*ch'ih huo-ch'iu*). Of these terms, "eating provided meals" (*ch'ih huo-t'ou*) is perhaps the most widely heard in Taiwan. However, the villagers of Ling-ch'uan (Chiu-ju *hsiang*, P'ing-tung *hsien*) in south Taiwan feel that the word "eating" *ch'ih* in "eating provided meals" (*ch'ih huo-t'ou*) is inelegant, and prefer in its stead the term "rotation" (*lun*) as in "meal rotation" (*lun huo-t'ou*). More than elegance is involved here, however. There is also an important sociological difference implicit in the terms "eating" (*ch'ih*) and "rotating" (*lun*). There are situations where the provision of regular support for parents is called "eating the family's meals" (*ch'ih i chia ti huo-t'ou*) (Li 1967: 49). The term "eating provided meals" (*ch'ih huo-t'ou*) also lumps together situations where support for parents is provided by several sons in rotation and situations where such support is provided exclusively by one son. The phrase "eating provided meals" (*ch'ih huo-t'ou*) seemingly cannot specify the particular characteristic of parents eating their meals at their sons' homes in "meal rotation" (*lun huo-t'ou*). The three distinct phrases "meal rotation" (*lun huo-t'ou*), "meal rotation by lots" (*lun huo-ch'iu*), and "eating meals by lottery" (*ch'ih huo-ch'iu*) are better able to express this particular characteristic of rotating and sharing the obligation for the parents' meals. The first two phrases make the point explicit by using the term "rotation" (*lun*), the last phrase implies rotation by using the word "lot" (*ch'iu*). This essay will concentrate on meal support by rotation.

This essay reports on meal rotation in four field sites in Taiwan:

1. Yang-chih *ts'un*. Taipei *hsien*, Shen-ken *hsiang*. 1980
2. Chu-lin *ts'un*. Nan-t'ou, *hsien*, Pu-li *chen*. 1981.
3. Ling-ch'uan *ts'un*. P'ing-tung *hsien*, Chiu-ju *hsiang*. 1981 and 1983.
4. Te-hua *chieh*. Taipei *shih*, Yen-p'ing *ch'u*. 1981.

35 cases of meal rotation from my own research at four sites are discussed in this essay: 5 from Yang-chih, 11 from Chu-lin, 18 from Ling-ch'uan and 1 from Te-hua street. Ling-ch'uan, the village which has been studied most intensively, has 308 households (as of 1981).² Villagers work as office workers, merchants, laborers and farmers. I use 30 Ling-ch'uan households of various types for discussion in this essay. Of these Ling-ch'uan households, 18 are either now practicing meal rotation (8 households) or have at some time in the recent past practiced it (10 households). A sample of 11 households from a total of 236 households in Chu-lin, 5 households from a total of 132 households in Yang-chih, and a single sample from Te-hua have been chosen for the other three field sites.

Preconditions

It is possible to distinguish between social and cultural preconditions for meal rotation. I contend that meal rotation develops by means of the former's penetration of the latter. Social preconditions include internal and external conditions affecting the household. Internal preconditions include the following:

1. Surviving Parent(s)
2. Two or more sons
3. Most sons married
4. Household division

The first two preconditions are necessary to the establishment of meal rotation, while the last two preconditions promote the establishment of meal rotation. In fact, sometimes one or two unmarried brothers participate as beneficiaries in meal rotation. Of the 24 cases from Ling-ch'uan, Yang-chih, and Te-hua, 3 cases (L11, L21, and L30) include one unmarried brother as a beneficiary and one case includes two unmarried brothers as beneficiaries. Also, the exact point in time when a household is "divided" is problematic. Household division is a process that can cover a long period of time, or be completed quite quickly (see Hsieh 1982: 274-5). Traditionally, household division involved an economic, domiciliary, and religious division (see Hsieh 1982: 274). Under present circumstances, economic division is functionally the more important,

domiciliary division less important, and religious division often does not occur. Economic division can be deemed to include separate consumption of meals, separate livelihood, division of property and so on. In not a few cases economic division occurs over a brief period of time, but in other circumstances it can itself be drawn out to involve a process of first separate livelihoods, then separate dwellings and finally property division. It can be said that property division is a key step, since property division makes the decision public.

My data on household division supports the above summary in general, and with regard to economic division as a process in particular. In all 18 cases from Ling-ch'uan, meal rotation did not begin until after household division. Of the five meal rotation cases from Yang-chih, land had yet to be divided in two cases. Since land is the most important property in the countryside, these two cases can be said to be meal rotation without economic division having been completed. In sum, it seems that as the process of household division lengthens the probability that meal rotation will be implemented increases (see Hsieh 1982: 274-5).

The 18 cases of meal rotation in Ling-ch'uan are summarized below in relation to other aspects of the process of household division.

1. Meal rotation beginning immediately after household division. (15 cases)
2. Household division prior to the marriage of all sons, with the following results:
 - a. The father at first participates in meal rotation alone while the mother continues to prepare meals for the unmarried son. After the unmarried son has married, both parents join in meal rotation at the homes of all their sons. (1 case)
 - b. The parents eat and live together with their unmarried son. The parents wait until the unmarried son has married before starting meal rotation with all their sons. (1 case)
 - c. The mother prepares meals for two unmarried sons. After one marries, the mother starts eating meals in rotation at the homes of the married sons. (1 case)

Maurice Freedman (1958: 19-21) held that most Chinese household divisions take place after the death of the father, and that division is often delayed until after the death of the widowed mother. In Yang-chih, Chulin and Ling-ch'uan, household division takes place in many families while the parents are still alive. If only the widowed mother survives, the household rarely remains undivided. (The only exception I have recorded in my field research is that of an 82-year-old widow in Yang-chih living

in a single extended family with her three married sons, their wives and children [Hsieh 1984: 65-70].) Other studies in Taiwan find that household division usually occurs while the parents are still alive (see Gallin 1966: 144; Wen *et al* 1975: 94; Chuang 1982: 52-3). I have already mentioned that there are even cases of household division taking place while the parents are still living and some sons are not yet married. In brief, while the phenomenon of economic division does not guarantee that meal rotation will be initiated, it is nevertheless a major impetus.

Although external social preconditions encourage the establishment of meal rotation, they are once again not effective causes of meal rotation. I think that such conditions are secondary and the result of industrialization. This is because industrialization leads to occupational heterogeneity, which in turn leads to social and geographic mobility. Many married sons are compelled to move to distant places, and no longer live with their brothers and parents in their home village. In such situations, parents can eat at their sons' homes in turn only if the distance is not too great and travel not too expensive. The alternative is for the parents to eat at the home of only one of their sons, to prepare their own meals, or to participate only in meal rotation at the homes of those of their sons who still live in the village. There is evidence from Shu-lin that the incidence of meal rotation has decreased since 1951 (Chen 1969: 97-9), and is perhaps linked to Shu-lin's out-migration.

Culture also plays a role in meal rotation. Ancestor worship, inheritance and filial piety reinforce each other; together they sustain the norms for supporting one's parents as well as helping and sharing among one's extended family. Besides providing children with the economic means to support their parents and retain some minimum level of cooperation among themselves after family division, meal rotation is one means whereby children can carry out their shared filial obligations toward their parents in a divided household.

Organization

Participants. Of my 35 case sample from four different sites in Taiwan, I found 20 cases where the mother is the sole beneficiary; 9 cases where both parents are beneficiaries; 4 cases where the father is the sole beneficiary; 1 case where the paternal grandmother is the sole beneficiary; and 1 case where a mother and her mother-in-law are both beneficiaries.

Schedules. The essential elements of meal rotation schedules can be illustrated with a description of a somewhat special case with scheduled stops of two months each. The widowed mother of four surviving sons

rotates between north and south Taiwan, staying with each of her married sons for a fixed period of two months each visit. All but the youngest son of the mother are married. The eldest son is disabled, but is still able to manage the family rice-husking mill established some time ago by the father. The two elder sons married prior to the father's death in 1971, and the fourth son shortly thereafter. The mother, sons, daughters-in-law, and grandchildren continued to live as an extended family until 1973. But the wife of the eldest son thought that the second and third brothers were taking unfair advantage of their eldest brothers efforts and using him as a free meal ticket. The second and third sons, on the other hand, believed that the eldest son was siphoning off funds from the family's rice-husking revenues. For the former, the fact that the latter had been providing his own son with spending money without giving anything to his paternal nephews was proof of his breach of faith.

When the household finally divided, each of the three married sons received three seventeenths (three *fen*) of the family's land and the soon-to-be married third and still unmarried fifth brothers each received four seventeenths (four *fen*) of the land. This allocation was expected to provide the unmarried sons with enough property to underwrite their future marriage expenses. The mother kept NT\$90,000 for her own private use as a hedge against the possibility that her sons might fail in some way to fulfill their filial obligations.

In the initial period after the division of the household the mother continued to prepare meals for her two unmarried sons and to help take care of things for her daughters-in-law whenever they gave birth. By 1978, the third son was married and living in Hsin-chu in north Taiwan. Although separated by many miles, transportation by rail made commuting between P'ing-tung *hsien* and Hsin-chu *hsien* relatively easy. It was at this time that the sons decided to have their elderly mother participate in meal rotation. The mother started eating in rotation in Ling-ch'uan with her first and fourth sons, and then moved on, first to her second son in Kao-hsiung and then finally her third son in Hsin-chu. Because of the long distances between her stops, the mother stays at each son's home for a period of two months. Wherever she stays, she does housework.

Residence. It is most common (25 cases, or 71.43% of the sample) for parents to live with already married sons in a U-shaped compound, or in a nearby annex. In four cases the sons live separately in the same village, and the parents live with just one of the sons. In five cases the parents live in rotation at each of their sons' homes. The details are not

clear in one case. In terms of residence, then, all households that participate in a meal rotation circuit should be viewed as forming a single high order unit, and aged parents should be considered members of a common agnatic group with at least some of the characteristics (meals, shelter, etc.) of a domestic group. It is not even uncommon for parents who share the same U-shaped compound with their sons to have their meals sent to their living quarters from the kitchens of their various sons.

Benefactors. Out of 35 cases, there are 19 where all the sons in a meal rotation agnatic group act as benefactors and 16 cases where only some of the sons so participate. In the remaining 16 cases there are a total of 21 sons who for one reason or another fail to serve as benefactors. Five of these sons do not serve because they have not yet married. Three do not serve because they have married uxorilocally. Seven do not participate because they are employed in distant places. In two instances sons do not serve because of a conflict with their parents. (I have not been able to find the reasons why the remaining four sons do not participate as benefactors.)

Spending money. When mothers are involved in meal rotation, their sons typically give them a little spending money. In some cases such money is given according to a fixed schedule. In other cases the money is given on an "as needed" basis or when the sons have "extra income." Some sons also similarly divide their parents' medical expenses. (In fact, it is my impression that medical expenses account for a large part of the total cost of supporting parents.) Some parents who have their own incomes do not accept spending money from their sons, while some wealthy parents even help support their sons and buy things for their grandsons. One mother, who rotates between her two sons' homes in Ling-ch'uan and P'ing-tung city according to a flexible schedule, is eagerly welcomed at each of her sons' homes. Whichever son's home she stays at, she pays that household's expenses for attending weddings, funerals, and other major events.

Labor. Except for the aged, weak, and sick, parents ordinarily help with the housework at the homes of their sons. In principle, parents who participate in meal rotation are like guests when they go to a son's home, should be treated like honored visitors, and are under no obligation to work. Be this as it may on the ideal plane, in the real world the parents do a lot of work. In fact, some sons and daughters-in-law are in great need of their parents' labor, and hope the parents will decide to abandon meal rotation and take up long term residence. This is especially true if the daughter-in-law works outside the home.

The Normative Grounds for Meal Rotation

Support for one's parents is regarded as a given absolute in Chinese culture. Patrilineality, ancestor worship and filial piety are mutually reinforcing; together they form a norm to which all Chinese families are expected to conform. A son's tie to his ancestors is made intimate by stressing the debt he owes them for his very existence, and he can look forward to his own descendants owing him the same debt. In Chinese kinship ideology the living link the past and future in an unbreakable chain of obligation. There are no acceptable means of side-stepping one's obligation as a member of a line. There is, however, a vast assembly of alternate means of providing descendants where biology fails.

The cult of ancestor worship makes this chain of obligation among the living objective by showing it as also inherent in the ties of worship between the living worshiper and the deceased ancestor: the beneficiary of his descendant's sacrifices. According to this view, ancestors must rely on the support of their descendants in the world of the living for their livelihood. If they fail to get this support, then the ancestors have no assured source of livelihood and their descendants in the world of the living lose by default any hope of spiritual assistance—moral or material—from their ancestors. The living who are without descendants look forward to a grim future.

The moral substance binding the hierarchy in an unbroken chain of obligation between members of a patriline is known as "filial piety." As indefinable as "love," it makes equally strict demands on behavior. Judgements of filial and unfilial behavior might vary, but unfilial behavior is universally condemned and filial behavior universally celebrated. Supporting parents is one way that descendants make their filial piety concrete (and public). Although both sons and daughters have the duty to be filial to their parents, the daughters' responsibility is relatively less. Sons and daughters share different rights and duties toward their parents, natal ancestors, and natal family property. One of the clearest examples of the bifurcation of rights and duties along gender lines is the fact that when sons divide their parents' property among themselves they then have the obligation and responsibility of supporting their parents.

Meal rotation is but one of several means of supporting parents. My data show that the two most common means of supporting parents in Ling-ch'uan are meal rotation and fixed support. By fixed support, I mean support of parents after household division where the parents live and

eat with only one of the sons. In meal rotation actual meals are provided, often together with spending money, housing, and other concrete forms of support for parents which may be provided through some equitable mechanism. Fixed support also implies that the obligation to provide meals, shelter and so forth is met, in coin if not in kind, equally by all sons.

First, there are examples of broken families in the sense that one or more married sons have already withdrawn their respective shares of the household property, leaving an undivided core (perhaps including only one son and some property). Structurally broken, the family nevertheless continues and the parents become dependent upon their economically independent sons. Secondly, there are those families that, undivided, need not resort to other means of support, and some parents who are for one reason or another unsupported and without a household.

In terms of supporting parents or not, the 30 sample households of Ling-ch'uan in 1981 can be detailed as follows. Eight households have meal rotation, three have fixed support, and three have parents eating with their unmarried children. One household has the parents buying and cooking their own food. In 6 households parents have died and there is no further need for support. In 8 households there are 4 joint families and 4 stem families (all of the latter with single surviving sons) where residence, support, and other forms of cooperation continue as before despite the fact that the family property has been divided. In one household mother and daughter-in-law conflict has resulted in one son not joining his two brothers in meal rotation support of their aged mother.

Distribution and Variation

Table 1 shows the distribution of meal rotation households in different parts of Taiwan, and includes data reported by other researchers. These percentages range from a low of almost no meal rotation households in She-liao in 1971 to a high of 31.85% in Nan-ts'un in 1980.

Chuang Ying-chang devotes much attention to this sharp contrast between She-liao (1972: 89) and Nan-ts'un (1981, 1982). Although it apparently was once common, meal rotation is now disliked by the older She-liao villagers. Dissatisfaction was described as being based on the thought of having to endure the grimaces and shifting moods of their daughters-in-law. Chuang has more recently (1976: 72-4; 1981: 85) added to his explanation of meal rotation the argument that the absence of meal rotation in She-liao is related to land ownership. Parents refused to join

TABLE 1
Percent of households in meal rotation for 6 Taiwan Villages

Village	Households	Meal Rotation	Pct.
She-liao (1971)	150	a few	—
Yang-chih (1980)	132	11	8.33%
Chu-lin (1981)	223	27	12.11%
Ch'uan-chou Ts'uo (1966)	225	31	13.78%
Ting Ts'un (1971)	159	32	20.13%
Ling-ch'uan (1981)	322	72	22.36%
Nan Ts'un (1980)	449	143	31.85%

in meal rotation because doing so undermined their authority. Parents who managed to keep a portion of land from being divided among the sons at household division could realize their preference of either preparing their own meals or living on fixed support with only son.

I see two problems with Chuang's explanation of the disappearance of meal rotation in She-liao and land. First, even if the parents retain some land called "old-age capital" (*lao-pen*) or "old-age support land" (*yang lao ti*) (see Tai 1963: 15 and Chuang 1980: 137), this does not bar them from taking part in meal rotation. There are many such cases in Yang-chih and Ling-ch'uan. In Ling-ch'uan meal rotation has even become a local norm. Comparatively speaking, the only part of Chuang's description of meal rotation that holds up is where he says it died out because people did not like it. This is even clearer when considering the second problem with Chuang's explanation: parents that have no land can still avoid meal rotation. Normatively speaking, sons share equally the responsibility of supporting their parents; if the parents are set on not eating their meals in rotation, the sons must either give the parents money or find some other means of meeting their filial responsibilities. In short, I find no cause and effect relationship between whether or not parents retain some land and whether or not they participate in meal rotation. Of course, the whole issue would be much clearer if Chuang had provided quantitative support for his explanation of the absence of meal rotation in She-liao.

Chuang's other point is,

Although meal rotation was once common, economic development and agricultural mechanization in recent years has made it possible for aged parents to continue farming after their children have left home. Because of this, aged parents

need no longer rely on rotating among their sons for their meals, and prefer instead to either live independently or permanently with one son. This situation has led to the disappearance of meal rotation. (Chuang 1976: 74)

Again according to Chuang, hired agricultural labor makes it easier for aged parents to live independently, which in turn lowers the incidence of meal rotation. I have trouble, however, in seeing any connection between hired labor and the convenience of living with only one son. Parents generally live with one married son to form a stem family. Whether the land is owned jointly by father and son or owned separately by either the father or son, it should be cultivated by the whole family working together. The appearance of hired agricultural labor and agricultural mechanization have only made it less necessary for the family to rely on its own efforts. This is totally unrelated to the cohabitation of the older and younger generations of a stem family. The agricultural mechanization and the hiring of agricultural labor mentioned by Chuang (1976: 72) can only be said to facilitate parental independence.

In short, Chuang has not offered a satisfactory explanation as to why meal rotation once popular in She-liao was virtually absent by 1971. I suspect that the change is better accounted for by a breakdown in norms. Aged parents, fearing the negative attitudes of their daughters-in-law and still able to run a farm on their own, opt for a more independent life style. Moreover, some aged parents choose to live together with only one son, forming a low level stem family household and a high level joint family (or a joint style household group family). Parental authority is perhaps greater in a joint family. Sometimes this puts the parents in a position of having to deal with the same daughter-in-law day in and day out. At least from the parent's perspective, this is not as good as participating in meal rotation, which enables parents to circulate among their daughters-in-law and avoid the frictions of too frequent and too close contact. With the diversification of occupations, many sons have moved away from their natal homes. If transportation is inconvenient, this most certainly will stop parents from leaving the village to participate in meal rotation. This is probably a major reason why there are no households participating in meal rotation in She-liao.

Land naturally comes to mind when trying to explain the differences in meal rotation distribution in fishing versus agricultural villages. Land is necessary for farming, but of little importance in fishing. As long as one is young and strong one can fish (see Chuang 1981: 85 and 1982: 56). Not unexpectedly, farmers and fishermen have different ways of

coping with old age. If a farmer retains some land, he can divide it among his sons for cultivation. In this way the sons' responsibility for supporting their parents is made greater and elderly farmers are given guaranteed incomes.

Support may be in the form of meal rotation, or some other alternative. A farmer might even choose to remain self-supporting and divide none, or only some, of his land among his sons. Agricultural mechanization and the hiring of agricultural labor have made it possible for him to continue running his farm without having to invest his own labor. Meal rotation is not likely to occur in such conditions. When a fisherman grows old, however, he has few means at his disposal for keeping immovable property like land under his control once the household is divided. In effect, he becomes a person with little capital who must be self-supporting. If a fisherman's health does not permit him to work at sea, he must rely on his sons for support.

We have seen that there are many different means of providing support, and that meal rotation is but one alternative. Why is meal rotation accorded so much importance in fishing villages? According to 1980 data (Chuang 1982: 54), 143 out of 449 households (31.85%) were participating in meal rotation in Nan-ts'un. In 45 (10.02%) households the parents prepared their own meals and were given money for living expenses by their sons. In 25 households (5.57%) the parents lived with one married son and their other sons gave them money on a monthly basis. Nan-ts'un fishermen definitely like meal rotation. In fact, it has become the norm.

I think the equal sharing of the responsibility of supporting parents by sons is a Chinese cultural concept. The tendency in the fishing industry to closely calculate fish harvest sales and the facility with which fish can be divided into equal shares make the concept of equal distribution especially important in a fishing village (cf. Wang 1967). As a result, this has strengthened the concept of equal division of parent support. Supporting parents by meal rotation is certainly more equitable than having the parents live with just one son. Meal rotation has been widely employed in fishing villages for this reason.

Another look at Chuang's Nan-ts'un data provides further evidence in support of this thesis. That is, the incidence of meal rotation is not as great among the 63 (14.03%) households there engaged in fish farming. Owning fish ponds is equivalent to owning land, so the situation of these households resembles that in farming villages.

I found large variation in meal rotation distribution between the three villages I surveyed (see Table 1). It is possible that variation in distribution

is tied to occupation. My census of occupation in Yang-chih, Chu-lin, and Ling-ch'uan show an inverse proportion in the distribution of farmers and laborers, the two most important occupations. The higher the proportion of farmers, the lower the proportion of laborers. This is the case in Chu-lin and Ling-ch'uan. When the proportion of laborers is high, the proportion of farmers is relatively low. This is the case in Yang chih. Chu-lin and Ling-ch'uan are farming villages. A large majority of Ling-ch'uan villagers are farmers. Data from these three villages would suggest that a high ratio of farmers to laborers will result in a high incidence of meal rotation.

It was found in Yang-chih, where out-migration is high, that it is difficult for elderly parents to move between their sons homes in meal rotation if some sons live outside the village. This has tended to reduce the incidence of meal rotation. In Chu-lin, where agriculture is concentrated on rice and sugar cane cultivation, most villagers do farm work and there is little out-migration. Here the incidence of meal rotation is high.

I have data on 30 households covering 30 years in Ling-ch'uan. Meal rotation households have ranged between 5 and 8 for the past 30 years. Various conditions influencing meal rotation converge in Ling-ch'uan and the incidence of meal rotation has stayed consistently high.

Ling-ch'uan has remained unchanged in important ways over the past 30 years, and such changes as have occurred have helped keep the economy centered on agriculture. Around 1951 the villagers began to open up river bottom lands, where they then grew vegetables. Harvests were good, and this encouraged more and more villagers to cultivate river bottom lands. The government opened even more river bottom land to private cultivation in the 1960s and 1970s. The profitability of the truck farming on that land has limited out-migration. This created an important precondition for meal rotation: quite a few elderly parents were supported by meal rotation because their sons were still in the village. This kept the percentage of households participating in meal rotation from dropping.

Conclusion and Discussion

First, meal rotation is a compromise between the ideal and the real in Chinese family life. The ideal Chinese family is an extended family whose members are all mutually dependent and work together for shared goals. Sons continue to live together after marriage. The family may attempt the goal of five generations under one roof. Property is one of

its major assets. If a Chinese family is viewed in terms of rights to family property, then it is a joint family in which rights to the family property belong to the sons jointly. Following division of the household, the sons divide the family property equally among themselves.

Ideally speaking, in China sons own household property jointly. Practically speaking, however, family life is not like this. At household division, not only are rights over property divided equally between sons, but so too are obligations for supporting collective dependents. My field work data indicate that at the time of household division corporate property and debts are shared equally by the sons. An equitable share of the responsibility for worshiping and offering sacrifices is also sought. Likewise, if the parents are still living, the sons also strive for an equal division of the burden of supporting them.

The Chinese consider supporting parents to be a natural, unalterable principle of life; it stabilizes the relationship between older and younger generations. This kind of vertical relationship between generations has more importance than the equal sharing between brothers. However, in supporting parents the equality of sons and the allocation of the burden of supporting parents also come into play. All else being equal, Chinese households find meal rotation attractive because it provides an equitable means of supporting parents.

Second, the extreme sensitivity of the Chinese household in general and meal rotation in particular to local socioeconomic context means that, in terms of structure, meal rotation varies widely from place to place and case to case. Family, lineage, and clan are all kinship groups. The essential structure of the first of these is rather different from the last two. Besides being the same as the lineage and clan in that they are ordered by the principle of shared descent, the family is also ordered by the flow of daily life. This is something not characteristic of the lineage or clan. For example, Arthur P. Wolf has said that Chinese domestic institutions are extremely flexible (Wolf 1981: 357).

The average duration of meal rotation for 30 households over a 3- year period in Ling-ch'uan has been 9.8 years. Demographic changes, such as in life expectancy, marriage age, and number of sons, will have an influence on meal rotation. As life expectancy lengthens, and if all else remains constant, one should expect more meal rotation. Also, later marriages should shorten the life cycle of meal rotation. Finally, it is possible that family planning will start to affect meal rotation as the number of sons drops. In sum, even though meal rotation has become something of a norm in some communities (such as Ling-ch'uan and Chu-

lin), its capability to restrain is not as strong as other norms, and probably increasingly sensitive to modern change.

Third, the unit of analysis for meal rotation is the agnatic group composed of the parents (and anyone else living as beneficiaries) and the sons' households. The household is viewed as a residential unit, and for this reason meal rotation presents a knotty analytic problem in cases where elderly parents seem in part members of all their sons' households but not wholly members of any single one of these households. There are people who use the terms "conditional stem family" and "rotating stem family" to handle these situations (Wang 1967: 64, Chen 1977: 116). However, if eating and residing are viewed separately, then only when the elderly parents' eating and residence overlap will it be possible to apply the terms "conditional stem family" and "rotating stem family" (Wang 1967: 64, Chen 1977: 116). In many respects these terms only apply to a narrow part of the meal rotation phenomenon. The term "meal rotation" at least comes closer to the native category, and stresses the emphasis of support. A meal rotation household is a high level household which links otherwise already independent families, and its members are united in an agnatic group by shared rights over parental property and duties for supporting the agnatic groups' common dependants. This means combining the parents and sons' households into a single kinship group. It is a high level unit that transcends the limitations of residence, and cannot be strictly defined by a common economy. In this it resembles the "federated" family (Hsieh 1982: 262). Only by considering meal rotation in terms of the significance of both the family's higher and lower levels will it be possible to better understand the Chinese family.

Structural Conflicts Within the Chinese Family

William H. Newell

Anthropologists are especially susceptible to brainwashing by traditional norms. In Japanese studies a campaign by a group of sociologists, partly centered on Sugimoto Yoshio of La Trobe University in Melbourne and supported by Befu Harumi of Stanford, has been campaigning against the so-called "group model" of Japanese society. Befu as a psychological anthropologist, defines this model as follows:

Co-operation and conformity among group members are prime virtues in such a group; conversely open conflicts and competition (which tend to counter mutual affective satisfaction among members) are taboos, enforced through means such as ostracism, as Smith has discussed with respect to rural community, and shame and ridicule, as Benedict reported. Emphasis on harmonious interpersonal relations goes hand in hand with the norm of a ritualised, formal behaviour pattern which tend to reduce, if not totally eliminate, open conflict or embarrassment. (1980: 171)

The main villains in propagandizing this model are allegedly American anthropologists aided and abetted by various historians, economists, and others both Japanese and non-Japanese. The main objection to this group model rests on the fact that there is now enough room for the recognition of conflict and variety. Sugimoto and Befu mostly blame foreign anthropological scholars for this oversimplified model, but they point out quite reasonably that this model has now been adopted as a useful propaganda device especially by the Japanese Foreign Office to "explain" Japanese behavior to foreigners. An ex-Australian Ambassador to Japan has recently been sent around by the Japanese Foreign Office to various countries in south-east Asia to "explain" Japanese behavior, and Nakane Chie's book *Japanese Society* has recently been distributed free by the

Foreign Office to persons overseas as a propaganda exercise.

A similar type of "national" model has perhaps been in existence in Chinese society. Like the Japanese model, which has been based on an extension of the *ie* to Japanese social institutions at large, the Chinese model has also been based on the model Chinese family in which the authority of the family head in a classical situation has been buttressed by a national ideology most strongly supported by a ruling class. This authority, although supported by law in Republican and pre-Republican China (see Tang 1978), rests much more on ideological and moral grounds. In the traditional "filial piety" stories, those of inferior status to the head of the family continue to sacrifice themselves for the father and mother irrespective of the character of the dominant head(s). In fact in some of the stories it is specifically stated that the old parents are crabby and selfish. It is this unpleasantness which shows how totally filial the son or daughter-in-law really is. The traditional joint family model implies the total authority of the parents in their status roles, and applies irrespective of the actual moral worth of the parents even if the family is destroyed in the process. For example, there is a story where the daughter-in-law of a very poor family gives her own milk intended for her new-born child to her sick father-in-law so that he may live at the child's expense.

It is no wonder therefore that when parents die, the dead retain the same immunity from moral judgement that they had when they were living. In some areas of the mainland it appears that these immediate lineal dead were believed to have beneficent effects on the living. Both Lin Yueh-hwa (1948) and Francis L.K. Hsu (1948) extend the dead ancestors' beneficence to include not only the immediate father and mother but all the ancestors on the altar. Even in Taiwan, in the few instances where some misfortune to the living is ascribed by the spirit medium (*tang-ki*) to the immediate dead father and mother, it is almost always due to some such problem as discomfort in the grave or a mistaken inscription which can be easily corrected, whereas other tablets on the altar often carry on their malevolence from some problem not solved in life, such as jealousy between sisters, one of whom bore a child and the other did not. They are not in the same direct patrilineal descent group.

These earlier books by Hsu or Lin, however, reflect an idealistic model of arrangements between the living and the dead which is regarded as highly oversimplified by almost all younger anthropologists who are interested in this problem. This patrilineal joint family model is the Chinese traditional equivalent of the Japanese group model, supported in this case by conservative Chinese themselves and adopted by a traditional

Chinese State philosophy. Today we realize that there are a number of different ways of behaving in the next world which are connected with different ways of behaving in this world. The attempt to "sell" one particular pattern of behavior and one particular ideology over others is a result of traditional propaganda, and there is no obvious reason why we should accept one specific model over others.

In all fairness however to Hsu and Lin, both recognize conflict as endemic within the Chinese family. But the explanation of this conflict does not lie in an incompatibility between different ways of organizing the members of the family, but rather as a natural development of the large family cycle resulting in family division (*fen chia*). Once the father dies, neither brother acquires authority over the other, so the unity imposed by the father's authority becomes divided with the land. As Tang (1978: 147) remarks on the division of a family described by Lin Yueh-hwa (1948): "Dunglin [the older brother] could actually assert only a small measure of authority [in preventing family division] because he had no legal position with respect to his brother's son."

In fact, within the local domestic group there are at least three different types of organization which sometimes overlap each other, are sometimes opposed, and are sometimes irrelevant to each other. Wolf and Huang describe these organizations as follows:

... what is generally referred to as the Chinese family is a composite of three interdependent but analytically distinct organizations... [One] sees a core composed of the men linked by descent and rights in property. It was with reference to this core that men related to their dead ancestors and the past, and to their children and the future. A shift from this kinship perspective to that taken by the community and the state brings another aspect of the family into focus. The relevant institution is the the *ke* [*chia*], the basic unit of production and consumption, which included women as well as men. Whereas the line spanned time and included the dead as well as the living, the *ke* located the family in space and regulated its relations with the community, the government, and supernatural bureaucracy. ... [The] family has still a third aspect. Crosscutting the jurally defined lines of the men are other solidary groups composed of women and their children. ... [These] groups exerted a powerful impact on decisions concerning marriage and adoption. (1980: 64-5)

Unlike India and most of traditional mainland China, male adoption in Taiwan does not require the permission of other members of the clan, nor is there any restriction on the right of the head of the household as to whom he or she may adopt. Even single persons may adopt children

as long as they form a separate household.

Wolf and Huang's study also deals with marriage, which they divide into three forms identified as major marriage, minor marriage and uxori-local marriage. From a practical point of view, the main difference between these three forms of marriage lies in which of the three organizations of the family (i.e., either the lineage, *ke* [*chia*], or mother/granddaughter tie) exercises the greatest influence. Major and uxori-local marriage results in a loss to the household of one person. But minor marriage, where a girl is brought into the household shortly after birth from another household but not adopted as a daughter so that she can marry a son, is an attempt to try to avoid the exogamic prohibitions normally applicable within the domestic group. Even if the brought-in girl never marries the son, she is entitled to have a tablet on the domestic altar on her death, unlike a natural daughter. The principle which allows her inclusion on the altar is that of recognition as a permanent member of the economic household. As with children born out of wedlock, she is included by being recognized by the household head and inscribed on the household register. Even when she does not marry the son, she is still regarded as a permanent member. Under Japanese law (which seems to have been carried over to some extent to modern Taiwan) the procedure for adoption is similar to the registration of a marriage in which a person is merely transferred from one household register to another.¹

The three different forms of organization within the domestic group associated with major, minor and uxori-local marriage have different implications. The traditional system described initially by Lin Yueh-hwa and Francis L.K. Hsu emphasizes male descent, transfer of property between generations and visible continuity between the dead, both in the grave and on the altar, and the male heir. This continuity is heavily buttressed by the law and by moral and ethical principles. The uxori-local system is a compromise where there is no male heir. But unlike the Japanese system where the *yoshi* fits straight into the position left vacant by the non-existent successor, the Chinese marrying-in system usually *has as one of its conditions* that at least one (usually the first) male child should take the surname of his mother's father. The minor marriage system, according to Wolf and Huang, is an attempt to find security for the mother in her old age, as her real daughter will leave her on marriage, whereas an adopted-in daughter-in-law will be a permanent member of the female working group. In some parts of China a natural daughter is often not recognized as a full member of the family from birth as she must marry out. Minor marriage is clearly a different sort of system from the

other two forms of marriage and frequently results in a conflict, not only between a man and his wife, but very often between a man and his mother. In the example that I deal with in my book on Malaysia in the rural countryside among Teochius (1962), a strong tie often continues between the real mother and her daughter-in-law. Nevertheless the daughter-in-law always bears some sort of hostility to her own parents, with whom she may continue relations. But when she grows up she knows that her mother-in-law is the only useful mother she is ever likely to get and, even when her mother-in-law ill-treats her, she very rarely contemplates running away.

Which of these three systems become dominant in a particular area clearly depends on ideological even more than economic factors. Wolf and Huang show that in Hai-shan in northern Taiwan the prevalence of minor marriage was not confined only to poor families who lacked the money to undertake major marriage, but that it was found also among rich families who already had daughters. In some parts of China the money necessary to marry a daughter out was frequently used to have the brother married. In a description of her Hakka wedding 50 years earlier in Kwang-tung given by an old lady in Sydney, there is a reference to her mounting the sedan chair to leave her ancestral home. Before she finally entered the chair she took out two coins, saying: "I give two coins to my brother to buy a piece of paddy field. Make sure you do not buy one that is next to the roadside, else the cattle may trample and damage the embankment and passing horses may lie down in the field." She then struck the sedan chair with the sole of *her own shoe* before departing.

The interpretation of the informant is that it was the money which passed to her family for her marriage that at least partially enabled her brother to marry. Moreover her brother would be obliged to attend her funeral before the sealing of the coffin to make sure of no foul play being involved. However, in the Cantonese wedding described by Watson (1981: 593) there is no reference to any rite such as this, and it is the brother who kicks the sedan chair rather than the bride herself, as in the wedding above. The difference in ritual between the two weddings surely reflects an obligatory difference in model behavior between siblings; in the one, girls must marry in part to gain money which enables the brother to marry in order to carry on the ancestral line; in the other, brothers and sisters have no responsibility for self-sacrifice one to the other, as their weddings are separately financed or money passes to the bridegroom's parents. Watson claims that in this Cantonese village in Hong Kong there was a substantial class difference in the marriage of poor and rich peasants,

insofar as among the poor a brideprice system prevailed with minimal dowry, whereas among the upper group, dowries predominated. However Watson claims that the actual rites of marriage did not differ. The rites reflected the ideology.

Marriage may be considered as a rite by which the number of relatives is extended to include new groups of affines. Each new marriage increases the size of the kinship pool, whereas a funeral reduces the number of the lineage members active within the household. In some parts of China women are never regarded as being members of the lineage as a result of marriage. Watson says "Chinese women in general and Cantonese women in particular stand outside the patrilineal system of descent" (1981: 610).

This situation probably varies in different parts of China. In some parts of China women may be regarded as just "passing through" the lineage. In other parts again, especially where lineage ties are weak, women may be regarded as belonging to two lineages at the same time, so that after the husband's death she may go back to live with her parents. I must admit, however, that I have only heard of this in overseas communities such as Sydney, where very few Chinese families even have ancestral tablets in the home.

What we have is a patrilineally oriented pattern of the Chinese "family," including both living and dead males continuously through time and connected with certain forms of property. This ideal of the family is heavily supported by the traditional State ideology and by the class which uses this ideology to accumulate property. In practice, however, this ideology can only operate continuously where the family forms a "stem" system. Where the head of the family produces more than one heir, it becomes impossible to continue operating the system and various devices are used to emphasize that the system is still working even when this is not the case. For example, at the time of family division, the division of the tablets on the family altar is usually the last division to be undertaken, and the younger brother has copies made of some of the tablets on his father's altar. This is a sort of dissimulation as such tablets do not have their eyes dotted and are in a sense "false."

However, there are at least two other forms of family social organization which are latent but which may be used as alternative models. One of these is the idea of a Chinese household as a member of a village community. The household in its ideal form consists of a working group of both sexes and includes, in some circumstances, persons who are unrelated to each other biologically. In my book on Malaysian Teochius (1962) I give an example of a servant who sacrificed himself in his

employer's house during the Japanese occupation by taking responsibility for a black market store of tin. He was executed instead of his employer so that his employer escaped punishment, but the employee's tablet was immediately enshrined on the altar in the central superior position, making him a member of the household. In another instance the head of the house emigrated with a close friend to Malaya, remained unmarried, was addressed as father's older brother within the house by his friend's children, and was ultimately enshrined on the domestic altar. The emphasis here is on the unity of the household.

Since the Chinese in the Malaysian village of Treacherous River did not own the land on which they worked, there was no continuity from father to son based on ownership. Nevertheless, even new households moving into the territory acquired ritual obligations towards the two village cult centers, at the annual worship of Heaven and Earth and at the worship of the Good Brothers. Those eligible for election by lot as president of the two cults included all households in the village, even those consisting of a widow and her children. Tablets on the domestic altar dating beyond three generations were likely to be destroyed, as is also described by Steven Harrell in the village of Ploughshare in Taiwan. He states:

Ploughshare has no recognized internal divisions based on agnatic ties; the next discrete social unit above the household or perhaps groups of brothers' households is the village itself, whose social structure is based on the local community and the network of dyadic ties within it—be they agnatic, affinal, sworn kinship, or simply close friendship, and not on lineage organization. (1976: 375-6)

Harrell also mentions a much higher proportion of uxorilocal marriages than in neighboring wealthier villages.

A third form of family social organization is the type described by Margery Wolf (1972) of a mother and her children. In some cases this form tries to identify itself with the predominant patrilineal ideology. A married woman as a potential or real mother of sons can have her tablet enshrined with her husband's on the altar. At the time of marriage she is entitled to her own property, which she can dispose of as she wishes, and to certain other types of property and goods, which she can take with her if she leaves the family and remarries. But for the most part she is excluded as a woman from owning inherited land, except as a trustee for her husband and son. This exclusion from dominance in her own right can result in the development of a sort of female ideology based on a male model. We know that for the most part an unmarried girl (although not

necessarily an unmarried boy) is excluded from having her ancestral tablet placed on the main domestic altar, although an adopted daughter-in-law (under the form of minor marriage), even if she never actually lives with the son, is entitled to a tablet on the domestic altar. It is clear, therefore, that the exclusion is not because the person is a woman but rather that she is not regarded as a likely permanent member of the household. However in a personal communication from Steven Harrell I have a description of a family altar in a coal mining village in Taiwan on which is displayed a series of tablets consisting entirely of daughters or adopted daughters. The tablets are arranged one behind the other in a Japanese-style tablet container. Since coal mining is very dangerous and many of the sons are killed or leave the village, we have a system of household continuity in this family through females. It is known too that often in the case of prostitutes (where husbands are unnecessary) daughters rather than sons are adopted to maintain continuity after death. This system is certainly irregular by the standards of the ordinary family model, but shows how in special circumstances one principle of organization, continuity, can dominate over another, patriliney.

Or again in the case of minor marriage described by Margery Wolf (1972), one of the main reasons why the mother forces the daughter to sell out her own female child in order to obtain a little daughter-in-law for her son is that the brought-in daughter-in-law will remain permanently in the household to look after the mother. Ordinarily daughters-in-law do not feel an obligation to support their mothers-in-law, as their interest is to maintain a husband-centered household in the case of conflict. Buying a daughter-in-law is an attempt to establish a female unilineal solidarity system parallel to the father/son relationship. The main obstacle to this, as Margery Wolf (1972) and Arthur Wolf and Chieh-san Huang (1980) point out, is the son's resistance to the marriage, as he regards it as in some respects incestuous in practice.

In a situation where the woman is almost entirely financially independent and where the clan ideology is extremely weak, as in the village of vegetable farmers that I have described in Malaysia, the marriage tie becomes much more a sort of *rite de passage* to adulthood.² If the woman becomes dissatisfied with the condition of her family after marriage she will often leave her first formally married husband and try to establish a new family by living with some other man, but retaining her own separate accounts and control of her own unmarried daughters.

In the two case studies of Cantonese quarrels in a neighboring village of Tortoise Mountain (1962: 85-8), the key problem to be faced by the

middleman is whether the man will pay money for his wife sufficient to support his new wife's mother in old age. But whereas sons tend to remain with their fathers (if the latter have any property at the time of separation) until they can take over their fathers' position, mothers have to stick with their daughters or daughters-in-law. One of the interesting features of the Malaysian Chinese system is that there are more Chinese males than females in Social Welfare homes run by the government. Women remain in the households of their daughters-in-law or daughters, looking after the children and being useful, whereas the relationship between fathers and sons is often very bad after the sons reach adulthood. In the Malaysian Chinese countryside there is often the Japanese system of *iinkyō bunke* (retirement household) in which the man is forced to live separately from his wife, who often continues to live in her sons' or daughter-in-laws' houses. This applies especially to poor fathers who own little but their labour.

These three principles of patrilineal descent, unity of the household and unity of the females under the authoritarian control of the mother are often in conflict with each other and result in extremely varied patterns. Tang Mei-chun in his book *Urban Chinese Families* (1978) shows how extremely varied this pattern of Chinese family organization may be. About the only form that he cannot produce in his urban example is that of a three generation family with pairs of married brothers, living together economically, commensally and religiously.

These three actual and often conflicting patterns within the household can also be used to explain behavior outside the household. In Chu-shan in southern Taiwan among Hokkien speakers, there is the custom of reburial after a certain number of years and also a belief that husbands and wives should be buried in the same grave. The reburial is not exactly a rite, as no professional is necessarily involved and the person most usually dragged into the arrangements of washing the bones seems to be the daughter of the family, with some assistance from a member of the village who has washed bones before. From my own observations, however, the great majority of the graves in the cemetery did not seem to have been disturbed after the first burial, and it appeared to me that many second burial performances were carried out more in the breach than the performance. Also in the case of one family with whom I was familiar, I paid a visit to the graveyard with the eldest son and discovered to my surprise that he could not find the grave of his father, although his mother's grave was beautifully decorated on a good site. Apparently the mother had died at about 80 years of age but his father had died when

he was only a few years old. He was now about 50. On Ch'ing Ming he visited his mother's grave and two uncles' graves (both FB and MB). This splitting of responsibility outside the patriline was by no means uncommon even for other families and, irrespective of uxorilocality, it was not uncommon for the children to visit graves of both their father and mother which were separated. In this case, the son said he did not know anything about his father, but his mother had brought up the family of three children without remarrying and he was very fond of her. We cannot say that there was a patrilineal pattern of burial in this village even though there was a patrilineal model. Each person was in fact buried as an individual and the treatment he or she received was related to the degree of love or affection or the depth of the relationship he or she had with persons still living.

Near the main island of Taiwan is the island of Yonaguni which has a specialized form of ancestor worship dissimilar from both the Japanese and Chinese forms. However, most of the islanders have a very good knowledge of Chinese customs, perhaps left over from the time when Japan ruled over both Taiwan and the Ryukyus. I asked the villagers several times to criticize the Taiwanese form of ancestor worship from their own point of view. Two criticisms immediately surfaced. Their first criticism against the Taiwanese system was that young children were not entitled to a mortuary tablet and that unmarried girls were excluded from the main altar. They considered that any member of the community should be eligible from birth to permanent membership of his or her household after death and that this particular Taiwanese custom was related to discrimination in Chinese society against women and the young. The second difference of importance between their society and that of Taiwan was that up to the end of the war all members of the household were buried in the same collective mausoleum or near each other. But in recent times the *yuta* (female shamans) have been carrying out a campaign not to allow two lines of potential descent to be buried in the same grave. Thus a man and his two wives, both of whom have given birth, cannot rest in the same vault. The second wife (and her children) must be buried separately. Similarly, two brothers cannot have their tablets on the same altar without a partition between them. It has been estimated that about one third of the illnesses on Yonaguni are ascribed to maleficent ancestors who plague the living because of conflict after death. This attribution is an attempt to introduce descent principles from the upper social strata of the main island of Okinawa. Also in the traditional Okinawan system, the eldest sister often remains permanently connected with her brother as a

sort of family priestess. In some parts of the southern Ryukyus it is not uncommon for a married sister to be interred with her brother rather than her husband.

This process of lineage (in contrast to household) continuity is not found on the neighboring island of Tarama, where even unrelated persons may be buried in the same vault and ancestors can be arranged on the altar in any order, provided that each generation occupies a different shelf. No illness is ever ascribed to the ancestors, and when I visited the island some years ago there was only one shaman on the island who was a ritual specialist rather than a *yuta*. There were no female shamans on Tarama, whereas perhaps one third of the married women in Yonaguni claimed to have shamanic knowledge of some sort.

In Yonaguni in the past there were many communal graves where whole families were buried together. But now under the influence of the *yuta*, many previous graves are being exhumed and divided, and so when either two wives or two brothers have been buried together one of the two must be disinterred and reburied in a separate grave. The people of both Yonaguni and Tarama carry out bone washing and reburial after about eight years. Whereas in Tarama the household is the basic unit in society, in Yonaguni it is the family with an increasing emphasis on unilineal descent. It is clear that the arrangements on the altar and in the grave and action taken to determine the behavior of the dead all closely reflect different aspects of the organization of the residential group. The Okinawan model of the household is unilineal, (not necessarily patrilineal) and graves are regarded as extensions of the house. In Tarama each main house occupies a traditional house site, each house site in the village being arranged in a traditional pattern, but in Yonaguni it is the descent system which determines the ranking and status of the household. Unlike China, if an older brother lacks an heir, the younger brother's child is expected to transfer from his line to become the main house's heir, thus possibly terminating the cadet line's house. Hence divisions which occur are often not permanent and still allow political or religious allegiance to the main stem.

What interests me in relation to the foregoing is that whereas in totally household-oriented Tarama, ancestors are wholly beneficent or harmless, in Yonaguni the rise of conflict between descent lines within households results in ancestors harming the living. Harmful ancestors seem to arise from conflicts between newly created different classes of ancestors. In Yonaguni this conflict is accentuated by the existence of numerous *yuta*, who are dedicated ideologically to emphasizing descent lines.

In Taiwan maleficent ancestors originate either from those dead who are excluded from a determined status in the male-dominated patrilineal ideology, or from those persons whose inferior status before death resulted in quarrels which were unresolved. It would be interesting to find out in the anomalous *chia* described by Tang Mei-chun (1978) whether the number of dissatisfied dead is much greater than in the case of household oriented families, where continuity through father/son is of such lesser importance that only tablets for three generations are found on the altar. Patrilineal descent is of less importance than residential identity. I am not sure, however, how far this comparison with the southern islands of Okinawa can be taken, as graves in Taiwan and to a lesser extent in Yonaguni are collective graves, whereas in China villagers are interred individually. Where Chinese believe in grave geomancy, the site of a father's grave may mean good luck for one brother and bad luck for the other. But there is no grave geomancy in Japan (including Okinawa), although in Yonaguni the first site of a new grave has to be oriented in certain directions.

Similar examples of conflicting models within the household can be found in other related aspects of society outside the *chia*. In Chu-shan in Taiwan, I visited a special hall built to commemorate all those persons of one surname who were able to claim any type of patrilineal relationship to the original immigrant from the mainland, but saw only one fictitious tablet in the hall for worship. At a reunion meeting all those present lit incense to the tablet, bowed to Sun Yat-sen's portrait on the wall, and then immediately got down to business. It is true that a special book has been published by this group with genealogical information, but this merely groups together households of the same name. At meetings each person present had an equal vote and was expected to contribute equally to social and other expenses. No one had any advantage through being eldest son of their generation. This "clan association" has only been started since the war. I think the members who were present knew that this was not at all similar to a traditional ancestral hall, yet when they tried to describe the system of operation to me, it was in terms of a traditional model. However, I must admit that there were only male representatives present. But female exclusion is not the same thing as patriliney.

It has been argued by a number of anthropologists that the continuity of the patrilineal/clan/male model of society depends on the ownership of some sort of collective property, especially land or a business, or perhaps a house. Tang Mei-chun (1978) shows that a house is now

regarded as a profitable investment in Taipei; with the current high price of land, many families stay together and extend the house into two or three stories which the brothers continue to own jointly with a single ancestral room, while each occupies a separate section of the building, perhaps even renting part of it out. The house remains jointly owned after all other aspects of communal cooperation have been terminated.

What is the situation where land and property belong to the State? It is often argued that on the mainland the abolition of major land and property holding was a more effective way of destroying the traditional model of a Chinese *chia* than any other political action that may have been taken against the large family. Yet in Shanghai when those youths sent down to the countryside were permitted to return to the city, one of the methods of tackling the unemployment problem was to allow any employed father to resign from his factory job (receiving a lower retirement pension) and to nominate one son to take over his position, thus creating a form of inherited occupation and also entitling the son to move into a factory dormitory. Any other unmarried children of course received no unemployment pay and no entitlement to independent accommodation, so they continued to live with their parents and were supported out of the father's retirement pension. It was the hope of the government that eventually all these returned youths would be able to find jobs. The official statement is that this would take at least four years, even for the returned youths who receive some priority in being given employment. This system seems to rest on the principle of unity of father and sons and implies the creation of at least one form of private property, that of occupation. Similarly, certain types of hawkers and small shops are entitled to exist in their own right, provided that only the proprietors' own children are employed.

It seems to me, therefore, that the standard model of a Chinese family still continues to influence behavior supported by the laws and ideology of the society at large, but that where dissatisfaction with the model arises, alternative structures of organization implicit in the sexual division of the family or the nature of the household may take over. Such conflicts as result are not only due to the eventual breakup of the *chia* by division, but are inherent in the nature of the household organization itself. These inconsistencies and quarrels are reflected in the next world and a study of the different practices involved in ancestor worship and burial can give anthropologists a key to contemporary structural conflicts in the *chia*,

between the sexes, and between those in the direct descent group and those who are anomalous in terms of the traditional descent system.

Part Three

STRUCTURAL FLEXIBILITY
AND INFLEXIBILITY

Matrilateral and Affinal Relationships in Changing Chinese Society

Bernard Gallin

Rita S. Gallin

Introduction

Over 20 years ago we wrote about the role of matrilateral and affinal relations in Chinese society in Taiwan and suggested that the findings provided ample justification for further inquiry into the subject (Gallin 1960).¹ Since that time, numerous sinologists have remarked upon the role of affinity in Chinese life, frequently noting our concern with this relatively unresearched and unrecorded area of Chinese life. Nevertheless, but for Rubie Watson (1981), no researcher—ourselves included—has taken up the suggestion and dealt head-on with the nature and significance of matrilateral and affinal ties in Chinese society.

There are several strands in the literature that suggest why this may be so. In the first section of this paper, then, we want to consider the reasons for the continued neglect of this subject via a sampling of the ethnographic literature on China. This examination not only will help us understand our preoccupation with patrilineality in China, but also will provide the rationale for the proposition we want to consider in the second section of the paper. This proposition grew out of a question which was raised by our review of the literature and our field experiences: under what conditions are matrilateral and affinal ties important in China? The proposition we will discuss states that inter-family ties are important when Chinese families' socioeconomic and political activities and interests extend beyond the lineage, village, and land-based economy.

Given the fact that we have not yet fully put this proposition to the test, our discussion will be fairly speculative. In part, it will be based on observations of and delimited interviews about the nature of matrilateral and affinal relationships among Hsin Hsing villagers—people

who, over the past 20 years, have been transformed from primarily peasant agriculturalists into part-time agriculturalists and full-time, off-farm workers and entrepreneurs. In part, our discussion will be based on inferences derived from secondary data about villagers in contemporary mainland China—people who, over the past 30 years, have remained primarily commune-bound agriculturalists. Through the use of these materials, we will attempt to show that matrilineal and affinal kin are important to villagers who are outward-oriented and, conversely, that they are less important to villagers who are inward-oriented.

The Neglect of Matrilineal and Affinal Relationships

Perhaps one reason why we have neglected matrilineal and affinal relationships in Chinese life is that as social scientists, our major goal is to discover and account for patterned relationships among phenomena. We seek knowledge about regularities and attempt to arrive at *generalizations* about Chinese society. But, as Fried (1953: 95) has noted, "...kin relations which are beyond clan...lack institutionalization and present few sweeping regularities on which generalizations may be based." The omission of these extra-"clan" relationships as a topic for research, then, may reflect our reluctance to study a phenomenon that allows us to account for the behavior of only particular groups of Chinese, not for that of a whole population of Chinese.

Yet another reason for our neglect of these relationships may be that as sinologists our training has emphasized the primacy of patrilineal kinship as the organizing principle of Chinese life. It is not surprising, then, that we have developed a prejudice in favor of lineage and focused our research on this perduring unit of kinship. Further, a major source of our knowledge about Chinese family and kinship has been the work of Maurice Freedman, whose primary laboratory was southeastern China and areas to which migrants from this region emigrated. Given that this region of China was dominated by elaborate lineages, Freedman adopted a descent paradigm to explain the social arrangements found there. It is not unexpected, then, that those of us who study derivative populations in Taiwan or Hong Kong followed Freedman's lead and made the patrilineal descent group the focus of our investigations.

Our training, however, has influenced not only our choice of research subjects, but our interpretation of data as well. We noted above that researchers frequently remarked upon the role of affinal relations in

Chinese life, suggesting that they "... could clearly serve as an important foundation for political and economic activity" (Freedman 1958: 105). Yet, despite their potential instrumental value, affinal relations are not analyzed in terms of their function. They are examined—when they are examined—within the context of the symbolic meaning of marriage and ritual (Ahern 1974; Freedman 1970; Wolf 1970). The researcher asks: "Why is it appropriate for...[affines] to behave as they do?" (Ahern 1974: 299). How do affinal relations affect the role of a daughter-in-law within the family and lineage or kinship group (Ahern 1974: 279–307; Freedman 1970: 163–187)? What is the relative status of and relationship between affines based on their roles as "wife-givers" or "wife-takers" (Ahern 1974: 279–307; Freedman 1970: 14–15, 185; Wolf 1970: 199)? In short, the question is not, what is the practical value of affines? The question is, how do affines fit into the arrangements of life of the agnatic group?

The omission of the utility of affines from the set of research questions produces a clear bias that is reflected in the analysts' interpretations of the nature of these relationships. Let us explain what we mean. We all are aware that social exchanges involve "...voluntary actions of individuals that are motivated by the returns they are expected to bring and typically do in fact bring from others" (Blau 1964: 91). We also are aware that Chinese invest their relationships with *ch'ing* (feeling) to better ensure that others will discharge their responsibilities. They maintain *kan-ch'ing* (sentiment) and *jen-ch'ing* (good will) because when good *kan-ch'ing* exists, people respond to one another with behavior appropriate to each other's expectations; when *jen-ch'ing* exists, people do things for each other because they expect a response in kind. Accordingly, if the instrumentality of affines was analyzed, the affective nature of these relationships probably would be emphasized. When, however, this instrumental dimension of the relationship is omitted from analysis, the conflictive nature of these relationships tends to be emphasized.

The duality of these relationships is recognized. Freedman (1970: 186) speaks to the issue when he describes affines as both "kindly" and "troublemaking." Nevertheless, when the analysis of affinity is limited to an interpretation of marriage rituals within the context of patriliney, emphasis is placed on the tensions, not the accord, between affines (*ibid.*: 184–186). They are viewed as a potentially divisive force, a threat to the exclusiveness, unity, and power of the patriarchal group (see also Watson 1981: 609). The rites of marriage, then, become symbols that

mark both the formal severance of ties between the bride and her natal family and the creation and maintenance of distance between affines.

The interpretation of these rites as a distancing mechanism, however, is in some ways paradoxical. It is acknowledged that affinal relations are "Foundations for political and economic activity" (Freedman 1958: 104). Further, it is acknowledged that "economic and political relationships . . . may flow along the channels of affinity" (Freedman 1970: 185). If, however, the rites of marriage are interpreted as symbols that create a distance between affines, the questions become: What "symbols" are available to help affines traverse these channels? How are these links activated?

Further, by whom are these links activated? Freedman (*ibid.*: 10-11) tells us that "...the place given to matrilineal kinship in any local system will depend on the extent to which agnation accounts for the composition of the community . . . while it will vary with the nature of political ties between lineages." There is no doubt that we can learn a great deal about affinity by focusing on the structure of lineage and inter-lineage relations. Yet, we must recognize that it is not lineages *qua* lineages that exploit these relations, but small groups such as the family that do. Further, we must recognize that these families do not constitute a homogenous group, but are socially and economically differentiated. Consequently, as Watson (1981) has shown so well for a village in the New Territories of Hong Kong, affinal relations vary by class. The point to be made, then, is: Important topics of research are obscured when we allow the principle of lineage alone to define our research topics.

In sum, although we have been told that non-lineage relations may be of great value in individual cases (Fried 1953: 95) and that they "...deserve the kind of wide-ranging inquiry so far made only of the family and lineage" (Freedman 1970: 10-11), none of us has responded to the challenge. Whatever the reasons for this apathy, the time has come both to explore this neglected area of research and to answer the questions raised by the literature. In the remainder of our paper we begin this exploration.

First, we discuss the nature of the relationships Hsin Hsing villagers had with their matrilineal and affinal relatives in the late 1950s and 1970s. This discussion is followed by a section in which we describe the role of affinity in the lives of peasants living in Kwangtung, mainland China. Then, using selected indicators, we compare the extent to which importance is attached to affines in the two areas.

Hsin Hsing, Taiwan

Hsin Hsing, one of the 22 villages in Puyen township, Changhua county, is a small, nucleated village located beside the road that runs between the market towns of Lu-kang and Ch'i-hu. Its people are Hokkien (Minnan) speakers—as are most in the area—whose ancestors emigrated from the Ch'uan-chou and Chang-chou areas of Fukien several hundred years ago.

When we first went to Hsin Hsing in the late 1950s, the area was primarily agricultural. There was little economic differentiation within the village and only a few people—better-educated, pre-reform landlords—had off-farm business interests. The majority of villagers derived most of their livelihood from two crops of rice, from marketable vegetables grown in a third crop, and, in some cases, from farm labor. There were virtually no industries and few job opportunities in the local area; underemployment and farms too small to support family members were problems shared by most villagers. Some people, in response, had begun to migrate to the larger cities of the island to seek employment and supplemental income, but most depended on income from the land to support themselves.

Within the village, families were grouped by patrilineal kinship into lineages (*tsu*) or incipient lineages consisting of a few recently divided family units. These *tsu* groups lived in separate compounds or in house clusters. The *tsu* functioned as a ceremonial group, drawing its members together for ancestor worship and life-crisis rituals, but they also had political importance. The more powerful *tsu* within the village formed coalitions in an attempt to coordinate and to control village affairs and succeeded, in that elected offices tended to be held by members of the larger *tsu*. Unrelated families who held the same surname as the influential *tsu* often tried to identify themselves with the group to gain some of the sociopolitical benefits and security that accrued to its members, further attesting to their power.

Patrilineal kinship, however, was by no means the only basis for relations within Hsin Hsing. A variety of voluntary associations drew unrelated families together and provided opportunities to develop relations that crossed *tsu* lines. Further, villagers maintained close relations with matrilateral and affinal kin (*ch'in ch'i*). These relations had practical value in three main fields—the economic, the social and religious, and the mediatorial and political—and have been described in detail elsewhere

(Gallin 1960, 1966: 175-181). Suffice it to say, then, that with the exception of political activities during times of elections, most exchanges between affines revolved around the exigencies of the agricultural cycle, family and village-based religious events, and intra-*tsu* conflicts.

The significance of these non-*tsu* ties were highlighted for us by a controversy which took place while we were living in Hsin Hsing in the 1950s. The controversy also has been described in detail elsewhere (Gallin 1959, 1966: 181-187). In brief, it involved a clash between two men from Hsin Hsing and people from the neighboring village—who beat the two Hsin Hsing men because they “stole” irrigation water—which became an inter-village conflict and a strain on the loyalties of the villagers. This strain had two bases. First, because the village does not coincide with kinship group in Hsin Hsing, no real institutionalized pattern of behavior exists to impel individuals to support a fellow villager as they would if he were a patrilineal relative. Second, because marriage is usually with outsiders, Hsin Hsing people have affines in neighboring villages.

The controversy, then, pitted village loyalty against *ch'in ch'i* loyalty. Some people with affines in the next village wanted to help their fellow villagers, but were wary. They then offered help, but in secret rather than openly. Others, however, felt such strong loyalties to their affines that they acted as “spies,” telling their *ch'in ch'i* about plans made in Hsin Hsing to fight the case. More interesting, though, such people were not censured for their activities on behalf of their affines.

The willingness of Hsin Hsing villagers to tolerate this disloyalty is attributable to the fact that Hsin Hsing was a village in change. To find outlets for the underemployed and to supplement insufficient income from the land, villagers had begun to migrate and, increasingly, to shift from involvement in a primarily subsistence form of agriculture to participation in the market economy. As villagers extended their activities beyond Hsin Hsing, the influence of the village and *tsu* on their lives weakened. The several *tsu* continued to perform functions within the context of the village, but as their members—by necessity—became more involved beyond the village, their role was affected; small and localized, the *tsu* had very limited influence or means to support members in their needs and relationships beyond the village.

Economic developments, however, were not the only factor that affected the solidarity of the village and *tsu*. Political developments affected their solidarity as well. The Land Reform Program of 1949-53 expropriated some of the corporate and private landholdings of the lineages and the two village landlords. As a result, the position of the

traditional landlord leaders within kin groups and the village was weakened. Further, the election system instituted after 1949 made participation by almost anyone possible. Consequently, although village political life continued to be based primarily on kinship, non-patrilateral relationships became important for election to offices beyond the village level.

The villagers' response to these economic and political developments was actively and consciously to reach out beyond the village and lineage, not particularly for political power, but primarily for the socioeconomic reinforcement of their security. Villagers realized that their dependence on others could not be limited to certain people or groups simply because of the chance relationship of village membership or even, for that matter, membership in kinship groups that were too small or economically weak to be of real help. Networks of reciprocal relationships that included affines (and friends) had to be built. Accordingly, when, as noted above, village loyalty threatened *ch'in ch'i* loyalty, the villagers accepted the importance and delicacy of affinal ties and left behavior up to the individual.

In sum, as the villagers became involved economically beyond the village and as the larger society impinged on their lives, they no longer necessarily found it advantageous to focus their relationships solely within the village. Matrilateral and affinal relatives became much more significant as an additional source of security, supplementing that derived from intra-village relationships. Nevertheless, we concluded when we left Hsin Hsing in 1958 that the importance of patrilateral relationships could not be underrated. Villagers continued to lean on their *tsu* and other smaller and less organized kin groups since they were the only basic groupings with which they maintained continuous, uniform, stable relations. They were, as noted in Gallin (1966: 181), "... unquestionably the most important, the most relied upon, and the most meaningful relationship."

Twenty years have passed since we drew this conclusion. During these years, the impingement on the village by the outside world accelerated and the villagers' lives and relationships with the societal system were transformed. The government's decision in the 1960s to adopt a policy of industrialization through export resulted in urban-industrialization, agricultural stagnation, and increased out-migration to cities. Further, national and international developments in the 1970s—including the abolition of the rice-fertilizer barter system in 1972; the implementation of the guaranteed rice price in 1973; the institution of programs to stimulate farm mechanization and rural industrialization that began in

1973; the oil crisis of 1974; and the world recession and inflation of 1974-75—had a profound impact on villagers. Rural industrialization burgeoned, the pace of out-migration slowed, the proportion of households with members working off-farm grew, and the percentage of families that relied *exclusively* on their farms for income decreased exponentially (see Gallin and Gallin 1982a, 1982b).

The impingement of the outside world on the village affected community and *tsu* solidarity as well. During the 1960s, the Land Consolidation Program redistributed the villagers' fragmented landholdings and drew them into different cooperative relationships that crossed kin and village lines. Further, the institution of two changes in election procedures in 1959 and 1961 both increased competition for office and participation of villagers in township political life, and decreased the importance of traditional bonds (see Gallin 1968).² Similarly, the more frequent intercession of government agencies and organizations in times of conflict during the 1960s tended to undermine the importance of the *tsu* group in mediation (*ibid.*).

Events in the 1970s continued to diminish the importance of the traditional relationships that bound villagers together. The introduction of farm mechanization was accompanied, as might be expected, by a decrease in exchange labor. Further, as the villagers' economic activities and interests extended beyond the village's boundaries, Hsin Hsing declined as a source of identity for them. Community religious events continued to unify them, but cooperation in other areas of life waned considerably. Similarly, involvement in off-farm activities further weakened solidarity within the village. Since the *tsu* had very limited influence or means to support their members in their needs and relationships beyond the Hsin Hsing area, their importance as a source of identification and security for villagers was undermined; they continued to perform some of their ceremonial functions within the village, but the *tsu* no longer were dominant sociopolitical organizations working on behalf of their members.

In light of these changes, one might ask: Was the outward-orientation of the villagers accompanied by an increase in the frequency and importance of their relationships with affines? The answer is yes. As a consequence of the villagers' conscious efforts to broaden and to intensify their contacts and relationships with people beyond the local area, the value of affines increased greatly. And these relationships continued to have practical value in the economic, social and religious, and political fields.

Within the economic field, affines offered numerous possibilities for establishing contacts and relationships with others that could be exploited to advantage. Further, they represented a fount of information and help in the establishment and management of businesses. In point of fact, several villagers operated satellite factories, engaged in businesses, or grew lucrative cash crops similar to those of their *ch'in ch'i*, a reflection of the assistance offered when they decided to become entrepreneurs.

Within the social and religious fields, the frequency and importance of relationships with affines also increased. In part, this increase was a consequence of improvements in the local transportation system—for example, motorcycles, “cruising” taxicabs, and an enlarged bus service—that made mutual visiting between *ch'in ch'i* extremely easy. In part, it was a consequence of the proliferation and elaboration of religious activities that accompanied the villagers’ relative affluence. Not only were such convivial occasions an opportunity to visit with affines, they also were opportunities to make contacts that could later be exploited for socioeconomic advancement.

Finally, within the political field, the introduction of the two procedural changes in elections noted above had effects on the importance attached to affines. The increase in competition for office brought by these changes meant that a candidate could no longer rely solely on the support of his or her own kinship group or even of a coalition of several powerful *tsu* groups to be elected. An extensive network of *ch'in ch'i* had to be cultivated to ensure a large circle of workers who would campaign for the candidate among their fellow villagers and their own relatives. In addition, as the villagers’ economic activities and interests broadened, the value of affines who held some official or semi-official position became even more important as a source of help in manipulating the governmental bureaucracy.

In sum, many incipient signs of the economic and sociopolitical significance of affines were evident during the late 1950s as villagers became involved in the market economy through sale of their agricultural products and labor power. Nevertheless, most villagers were tied to the land and the village community, and patrilineal relationships remained their primary source of support. In the late 1970s, by contrast, villagers were involved in the world market and their lives increasingly were defined by non-agricultural economic activities. As the villagers pursued their individual interests, the need to solidify matrilateral and affinal relationships—as well as friendship ties—outside the village for purposes of socioeconomic advancement increased. The extension of such relation-

ships tended to interfere with and weaken *tsu* organization by impairing its solidarity and, therefore, its ability to achieve security for its members. We have not yet asked the villagers whether these changes have increased the value and importance of affines. We suspect, however, that if we did ask they would answer that since affinal relatives outnumber lineage relatives and extend into a wider area, relationships with them better fit their present socioeconomic and political needs.

Kwangtung

The assumption of power by the Communists in 1949 brought profound changes to the rural areas of China. The advent of the commune was accompanied by a decline in villagers' active involvement in non-community economic and political activities and an apparent decrease in their need for outside contacts. Since only passing reference has been made in the literature to the significance of affines in Chinese life before 1949, it is difficult to know what part they played in peasants' lives during earlier times. Nevertheless, Whyte (1979), on the basis of interviews in the 1970s with refugees from the mainland, concludes that in the past, such ties had practical value in the economic and social fields. Before the introduction of the commune system:

...in any locality the households formed on the basis of patrilocal residence often grew similar crops on much the same schedule, and they had to reach outside of the village to get extra labor during peak agricultural seasons. Affinal kin, living in different villages often a good distance away, and therefore growing their crops on a slightly different schedule, formed a primary source of such peak-season labor. In addition, the annual festival cycle took peasants to celebrations outside the village, not only on visits to affines, but also from village to village to take part in the local feast days of the community deities. (Whyte 1979: 221)

Many of these social forms of relations continue, particularly among women. They maintain, for example, some "...standard sort of minimal visiting relationship" and return to their natal home on major holidays (*ibid.*). Further, within the economic field, their relatives "...may still be the source of occasional loans or other assistance in times of need" (*ibid.*). Nevertheless, although women have not severed their ties with their natal family, Whyte finds no evidence that "affinal ties and obligations...have strengthened, and [concludes] we have reason to feel that they are less important today" (*ibid.*).

The reasons Whyte offers for this conclusion have direct bearing on

the relationship we posit between villagers' orientation to and involvement with affines—that is, inter-family ties are less important when the activities and interests of Chinese families are localized. Whyte (1979: 221–222) reasons that “today” affines are less crucial in Kwangtung because:

First . . . some marriages are occurring among members of the same village and localized lineage and thus do not create a separate set of ties outside the village. Second, family farm enterprise has been reduced to the minimal form of a private plot and livestock which can be managed without help from distant kin. Third, the major crops are now farmed collectively by production teams, and peak-season for extra labor are met in new ways—by mobilizing existing labor more effectively (e.g., by letting out school so children can all pitch in) and if necessary by requesting assistance from neighboring teams. So affinal kin are no longer important in coping with agricultural labor bottlenecks. Fourth, the material contribution of the bride's family dowry establishing the new couple is now less important. Additionally, community festival life has almost disappeared, although domestic celebrations remain very important. This means that there are fewer occasions now for peasants to visit their affinal kin and celebration of the traditional round of festivals involves in most cases the immediate family.

Yet other reasons for the localization of peasants' activities and interests might be mentioned as well. Opportunities to supplement income from farming or assigned jobs by engaging in economic activities outside the village decreased with the curtailment of “free” markets (until about 1978–79). Involvement with the area outside the local community lessened with the assumption of the market function by the commune bureaucracy. Relationships with the outside waned with the restriction of migration. Participation in area-wide political life declined with the demise of local elections. (Only a few selected cadres or members of significant commune committees actively participate in political affairs in and beyond the communes.)

In sum, although the data are limited, it would appear that as the exclusivity of peasants on the mainland of China increased, the importance of their affinal ties decreased. The impingement of the larger society on their lives virtually eliminated their economic involvement beyond the “village.” Further, the tenets of socialism assured their livelihood. Accordingly, they no longer needed to reach out beyond the local area for the socioeconomic reinforcement of their security or advancement of their fortunes. “Socialism has paradoxically made peasants more exclusively and intensively reliant on those close at hand, and less oriented to cooperating with peasants living elsewhere” (Whyte 1979: 222).³

A Comparison of Indicators

In the preceding pages we have suggested how the orientation of rural Chinese is related to the nature and significance of their matrilineal and affinal ties. Now we will particularize and indicate the existence of this relationship in the context of behavioral patterns. More specifically, we will compare the way in which bride price, dowry, and marriage arrangements are indicators of the importance or non-importance attached to affines.

Marriage in China traditionally had a broader social function than marriage in contemporary Western culture. It brought a new member into the family, it joined two people who then produced children, and it established an alliance between two families that was, according to Hsin Hsing villagers, "... one of the most important factors in any marriage" (Gallin 1966: 212). To strengthen the bonds of cooperation and obligation between allied affines, families traditionally employed the principle of equivalency. They arranged marriages between children from families of relatively equivalent socioeconomic standing. And they exchanged a bride price and dowry that were as equitably balanced as possible.⁴

In the late 1970s, Hsin Hsing villagers continued to adhere to this principle. Despite the fact that marriages increasingly were "love-matches," the families of a newly married couple usually were as evenly matched in status as the bride and groom were matched both physically and intellectually. Further, the amount and kind of engagement gifts and dowry negotiated by the matchmaker were, ideally, equilateral, thereby ensuring no financial loss to either side.

In mainland China, by contrast, the principle of equivalency seems increasingly to have been abandoned. Social differentiation continues to exist there and is reflected in class labels derived from pre-revolutionary economic statuses such as landlord and peasant. Inter-class marriages, however, have been reported in rural Kwangtung (Whyte 1979: 217-218).⁵ That is, marriages in which one partner was a member of a former landlord family ("exploiting class origin") and the other a member of a poor peasant family seemed to be less uncommon than they had previously been.

Such inter-class marriages, however, tended to adhere to the traditional dictum that "a woman marry up," although the direction in which "social mobility" was achieved had changed. This directional change reflected the fact that class labels are inherited through the male line. Thus:

... a woman from a former poor peasant family who married the son of a former landlord was known informally as a "landlord wife" (*ti-chu p'o*), and her children would bear the landlord label. In contrast, the daughter of a former landlord who married into a poor peasant family would have her own origins largely obscured by the "good class" label of the family she entered, and her children would bear poor peasant labels. (Whyte 1979: 218)

A woman from a former landlord family, then, "married up" when she wed a man from a family of poor peasant origin. Accordingly, when inter-class marriages occurred, it was more usual for the bride to have origins in the "exploitive" class than for the groom since "many preferred not to marry males bearing negative labels" (*ibid.*).⁶

Equivalency in bride price and dowry exchanges also apparently were on the wane in Kwangtung and the worth of a dowry usually was less than the cash and gifts that comprised the bride price (Parish and Whyte 1978: 193). Parish and Whyte (1978: 185) interpret this change as an:

... emergence of something like a pure bride-price-custom, with dowry and indirect dowry becoming much less important. Most of the wedding expenditures of a bride's family are met out of the bride price to get a wife for the family's son. The groom's family, in comparison, has to view the transaction as more unilateral than used to be true, since what they expend does not return to them by way of a dowry. This implies that customs in rural Kwangtung today involve more "marriage by purchase" than in the past.

How can these changes be explained? Whyte (1979: 217-219) argues that their roots lie in the custom of patrilocal postmarital residence. In the instance of inter-class marriage, he notes that while a groom's parents were most concerned with the woman's personal characteristics, her family was interested in the characteristics of both the groom and his family. The groom's family's concern for the woman's traits, then, is viewed by Whyte as an attempt to ensure that she meets criteria defining a good worker; the marriage is a means by which the domestic unit recruits additional labor power to maintain the family. The bride's family's interest in both the groom and his family, in contrast, is viewed by Whyte as an attempt: 1) to ensure the woman's future as best as possible; and 2) in the case of a woman from an "exploiting-class" to obscure her origins and avoid stigmatization.

In the instance of the imbalance between bride price and dowry, Whyte notes that women continue to be brought into the family for two reasons:

1) to bear and rear children; and 2) to contribute their labor power—labor power that could be sold for “respectable” wages—to the family enterprise (*ibid.*: 223). The inequitable imbalance, then, is viewed by Whyte as a reflection of the increased value of women that requires the families of grooms to offer substantial compensation to women’s families for the loss of their daughters’ labor power and earnings (*ibid.*: 219).

While we certainly agree with Whyte that the principle of patrilocality defines marriage practices, we view this principle as a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to explain the behavioral changes that have occurred in Kwangtung. Marriage in China, as noted above, traditionally had a broader social function than the reproduction of the family. It also established an alliance between families—an alliance that could be exploited both to secure and to further the socioeconomic status of the domestic unit. Accordingly, any explanation of the changed customs in Kwangtung—as well as the persistent customs in Taiwan—will be an incomplete explanation if the principle of affiliation is omitted.

Whyte tells us that inter-class marriages that occurred in Kwangtung usually were marriages between women from the “exploiting-class” and men from the poor peasant class. Further, he tells us that the bride’s and groom’s families used different criteria to select a mate for their children. The question is, then: Why was only the bride’s family concerned with family characteristics, and not the groom’s? Postmarital residence has always primarily been virilocal in China. Yet traditionally, and in contemporary Taiwan, both domestic units were concerned about each other’s characteristics. One explanation would seem to be that the groom’s family—and, by extension, the bride’s family—neither intended nor expected to maintain anything more than a minimal visiting relationship after the marriage. A bride whose “bad class” could be obscured was acceptable. But extensive, or perhaps even continued, affiliation with her family entailed stigmatization and was to be avoided.

Similarly, Whyte tells us that a large bride price was the norm in Kwangtung and that dowry had become much less important. Further, he tells us that this norm reflected women’s value as wage-earners. Yet, an equitable balance between bride price and dowry was the norm in other times in China when women also had been wage-earners (Fei 1939; Lang 1946) and is the norm in contemporary Taiwan where women constitute a sizeable proportion of the industrial labor force. The question is then: Why was the bride’s family compensated for the loss of her labor power in Kwangtung but not in pre-Communist China or in contemporary Taiwan? Put another way, why did the groom’s family in Kwangtung

nullify a potential exchange relationship by paying compensatory monies, while at other times and in other places it did not? The explanation again would seem to be that the groom's family—and, by extension, the bride's family—neither intended nor expected to maintain anything more than a minimal visiting relationship after the marriage. The cancelling of the debt incurred by withdrawing the bride's assets at marriage virtually precluded social exchange between the affines since exchange relationships exist only as long as they are imbalanced.

In sum, bride price, dowry, and marriage arrangements were reflective of the importance attached to affines in Hsin Hsing and of the lesser importance attached to them in rural Kwangtung. Hsin Hsing villagers followed the precepts of the principle of equivalency—to the best of their ability—in order to nurture ties that implied acts of reciprocity. People in rural Kwangtung, in contrast, increasingly seemed to abandon the principle. Encapsulated in their production team, and to an extent in their brigade, they saw little need to reach out actively to establish obligation ties with outsiders.

Discussion and Conclusions

Earlier in this paper we posed two questions: What "symbols" are available to convert a tie of affinity into a recognized set of rights and obligations? That is, how are such ties activated? And by whom and under what conditions are they activated? Implicit in these questions is the recognition that links in a social network may be "potential" or may be "actual."

Not all of the potential links that a person may have with another need be activated at any particular moment. The relationship an individual has with some other person may be dormant or latent until it becomes the basis of some social action. . . . For this to happen the people concerned must become involved in. . . . social exchange or transaction which converts the possible into an actual social linkage. (Mitchell 1969: 40, 43)

In other words, by virtue of group norms, individuals might be expected to provide or to claim services or aid. But until some exchange takes place, their relationship with one another remains probabilistic.

Mitchell's distinction is extremely relevant here given the fact that in China there usually is no religious or civil ceremony to mark the joining of a couple—and their families—in marriage. Ties of affinity, however, are recognized at the time of the couple's engagement (Gallin 1966: 212;

M. Wolf 1972: 125-127), and the occasion might be said to demarcate the latency phase of the affinal relationship. The woman's and the man's families recognize each other as kinsmen, but the extent to which the obligations implied by their relationship are "mandatory" is unclear. We would argue that this indefiniteness dissipates with the arrival of the bride's dowry at the groom's home. With the "re-payment" of the bride-price, the set of norms applicable to affines is realized; members of the two families feel free to claim assistance or support on the basis of their bonds. The dowry is a "symbol" that serves to activate links of cooperation between them.

We have seen, however, that these links are differentially activated. In Kwangtung, the "dowry" has given way to more of a pure "bride-price exchange" (Whyte 1979: 218). Peasants are less interested in establishing the ties and obligations with affines that the endowment of a dowry implies. In Taiwan, by contrast, dowry remains an important part of marriage ritual. Villagers are unwilling to jeopardize a potentially meaningful and utilitarian relationship by disappointing their affines' expectations. People pick and choose from categories of individuals and families those with whom they wish to forge bonds that can be manipulated to promote their interests.

We have argued that the choice of affines is reflective of villagers' orientations: that they are less important to villagers who are inward-oriented and that they are more important to villagers who are outward-oriented. In mainland China, collectivization has encapsulated villagers' interests in the local community and "...ties and cooperation with affinal kin...[are] less important" (Whyte 1979: 225). In Taiwan, by contrast, socioeconomic development has educed villagers' interests from the home community and "...affinal kinship provides the most important relationship across villages" (Winckler 1981: 27).

Agmatic kinship, of course, "...remains the most important relationship within villages" (*ibid.*), in Taiwan as well as in mainland China. Undoubtedly, this is why many who study Chinese culture and society continue to be preoccupied with patrilineality. Their emphasis on the conflictive nature of matrilineal and affinal ties—a negativeness they deduce from the symbols of marriage ritual—is, however, less clear. Perhaps they forget that the symbols they observe are products of an ideology that attempts to support patrilineal exclusiveness. In this sense, then, their interpretation of these symbols may tell us less than we think about the reality of behavior in a changing society.

Dowry and Inheritance

Chung-min Chen

This paper examines a series of gift prestations which take place in association with wedding ceremonies in the rural areas of southwestern Taiwan.¹ Specifically, I will focus on the goods and cash transferred between the bride's and the groom's households. Such cash and other valuables, transferred before, during, and after the wedding ceremony, are generally referred to as "brideprice" and "dowry" by the local people and anthropologists alike. For reasons that are still not very clear, dowry as a topic has received much less attention from anthropologists than brideprice.

This is not only the case in general ethnological studies of marriage and related social institutions, but also in studies of Chinese kinship and marriage. Dowry and dowry-giving practices are frequently mentioned in most ethnographic accounts of Chinese communities, but are rarely examined in detail, excepting Myron Cohen's *House United, House Divided* (1976). Why this social institution has failed to attract as much attention as the practice of brideprice is in itself a very interesting topic, but it is not our immediate concern here. In this paper I limit myself to discussing: 1) the practice of dowry-giving as seen in the rural areas of Changhua *hsien* and Tainan *hsien*; and, 2) the relationship between dowry and inheritance.

What Constitutes a Dowry?

A working definition of dowry seems to be in order. Dowry, as seen in rural Taiwan today, can be defined as those valuables transferred from the bride's natal family to the new conjugal unit to be formed either within the groom's natal family or apart from it. Although some of these valuables are given to the new couple for their joint use and possession, the major portion of a dowry is considered as property given to the bride for her own use and control. The contents of the dowry differ in quantity

and quality from one case to another, but some basic categories are still discernible. There are, of course, many ways of categorizing dowry contents. For our purpose, however, we will distinguish these goods and valuables in terms of the occasions when they are transferred from the young woman's natal home to a new conjugal unit that is in the process of being organized and which she will soon join.

Dowry given before the wedding ceremony. The wedding ceremony observed in this part of rural Taiwan is generally preceded by the rite of engagement, which itself can be further divided into two stages. The "initial rite of engagement" (*hsiao-ting*) occurs shortly after the couple and their parents have agreed to the match, and is marked by a formal visit to the young woman's family by the young man, his father, some male relatives and friends, the matchmaker(s). The visitors are formally received by the young woman's father or the male head of her household, accompanied by their male relatives and friends. During this formal visit a set of gifts is presented by the young man's father. These include clothing, jewelry and an engagement ring for the prospective bride, as well as food, engagement cakes and a small portion (or "the first installment") of the brideprice. In return, the young woman's family presents the prospective groom with a new suit (or the material for one), shirts and neckties, and a pair of new shoes. In addition to these articles of clothing, the young man also receives an engagement ring and a gold pin to go with his necktie. The young man's family is presented with food, sweets and fruits to be distributed among his family's relatives and friends as an announcement of the engagement.

The above list clearly shows that there are two types of gifts exchanged at this occasion: durables that go to the young man and young woman, and consumables that go to their families. In the past, these gifts were generally considered as engagement gifts and not dowry *per se*. But, in terms of the above working definition of dowry, it is clear that both the young man and young woman receive some durable personal property from their families at this stage. Furthermore, a portion of the brideprice presented at this occasion will eventually go into the preparation of the dowry when the wedding takes place.

Dowry given at the wedding. A Chinese wedding is a lengthy process replete with many symbolic meanings. What concerns us here, however, are the goods and cash transferred at this occasion. A few days before the wedding is to take place, the "second rite of engagement" (*ta-ting*), is observed. This is marked by the presentation of the remaining sum of the brideprice, its actual amount having been negotiated and agreed

upon by both families beforehand. In most cases, the payment of the second installment of the brideprice is the only item on the agenda on this particular occasion. There are also cases, however, when other kinds of gifts are exchanged between the two families.

On the wedding day, the dowry and the bride are taken from the bride's natal home and transported to her new house by a group of helpers sent by the groom's family. This is also the time when the dowry is proudly displayed. The dowry is laid out in trays and boxes in the bride's house and courtyard before the arrival of the groom's party. When the groom and his helpers arrive, these trays and boxes are loaded onto a truck or some other vehicle to accompany the new couple. One of the most important considerations in loading the dowry is to arrange it in such a way that it can easily be seen by the onlookers. When the bridal party arrives at her new home, the dowry is again laid out for public viewing.

Items intended for the bride's personal use are neatly arranged and attractively laid out in trays and boxes. The trousseau includes articles of clothing ranging from hats to shoes for various occasions and different seasons. Jewelry is another general category of the bride's trousseau that is frequently displayed. In addition to the bride's trousseau, one can also find bedroom furnishings, living room furniture and some major appliances such as a refrigerator, television set, stereo console, sewing machine, bicycle and/or motorcycle. If it is understood that the new couple will set up their own cooking facilities immediately following the wedding, then kitchenware and cooking utensils are provided as another category of the bride's dowry. One part of the dowry includes gifts for the bride to present to her new in-laws shortly after the wedding ceremony. Although these gifts are for neither the bride nor the groom, they should nevertheless be considered as part of the bridal dowry for two reasons. Firstly, they are furnished by the bride's family. Secondly, upon the presentation of such gifts, it is customary for the recipients to reciprocate with a gift of money to the bride. Such gifts of money then become the bride's personal property.

In addition to the articles mentioned above that are openly displayed at the wedding ceremony, there is another important part of the dowry which is generally not made public. This is the cash given to the bride by her parents and other relatives. The amount of such cash, frequently referred to as "private money" (*szu-fang-ch'ien*), is variable. As a general rule, however, this money is intended for the bride and she has sole control over it. Although the amount of the newly wed wife's private money is often a topic that attracts a great deal of speculation, she is the only one

who knows the exact figure and she is usually very reluctant, at least in the initial stage of marriage, to share this information even with her husband.

Dowry given after the wedding. If it is understood that the engaged couple will join the groom's natal family after marriage and will not immediately set up a separate household, the dowry given at the wedding ceremony will not include kitchenware and cooking utensils. Instead, these articles will be given at a later date. It is customary for the woman's natal family, or *hou-t'ou* (literally "behind"), to provide a new set of cooking utensils and kitchenware when she and her husband separate from her husband's parents or brothers to form their own household. When such utensils are delivered a few years after the marriage has taken place, they should be considered as the last installment of the dowry because this delivery is an institutionalized transfer of valuables from the young woman's natal family to her new conjugal family. Her natal family regard these as part of the dowry that they should provide for their daughter. Delivery of the kitchenware and cooking utensils is simply delayed in those cases where the young woman had no need for such items when she first married.

Looking at the dowry from an angle other than that of the occasions when it is presented, it is evident that the bride is taking two types of goods into her marriage: 1) private property, which includes clothing, jewelry and the cash given to the young woman by her parents and in-laws; and, 2) household appliances that are intended for use by the young couple as a unit even though they still constitute a subunit within the larger household of the young man's parents. In other words, with the arrival of his bride and her dowry, the groom not only undergoes a transition in social status (i.e., from an unmarried young man to a married adult), but also forms a new property-owning unit within his parents' household (assuming the new couple will not set up their own household immediately after the wedding), and thereby achieves a certain degree of financial independence. The new couple will not only have their own living quarters furnished with their own furniture and appliances; they, or at least the bride, will have a certain amount of cash under her individual, or their joint, control that can be used for private purposes. Thus, the arrival of the bride together with her dowry is not simply an expansion of the groom's natal family, it initiates a structural change which will eventually lead to the division of the household into separate units. Similarly, Rheubottom observes of the contributions made by the guests toward the

bride's dowry and private money when a Yugoslavian bride arrives at her new home that, "it is as if the guests, in their capacity as kinsmen, are financing the formation of an embryo of dissolution within the womb of the groom's household" (1980: 240).

Funds Used to Prepare the Dowry

Having considered the presentation of the dowry and its contents, I now turn to the sources of funds used to purchase the dowry. This may sound like a very simple question, but the answer to this simple question could help our understanding of the problem of female inheritance.

As observed in southwestern Taiwan, there are three sources of funds commonly used to purchase and prepare a dowry. These are the marrying daughter's family funds, the brideprice paid to the young woman's parents, and the personal savings of the daughter if she has been employed and has had her own income. Furthermore, it should be noted that there is a close correlation between the amount of the brideprice and the amount of the dowry funds provided by the young woman's family. Although the amount of brideprice varies from one marriage to another, it is usually determined through a series of negotiations mediated by the matchmaker or some other go-between. The common belief that parents always try their best to obtain the highest possible brideprice for their daughter is rarely substantiated, at least in areas where I did my fieldwork. People in Changhua and Tainan *hsien* seem reluctant to accept from others a brideprice larger than that they themselves are willing to spend on the dowry. There is in fact an unwritten rule requiring the bride's parents to both spend the entire brideprice received and also to spend roughly an equal amount of their own money to prepare the dowry for their daughter. In other words, the amount of the brideprice agreed upon by both families will roughly decide the total amount of money to be used for the dowry.

To further explain this general practice, let me use an example I also discuss in my ethnography *Upper Camp* (1977). In 1970, a relatively poor sugarcane farmer surnamed Huang in Tainan *hsien* received NT\$12,000 as the brideprice for his eldest daughter. Huang was rather worried because he believed that he himself was obliged to provide a dowry worth at least NT\$24,000 in goods and cash. Being poor and somewhat unprepared to marry off his eldest daughter (she was two months pregnant), Huang was forced to borrow money from his friends and relatives:

When asked why he couldn't merely use the "bride price" for the dowry, thus saving himself from going into debt, Mr. Huang said: "I don't want to give my daughter a bad start in her married life. If she goes over there, to her husband's household, without bringing anything, she will be looked down upon; I will be looked down upon. And, even my neighbors in this village will criticize me for being stingy. Also, as you know, my daughter has been working for five years now, and she gave most of her wages to us. Now that she is getting married, if I don't give her some dowry she is going to be very displeased."

Mr. Huang's is not an exceptional case, and his determination to match the brideprice and spend all the money on the dowry is rather typical. Although he was poor and had to borrow money to do it, none of his relatives and neighbors seemed to disapprove of his decision. (1977: 131-2)

Matching the brideprice seems to be a practice for families of average economic standing. It is common for well-to-do and rich families to surpass the brideprice, thereby providing their daughters with a very substantial dowry.

In addition to the dowry provided by the bride's natal family as a unit, a third source of funds—the young woman's personal savings—is also used to purchase dowry items, or is simply taken along with the bride as part of her private money (*szu-fang-ch'ien*). This third source of funds is playing an increasingly important role in dowry funding because of the increasing number of young village women earning wages from their factory jobs. For example, in 1970 there were seventy-three single women between the ages of 15-24 in Upper Camp. Of these seventy-three women, fifteen were still in school, while eleven were housewives or farmers. The largest sub-group, however, included forty-seven women wage earners employed at factories and stores in neighboring market towns (Chen 1977: 81, 134). Wages earned by these unmarried women were usually handed over to their parents and pooled with other sources of household income. There was an understanding among Upper Camp villagers at the time of my fieldwork that a large portion, if not all, of a daughter's earnings would be used to prepare a dowry when the young woman was ready to get married. In fact, villagers in this area were fond of describing the unmarried female workers as the ones who were working to earn their dowries.

The fact that there have been more women working as wage earners before marriage has changed people's attitudes toward the practice of dowry-giving. From the parents' point of view, after receiving their daughters' earnings for a prolonged period of time, it is quite understandable that they feel more obliged to provide their departing daughters

with a better dowry. The young women, aware of how much they have given to their parents, are not reluctant to complain should they feel that they have not been given a "fair" amount of dowry. As I note in *Upper Camp*:

Some villagers pointed out to me when we were discussing dowry and related customs: Nowadays, girls are very bold. In the old days, no girl would dare to ask or even show her attitude regarding her dowry. They took whatever their parents gave them. But things are certainly different now. Girls of today not only will tell you what they want, sometimes they even dare to argue with their parents for not giving them enough dowry. (1977: 133-4)

Not only have the attitudes of young women and their parents changed, but the perceptions of young men and their families on the same subject have also altered to a certain degree. With the knowledge that a bride has been working and earning wages, the groom's family usually expects her to bring with her a larger, more substantial dowry than if she had never held a job. Such an expectation is not only justified by the fact that the bride has an income, but also rationalized on the grounds that "good girls" save a large proportion of their earnings. In other words, a moral value is attached to the size of a working girl's dowry. This, undoubtedly, has placed an added burden on the bride and her parents to present a "decent" dowry.

Although what we have just presented is not meant to be an exhaustive list of all the funds that go into the making of a dowry, it does cover the most important and frequently used sources. Other sources are also used; for example, gifts and cash given by the bride's family's relatives and friends are frequently included as part of the dowry. In fact, there is a special term for gifts presented to a bride just before the wedding by her natal family's relative's and friends, i.e., *t'ien-chuang* ("something to add to the dowry"). Such gifts and cash are usually included in her dowry. Closer examination reveals that such *t'ien-chuang* gifts actually reciprocate a wedding gift presented by the bride's natal family on an earlier occasion, or are themselves gifts that will eventually have to be reciprocated by the bride's natal family. Thus, the *t'ien-chuang* should in the final analysis also be considered as coming from the bride's natal family's funds.

In sum, then, there are two major sources that go into the purchase and preparation of a dowry: 1) the brideprice that originates from the groom's family's funds, and 2) the bride's natal family's funds, which

should also include the "personal savings" accumulated by a young, wage-earning woman, as well as such *t'ien-chuang* gifts and cash as are presented by relatives and friends.

Dowry as a Form of Inheritance

Knowing the sources of funds that go into the making of a dowry in contemporary rural Taiwan, we shall now concentrate on the significance of such goods and valuables. One of the most commonly-made interpretations of this practice centers around the theme that the dowry is a gift from the bride's parents to their departing daughter. Those who subscribe to such an explanation would not hesitate to point out that since by tradition Chinese daughters do not have any claim on their natal family's property, whatever they received from their family can only be considered as a gift motivated by parental love. Another explanation is that dowry-giving is actually an indication of the young woman's parents' concern for their own social status and standing in the community. For example, Maurice Freedman has this to say when describing the dowry-giving practices found among rich families in southeastern China,

They make it not because the girl has any specific economic claim on them (she is not a member of the property-owning unit), but because their own status is at stake; a bride-giving family must, in order to assert itself against the family to which it has lost a woman, send her off in the greatest manner they can afford. And it is no accident, therefore, that dowry and trousseau are put on open display; they are not private benefactions to the girl but a public demonstration of the means and standing of her natal family. (1966: 55)

Although differing in emphasis, these two interpretations do have one important common denominator: both stress the view that Chinese daughters do not have any claim on the property of their natal family and, by implication, that dowry is not a form of inheritance. It is this particular viewpoint that I will examine in the following paragraphs.

China ethnographies repeatedly reported that in traditional China, men were the only family members with a claim to the family estate. When the family property was divided, all the property was distributed among the male coparceners. Daughters and wives were their father's and husband's heiresses only in rare and exceptional cases, for instance when there was no son in the family or when the family failed to adopt one before the death of the male head of the household. These ethnographic

reports have also noted that although the law was changed shortly after the 1911 Republican revolution and daughters have become as legally eligible as their brothers to inherit their parents' property, the traditional practice of male inheritance is so deeply rooted that it has not been changed in real life, at least in the rural areas (cf. Lang 1946: 44, 115; Tang Mei-chun, this volume).

On the basis of my observations of dowry-giving in contemporary rural Taiwan, I contend that the above viewpoint—that only male members are considered as coparceners of family property and the daughter has no claim on her family estate—is no longer applicable. Such a viewpoint would only still be valid if we equated the right to claim family property with the right to receive a share of such property at the time when the family is formally divided. It can no longer be sustained, however, if we take a broader interpretation of the phrase “a claim over the family property.” If the custom of dowry-giving is examined in great detail and the sources of funds as well as the changing attitude toward dowry is kept in mind, it may have to be concluded that daughters now have some claim on their natal family's property. To further strengthen this argument, let me use another example, this time from Changhua *hsien*.

A person I will call Chou had four children living at home in the spring of 1965: two married sons and two unmarried daughters. It was Chou's preference that all his children would live together in an extended family at least until his two daughters married. The two married sons and their wives seemed to see the situation differently. Their quarrelsome and uncooperative attitude suggested that each would like to see the family divided and each couple form independent households. To avoid further domestic strife, Chou agreed to divide the family. The family's property, including its land, was divided into two equal shares, and each son was given one share. Moreover, the two brothers agreed that they would take turns providing both parents and sisters with food, and their parents with spending money. It was also agreed that wages earned by each of the two unmarried sisters would be their own private money and no one else should have any claim on it. To insure that his two unmarried daughters were given adequate dowries at marriage, Chou extracted from his sons a written promise stating that each would fund the dowry of each of his unmarried daughters with 6,000 catties of rice. Chou asked for rice instead of cash because he knew inflation might otherwise reduce the value of his daughters' dowries should they be slow to marry.

Chou's case was somewhat unusual only in the sense that he had to divide his family before the marriage of his daughters. As far as the

arrangement for his daughters' dowry fund was concerned, Chou's case was not unique. A daughter should be provided with a fair amount of dowry from the family property. Arrangements must be made for future dowries when family division occurs before all daughters have married. My two ethnographic cases of Chou's solution to financing the dowries of his unmarried daughters and Hung's determination to provide a decent dowry even though it meant going seriously into debt, and my general description of the changing attitudes toward dowry-giving, seem to indicate that Chinese daughters now have a certain claim on their natal family's property. I hasten to add, however, that differences still exist between sons and daughters with regard to the timing of withdrawal and size of shares. Unlike her brothers, a daughter receives her share of the family property when she marries and leaves her natal family. Her brothers, on the other hand, receive their shares when the family is formally divided. Furthermore, a daughter's share, received in the form of her dowry, is frequently smaller than that of her brothers. Finally, the daughter not only receives a smaller share, but the kind of property she receives also differs. A daughter, as we are all very aware, gets her share in the form of movable property, while her brothers receive mostly patrimonial property.

While recognizing that differences exist between a son's and a daughter's share of their family property, one must also take note of the fact that the dowry is not a pure gift, nor a mere social statement used to either simply express the status of the bride's family or to demonstrate its standing in the community. A dowry, as now found in southwestern Taiwan, largely represents the daughter's claim to her natal family's property, property to which she is becoming more and more capable of making a measurable contribution with her own income. In other words, the practice of dowry-giving should be seen primarily as a release of the daughter's share of her family funds, or as what Jack Goody called "a type of pre-mortem inheritance to the bride" (1973: 1).

Brideprice and Inheritance

Having argued that part of the dowry should be considered as a form of the young woman's inheritance, let us analyze the other part of the dowry, i.e., that part purchased with the brideprice. We have already noted that the entire dowry is basically intended to be owned by the bride, and eventually shared with her husband as a unit. Thus, the brideprice can be seen as an "investment" made by the groom's family to help him

start a new family. Stated differently, the brideprice can be considered as the first "withdrawal" of the groom's share of his natal family's estate. Through the process of wedding presentations, a part of his family funds is transformed into his wife's dowry. It thus becomes part of the property that he and his wife will own exclusively.

To conclude, let me sum up the main themes of this paper. In rural Taiwan today, the dowry can be considered as a combination of the bride's and the groom's respective shares of their inheritance. The bride takes into marriage her entire share of her natal family's property, while the groom's side contributes only a portion of the groom's future inheritance. The real difference between the dowry and what we used to think of as inheritance is timing: that is, when they are given or made available to the recipients. Inheritance *per se* is given when the family is divided and/or the family head dies. On the other hand, the dowry represents an early payment of inheritance given to its recipient so that a new property unit and conjugal relationship can be formed.

If the dowry can be considered as essentially a form of female inheritance, then it can also be argued that a Chinese daughter's share of her natal family's property is not really so small when compared to her brothers' share. If we examine this situation in the context of obligations and rights, we cannot fail to notice that a daughter's obligations toward her natal family and parents are largely terminated when her bridal sedan departs from her home, whereas a son's responsibilities toward his parents are just beginning when he receives his share of the inheritance. Put in another way, one can say that a daughter's share (in the form of her dowry) is smaller than her brother's because they have different obligations toward their natal family and not simply because the one is female and the other male.

Family Structure and Reproductive Patterns in a Taiwan Fishing Village

Chuang Ying-chang

Introduction

Some scholars think familial networks might be an important factor in reproductive behavior in societies undergoing rapid social and economic change. The importance of familial networks has been ignored for the most part in past studies of reproductive behavior, including especially the KAP studies in Taiwan. For example, these studies generally uncritically assume that the parents are the decision makers in reproduction, and neither take into consideration the possibility of there being beliefs and customs which work against birth control nor the possibility that grandparents influence the reproductive behavior of their children and children's spouses. Both possibilities, however, have been shown to influence birth control (see Caldwell 1982: 335-337).

Chinese familial networks are particularly well developed, and might very well instill social values which affect reproductive patterns. Also, even if these values are economically irrational, particular familial networks might nonetheless support and maintain them. The studies in Africa of Caldwell (1977), Ware (1977) are the most relevant work in this regard. Still, as Freedman (1981: 16) notes, "Most of the empirical work has been done in countries in which fertility is high and neither the family nor the society in general has changed much." Taiwan provides a favorable site for study since its socioeconomic conditions, familial networks, and reproductive patterns are experiencing extensive change.

There have already been many studies of reproductive patterns and family structure in Taiwan (Li 1975; Hsieh 1980; Freedman, *et al* 1978). In particular, the KAP surveys conducted over the years (1965, 1967, 1970, 1973 and 1979) by the Taiwan Provincial Family Planning Institute have been broad in scope. The results of such investigations suggest that

the total birth rate for Taiwan fell by 52 percent between 1961 and 1978 as the use of contraceptives spread, although the speed of the drop in birthrate has already slowed (Chang, *et al* 1981: 211). These results also suggest that total Westernization in family form and values is not a prerequisite for lowering birthrates. Nevertheless, such studies provide little data on familial networks. Some questions that remain unanswered include: What are the distinctive characteristics of familial networks? Have socioeconomic changes brought about changes in these distinctive characteristics? And, have these changes led to changes in reproductive behavior? The literature cited above fails to fully answer such questions (Freedman 1981: 16). This paper will attempt to provide answers to them.'

Research Design

This essay examines the relationship between family structure, familial networks, and reproductive patterns. In other words, have there been any changes produced in family structure, familial networks, and values in the course of Taiwan's rapid social and economic development? And, have any such changes taking place influenced female reproductive behavior? The original hypothesis which outlined these questions is summarized in Figure 1.

Broadly speaking, Figure 1 postulates three models: first, individual characteristics and family characteristics are independent variables that directly affect reproductive patterns; second, individual characteristics and family characteristics influence reproductive patterns via the intervening variables of networks and values; and third, the number of living children directly influence reproductive patterns. A discussion of what is included in each of the three models will help clarify the hypothesis.




Figure 1 Research Design

Individual characteristics

Individual characteristics include age, level of education, occupation, outside activities, exposure to mass media, and economic status.

Age. Most scholars consider age to be a factor affecting the modernity of individuals' attitudes (cf. Wen Chung-I *et al* 1975). This study will discuss whether age affects reproductive patterns directly or through the intervening variables of familial networks and values.

Education. This item is included in the hypothesis since it has been indicated that level of education has an impact upon female reproductive behavior. For example, Yang Li-hsiu's study indicates that the most direct and convenient way of lowering the birth rate is to raise the level of education (1980: 109). Scholars also stress that the level of education has a greater effect on reproductive patterns than either urbanization or industrialization (Coombs and Freedman 1979: 371).

Occupation. Occupation is included to establish the relationship between women working outside the home and reproductive patterns. Some studies suggest that the influence of work on women's reproductive aspirations and behavior in Taiwan differs from that reported for women in Western societies (Coombs and Freedman 1979: 365). This point is not supported by other studies which report relatively lower birth rates for women who have work experience outside the home as against those without such experience. Still other studies indicate, however, that the greater the participation by women in professional and technical work, the lower the ideal number of children (Li 1975: 3; Yang 1980: 104-5). This study will also examine this point in further detail.

Outside activities and mass media. This item will measure the widely held assumption that the greater the level of participation by women in outside activities and the greater their exposure to mass media, the more prone they will be to adopt modern views, which in turn influences reproductive patterns.

Economic status. Studies indicate that the impact of income on preference for male descendants is not great (Sun *et al* 1978: 60-62). Economic status is examined to determine whether economic status influences reproductive patterns directly or through the intervening variables of familial networks and values.

Family characteristics

Family characteristics include family type and length of virilocal residence.

Family types. The literature indicates no significant positive correlation between family form and the ideal number of children (Li 1975: 3). Three major types of families are considered: nuclear, meal rotation, and stem and grand families. The nuclear family is composed of either a younger couple and their unmarried children or an elderly couple whose children have already married and set up independent families. Married brothers in meal rotation families have their own respective families, but continue to support their elderly parents in rotation. Grand families are composed of the elderly parents, one or more of their married children, and the spouse and any children of that union. This study examines whether the familial networks for the above three distinct family types create distinctive values and reproductive patterns.

Length of virilocal residence. Generally speaking, Chinese family division is usually stretched out over a considerable period of time and broken into several stages (Chuang and Chen' 1982: 284). This study will try to pinpoint whether family division has already occurred, and if so when and how. Duration of virilocal residence by respondents might affect the composition of family types and reproductive patterns.

Familial networks

Economic and social interaction between family members will be analyzed from both agnatic and affinal perspectives. Variables are labeled by treating the respondent as ego and are expressed as frequencies. They include: 1) gifts of money to and from wife and her husband's parents, 2) gifts of money to and from wife and her parents, 3) gifts of money by husband and his brothers to their parents, 4) visiting between wife and her husband's parents.

China is a patrilineal society and the focus of social interaction has traditionally been with agnatic relatives. Even with today's rapid educational modernization and economic growth and the trend toward female employment outside the home, traditional inter-generational lineal relations are still maintained (Chang *et al* 1981: 227). Even young married couples in Taiwan's urban areas remain firmly tied economically, religiously, and affectively to the husband's agnatic kin (Tang 1978). This study will analyze agnatic kin networks in depth. Questions addressed include the circumstances of economic and financial transactions between members of separate families among the various family types. First, what are the prestations and the direction of the prestations between parents and children? Second, is there mutual assistance between married

brothers? And third, what are the patterns of mutual visitation and labor exchange between members of separate families among the different family types?

How do affines interact? Affinal relations have never been treated lightly in Chinese society and their importance continues to grow. As Bernard Gallin points out, affines are not only valuable in the social and religious, and political and mediatorial resources they make available, they also provide economic help (1960: 637-41). This study will make a further in-depth analysis into whether the intensity of interaction between kin, both affinal and agnatic, influences female reproductive behavior.

Values

There will be discussions of four variables for values: 1) religiosity, 2) husband-wife roles, 3) child responsibilities, and 4) perceptions of child mortality. Do these variables vary significantly among different family types? Are these intervening variables influenced by the independent variable of individual characteristics? What kind of impact do they have on female reproductive patterns?

Reproductive patterns

There are two reproductive pattern variables: 1) ideal number of children, and 2) son preference. The literature suggests that the ideal number of children in Taiwan has been dropping in recent years, and that the cause is the influence of modernization on personal behavior (Coombs and Freedman 1979: 367; Li 1975: 3). We can see that Chinese are already becoming more modern in their reproductive behavior by the popular acceptance of birth control methods. Although the ideal number of children is related to many cultural factors, Li Yih-yuan's study did not demonstrate a significant correlation between cultural factors and family form. A significant correlation has been demonstrated between family form and kin pressure toward son preference. This study explores further the relationships between the two dependent variables of ideal number of children and son preference and the four independent variables of individual characteristics, family characteristics, familial networks, and values.

Current number of children

According to the literature, there is a significant positive correlation

between son preference and both current and ideal number of children (Li 1975: 3). That is, if the current number of children is small, then both the ideal number of children and son preference will be lower. This too will be examined further in this study.

Methods of Investigation

Data collection for this study included questionnaires, directed in-depth interviews, and open-ended interviews and participant observation. Respondents (R) were limited to married women between twenty and forty years-of-age. The selection of the sample, statistical methods, and definition and scoring of the variables were as follows:

Selection of sample

The Nan-ts'un village sample was originally derived by choosing 100 women from the 449 families in the village. Sufficient data were subsequently obtained from 90 respondents. Respondent distribution according to the type of family to which they belonged was as follows: 21 from nuclear families, 31 from meal rotation families, 23 from stem families, and 15 from grand families. Sampling was made according to the study's special needs. A respondent from each of Nan-ts'un's grand families was included in the questionnaire sample. The 85 remaining respondents were selected randomly by choosing a respondent from one out of every four of the remaining families in Nan-ts'un.

Statistical methods

Multiple regression analysis is the primary statistical method. It is used to find the proportion of variation for factors affecting dependent variables.

Definition and scoring of variables

Age index. Respondent age distribution is presented in Table 1.

Education index. Five categories are educued and ranked from low to high on the basis of the level of education: illiterate, elementary school, middle school, high school and university or college education (see Table 2).

TABLE 1
Age Index Distribution in Nan-ts'un

Age	No.	Pct.
20	2	2.2%
21	2	2.2
22	3	3.3
23	1	1.1
24	2	2.2
25	2	2.2
26	5	5.6
27	5	5.6
28	6	6.7
29	8	8.9
30	5	5.6
31	7	7.8
32	4	4.4
33	4	4.4
34	6	6.7
35	3	3.3
36	6	6.7
37	7	7.8
38	4	4.4
39	8	8.9
Total	90	100.0

Source: Survey data collected by author.

TABLE 2
Education Index Distribution in Nan-ts'un

Level of Education	No.	Pct.
Illiterate	42	46.7%
Elementary School	40	44.4
Middle School	6	6.7
High School	0	0.0
University or College	2	2.2
Total	90	100.0

Source: Survey data collected by author.

Premarital employment index. Respondent ranking according to the number of months worked is from fewest to greatest number of months employed; the greater the length of employment, the higher the score.

Index of current employment. Respondents are divided into currently employed (scored as 0) and currently unemployed (scored as 1).

Outside activity index. Scoring is based on frequency of movie attendance, restaurant patronage, tour participation, or organization, regularly meeting group or club memberships. Those who participate in more outside activities are given higher scores.

Mass media exposure index. Scoring is by frequency and for reading newspapers and magazines, listening to the radio, and watching television. The higher the frequency, the higher the score; the higher the score, the greater the exposure to mass media.

Economic status index. Economic status was to be calculated on the basis of husband's income, household income, and ownership of household vehicles and appliances. However, since data on two of the above items proved inadequate, this study only took ownership of household vehicles and appliances to indicate economic status. The determination of economic status is based on Wu Ts'ung-hsien and Su Ya-hui's (1972) measure; the higher the score, the higher the economic status of the respondent's family.

Duration of virilocal residence index. Ranking is according to actual number of months of virilocal residence; the more months, the higher the score.

Gifts of money to and from wife and her husband's parents index. This index records frequency for the past year. The frequency is ranked from high to low; the higher the frequency, the lower the score.

Gifts of money by husband and his brothers to their parents index. Frequency is calculated for the period of one year up to the time of data collection. Ranking is from highest to lowest; the higher the frequency, the lower the score.

Visiting between wife and her husband's parents index. The frequency is calculated from mutual visiting between respondent and her parents-in-law. Ranking is by frequency and from highest to lowest; the higher the frequency, the lower the score.

Religiosity index. This index is based on whether or not ancestor worship (i.e. death day or birthday observances) were held, or other rituals held, whether or not geomancy of the grave was believed in, or an altar was kept in the home, and whether rituals were held on the first and

fifteenth, or second and sixteenth, of each lunar month. Ranking is from most traditional to most modern. The more modern, the higher the score.

Husband-wife roles index. This index is based on whether or not important affairs of the family were decided by males, whether or not there was a clear male-female division of labor, and whether or not respondent felt that males ought to help with housework. Ranking was from traditional to modern; the more modern, the higher the score.

Child responsibility index. The index is based on whether or not respondents thought contemporary young people more willing to: 1) live virilocally immediately following marriage; 2) give the parents part of their wages as a young person starts earning money; 3) support the parents when the parents get old; and, 4) ask parents for guidance in young people's own affairs. The index is from low to high; the greater the willingness, the higher the score.

Perception of child mortality index. Ranking is according to whether or not respondents said health of contemporary children was better than when respondents were children, and whether or not respondents said it was important for a family to have a large number of children. Scoring is from traditional to modern; the more modern, the higher the score.

Current number of children index. Ranking is from few to many children according to actual number of children.

Ideal number of children index. Preference determination is according to the Ideal Number of Children scale (IN scale). Ranking is from smaller to larger ideal number of children; the smaller the ideal number of children, the lower the score. The lower the score, the greater the tendency toward small families; the higher the score, the greater the tendency toward large families.

Here are the questions asked respondents concerning the ideal number of children:

Interviewer:


I would like to ask you now to think about a different matter. If you could have half your children be male and the other half female, would you want 2, 4, 6 or no children?

After having circled the number given by the respondent on the first row (see Figure 2), the interviewer was to ask:

If you could not have this number of children, would you like to have the number of children to the right or to the left on the chart?

The interviewer was then to circle the number corresponding to the number indicated by the respondent.

Ask:



Path:

PN1 PN2 PN3 PN4 PN5 PN6 PN7 PN8

Preferred Number of Children = PN

PN1 = code 1, PN2 = code 2, PN3 = code 3, PN4 = code 4, PN5 = code 5, PN6 = code 6, PN7 = code 7, PN8 = code 8.

Figure 2 Ideal Number of Children

Son preference index. Ranking for preference as to the sex of children was given according to the IS scale from prefer female children to prefer male children. Respondent preferences for male children were scored from low to high; the higher the score for a respondent, the stronger the preference for male children (see Figure 3).

Code:

- 1 Prefer female children
- 2 ↓
- 3 ↓
- 4 Have the same preference for male and female children
- 5 ↓
- 6 ↓
- 7 Prefer male children
- 9 None of the above

Tree of choices:




Figure 3 Ideal Sex Scale

Social Background of Nan-ts'un

Nan-ts'un is a small fishing village belonging to Hsingta township in Kaohsiung county on the southwest coast of Taiwan. It is only about a half hour's ride by bus from the city of Tainan. There are salt fields and fish ponds to the east and north of the village. The Taiwan Straits lie close by to the west, where there is an approximately five-hundred hectare tidal basin called Hsin-ta-kang.

The topography of this village is flat and only one meter above sea level. Cultivation is impossible due to the salinity of the soil. It is, however, quite easy to draw salt water from the sea for fish pond aquaculture since Nan-ts'un lies so low and close to the coastline. In addition to fish pond aquaculture, there is salt production from sea water. The sun is strong and the wind heavy during the winter half of the year, conditions that facilitate the rapid evaporation that is necessary for salt production from sea water. Finally, Hsin-ta-kang is well sheltered from the winds, and this suits oyster farming, which once enjoyed a period of great prosperity in Hsin-ta-kang.

Nan-ts'un village was founded more than 200 years ago. What the population was like during the early era of the village is unclear. According to household registration data for 1950, however, there was a total village population of 1,648 people in 240 households. By 1979 the population had jumped to 2,866 people in 483 households. If the age profile for the two years of 1968 and 1979 are compared, it can be seen that the dependent population fell significantly over the course of the intervening ten years. The high point for the population aged thirteen or below was 55.24% of the total village population in 1968. By 1979, the percentage had already dropped to 36.12%. The village birthrate has shown a sharp drop since 1968.

The Ch'iu surname is still by far the most common surname in Nan-ts'un, with about 70% of the village population surnamed Ch'iu. Those who are surnamed Ch'iu divide themselves into two distinct agnatic descent groups on the basis of their differing genealogical origins, one of which is called the "Nine Segments" and while the other is known as the "Five Segments." The holders of most other surnames in the village are related affinally to at least one of the two Ch'iu descent groups. People who are not surnamed Ch'iu entered the village by way of uxrilocal marriage. Only a minority of these people are recent arrivals to the village.

Although the Ch'iu surname members of Nan-ts'un trace their origins

to Fukien province, a place of high lineage development, the Ch'iu surname members possess no corporate lineage halls, written genealogies, nor corporate lands. This should not be construed to mean, however, that people surnamed Ch'iu do not stress lineage ties. In reality, their sense of lineage identity is fairly strong, and some of the strength of this sense of identity can be seen in local election activities. Moreover, the Chenghsun temple plays an extremely important role in the village and its environs. The temple is not only the religious center for the village, it is also an important social basis for village unity. This temple always holds a village-wide "rewarding the soldiers" (*siu:-pieng*) ritual on the second day of every lunar month, and an annual "ghost festival" (*pho'-to*) on the 15th of the 7th lunar month. Most families prepare sacrifices and join in the religious activities. Sacrifices are made to wandering and hungry ghosts during the "ghost festival" in hopes of ensuring village security and tranquility.

In the not too distant past, Nan-ts'un villagers were engaged mainly in fish raising, salt extraction, or took jobs in joint state-private enterprises. For example, as of 1968 there were up to 310 families out of a village total of 358 involved either in fish raising or coastal fishing. The emphasis in these 310 families was on fish pond aquaculture and oyster farming in Hsin-ta-kang, and fishing proper was secondary and limited to fishing just offshore for small fish. Few went deep sea fishing.

The entrance to the tidal basin of Hsin-ta-kang, upon which villagers relied for their livelihood, was nearly blocked in 1963 by shifting sands. To solve the problem this presented for getting water to the local fish ponds, the government spent more than NT\$10 million in 1968 to dredge a new entrance to the harbor. This not only insured a source of water for use in fish aquaculture and salt production, but was also beneficial for the cultivation of oysters in the tidal basin. This vastly improved the livelihood of the villagers.

Good times did not last long, however. The government started in 1975 to develop a fishing harbor at Hsin-ta-kang to solve anchorage problems for offshore fishing boats from Hsingta township. By the time construction of the harbor was finished in 1977, anchorage for all fishing boats in the entire township, both large and small, was at this harbor. Although the building of this fishing harbor made a tremendous contribution to the development of offshore fishing in Hsingta township, it also delivered a sharp blow to the oyster farming upon which so many Nan-ts'un villagers had been dependent. Many villagers subsequently had to abandon raising oysters in the harbor's tidal basin, and switched occupations. This

fostered a move toward occupational heterogenization within the village.

Offshore fishing had previously never been very developed in Nan-ts'un. Except for a few villagers who served as "boat hands" (*hai kha*) for Hsingta township people outside of Nan-ts'un, most villagers who fished did so just offshore from bamboo platforms, since they were unable to compete with motorized fishing boats from other villages in the township. Nan-ts'un's sea fishing industry started to slowly develop after the harbor was built and investments were made in offshore fishing boats. There then followed a gradual increase in the number of villagers serving as "boat hands."

In addition to fish and oyster aquaculture and offshore and sea fishing, there are also 20 village families employed in salt extraction. Since the price of salt has been low, income for such villagers is not good. In recent years few young people have entered the salt industry for this reason. The age of salt workers has also tended to be high, and most have other jobs during the off-season.

There are also quite a few villagers who work at the Tainan Export Processing Zone or in factories near Nan-ts'un village. More than 100 young Nan-ts'un women, both married and single, are factory workers. Their earnings are an important addition to their family incomes.

In summary, Nan-ts'un is a highly traditional fishing village. It has only recently started to become mechanized, to develop offshore fishing, and to increase the degree of its occupational heterogenization.

Analysis of Data

Family structure in Nan-ts'un will be briefly described before turning to an analysis of the survey data.² Several changes in Nan-ts'un family structure were brought about by the above described socioeconomic modernization of Nan-ts'un. We can see several of the changes in family type in Table 3. Grand families still took up 12.48% of all Nan-ts'un families in 1969. By 1980, however, the percentage of grand families had dropped to only 3.34%, including 1.34% of the village families which were "federated" or "dispersed joint" families. It can be seen from this that the grand family has already all but disappeared from Nan-ts'un. Be this as it may, meal rotation families now take up an even greater proportion of Nan-ts'un families at 47.44% of the total number of village families (Chuang Ying-chang 1971, 1982).

TABLE 3
Distribution of Nan-ts'un Families by Family Type for 1969 and 1980

Year	Nuclear		Stem		Meal Rotation		Grand		Totals	
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
1969	95	32.23%	52	17.62%	110	37.37%	37	12.48%	292	100%
1980	162	36.08	59	13.14	213	47.44	15	3.34	449	100%

Sources: Chuang (1971: 21-22) for 1969 figures and Chuang (1981: 26) for 1980 figures.

These data are sufficient to clearly indicate that Nan-ts'un families now divide earlier. According to field interview data, a total of 51 (approximately 68%) of the 75 males in the village married since 1971 had already divided the family with their brothers. Only 12 males (or about 23%) belonged to sibling sets where all brothers had already married by the time of family division. 29 males (or 56%) belonged to families that divided within one year of his marriage. Indeed, family division in Nan-ts'un is now quite early.

Not only has the timing of family division been moved up, family division is now taking place prior to the death of the parents. Parental support has now become a pressing problem for families that have already divided. Most people in Nan-ts'un solve this problem by setting up "meal rotation" between the newly established families to support the parents. Initiation of meal rotation presents a powerful challenge to the authority of the senior family head. The senior parents already have little power over their daughters-in-law. Nonetheless, and although the younger generation already enjoys greater powers of self-determination in stem and grand families than in the past, the family head, or the senior parents, still retain important decision-making powers, especially with regard to major family decisions.

Finally, we will discuss familial networks. Since Nan-ts'un is a village, residents live in almost daily face-to-face contact. Labor exchange still occurs very naturally between kin, although mutual economic assistance is now neither compulsory nor the funds substantial. Ordinary economic difficulties are managed by taking part in local rotating credit associations. Also, both social interaction and reciprocal economic assistance with affines has gradually intensified with the growing economic independence of young couples from the husband's parents.

An in-depth analysis of the survey data is presented below. The living

number of children, selection of birth control methods, ideal number of children, and son preference will be discussed first to give an overall understanding of Nan-ts'un village fertility patterns. The influence of individual characteristics and family characteristics on familial networks and values will then be discussed. Finally, the influence of individual characteristics, family characteristics, familial networks, values, and the number of living children on fertility will be discussed. It must be stressed, however, that the data given below comes, unless indicated otherwise, from a questionnaire sample of 90 married women respondents between 20 and 40 years of age.

Number of living children, birth control, ideal number of children, and son preference

Number of living children. The average number of living children in Nan-ts'un families at the time of questionnaire administration was 3.3. The distribution for the number of living children is given in Table 4.

Table 4 shows that the number of living children is concentrated between 3 and 4, with most families having 3 children. Naturally, only the current number of living children is tabulated, and the ultimate number of children for the families cannot be deduced from such data. The question of the current number of children can be discussed further only in conjunction with other data.

TABLE 4
Number of Living Children in Nan-ts'un

Current Number of Children	No.	Pct.
0	4	4.4%
1	6	6.7
2	9	10.0
3	32	35.6
4	23	25.6
5	9	10.0
6	4	4.4
7	2	2.2
8	1	1.1
Total	90	100.0

Source: Survey data collected by author.

Birth control. Use of birth control methods is widespread. Out of a sample of 90, 66 (or 73.3%) of the women respondents had at some time used birth control methods. Only 24 (or 26.7%) had never used birth control methods. Only a very few of those who were not then using birth control methods, a figure which includes several newlyweds and women with only a few children, had never employed birth control methods.

This widespread use of birth control methods has met with widespread approval on the part of survey respondents in certain circumstances.³ For example, the questionnaire asked, "Are you in favor of birth control?" Responses reveal that fully 87 (or 96.6%) out of the 90 women interviewed answered affirmatively, while only 2 women (or 2.2%) said it depended upon the circumstances, and 1 woman had no opinion. The questionnaire also asked, however, "Do you agree with the use of birth control methods between the wedding and first pregnancy?" Responses show that 22 (or 24.4%) of the sample of 90 women agreed, but 42 (or 46.7%) disagreed, 16 (or 17.8%) said it depended upon the situation, and 10 (or 11.2%) expressed no opinion. It can be seen from this that although respondents approved of birth control, many did not approve of the use of birth control methods to delay the first pregnancy.

Ideal number of children. A majority of the women interviewed in Nan-ts'un (67.8%) gave 3 as the ideal number of children. The ideal number of children for women interviewed in Nan-ts'un tended to be higher in comparison to a Taiwan-wide figure of 44.3% women aged 20 to 29 who were interviewed. The women interviewed in Nan-ts'un who gave 2 as the ideal number of children constituted only 12.2% of the total sample. This is much lower than the Taiwan-wide figure of 34% who favored 2 as the ideal number of children (see Table 5).

The average ideal number of children was 3.08 for Nan-ts'un respondents, but 2.84 Taiwan-wide. Even if the ideal number of children for Nan-ts'un respondents exceeded the figure for the Taiwan-wide sample, the current Nan-ts'un figure is still lower than the Taiwan-wide figure of a few years ago.⁴

Son preference. Among Nan-ts'un respondents, 81.1% gave 2 sons and only 8.9% gave 1 son as the ideal number of sons in the total number of children for their own families (see Table 6). In contrast, only 20% of the Nan-ts'un sample chose 2 daughters and 70% chose 1 daughter as the ideal number of daughters in the total number of children for their own families. The figure for the ideal number of daughters does not differ from the Taiwan-wide sample: one daughter is the ideal in both the Nan-

TABLE 5
The Ideal Number of Children in Nan-ts'un and Taiwan-wide

Number of Children	Nan-ts'un		Taiwan	
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
1	—	—	40	1.0%
2	11	12.2%	1313	34.0
3	61	67.8	1711	44.3
4	18	20.0	717	18.6
5	—	—	22	0.6
6	—	—	7	0.2
7 or more	—	—	3	0.1
Do not know	—	—	44	1.1
None of Above	—	—	2	0.1
Total	90	100.0	3859	100.0

Sources: Nan-ts'un survey data collected by author, Taiwan-wide data from KAP-V survey data.

TABLE 6
Son Preference in Nan-ts'un and Taiwan-wide

Number of Children	Pct.							
	Nan-ts'un		Taiwan		Nan-ts'un		Taiwan	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
0	—	—	—	59	—	—	—	1.5%
1	8	63	1143	2726	8.9%	70.0%	29.6%	70.6
2	73	18	2305	724	81.1%	20.0	59.7	18.8
3	—	—	71	8	—	—	1.8	0.2
4	—	—	2	2	—	—	0.1	0.1
5	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	0.0
No Preference	9	9	293	293	10.0	10.0	7.6	7.6
Not Applicable	—	—	43	43	—	—	1.1	1.1
No Response	—	—	2	3	—	—	0.1	0.1
Totals	90	90	3859	3859	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: Nan-ts'un survey data collected by author, Taiwan-wide data from KAP-V survey data.

ts'un and Taiwan-wide samples, There is a large difference between the Nan-ts'un and Taiwan-wide samples, however, in the ideal number of sons. In the Taiwan-wide sample only 59.7% gave two sons and 29.6% gave one son as the ideal number. Nan-ts'un respondents show stronger son preference. Nonetheless, current son preference among the women interviewed in Nan-ts'un is weaker now than used to be the case elsewhere, as indicated by comparison with the report by Li Yih-yuan of his study several years ago of four villages and Taiwan in general.⁵

Impact of individual characteristics and family characteristics on familial relations and values

It was hypothesized above that certain latent characteristics (i.e. individual and family characteristics; see above pages 130–31) influence familial networks and values (see pages 131–32 above). Dependent variables for familial networks and values will be taken up individually below.

Familial networks. Four familial network variables were included in the research design for interviewing women in Nan-ts'un: 1) gifts of money to and from a wife and her husband's parents, 2) gifts of money to and from a wife and her parents, 3) gifts of money by husband and his brothers to their parents, and 4) visiting between wife and her husband's parents.

Before going into the influence of latent individual characteristics on these four variables, it must be pointed out that the fourth of these variables, visiting between wife and her husband's parents, is insignificant. There are several reasons for this. First, 33.3% of the women in the sample are already without surviving parents-in-law. Another reason is that women interviewed who live in stem and grand families reside virilocally with the husband's parents, which of course makes any question about frequency of visiting meaningless. Other women interviewed live in meal rotation families, and consequently many of them also frequently reside with the husband's parents, since a common form of meal rotation has the senior couple circulating for their meals among the independent families of their sons but sleeping permanently in the household of just one of these sons. Finally, there are other families, including both meal rotation and nuclear families, which while socially autonomous, or at least semi-autonomous, are nonetheless architecturally and spatially part of a single compound, which makes interaction on a daily basis hard to avoid.

Networks include both social and economic interaction. There are places where social and economic interactions overlap. This is especially so for kinship behavior and exchange behavior, where exchange behavior is always heavily endowed with social significance. Inter-generational reciprocity in the traditional Chinese family emphasized the subordination of junior generations to senior generations when making prestations, and this subordination was grounded in a strong sense of moral compulsion. The tendency in agrarian China toward large families has gradually given way to a growing preference for small families as Chinese society and culture, and especially family types, have changed. Also, the diversity in

Chinese society resulting from social and cultural change has tremendously increased the heterogeneity of individual characteristics, and this in turn has altered the relations between the generations. How such changes affect familial networks will be discussed further below.

According to the results of regression analysis as set out in the research design, we found the influence of economic relations on the cluster of variables in individual and family characteristics to be more or less decisive. The gross explanatory values (R^2) of the four variables in economic relations are 36%, 31%, 27%, and 19% respectively for 1) gifts of money to and from a wife and her husband's parents, 2) gifts of money to and from a wife and her parents, 3) gifts of money by husband and his brothers to their parents, 4) visiting between wife and her husband's parents.

The difference in family types lies not only in differences in organization and membership, it is also expressed economically (Caldwell 1976). This economic difference can be detected in the frequency of pecuniary gifts between kin. Families that have already been divided (nuclear families and meal rotation families) exhibit in their sum prestations of gifts of money to the husband's parents a low frequency of interaction (.28 and .38). Since meal rotation families are organized into agnatic sets of otherwise independent nuclear families still linked as grand families insofar as parental support is concerned, this low frequency of interaction might be some sort of structural consequence of family type. The point where nuclear and meal rotation families differ, however, is in gifts of money to and from a wife and her husband's parents. Respondents who live in meal rotation families might have such a high level of interaction (-.36) because they are still responsible for providing the husband's parents with meals. However, this relationship does not show up in nuclear families. Generally speaking, women interviewed who come from nuclear families no longer live with the husband's parents, have budgets independent from the husband's parents, and make independent provisions for the livelihood of their own children and deal independently with any difficulties that the family may come across. This economic arrangement has already dispensed with the mechanism for sharing responsibility in emergencies present in non-nuclear families, and for this reason provides less economic support toward the livelihood of the husband's parents.

Unfortunately, it was impossible to make an analysis of variables in family characteristics of stem, grand and meal rotation families where the women interviewed had outside jobs, due to insufficient distribution

in the sample.

We found a major difference between nuclear and non-nuclear families when we selected a working sample. That is, respondents living in nuclear families reported the same frequency of gifts of money to and from a wife and her husband's parents, whether or not they had outside jobs (an indicator of the extent of the families' economic resources). According to results from respondents living in non-nuclear type families, on the other hand, each example of this type of family engage in more exchange (-.24) with the husband's parents. Moreover, the longer the period of coresidence with the husband's parents, the lower the level of gifts of money to and from a wife and her husband's parents. This is not easily accounted for.

Age is clearly an influential factor at .33 and -.27 respectively for the dependent variables of gifts of money to and from a wife and her husband's parents and gifts of money to and from a wife and her parents (see Table 7). That is to say, the older the respondent, the lower the frequency of gifts of money between them and their parents. It was established through interviewing that, generally speaking, the older a woman, the later her marriage, and the longer the duration of her marriage, then the more likely it is that nuclear or meal rotation families will have been formed by her sons. We know from background data gathered during a village-wide survey of family division (cf. pg.141) that 56% of all males in Nan-ts'un village who married between 1971 and 1981 belong to families that divided within one year of their marriage. This indicates that the timing of family division is quite early for Nan-ts'un villagers. It can moreover be concluded that the older a person, the more likely it is that a nuclear family or meal rotation family will be formed. It was just mentioned that there is a low frequency of gifts of money to and from a wife and her husband's parents if the respondent lives in a nuclear or meal rotation family. Aside from this, the powers of control and influence exercised by the parents-in-law over a respondent tend to be weakened, and interaction with her own parents is more likely, and so there is a comparatively greater likelihood of gifts of money to and from a wife and her parents.

In addition, outside activities are obviously influential, at -.24 and .25 respectively for the two dependent variables of gifts of money to and from a wife and her parents and gifts of money by husband and his brothers to their parents (see Table 7). That is, the more intensely a respondent participates in outside activities, the greater the likelihood of a high frequency of gifts of money to and from her parents and the lower the

TABLE 7
Factors Influencing Familial Networks in Nan-ts'un

	Gifts of money to & from Wi & Hu parents	Gifts of money to & from Wi & her parents	Gifts of money by Hu & his brothers to their parents	Visiting between Wi & her Hu parents
Age	.33***	-.27***	.10	-.05
Economic Status	.08	-.24***	-.10	.31***
Education	-.08	-.12	-.11	-.08
Current Employment	-.06	-.15	-.15	-.04
Premarital Employment (months)	-.14	.17**	.08	-.26***
Outside Activities	.15	-.24***	.25***	-.16
Mass Media	-.03	-.11	-.09	.18*
<i>Family Type</i>				
Nuclear	-.11	.08	.28***	-.10
Meal Rotation	-.36***	.17	.38***	-.10
Stem & Grand	— ^a	— ^a	— ^a	— ^a
<i>Employed</i>				
Nuclear	-.06	.04	.09	-.11
Meal Rotation	— ^a	— ^a	— ^a	— ^a
Stem & Grand	-.24*	.02	.08	-.17
Virilocal Residence (years)	.18**	.09	.08	.21**
Constant	.71	6.31	1.71	6.80
R ²	.36	.31	.27	.19

—^a Sample size too small for analysis *** P<.001 ** P<.01 *P<.05

Source: Compiled by author.

likelihood of a high frequency of gifts of money from her husband and his brothers to their parents. I personally think on the basis of interviews and participant observation that Nan-ts'un women who actively participate in outside activities are less constrained by their parents-in-law and their husband's agnates. In other words, these women are more independent and self-determined. Less subject to such constraints, their interaction with their own parents is freer. This would account for why women interviewed who participate more energetically in outside activities report a higher frequency of gifts of money to and from their own parents. In the same light, the less a Nan-ts'un woman is subject to constraint by parents-in-law and the other agnatic kin of the husband, the lower the frequency money gifts by her husband and his brothers to their parents.

Finally, there is a significant influence at -.24 exerted by economic status on gifts of money to and from a wife's parents (see Table 7). That is, the lower the economic status, the lower the frequency of such gifts

to and from a wife and her parents. I personally think on the basis of interviews and participant observations that the reason is quite obvious: poorer Nan-ts'un woman lack the economic wherewithal to make gifts of money to their parents.

Values. The four value variables are religiosity, husband-wife roles, child responsibility (i.e. willingness to assume filial obligations) and the perception of child mortality. Individual characteristics and family characteristics have little influence on these four value variables. Family type, on the other hand, is a strong influence on these four variables at 33%, 65%, 43% and 51% respectively. Religiosity is rather distinctive, however, insofar as what little influence it does have is by way of the intervening variable of the nuclear family (Table 8). I think religiosity has a low correlation with the nuclear family because nuclear family members are more receptive to new ideas.

TABLE 8
Religiosity in Nan-ts'un and Taiwan-wide

Religiosity	Nants'un		Taiwan	
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
<i>Traditional</i>				
4	—	— %	158	4.1%
5	3	3.3	911	23.6
6	70	77.8	1,067	27.6
7	6	6.7	660	17.1
8	8	8.9	378	9.8
9	3	3.3	294	7.6
10	—	—	183	4.7
<i>Modern</i>				
No Answer	—	—	208	5.4
Totals	90	100.0	100.0	

Sources: Nan-ts'un survey data collected by author. Taiwan-wide data from KAP-V survey data.

The level of education also significantly influences the three dependent variables of husband-wife roles, child responsibilities, and the perception of child mortality at .32, -.23, and .21 respectively (see Table 9). That is, the higher the level of education for respondents, the more modern their attitudes toward husband-wife roles, the more they think contemporary young people less filial than young people used to be in living up to filial ideals, and the more modern their perception of child mortality. There is much previous research by native and foreign scholars alike which supports such a generalization. That is to say, the higher a

person's level of education, the more modern that person will be in outlook (Inkeles 1966: 146-47; Freedman and Takeshita 1969: 31; Yang Kuo-shu and Ch'u Hai-yuan 1975: 13).

TABLE 9
Factors Influencing Values in Nan-ts'un

	Religiosity	Hu-Wi Roles	Child Responsibility	Child Mortality
<i>Individual Characteristics</i>				
Age	.13	.14	-.28***	-.14
Economic Status	-.07	.35***	.12	-.16
Education	-.05	.32***	-.23**	.21*
Current Occupation	.14	.05	-.23	-.33***
Premarital Employment (months)	.08	.09	.06	.07
Outside Activities	.12	.02	-.15	.11
Mass Media	-.03	.09	-.03	.10
<i>Family Type</i>				
Nuclear	.36**	.09	.01	-.03
Meal Rotation	.24	.01	.06	.04
Stem & Grand	— ^a	—	—	—
<i>Employed</i>				
Nuclear	.06	.35***	-.25**	-.16
Meal Rotation	— ^a	—	—	—
Stem & Grand	.21	-.01	-.05	.36***
Virilocal Residence (years)	.02	.10	-.09	.04
Constant	5.18	-.93	13.10	2.04
R ²	.33	.65	.43	.51

a: Sample too small to analyse *** P<.001 ** P<.01 * P<.05

Source: Compiled by author.

Age is also a significant influence on child responsibility at -.28 (see Table 9). The higher the age of a respondent, the more she thinks contemporary young people less filial than young people used to be. We mentioned above that age is a factor which influences modernity of outlook in the individual. Age is linked to conservatism, which explains the above result.

Finally, multiple regression analysis results show that the variable of living in a nuclear family while working outside is a significant influence at .35 and -.25 respectively on the two dependent variables of husband-wife roles and child responsibilities (see Table 9). In other words,

respondents who live in nuclear families and have jobs are more modern in their attitudes toward husband-wife roles, and with regard to the filiality of their own children tend to think that contemporary young people are less filial than young people used to be. Also, respondents who live in extended families and have jobs are clearly influenced by this in their perception of child mortality. It is clear that the lack of emphasis on child mortality by women interviewed who live in the traditional family types of grand and stem families is due to the large number of people in grand and stem families.

Influence of individual characteristics, family characteristics, familial networks, values, and the current number of children on reproductive patterns

What are here termed reproductive patterns include the two variables of ideal number of children and son preference. According to the above mentioned research design, it was hypothesized that individual characteristics, family characteristics, familial networks, and the current number of children would significantly influence the two dependent variables of the ideal number of children and son preference. These will now be discussed in turn.

Ideal number of children. Regression analysis results show that the gross explanatory power (R^2) of individual characteristics, family characteristics, familial networks, values, and the current number of children variables on the ideal number of children to be 48%. The four variables of nuclear family, nuclear family where the respondent has an outside job, the current number of children, and level of education significantly influence the dependent variables of ideal number of children and son preference (see Table 10).

The analysis in the preceding section demonstrated that independent variables of level of education, economic status, age, employment, exposure to mass media, and the number of months working prior to marriage in individual characteristics, and the independent variables of nuclear family, meal rotation family, and time spent living virilocally in family characteristics are influential in relation to the intervening variable of familial networks and values. Nevertheless, specific variables in familial networks or values do not by themselves significantly influence the ideal number of children. For this reason the influence of the four independent

variables (i.e. nuclear family, nuclear family where informant has an outside job, current number of children, and level of education) in individual and family characteristics on the ideal number of children is direct. In other words, these independent variables did not in fact influence the ideal number of children via distinct familial networks and values.

TABLE 10
Factors Influencing Fertility Patterns in Nan-ts'un

	Ideal Number of Children		Son Preference	
	r	beta	r	beta
<i>Individual Characteristics</i>				
Age	.34	.05	.09	-.16
Economic Status	-.30	.01	-.11	-.06
Education	-.44	-.24***	-.11	.06
Current Employment	-.17	.08	.04	.04
Premarital Employment (months)	-.17	-.09	-.22	-.08
Outside Activities	-.38	-.12	-.21	-.24**
Mass Media	-.22	.07	-.04	-.01
<i>Family Type</i>				
Nuclear	-.17	.10	-.20	-.31***
Meal Rotation	-.01	.14	.06	.07
Stem & Grand	.16	—	.11	—
<i>Respondent Employed</i>				
Nuclear	-.28	-.38***	.02	.16
Meal Rotation	-.12	-.10	-.02	-.03
Stem & Grand	.12	—	.06	—
Virilocal Residence (years)	.10	-.07	.02	.05
<i>Gifts and Visiting</i>				
Gifts of money to & from Hu parents	.05	.03	.04	.05
Gifts of money to & from Wi & her parents	.15	.09	-.14	-.18*
Gifts of money by Hu & his brothers to their parents	-.11	-.10	-.04	.02
Visiting between Wi & her Hu parents	-.03	-.06	.04	.01
Current Number of Children	.53	.38***	.34	.29***
Constant		4.70		6.17
R ²		.48		.24

*** P<.001 ** P<.01 * P<.05

Source: Compiled by author.

Why did each of these variables in familial networks and values not significantly influence the ideal number of children? The reason might be in part due to the following two points: first, since the difference between each of the variables in values and familial networks for respondents is not large, and since these variables were not well ranked, it is impossible to generalize about the real relationships between these variables and the ideal number of children. Second, other unconsidered factors which await further consideration might be intervening between these variables and the ideal number of children.

It was found that the research design set out at the beginning of the essay completely failed, on the basis of regression analysis results, to show that values had any influence on reproductive patterns. There are many reasons for this. The two above mentioned reasons are but two possibilities. It also might be that there are problems in the selection of value variables, and it even might be that values themselves are not effective intervening variables in terms of theory and practice. Since these problems transcend the scope of this essay, they will not be discussed further. In addition, for the sake of clarity in description and analysis we are going to eliminate the four variables of values. A repeat of the regression analysis without the four variables of values gives results that do not differ significantly from regression analysis that included them, which further confirms that the four variables of values are ineffective.

We will now analyze further those three variables that do significantly influence the ideal number of children, discussing each of them in turn.

Nuclear family where woman interviewed has an outside job. Respondents are similar in nuclear and non-nuclear families insofar as there is no clear influence on the ideal number of children. This is comparable to the findings of Li Yih-yuan (1975). That is, family form and the ideal number of children are not clearly related. Nevertheless, respondents who have jobs and live in nuclear families apparently differ in that they are clearly influenced negatively ($-.38$) by the variable of the ideal number of children. They look forward to having fewer children than respondents in other families. When we only consider nuclear families and occupation, neither is significantly influenced. Simultaneous consideration of the two variables gives significant results insofar as it seems to reveal that occupation factors have an interaction effect on family structure and the individual. This factor obviously deserves further analysis.

The current number of children. The current number of children also

directly influences the ideal number of children with a significance level of .38. That is, the greater the number of children a respondent has, the more likely it is that there will be a larger ideal number of children for that woman. According to Li Yih-yuan's study, there is a significant positive correlation between the current number of children and the ideal number of children (1975: 3). This study found a further influential relationship between them. Why is it that the current number of children significantly influences the ideal number of children? I personally suspect that many respondents use their current number of children to serve as their ideal number of children, and even if they already have too many children, they are still unwilling to genuinely state their feelings in this regard for fear of inviting misfortune. If this is true, it serves to further reinforce the impression of conservatism that Nan-ts'un women give.

Level of education. The level of education also directly influences the ideal number of children at a significance level of -.24. That is, informants with higher levels of education take smaller numbers of children as the ideal. This result directly supports Li Yih-yuan's above mentioned thesis. Why does education affect the ideal number of children? We mentioned above that the higher the level of education and individual modernity of a respondent's outlook, the more likely it was that she would be open to new values. The fall in the ideal number of children can be attributed to new trends in contemporary society, with the result that the higher a woman's level of education, the smaller her ideal number of children.

Aside from the significant influences produced by the above four variables (i.e., nuclear family, nuclear family where respondent has an outside job, current number of children, and level of education) on the ideal number of children, there are several other factors that await further consideration. We can see in Table 10 that the independent variables and intervening variables of mass media, age, perception of child mortality, outside activities, husband-wife roles, and economic status have a significantly high zero-order correlation level with ideal number of children. However, regression analysis results show that these variables do not correlate significantly with the ideal number of children. In other words, the correlation between these variables and the ideal number of children is spurious. That is, owing to intervening factors.

It was found on the basis of further tests (see Table 11) that all the variables mentioned above correlate significantly with level of education. It was just indicated that level of education significantly influences the ideal number of children. It is possible then that the correlation between these above mentioned variables and the ideal number of children might

be via the level of education and that the variables may not be genuinely influential in themselves.

Furthermore, the two variables of nuclear family and nuclear family where the respondent has a job originally did not show a significant relationship with the ideal number of children. The results of regression analysis show, however, that the two variables do significantly influence the ideal number of children. This may also be influenced by intervening factors such that the zero-order correlation between these two variables and the ideal number of children is not high. The degree of the influence of these two variables on the ideal number of children shows itself to be significant only after controlling for other variables.

Son preference. Regression analysis results show that all variables of individual characteristics, family characteristics, familial networks, values, and the current number of children have a gross explanatory power (R^2) of 24% on son preference. The influence of the variables of outside activities, current number of children, and gifts of money to and from a wife and her parents on the dependent variable of son preference has a significance rating of -.24, .29 and -.18 respectively (see Table 10).

What, then, are the characteristics of this influence? According to the analysis, the influence of outside activities and current number of children on son preference is direct and is not exerted via the intervening variables of familial networks and values. Further, the independent variables of age, number of months worked prior to marriage, economic status, and outside activities have a significant effect on son preference via the intervening familial network variable of gifts of money to and from a wife and her parents.

These research results differ slightly from earlier ones. According to the work of Li Yih-yuan, the variables of education and family form correlate significantly with son preference (1975: 4). The present study does not find the level of education and family form significantly influencing son preference, and only finds outside activities and current number of children significantly influencing these dependent variables. That is, irrespective of their level of education and family form, so long as respondents actively participate in outside activities, it is likely that the respondent's son preference will weaken.

In my view the women interviewed who actively participate in outside activities are more modern in outlook and conduct. In other words, their views and actions reflect a comparative open-mindedness; they accept new things more readily, and so their son preference is weaker. Secondly, respondents who have a higher frequency of participation in outside

(Continue)

TABLE 11

	Gifts of Money from Hu & HuBr to their Parents	Visiting Between Wife & Her Parents	Religiosity	Husband- Wife Roles	Child Responsibility	Child Mortality	Current Number of Children	Ideal Number of Children	Son Preference
Age	.0352	.0923	.1474	-.1476	-.2306*	-.2910**	.5333***	.3437***	.0925
Education	-.0432	-.0272	-.0636	.4797***	-.0845	.3778***	-.3591***	-.4375***	-.1116
Premarital Employment	.0707	-.2087*	.0690	.1936*	.0912	.1247	-.2152*	-.1651	-.2191*
Current Employment	-.1285	-.0678	-.0856	.0989	-.1097	-.0022	-.0139	-.1440	-.0013
Outside Activities	.0906	-.0770	-.0206	.3391**	.0163	.3093**	-.3908***	-.3835***	-.2125*
Mass Media	-.1216	.1247	-.0680	.3842***	-.0665	.2334*	-.2121*	-.2154*	-.0354
Economic Status	-.0425	.0662	-.0764	.4833***	.1507	.1960*	-.3002**	-.3022**	-.1134
Virilocal Residence (years)	.0622	.2280*	.1012	-.0477	.2108*	-.1304	.1473	.1032	.0235
Gifts of Money to & from Wi & Hu Parents	.2264*	.2630**	.2096*	-.1061	-.0898	-.0360	.1925*	.0511	.0435
Gifts of Money to & from Wi & her Parents	.0205	-.0415	-.0319	-.2869**	-.0831	-.0473	-.0712	.1490	-.1396
Gifts of Money from Hu & HuBr to their Parents	.1034		.1886	-.0162	-.1375	.0969	.0162	-.1143	-.0353
Visiting Between Wife & Her Hu parents			-.0850	-.0558	.0184	.1288	-.0590	-.0297	.0360
Religiosity				.1977*	-.0430	-.0757	-.0711	-.0687	-.0506
Husband-Wife Roles					-.1343	.1581	-.1406	-.3585***	-.0554
Child Responsibility						.0813	-.0394	-.0030	-.0343
Child Mortality							-.4330***	-.3365**	-.2380*
Ideal Number of Children								.5343***	.3395**
Son Preference									.2485**

***p < .001

**p < .01

*p < .05

activities also show themselves to be more independent and self-determined in their actions, and less under the control of their parents-in-law and other agnatic kin of their husbands. Be this as it may, son preference for respondents is not changed by external pressures. Li Yih-yuan has pointed out in his study that those under great pressure from the husband's agnatic kin also have a high son preference (1975: 3). This study reconfirms that conclusion.

In addition, the greater the current number of children, the stronger the son preference. Respondents who have many children do so primarily because of son preference. The women interviewed had more children because they hoped to have more sons.

Age, number of months worked prior to marriage, economic status, and outside activity variables of respondents also indirectly influences the degree of son preference via gifts of money to and from a wife and her parents, and the proportion of explained variation for this was .1087. Here we find the influence of the frequency of gifts of money to and from a wife and her parents on son preference to be negative: respondents with a higher frequency gifts of money to and from their own parents have a stronger degree of son preference. This point would seem to contradict the original hypothesis. There seem to be two possible explanations: 1) correct results could not be obtained due to the small difference in frequency and poor question design; or, 2) other factors which await further investigation are intervening between these two variables.

In addition to the significance of the influence of the above variables on son preference, there are still other phenomena yet to be explained. Table 11 shows that the high zero-order correlation between the variables of perception of child mortality, the number of months working prior to marriage, nuclear family, and nuclear family where respondent has outside job is significant. However, regression analysis results show that these variables certainly do not significantly influence son preference. In other words, the correlations between these variables and son preference are spurious; the correlations are influenced by other factors.

The variable of gifts of money to and from a wife and her parents, while originally not showing a significant correlation with son preference, did prove to significantly influence son preference once subjected to regression analysis. There might be intervening factors with the result that zero-order correlation between these two variables are not high until other variables are controlled for.

Conclusions and Suggestions

The above analysis and discussion demonstrates that reproductive patterns for Nan-ts'un women show a trend toward becoming more modern. This is apparent in the universal acceptance of birth control methods, the lowering of the ideal number of children, and the weakening of son preference among women interviewed. Though the ideal number of children in Nan-ts'un still exceeds that of the Taiwan-wide sample, it has already dropped by comparison to the Taiwan-wide sample of several years ago. The same goes for son preference. Although son preference is still strong, it is weaker when compared with the Taiwan-wide sample of several years ago.

The universal acceptance of birth control methods and the continued presence of son preference might be explained by saying that the former shows a behavioral change while the latter shows that old values have yet to die in the course of social change. Although this study has not shown that values significantly influence reproductive patterns, this is perhaps due to the spectrum of values in Nan-ts'un being too narrow, which itself is a manifestation of Nan-ts'un conservatism. If so, this would explain the difficulty in generalizing the influences of the two.⁶ Or perhaps the lack of significance is due to an ineffective design of the questionnaire making it impossible to test out influential relationships. However, this would not by itself explain the complete absence of a relationship between values and reproductive patterns. According to the analysis in the preceding section, the current number of children significantly influences the ideal number of children and son preference. That is, the greater the current number of children, then the greater the ideal number of children, and the more intense son preference. This pattern can be mainly ascribed to the fact that when a woman has more children, she always takes that number to be the ideal number of children. This is indicative of the conservative outlook among the women interviewed in Nan-ts'un and shows that reproductive patterns of Nan-ts'un women are still influenced by traditional ideals.

Although this study cannot prove that the nuclear family and level of education clearly influence son preference, it was found that these two variables do significantly influence the ideal number of children and that son preference is emphasized by Nan-ts'un women regardless of family form and level of education. This result might suggest that son preference is the heart of the traditional Chinese concept of descent line continuity,

and the part that is least easily changed. Even if a woman is more modern in terms of her individual characteristics and family characteristics, her son preference is still not easily changed. However, these two variables of individual characteristics and family characteristics differ from the above in their impact upon the ideal number of children: respondents who live in nuclear families have a smaller ideal number of children, and respondents that have a high level of education also have a smaller ideal number of children. This suggests that the figure for the ideal number of children is actually not the heart of the concept of continuation of the family line. Since the ideal number of children and son preference are not directly correlated, the modernity of individual characteristics and family characteristics can thereby directly influence the ideal number of children without necessarily influencing son preference.

Moreover, although this study does not find that outside activities significantly influence the ideal number of children, it does demonstrate that outside activities directly influence son preference. Irrespective of their degree of participation in outside activities, the ideal number of children is all more or less the same for all Nan-ts'un women, with the majority of the women concentrating around a figure of about three children as the ideal number. This phenomenon can perhaps be explained by the fact that the high degree of development in Taiwan's mass media in recent years has made it almost impossible to avoid the influences of the outside world. The drop in the ideal number of children has already become widespread, and because of this views on the ideal number of children differ little, irrespective of the degree of participation in outside activities. However, the frequency of participation in outside activities has different consequences for son preference: those with high frequency of participation have a weaker degree of son preference. In explanation, I will hazard the tentative explanation that women who actively participate in outside activities are more independent and self-determined, their actions less subject to control by their parents-in-law or their husband's agnatic kin. Such women might be less conscious for this reason of the differentiated treatment of men and women, and hence not have so strong a son preference.

I agree that a balanced development of Taiwan's population requires a diminution in son preference. Li Yih-yuan suggests that a revision in family and inheritance laws will help to do this. I suggest in addition that female participation in outside activities be encouraged. The conclusion of this study is that increased participation by women in outside

activities will lessen son preference.

Secondly, we found in the structure and design of the study that among the two intervening variables in this study, the design of different variables was imperfect, and hence we were unable to effectively test out their correlations with reproductive patterns. In familial networks, for example, the four variables decided upon were narrowly limited to the frequency of gifts of money and visiting between families, and so it was impossible to effectively test out influences between them. In addition, since the variation between respondents is quite small in terms of values, it will be necessary to design more concrete and effective indices before it will be possible to test out genuine correlations between them. These two problems are obviously closely tied to sample size. The sample for this study is but 90 women, and so opportunities for statistical analysis are limited and bias easily produced. For example, the sample for nuclear families is only 21 women, and when separate subcategories for women with and without outside jobs are set up the samples become smaller still. If the research design for this study had been based on a sample of three thousand people throughout Taiwan it would have been possible to test out genuinely influential relationships among the variables. Hence, when making similar studies, the sample should not be too small.

Part Four

LINEAGES

The Disquieting Chinese Lineage and Its Anthropological Relevance

Burton Pasternak

Our repertoire of concepts and theories concerning peasantries has been built up through contributions from scholars working in many parts of the world. Latin Americanists and India-Wallahs, in particular, have played a major role in the development of models, but we have also heard from specialists in Indonesia, Japan, Europe, the Mediterranean world, and even Africa. But where is China in all this? Why are students of the world's largest peasantry silent? In part, it is because we are so few and too preoccupied with our own peasants to have time for anybody else's. More to the point, however, the whole body of inherited anthropological wisdom concerning peasantries seems somehow alien and irrelevant to students of Chinese society. (Skinner 1971: 270)

That anthropologists have not been especially attentive to the Chinese cannot be entirely blamed on the parochialism of students of Chinese society, although that is undoubtedly part of the problem. There are other reasons. For one thing anthropologists have only recently become interested in stratified, state organized societies. More important perhaps is the fact that the Chinese peasant so often fails to conform to cherished models derived in less complex societies. Perhaps the "peculiarity" of Chinese society is at least in part also responsible for the reluctance of anthropologists to recognize the relevance of the Chinese case.

G. William Skinner has taken pains to highlight the limitations of the notion that peasant communities are normally "closed" in terms of what is known about China (1971). In this paper I focus on Chinese lineages with much the same purpose in mind—to suggest the possibility that models and assumptions formulated on the basis of data from simpler societies might profitably be reconsidered in light of what we have learned about descent groups in China.

What is most disturbing about the Chinese descent group is that it has

existed at all. At the very least it should have been on its way out. The fact that it endured and thrived in what most scholars would consider an exceptionally inhospitable social, economic, and political context may be one reason for the lack of attention given the Chinese descent group in anthropological literature. What makes the Chinese lineage anthropologically important is its peculiarity. Because it challenges established beliefs about the nature and forms of descent in human society, the Chinese case forces us to rethink the entire matter with fewer preconceptions.

Traditional Views on the Relationship between Descent and Society

That most of the world's peoples form groups on the basis of descent from a common ancestor has long been known. We have come to appreciate only slowly, however, that the kinds of descent groups vary enormously from society to society as well as within societies, and that the kinds of descent groups people construct may be related to the economic and political attributes of the societies in which they live. Our increasing sophistication has been reflected in a steady proliferation of terms. Debates over which term is appropriate for what kind of descent group in what circumstances amount to more than a splitting of academic hairs. At issue is the extent to which descent relates to other aspects of culture. What are the principles and structures of descent, how do descent groups function, and how do these groups reflect the attributes of the societies within which they are found?

Scholars have generally been inclined to one of two views on the relationship between descent and society. One approach has been to insist that there is *no* relationship, since all principles of descent are found in societies of all degrees of complexity. This view has been attractive to a few passionately anti-evolutionist American anthropologists, like G.P. Murdock, who stimulated an almost explosive reaction among his colleagues with such assertions as the following:

Among the most primitive or culturally undeveloped tribes . . . the Andamanese pygmies, the Paiute of the Great Basin, and the Yahgan of Tierra del Fuego are bilateral in descent, the Vedda of Ceylon, the Rankokamekra of east-central Brazil, and the Kutchin of northern Canada are matrilineal, and the Witoto of Amazonia, the Gilyak of Siberia, and the Miwok of California are patrilineal, while several native Australian tribes are characterized by double descent. All rules of descent are likewise well represented on the intermediate levels of culture, among agricultural and developed pastoral people. Even among the literate people

with relatively complex civilizations, our sample includes the bilateral Yankees and Syrian Christians, the patrilineal Chinese and Manchus and the matrilineal Minangkabau Malays of Sumatra and Brahmin Nayars of India. (1949: 186; see also 187)

In Murdock's view we should expect to find all principles of descent manifested in societies of all degrees of complexity simply because the number of such organizational principles is finite. Repeatedly Murdock used the notion of limited possibilities to justify his conviction that, "nowhere does even a revised evolutionism find a shred of support" (1949: 187).

More common, however, has been the view that the relationship between descent and societal complexity is curvilinear—that descent groups are most commonly found in societies of mid-range complexity; they are unsuited to very simple societies and tend to atrophy and vanish in complex societies. While this view might seem to imply some concession to an evolutionary perspective, it has frequently been endorsed by scholars who see little merit in such an approach. The curvilinear hypothesis has been characteristic, for example, of the British structure-functional tradition of which the noted China scholar, Maurice Freedman, was a part and to which he was consistently faithful.

Although Freedman's contribution has been substantial and remarkable in many areas, it is probably for his work on the Chinese lineage that he will best be remembered. Freedman was not content to provide the most incisive analysis of the structure and functions of Chinese lineages, which would have been a substantial contribution in itself; he also left us insights on the possible origins of descent groups in China as well as on the sources of their variation. More important, by showing how the Chinese lineage fit Chinese society and contributed to its maintenance, Freedman made it necessary for us to consider anew the relationship between descent and society.

The Problem of Fit

Freedman's interest in the Chinese lineage emerged quite naturally from the tradition within which he was trained. British anthropologists have long been interested in the structure of descent groups and in their contribution to the maintenance of relations within and between groups. Radcliffe-Brown, a pioneer in the study of descent, was aware that most societies have corporate unilineal descent groups. He even suggested that

"unilineal institutions in some form are almost, if not entirely, a necessity in any ordered social system" because they respond to a universal need for formulating rights over persons and things in such a way as to avoid conflict, and because they constitute so effective a response to the universal need for social structure continuity (1952: 47-48). What were unusual in his view were systems in which unilineal descent was either absent or compromised.

Meyer Fortes elaborated upon Radcliffe-Brown's analysis. He proposed that lineage organization is most developed in "segmentary" societies—that is, in "homogeneous," mechanically integrated societies, where all legal and political relations take place in the context of the lineage system (1971: 164). This is not to say that descent groups cannot be found in other kinds of societies, but only that the fit is best in relatively egalitarian societies. Fortes was aware that the lineage was also the basis of local organization and of political institutions in some states, as among the Ashanti and Yoruba, but he insisted that the functions of descent groups are usually reduced in complex societies of this sort. According to Fortes, the "primary emphasis" in such societies is more commonly limited to "the legal aspects of the lineage":

The more centralized the political system the greater the tendency seems to be for the corporate strength of descent groups to be reduced or for such corporate groups to be nonexistent. Legal and political status are conferred by allegiance to the state, not by descent, though rank and property may still be vested in descent lines. . . . There is, in these societies, a clearer structural differentiation between the field of domestic relations based on kinship and descent and the field of political relations, than in segmentary societies. (1971: 164)

Others have questioned the degree to which descent groups in particular, and kin groups in general, can tolerate social and economic differentiation and yet remain viable and effective. Paul Kirchhoff, like Fortes, proposed an antagonism between social differentiation and descent:

The process of differentiation within the clan, while for a long time taking place within this flexible unit, finally reaches the point where the interests of those of equal standing, in *all* the clans of the tribe, come into such sharp conflicts with the interests of the other strata that their struggles, the struggle of by now fully-fledged social classes, overshadows the old principles of clanship and finally leads to the break-up of clan, first as the dominating form of social organization and then to its final disappearance. (1968: 379-80)

More recently Paul Bohannan suggested that, "if unilineal descent groups are found, they are found for the most part in societies of medium size that have fairly adequate means of exploitation of their environments" (1963: 136). Others propose that descent groups are not only incompatible with stratification but also with strong, centralized states. Frederick Engels suggested long before Fortes, Kirchhoff, and Bohannan that there is an "irreconcilable opposition" between the existence of descent groups and the presence of state organization; emergence of the latter ultimately produces an erosion of the former (1942: 99). In the writings of Yehudi Cohen we find a similar view:

Part of the course of a state's vertical entrenchment is the arrogation by its leaders of the exclusive right to wage war, enact and administer laws, control productivity and redistribute wealth, lay claim to rights of eminent domain and administer tenure, exact tribute, and the like. These are among the rights that are also claimed by the controlling personnel of corporate kin groups and communities. Since such authority and other political activities can be carried out autonomously in only one of the two boundary systems, one of them must be subverted if the society is to remain stable. (1969: 665-66)

In much the same vein Marshall Sahlins proposed an incompatibility between markets and descent. Primitive society requires conditions that favor the continuity of social relations. Generalized reciprocity, in his view, better meets this end than does balanced reciprocity, which is inherently unstable. Nonetheless balanced exchange replaces generalized exchange where markets emerge and begin to attract local resources. Continuous alliance obligations, such as those associated with descent, are at least partially subverted so that resources can be diverted to market sale rather than to social relations (Sahlins 1972: 224). The suppression of generalized reciprocity has definite implications both for the nature of descent and for community integration. In the hinterlands of southeast Asia, for example,

restricted sharing of staples, demanded by articulation with the siphoning market, finds its social complement in an atomization and fragmentation of community structure. Lineages, or like systems of extensive and corporate solidary relations, are incompatible with the external drain on household staples and the corresponding posture of self-interest required *vis-a-vis* other households. Large local descent groups are absent or inconsequential. Instead, the solidary relations are of the small family itself, with various and changing interpersonal kin ties the only such nexus of connection between households. (1972: 225)

As Freedman observed, loose communities with weak descent groups are not uncommon in China. What is unexpected is the emergence of strong descent groups, especially in southeastern China. If we are to accept Potter's interpretation (1968), descent groups were particularly elaborate and functional in that region in part *because* commercialization was most developed there. Why then did success in the market not subvert investment in descent groups and why did desire for regional, national, or marketplace advancement not compromise commitment to the local system of communities (cf., E. Wolf 1957 and G. Foster 1965)?

If the matter was as Sahlins and others have proposed, then we might expect the poor in China to have been more committed to local social and ritual obligations than the wealthy, but that is not what we find. In China ritual display, until recently at least, has been a sign of wealth and power. Far from balancing economic differences, ritual display has more often served to exacerbate them. There is ample evidence in support of Freedman's thesis that lineage elaboration depended on the ability to set property aside in the form of ancestral trusts and that such trusts were established not by the poor but by the wealthy—that is, precisely by those who in Sahlins' view should have been most inclined to divert such investment to the market.

The Chinese case thus poses a challenge to conventional wisdom. Why is it that involvement in the market (and the wealth that derived from such involvement) strengthened rather than weakened community integration, local commitment, leadership, and descent? The insecurity of wealth in traditional China may have had something to do with it. Perhaps the wealthy had most to gain from maintaining and reinforcing a secure home base of support. But a more substantial answer to this question must await the solution to another problem raised by Freedman; how did complex lineages develop out of simple ones in China?

Implicitly or explicitly many scholars have expressed the view that when differential access to strategic resources emerges in society and it becomes possible to accumulate wealth independently (i.e., from trade, commerce, or industry rather than on the basis of genealogical position), the descent group ceases to reflect economic and political reality. Those who enjoy privileged access to the means and products of production come to have more in common with each other than with less fortunate members of their respective descent groups. It is reasonable to suppose that a serious contradiction might develop between descent and economic reality if a genealogical nobody managed to end up a controller of strategic resources and a purveyor of political and economic influence.

Some scholars have proposed that descent groups are not only weakened or eliminated in complex societies but that they may not be natural to very simple societies either. For example, Elman Service departed in this regard from the view of his teacher, Julian Steward, who believed that the earliest of people were probably both patrilocal and patrilineal. Service proposed that descent groups may not have been characteristic of early hunter-gatherers but may first have emerged in tribal societies where they served to link local groups in the face of competition (1962). And indeed there is some cross-cultural evidence in support of this view; descent grouping is predicted by the presence of both a unilocal mode of postmarital residence and intergroup fighting (Ember, Ember and Pasternak 1974). In societies with a high level of political development people may call upon the state for defense; but where political development is not so advanced unilineal descent may constitute a convenient and common response to the challenge of competing groups (see also Sahlins 1961).

Cross-Cultural Evidence on the Curvilinear Hypothesis

Regardless of theoretical persuasion, most anthropologists have embraced the notion that the relationship between descent and societal complexity is curvilinear. There is some empirical justification for this view. David Aberle (1961) compared 564 societies in terms of subsistence technique and principle of descent and discovered that while all rules of descent are found in all subsistence settings they are not found with equal frequency in all contexts. Most contemporary hunter-gatherers (60 percent of these societies) lack unilineal descent groups. Although not all bilateral peoples are hunter-gatherers, and while not all hunting-gathering peoples are bilateral, societies based on this mode of subsistence are significantly more likely to lack descent groups than people at any other level of technological development.

Allan Coult and Robert Habenstein (1965: 524) looked at the relationship between unilineal descent and level of political integration and came to similar conclusions about the relationship between descent and societal complexity. They discovered that while societies are likely to form unilineal descent groups at all levels of political development, societies of mid-range political complexity are significantly more likely to do so than those that are simpler or more complex. It should be noted that while their findings suggest a harmony between mid-range political complexity and descent, they do not indicate an incompatibility between

descent grouping and either simple or complex political integration.

While this evidence seems to support the curvilinear hypothesis there are problems nonetheless. Hunter-gatherers are now confined, for the most part, to some of the world's most marginal areas—to locations where food and other necessary resources tend to fluctuate in availability. Given the limited technological means available to them for exploiting these environments it is hardly surprising that hunter-gatherers often adjust to resource and demographic imbalances by shifting band affiliation. *De facto* bilocality is not uncommon among contemporary hunter-gatherers, and cross-cultural evidence suggests that this mode of post-marital residence is effectively predicted by a recent and dramatic depopulation (a common consequence of contact), by resource fluctuation, and by small group size (C.R. Ember 1975; see also M. Ember and C.R. Ember 1972). These studies lend some support to earlier speculations by Steward (1955) and Service (1962) that composite bands (those not strictly exogamous or unilocal) may be relatively recent.

Clearly where people adjust to contact and environmental marginality by bilocal residence we should not expect descent groups to thrive since, as indicated earlier, unilineal descent is most effectively predicted by fighting and a unilocal mode of postmarital residence. While competition would also encourage bilocal peoples to form alliances between families and local groups, it would be harder for them to form effective unilineal descent groups because their consanguineal kinsmen are not localized. But if earlier hunter-gatherers lived in less marginal areas, if their groups were larger, if they were in a position to fight more commonly, and if they were more commonly unilocal than they are now, then descent groups may also have been more common among them than is now the case.

There is also a problem at the other end of the proposed curve, and it is at that end that the Chinese become important. If there really is a fundamental incompatibility between the presence of stratification and a strong state on the one hand and descent grouping on the other, then what are we to make of the Chinese? How could descent groups have thrived in one of the world's most stratified and politically centralized states? This is a question to which Maurice Freedman gave considerable attention.

The Problem of Structure

There is another sense in which the Chinese lineage is theoretically problematic; in its most elaborate form it is structured in a manner that

would appear unlikely, if not inappropriate. As noted earlier, Fortes believes that descent groups are particularly suited to relatively homogeneous, segmentary societies. The fit is reflected in the nature of lineage segmentation. As Fortes describes the structure of descent groups, segmentation takes place in an automatic, mechanical fashion, producing a hierarchy of balanced units. If an apical ancestor had two sons, for example, they become foci for two equivalent, balanced segments. If each of them has two sons, these sons become the foci of four roughly similar segments. The hierarchy of segments is genealogically defined. Indeed, in Fortes' view, the lineage is an extension of the family and its segmentation is modeled after analogous processes within the family. As he put it, "the actual process of segmentation is seen as the equivalent of the division between siblings in the parental family" (1971: 168).

The model Fortes describes also reflects familial attributes in terms of authority structure. According to Fortes, "we find, as a general rule, that not only the lineage but also every segment of it has a head, by succession or election," and that, "it is on the basis of the ties and cleavages between husband, wife, between polygynous wives, between siblings, and between generations that growth and segmentation take place in the lineage" (1971: 169). In short, the segmentary lineage can provide an important integrative role in homogeneous societies because it is, in terms of segmentation and authority, much like the family—symmetrically segmented into roughly equivalent, balanced units. Lineages of this sort are fully consonant with political reality in such societies. Both are constructed on the principle of segmentary opposition:

Study of the unilineal descent group as a part of a total social system means in fact studying its functions in the widest framework of social structure, that of the political organization. A common and perhaps general feature of political organization in Africa is that it is built up in a series of layers, so to speak, so arranged that the principle of checks and balances is necessarily mobilized in political activities. (1971: 166)

By implication, where society loses this quality of symmetry and balance—where, for example, stratification and the state appear together—the political function of descent groups should shrink and their general usefulness should diminish. The atrophy and decline of the descent group is hastened as a variety of cross-kin agencies emerge to usurp its functions—defense, social control, education.

The lineage model described by Fortes was mainly based on African

ethnography. Sahlins confirmed the model in an important essay on the Nuer, a people of Nigeria (1961, see also Evans-Pritchard 1940), and Bohannan's endorsement of Fortes' view on the fit between lineages and homogeneous societies seems natural since his own work involved another African people not unlike the Nuer, the Tiv (1953). Because descent groups *are* most commonly found in relatively egalitarian societies of this sort, and because anthropologists have given so much attention to such societies, we have come to view this type of lineage as being somehow modal or normal.

The expectation is even reflected in our terminology. In the work of G.P. Murdock, for example, we find a discussion of terminology appropriate for describing the internal complexity of "sibs" (more commonly called clans). Between the sib and the lineage, according to Murdock, are "sub-sibs" or "phratries." Where phratries form two exogamous, intermarrying higher-level units we have "moieties" (1949: 47). Fortes and Evans-Pritchard preferred a different set of terms to describe the internal structure of descent groups—they suggested major, maximal, minor, and minimal lineages. What all these usages have in common is the presumption of a lineage structure based on balanced and opposing segments at each hierarchic level. These segments are presumably automatically produced; they are the result of genealogical bifurcations.

The evidence from Polynesia, Korea, and from China challenges these presumptions. We are now aware that lineage segmentation may be asymmetrical rather than symmetrical; segmentation may result in unlike units or in units for which there are no counterparts. We are now also aware that lineage segmentation may not proceed automatically from genealogy but may find its source elsewhere.

A certain malaise developed among us as scholars on both sides of the Atlantic confronted and tried to make sense out of materials obtained outside Africa. Firth, working among the Tikopia, was perplexed by what he first termed "anomalous" descent groups—"clans" that were neither strictly exogamous nor consistently unilineal. His work among the Maori put him in a similar quandary. As Fried has pointed out (1957: 6), Firth preferred to avoid a direct confrontation with the African model. He escaped the problem terminologically, by shifting between "ramages," "lineages," and sometimes by resorting to native terms to accommodate the distinctiveness of the descent groups he found. But this only obscured the fact that they were not really like those described by Fortes, Evans-Pritchard, Sahlins, or Bohannan. It was Morton Fried and Maurice

Freedman who, independently, made the breakthrough that finally enabled us to accept and make sense out of these apparently anomalous instances.

Convergence of Minds: Two Traditions but a Common Puzzle

It is no coincidence that these two anthropologists, working in terms of different theoretical traditions and with very different goals in mind, both found it necessary to reconsider the idea that descent groups naturally weaken in complex societies. Nor is it surprising that despite their different theoretical predispositions they came to remarkably similar conclusions, since what they had in common was a familiarity with the disquieting Chinese case.

Freedman's understanding of the southeastern Chinese lineage made clear that it bore little relationship to the African model. In keeping with the structure-functional tradition in which he was trained and of which he was a part, Freedman devoted considerable intellectual energy to demonstrating fit between Chinese lineages and the economic and political complexity of the Chinese state. He was intent on showing that the Chinese lineage reflected and reinforced structural features of Chinese society and functioned to maintain that society. China was neither egalitarian nor lacking in strong state apparatus but the lineage fit nonetheless.

The issue for Fried was the relationship between social structure and economy. He was certainly not the first to recognize that descent groups were not all the same. But for an evolutionist like Fried, Murdock's claim that since all principles of descent are found in all kinds of societies even a revised evolutionism was unsupportable could not go unanswered. Fried did not really put his finger on the character of the Chinese lineage (his fieldwork had been done in an area of China where lineage development was not pronounced), but he knew enough about the Chinese lineage and about Chinese society to make a convincing case for the fact that Tungus and Chinese patrilineal descent groups are polar opposites in terms of how they work and in terms of the societal attributes they embody and reflect (1957).

The Chinese case thus led to a rare convergence of minds and traditions. The Chinese unexpectedly brought Fried and Freedman to a common high ground and imposed a truce upon them. It was a convergence rarely achieved in anthropology and for that reason alone deserves further elaboration.

Fried on the Question of Fit and Function

Responding to Murdock's challenge, Fried urged closer attention to the political and economic contexts within which lineages are found. He warned us to avoid classifying descent groups together "merely because they utilize kinship as an articulating principle without determining the nature of their particular kin relations or their quality" (1957: 8). The Tungus, Nuer, Tikopia, and Chinese all make use of a patrilineal descent principle but the way they do is distinctive, reflecting important economic and political differences.

Paul Kirchhoff had already indicated that lineage segmentation can be asymmetrical, reflecting genealogically determined ranking (1968). Fried carried Kirchhoff's analysis further. Whether people demonstrate or merely stipulate common descent (and have lineages in the former case or clans in the latter) is of crucial importance for Fried. If people take the trouble to demonstrate genealogical connections they must be interested in establishing differences within the group for some purpose, for example to account for differences in access to various privileges or resources, or differences of obligation. The symmetry of Nuer or Tiv lineage segmentation reflects the egalitarian nature of these societies; the demonstration of descent is needed only to determine relative obligations in warfare. Since people owe greater allegiance to closer relatives it is important to know precisely how people are related. But in ranked lineages, such as those often found in Polynesia, each division produces segments that are not balanced but different in rank. The asymmetry of lineage segmentation reflects the ranked nature of the societies in which such descent groups are found. We should not expect to find lineages of this sort in egalitarian societies unless they were formerly ranked.

Kirchhoff had speculated that early people probably lived in unstable, bilocal bands and lacked descent groups. As higher forms of economic activity developed two kinds of descent groups emerged. No evolutionist, Kirchhoff took pains to deny that the ranked (or "conical") descent group may have developed out of the "egalitarian" form. He was prepared to admit, however, that since the egalitarian descent group did not admit social differentiation it was probably incompatible with further development. The ranked form had greater potential in this regard because it did accommodate a certain, limited degree of differentiation. Even this form of descent would wither and die in the presence of true classes, however.

Fried accepted the notion that ranked descent groups have greater evolutionary potential than egalitarian descent groups but he rejected Kirchhoff's proposal that the two forms of descent-grouping must have been temporally equivalent:

I prefer the hypothesis that some form of the egalitarian clan preceded all forms of the conical clan and that the conical clan actually was dependent on the prior existence of and emerged from some form of the egalitarian clan, admitting, however, that a given society through exposure to special conditions need not from a simple bilateral or non-kin-reckoning situation pass through an egalitarian clan phase before emerging with stratified clans. (1957: 6)

Fried's attempt to indicate the fit between Chinese lineages and Chinese society was not as convincing as his demonstration of fit between conical lineages and ranked societies, mainly because his familiarity with Chinese lineages was limited. In light of Freedman's analysis, however, we find that Fried was correct nonetheless. The Chinese lineage does fit and reflect both stratification and strong central government. While Fried made an effective case for fit between form of descent and societal complexity, and while his argument lent support to the view that descent groups evolve in conjunction with increasing societal complexity, he never explained how descent groups transform from one type to another, why they are found in some societies but not in others, or why they vary within particular societies.

Freedman on the Question of Fit and Function

Two main problems attracted Freedman's attention and interest—how do lineages fit and contribute to Chinese society and secondly, what accounts for variation in lineage form, structure, function, and territorial scope? With respect to the first of these questions, Freedman came forward with a model of Chinese lineage organization that does make sense of the fit. It is a model that subsequent research indicates was commonly realized in southeastern China (Ahern 1973, Baker 1968, Pasternak 1972, Potter 1968, and Watson 1978).

The Chinese lineage had in common with Tiv and Tungus descent groups the fact that all members were equally descended from a common ancestor. In contrast to these descent groups and to the ranked (conical) lineage, however, segmentation is not genealogically determined but reflects socioeconomic differentiation. A brief summary of Freedman's

generalized lineage model will make this clear:

The Chinese have traditionally recognized two basic kinds of property—private property, which can be lent, rented, sold, or divided among one's heirs; and ancestral property which, once established, cannot be divided or disposed of without the consent (at least in theory) of all shareholders. Any man of means may set aside a portion of his private property to establish an ancestral estate. Its profits will be used to underwrite periodic ancestral rites and to finance various welfare activities. A portion of these earnings may also be distributed among the members of the descent group.

What is important to keep in mind is that a lineage or lineage segment does not come into being unless a focal ancestor has been designated and an ancestral estate established in his name. The prerequisite is wealth. Since wealth does not automatically derive from genealogical position in China, only certain members of the descent group can set land aside as an ancestral estate. When they do, they usually attempt to ensure that its profits will not be diluted by the claims of more distant agnates. The fewer the shareholders the greater is the return per share. For this reason people normally prefer to establish ancestral estates in the names of more immediate ancestors or in their own names.

Since the process of lineage elaboration depends on wealth the segments that result are not invariably balanced like those of the Tiv or Nuer. And in contrast to the ranked lineages described by Kirchhoff and Fried, Chinese lineage segmentation is not genealogically determined; wealth rather than birth order determines the asymmetry. In short, Chinese lineage segmentation is not only asymmetrical, but it is also based on stratification.

In practice if not in theory, patterns of lineage leadership also reflect the social and political realities of Chinese society. There is no genealogically determined senior line of descent. The nominal head of a lineage or lineage segment is the oldest living member of the senior generation. Theoretically the Chinese descent group was egalitarian in the sense that any male who lived long enough could become a headman. But as Freedman pointed out, leadership and responsibility was actually concentrated in the hands of the wealthy and literate.

How could so internally differentiated a descent group have survived? Freedman argues that far from being weakened by its heterogeneity the Chinese lineage was actually strengthened by it. So long as real power was concentrated in the hands of an elite and the importance of genealogical authority was minimized, the lineage could effectively hold its

members together, protect them against powerful neighboring descent groups, and soften the demands and exactions of the state. The wealthy and literate afforded political and economic protection while poorer agnates provided the muscle that discouraged outside interference.

Although the Chinese political system was highly centralized it allowed a great measure of autonomy to local communities which, especially in southeastern China, often meant local groups. From the point of view of the central government this was a more efficient method of ensuring stability and control in the countryside. It was certainly administratively simpler and cheaper than stationing soldiers in every remote part and village. The strong centralized state was no fiction in China, but neither was the strong descent group. It is true that when the Chinese state was strong the descent group tended to be relatively weak, and when the state was weak the descent group sometimes managed to usurp some of the functions and powers of the state. Despite such fluctuations in relative power, however, the Chinese lineage has manifested an extraordinary viability.

Freedman proposed that the key to the viability of the Chinese lineage may be found in its internal stratification and in the role played by an elite class:

Since the effective leaders of the differentiated lineage were neither appointed by nor under the orders of the magistrate, and since if they were themselves scholars they could confront the magistrate on an equal footing, the will of the state could be resisted without a breach of administrative duty. Unless he was prepared to bring in the militia, the magistrate could only deal and treat with a recalcitrant lineage; he could not command it. By preventing a bureaucrat from serving in his own province the system attempted to avoid nepotism and corruption; but by allowing lineage leadership to take on a strong bureaucratic colouring without imposing any bureaucratic checks upon it, the state weakened its control of the lineage, however much it may have suffused its leadership with the correct ideology. With the gentry as a buffer, the differentiated lineage could oppose itself to the state and yet maintain its standing in official eyes. (1958: 138)

Freedman's description of how the Chinese lineage works supports Fried's claim that while the Tungus, Nuer, Tikopians, and Chinese all employ a patrilineal descent principle, the manner in which they do varies considerably in terms of economic, political, and social differences.

It would be difficult to imagine how a lineage of the sort Freedman has described could emerge and thrive in an egalitarian context. On the other hand the Chinese case illustrates that descent groups need not be

incompatible with stratification and strong states. The Chinese empire was unusual in size. Perhaps it was the administrative complexity and cost of managing a realm of such territorial scope that inclined Chinese rulers to delegate some of the responsibility for maintaining order in remote areas to descent groups. Lineage development and persistence might also have been encouraged by the cyclical nature of Chinese dynastic control and the fact that there were repeated periods during which the ability of the central government to maintain order faltered or failed entirely.

The emergence of empire in China clearly did not compromise vital functions of the Chinese descent group. While precise counterparts to the Chinese lineage are not found elsewhere, China was not the only complex, stratified society with important, functional lineages. Korea had them as well, for example. Whereas the functions performed by lineages in Korea and southeastern China are quite similar, their structures are quite different. In particular, Korean lineages do not segment internally to accommodate a socially heterogeneous membership.

R.L. and D.Y. Janelli have considered the applicability of Freedman's analysis to the Korean case. They agree that lineages can accommodate social differentiation, but their analysis suggests that Korean lineages do so differently. In Korea localized lineages lack the elaborate internal segmentation common to lineages in southeastern China. As Janelli and Janelli see it, what little segmentation occurs is not a direct product of genealogical seniority (primogeniture) nor does it reflect differences of wealth. In their understanding, segmentation more directly reflects differences of prestige. By creating estates in the names of a few famous ancestors, genealogical segments can assert their status despite the existence of primogeniture. Thus, "the prestige of a senior genealogical segment and its primogeniture descendant is not at all immune from challenges by junior segments with their own primogeniture descendants" (1978: 279). The Korean case suggests that primogeniture is incompatible neither with lineage segmentation (as Freedman believed) nor with functional descent groups in stratified societies.

If segmentation of the localized lineage does not result from and reflect differences of wealth as much as differences of status derived from having famous ancestors, how then do Korean lineages accommodate stratification? Because Janelli and Janelli are unable to identify any structural device by means of which this is done, they are led to question the basic assumption that descent and stratification are incompatible:

Korea seems to provide one instance of lineages which were not at all incompatible with class structure. Rather than view lineages and complex societies as inherently

incompatible, therefore, we find it preferable to regard certain lineage functions as particularly well suited to certain kinds of societies (and by implication, ill suited to others). . . . In sum, incompatibility lies between particular kinds of lineage functions—not lineages *per se*—and certain kinds of societies. (1978: 286)

While Janelli and Janelli therefore agree with Freedman that descent and stratification are not necessarily incompatible, the Korean evidence leads them to disagree that viability of the descent group in complex societies requires that stratification be structurally accommodated—that it be reflected in the nature of lineage segmentation. They go further and propose that Freedman was “probably wrong” in believing that stratification was accommodated in southeastern China *because* of the optional, or non-genealogical nature of lineage segmentation:

We doubt that it contributed towards the survival of lineages in southeastern China, for if Korean lineages could tolerate a high degree of social and economic differentiation without such segmentation, it seems likely that Chinese lineages could have done the same. (1978: 274)

The Korean evidence does indeed suggest that the viability of descent groups is compromised in complex, stratified societies only when the important functions they perform become obsolete or are transferred to other agencies. On the other hand to say that the Chinese, like the Koreans, *could have* maintained lineages without internal segmentation does not imply that segmentation of the Chinese lineage did not accommodate and reflect social differentiation. On the basis of what we know about how Chinese descent groups worked we should expect that, if functionally important segmentation does occur, it will not long contradict economic and political reality. The nature of descent groups in both Korea and China suggests that if lineages segment in stratified societies, the divisions will not be dictated by genealogy in an automatic way, but will rather reflect important social, political, and economic differences. It seems to me that the Korean evidence only provides further support for the view that descent is not intrinsically incompatible with social differentiation so long as the functions of descent continue to be vital and so long as the structure and operation of the descent group do not contradict economic and political reality.

The Problem of Variation

Descent groups vary in structure, function, and degree of localization. Attempts to account for such variation are normally based on some kind

of intercultural comparison. Fried, for example, compared corporate unilineal descent groups in several societies. Others have preferred a cross-cultural method that involves random samples drawn from some representative ethnographic universe (see Aberle 1961; Coult and Habenstein 1965; Ember, Ember, and Pasternak 1974; or Befu and Plotnicov 1962). Relatively few scholars have approached problems of this sort in terms of intracultural comparisons—that is, by describing and attempting to account for differences in time and space within a single society or culture area (see, for example, Eggan 1937; or Sahlins 1958). China provides an exceptional opportunity for comparisons of this sort.

Freedman took good advantage of that opportunity. He was very well aware that Chinese lineages, on the ground, depart in a variety of ways from the generalized model he had described, that:

Chinese are not all patrilineal in one simple sense, . . . different lineages in China take on different forms, fulfill different tasks, and are differently articulated with society at large. It is perfectly legitimate to work with a generalized model of Chinese kinship, . . . but as soon as we begin to survey the ethnography of China we see that there are important problems in the variations we can detect—from region to region, from period to period, from 'dialect' area to 'dialect' area, and so on. (1966: 168)

Why are Chinese lineages more elaborately developed in some regions than in others, why are some more localized than others, and where lineages are not entirely localized, what determines the extent and nature of their distribution in space? These are only a few of the questions Freedman posed, addressed, and invited others to pursue.

Following Freedman's initiative a number of scholars have devoted attention to various aspects of lineage variation in China; adding to, modifying, and in some cases challenging Freedman's earliest speculations. Freedman welcomed, delighted in, and actively contributed to this cumulative understanding. The work of his colleagues and students only served to reinforce his conviction that variation in lineage structure and function could only be understood in terms of the social, political, and economic context. As he put it,

agnatic kinship is but one important axis along which Chinese society organized itself; and to understand its significance it must be taken in its full social context. The study of all modes of grouping and alignment—not only lineage but also village, marketing community, *hsiang*, secret society, cult, and so on—will show us how complex was the political system within which agnatic kinship played a

role. (1979: 346)

Freedman's observations on the factors that affect agnatic organization and variation in Chinese society would undoubtedly apply as well to other complex societies in which descent groups are found. What we have learned about the nature and sources of descent group variation in China should, for this reason, be of interest to scholars working elsewhere. Our more general understanding of how and why descent groups vary would clearly benefit from a broader cooperation and sharing of information. As a step in this direction let me review some of the findings on variation in China.

Strong and Weak Lineages

Freedman proposed a connection between strong, elaborately segmented lineages on the one hand and rice cultivation, extensive irrigation, and frontier conditions on the other. Potter (1968) supported and elaborated on Freedman's proposal, attributing lineage elaboration in southeastern China not only to agricultural surpluses, the exigencies of frontier life, and the absence of strong government control, but also to the development of commerce and capitalism. Other researchers have attempted to apply these ideas to Taiwan, the last Chinese frontier.

After comparing two Taiwanese communities in which I did fieldwork (Ta-tieh and Chung-she) with others described in the literature, I (1972) proposed several modifications to the formulations of Freedman and Potter. It seemed to me that when frontier settlement involved neither conflict, competition, nor a need for cooperation, descent groups might prosper in relative isolation, as they did in Chung-she. Under different frontier conditions, like those in Ta-tieh, where geography and warfare encouraged mixed settlements and extensive cooperation across surname lines, the development of descent groups may often have initially been inhibited. The subsequent pacification of such frontiers might release the sort of competitive forces that would lead to the emergence of strong descent groups.

Hsu Cho-yun subsequently observed that while the I-lan plain of Taiwan met the conditions Freedman and Potter believed should have encouraged lineages, they failed to develop there. Hsu's explanation for this failure, like my own, points to ecological and economic aspects of frontier life:

The various needs which required some corporate effort to provide a solution

actually were met by means other than lineage organization. The hired Hakka guards provided I-lan farmers as well as travellers (sic) with effective protection against the adversary activities of the hostile aborigines. The local order was kept by the headman (Chieh-shou) who was leader of the reclamation band. The expensive cost of irrigation construction was financed by outside investment. And many such activities were carried out by concerned parties who signed formal contracts (with) well-spelt (sic) rights and obligations. What Freedman viewed as favorable conditions to create strong lineages seemed to have endorsed the growth of local ties and the commercialization of agriculture. Very few strong lineages appeared in I-lan in the 19th century. I-lan people created scores of temples in the 19th century. Even today, when I-lan is sufficiently wealthy to maintain no less than two hundred temples for various kinds of deities, there are only three lineage temples in the whole region. (1972: 66)

Another illustration of how territorial integration compromised lineage development on the Taiwanese frontier is provided by Chuang (1973), who stressed that need for cooperation, especially with respect to irrigation and cultivation, was primarily achieved in terms of territory rather than kinship in Chu-shan, and that in terms of community and inter-community integration temples were more important than ancestral halls.

These studies all suggest that where defense and cooperation required a bridging of agnatic groups, territory was likely to take precedence over descent. But not all areas of Taiwan were of this sort. The ethnography reveals communities ranging from multisurname (Diamond 1969; Gallin 1966; Ta-tieh village in Pasternak 1972; and Wang 1967) to single surname (Ahern 1973; Harrell 1982; and Chung-she village in Pasternak 1972). Chung-she villagers, for example, did not have to adjust to hostile aborigines, violent ethnic confrontations, or to significant competition for critical economic resources like land and water. There was little need for cooperation for defense or for making a living and the community was dominated by one, internally segmented lineage.

Falling somewhere between Chung-she and the various multisurname communities described in the literature are the four lineage-dominated settlements of Ch'i-nan (Ahern 1973). Although the four lineages of Ch'i-nan differ in terms of corporate resources, degree of political integration, and in the extent to which families are economically differentiated, they are not internally segmented. Why are Ch'i-nan's descent groups more active than those in Ta-tieh but less elaborate internally than those in Chung-she? Ahern's work suggests that the answer may be found in the way Ch'i-nan developed:

The founding ancestors of the four lineages settled there at about the same time. They were bound together physically by the rivers and mountains that make Ch'inan into a natural amphitheater; they were bound together socially by the experience of constructing irrigation works and defending themselves against the aborigines. In these circumstances, the settlements came to view each other as four like units. They competed for prestige through their ancestral halls, yet at the same time cooperated through the Tho-te-kong temple. But in Ch'inan [these] groups of like order are separate lineage communities, not segments with a single lineage. (1973: 113)

It seems likely that the four settlements of Ch'i-nan initially cooperated less fully than Ta-tieh did with her Hakka neighbors. Once irrigation canals had been constructed, for example, little cooperation was required to run or maintain them. Fighting with nearby aborigines was evidently not frequent or extensive enough to require multisurname settlements, but subsequent competition among developed lineage groups did sometimes lead to violence (Ahern 1973: 71-74).

The fact that Ch'i-nan's descent groups were not entirely localized may indicate that there was little need for territorial alliances, and the lack of segmentation within local descent groups may reflect the fact that wealth was not, as in Chung-she, concentrated in particular lines. In the face of competition among descent groups, then, the unity of individual descent groups (or settlements) probably took precedence over differentiation within them, especially after the threat of conflict with aboriginal populations abated under Japanese rule.

Steven Harrell compared Ch'i-nan with Hsi-yuan and Ploughshare, two Taiwanese villages in which he did fieldwork. His comparison of lineage organization in the three localities seemed to support some of Freedman's suggestions. Following Freedman, Harrell proposes that the development and elaboration of lineages depends upon some economic potential for establishing lineage estates. He further suggests that lineage solidarity is enhanced by localization, which is in turn affected by land use and need for defense (see also Befu and Plotnicov 1962). But Harrell's endorsement of Freedman's views about the crucial role of lineage property may have been premature. Lineage solidarity may require a corporate focus of some sort, as Freedman, Baker, Potter and Harrell suggest, but strong agnatic ties could as well be the impetus for establishing ancestral estates as the result of having established them. A lineage does not necessarily create ancestral estates simply because it can, and the size of these estates is not necessarily the most accurate indicator of lineage strength.

Whether strong agnatic groups are the cause or result of lineage estates is an empirical question. In each instance the problem is to account anew for the strength of agnatic ties. But apart from this question about why some lineages are stronger and more elaborate than others there is another aspect of variation to which Freedman directed us. Under what circumstances do lineages extend beyond individual localities and, where they do, what determines their scope?

Higher-Order Lineages

One of the things we have learned from the study of Chinese descent groups is that they often include people in separate communities. Freedman believed that "higher-order lineages" (i.e., non-localized lineages with corporate branches in more than one community) most commonly developed, like localized lineages, through a fission process. Limitations of terrain forced groups of agnates to migrate. Higher-order lineages resulted if migrants developed local lineages but at the same time maintained formal (corporate) ties with their original community. But, since broken terrain and migration have not invariably led to higher-order lineages in China, what conditions might have encouraged some migrants to perpetuate such ties?

M. Cohen and I have both described higher-order lineages in south Taiwan (Cohen 1969; Pasternak 1972, 1973). Cohen proposes that they were a response to surname heterogeneity and conflict among small agnatic groups. He attributes the small size of local agnatic groups to recency of settlement. My own research suggests another impetus for the formation of higher-order lineages. The threat of interethnic violence may have stimulated both agnatically heterogeneous Hakka settlements and the emergence of higher-order lineages. The latter provide one way to organize and perpetuate alliances on a vast territorial scale when local agnatic groups are small and the threat of external warfare great.

It is important to point out that higher-order lineages in south Taiwan display the structural asymmetry of Freedman's generalized model. As I have elsewhere proposed (1972), however, segmentation in this case does not primarily function to reflect differences of wealth within the descent group but rather to unite real or putative agnates in different communities. Here, at least, higher-order lineages developed through an aggregation of local segments rather than from a fission process; descent was demonstrated not so much to draw distinctions within the lineage as to demonstrate agnatic solidarity. This brings us to an interesting

conceptual problem.

In his later work (1966), Freedman explicitly departed from the commonly accepted distinction between clan and lineage in terms of whether descent is stipulated (clan) or demonstrated (lineage), and proposed that the distinction should rather be based on corporation (lineage) or lack of it (clan). Fried's objection to this proposal has some merit:

Cohen (1967: 168) raises what I consider to be the crucial question that Freedman never confronts: "What is the point of distinguishing two types of agnatic groupings when they are doing pretty much the same thing?" My answer is different from Freedman's because the groups I distinguish do different things. Lineages limit membership in the attempt to exclude competitors for scarce resources. Clans recruit as widely as possible in order to fulfill different social functions among which the attempt to gain a measure of collective security is immediately apparent. (1970: 33)

Fried believes there is an intimate relationship between demonstrating descent and certain economic-political conditions. If people take the trouble to keep track of the links that connect them they must be doing so to enable them to make distinctions within the group for some purpose. The Nuer and Tiv demonstrate descent to distinguish degrees of obligation in feuding; in the conical lineage concern is with distinctions of rank and privilege. In China lineage segmentation reflects stratification, and descent is demonstrated so that there will be little doubt as to who has access to what.

In Fried's view, then, the main reason for demonstrating descent is to limit or restrict obligation, privilege, or access. The problem is that by emphasizing only the limiting function of demonstration Fried may go too far. If Freedman distinguished agnatic groups that were doing much the same thing, Fried's usage may lead us to classify together groups doing different things. Surely when people take the trouble to trace, remember, or create genealogical links they have some reason for doing so. Often they do intend to establish different degrees of obligation or privilege, but they may also do so to establish commonality.

To support his proposal that the function of descent demonstration is limiting, Fried draws from the work of Hu Hsien-chin (1984). We are reminded that the Chao lineage of Kiangsu consisted of two branches until 1810, when one member donated a sizeable estate for the benefit of the entire lineage. That families belonging to the senior branch received twenty times more income from this estate than families in the junior

branch is considered by Fried to be evidence of an explicit distinction in terms of relative wealth.

But why should the donor have taken the trouble to establish a lineage estate the profits of which would, in any part, be shared by all lineage members? Perhaps what we have here is a simultaneous attempt to fuse lineage members and, at the same time, to distinguish among them. That descent is also demonstrated in lineages formed by aggregation suggests that, under certain circumstances, tracing genealogical links may serve not to limit membership but to render the group more inclusive. As I have suggested elsewhere (1973: 261), aggregative and fissionive processes need not be mutually exclusive in Chinese lineages—a suggestion which Freedman was ultimately to find congenial (1979: 344).

Fried seems to have been at least implicitly aware of this. In a more recent essay (1970) we find a significant alteration of original definitions; the modifications suggest that Fried was trying to accommodate fusion without having to withdraw his initial insistence on the exclusive intent of tracing genealogical connections. In his earlier article Fried described demonstration as follows:

The genealogical basis of all relationships within the group is explicit, i.e., connecting links between tertiary or more distant kin are known and can be identified. (1954: 23)

Where descent is stipulated, on the other hand, connections are “implicit” (1957: 23). If we follow these instructions a higher-order descent group formed by aggregation would be a lineage. It would make no difference whether the demonstrated genealogical links were real or putative. But Fried would be uncomfortable classifying descent groups based on fusion with lineages. Perhaps this is why he subsequently added a requirement. Demonstration would now require “proper, *a priori* (italics mine), genealogical identification.” In the case of stipulated descent, on the other hand, genealogical ties may be “rationalized subsequent to membership, often on the basis of fictitious or legendary common ancestors” (1970: 26).

But what is a “proper” and “*a priori*” identification? Does this mean that people know the “actual” ancestral links that connect them before they select particular ancestors to serve as lineage or segment foci? If so, then the Chao of Kiangsu and most south Taiwan Hakka higher-order descent groups would still constitute lineages, despite the aggregative manner in which they were formed. In neither case were the ties

"rationalized subsequent to membership"; known ancestors were used as the basis for membership, and in most of the Hakka cases the ancestors chosen as segment foci were not fictitious, although the effect would have been the same had they been so.

How Inclusive the Higher-Order Lineage

Freedman proposed that higher-order lineages were likely to be confined to "vicinages," areas that can be crossed on foot in a couple of hours (1966: 23, 37). Skinner suggests that they do not normally extend beyond the boundaries of the standard marketing area (1964: 36-37). The two positions have much in common since, as Freedman observed, vicinage and standard marketing area are usually congruent (1966: 25). One reason lineages rarely extend beyond single vicinages or standard marketing areas may be that once they do they invite government attention and restraint (see Hsiao 1960: 354; and Freedman 1979: 340-342).

But higher-order lineages are not invariably confined to single vicinages or standard marketing areas. For example, Hakka higher-order lineages in south Taiwan included members in many vicinages and marketing areas. Primarily the result of an aggregative rather than of a fission process, these higher-order lineages were a response to the omnipresent threat of conflict with a Hokkien-speaking majority. In fact, higher-order lineages were only one of several means by which Hakka in this area were integrated. Hamlets were combined into neighborhoods or villages which in turn formed higher-level systems. These were linked in still larger aggregations for social, religious, political, and military purposes (see Pasternak 1972). The highest level of organization was the total area of Hakka habitation on the southwestern plain—the region of common peril.

Chinese lineages vary not only with respect to whether they are confined to single communities, but also with respect to whether members live contiguously. At one extreme core members (those who stay put after marriage) live in compact, unmixed communities, at the other core members live interspersed with people of different descent groups. The physical distance between agnates and the degree to which they live contiguously are not the same thing. Interspersion may reflect the nature of warfare. A recent cross-cultural study (Ember, Ember and Pasternak 1974) provides some evidence for a link between contiguity and internal warfare on the one hand, and interspersed and external warfare on the other. It was found that local fighting often induces patrilineally related

males to live contiguously. Where fighting mainly or exclusively involves other societies or ethnic groups, however, the clustering of agnates is not as necessary and interspersed settlement may develop, and may even be strategically advantageous. It is interesting that the Hakka of south Taiwan formed both contiguous and interspersed lineages. Perhaps this was because continuous pressure from their enemies suppressed internal squabbling without altogether eliminating it.

The Lineage in a Socialist State

Freedman's generalized lineage model derives from the nature of Chinese property relations. The lineage does not exist if it is not incorporated. Internal segmentation too requires the establishment of corporate foci. Given Chinese Communist hostility toward both private landownership and the lineage, Freedman predicted that local and higher-order lineages would soon vanish in China if they had not already done so (1966: 176). Agrarian policy was designed to socialize landownership and to undermine authority and leadership based on property. For Freedman such policy would inevitably undermine the lineage as well:

It is self-evident that first land reform and then collectivization were by themselves enough to put an end to a system of which differential wealth and the ownership of estates by lineages and their segments were crucial parts. (1966: 173)

But Freedman also expressed a reservation of importance. In southeastern China the various stages of collectivization, and the development of mature communes after the failure of the Great Leap Forward, may have "given some organizational expression within the latest framework for small lineages as teams and moderately large lineages as brigades" (1966: 176).

Freedman thought it was significant that postmarital residence continues to be predominantly patrilocal in China—women leave their own localities when they marry. This means that local collective units (teams and brigades) usually correspond to one or more agnatic groups. Since ownership and control over productive property have been transferred from families to these collective units, it is possible that Communist agrarian policy has strengthened existing agnatic groups and may even have created corporate agnatic groups where none existed before. If this is the case, and there is already some ethnographic evidence to suggest

that it is (see N. Diamond 1975; c.f., Parish and Whyte 1978: 58–59, 113–114, 304, and 311), then the next problem will be discover what these groups are like, how they work, and how they compare to analogous groups in other socialist countries.

I have the impression that Freedman was inclined to view these *de facto* agnatic units as something apart from lineages. Commenting on John Lewis' speculation that cooperativisation in the 1950's led to reestablishment of traditional lineage organizations (1963: 462ff), Freedman warned that, "it takes more than pooled land and village solidarity to make a lineage—which must have both solidarity and internal competition at the same time" (1966: 176). Freedman posed the question this way:

How lineage-like are they? To what extent may the lineage in its new guise as brigade or team display some of its old solidarity vis-a-vis its neighbours and the state and show its former inner differentiation? How far, in recovering from the upsets of the first impact of the commune system, has the lineage been able to reconstruct its own mechanisms of internal control? (1966: 176–77)

In raising these questions Freedman pointed to the next phase of our work. We must now consider the possibility that descent groups may endure and even thrive in socialist versions of the complex state society. And if they do, we must look to their nature and to the sources of their variation.

Maurice Freedman demonstrated how the structure and organization of Chinese descent groups reflect and accommodate the nature of Chinese society. In so doing he challenged a number of popular notions about the nature and viability of descent groups in general. Freedman was also interested in how and why Chinese descent groups vary; his contributions in this regard have sensitized us to the benefits that may derive from thinking about people in less monolithic, mechanical terms. But when all is said and done, Freedman's main contribution may have been that he raised more questions about Chinese descent groups, and about descent in general, than he answered. He inspired a number of scholars to take up the challenge, and they, in turn, have proceeded to raise still more questions. It would be rewarding to be able to predict or to retrodict the conditions under which Chinese behave one way rather than another; it would be still more gratifying if what we learn about the sources of similarity and difference in China has relevance for peoples elsewhere. Here lies the greater challenge and China's promise.

The Conditions of Development and Decline of Chinese Lineages and the Formation of Ethnic Groups

David Y. H. Wu

Introduction

Jack Potter's 1970 essay "Land and Lineage in Traditional China" was published in *Family and Kinship in Chinese Society*, a volume edited by the late Maurice Freedman. In the article Potter raises what I think is a major question in the study of Chinese society. He says,

Why the Chinese were more motivated than other traditional peasant groups to use lineages as important features of their social structure is a question that requires a complex explanation. (1970: 131)

But Potter does not try to explain this complexity. He merely states that,

This differential distribution of lineage organization in China can be explained only by the joint effect of several variables—cultural, social, political, ecological, and economic—a task of explanation that I do not attempt here. (1970: 131)

Potter first accepts the hypothesis that Chinese were fond of organizing "lineage villages," and then only goes on to discuss in detail the conditions for forming "lineage villages." His conclusion fully supports Maurice Freedman's (1958 and 1966) theory that the popularity of strong lineages in China's Kwangtung and Fukien provinces was a consequence of paddy rice, corporate ownership of land, weak government, and frontier society.

In 1972 I paid particular attention to this question raised by Potter while I was organizing my kinship data on overseas Chinese in New Guinea. I did so because I found that the Chinese not only emphasize

the family, clan, and lineage in China proper, but also do so in overseas Chinese society. This is why I wrote an essay that attempted to explain the problem Potter raises but leaves unanswered (Wu 1973).

I discovered that in a small New Guinea town with a population of just over a thousand Chinese, many clan associations (*tsung-ch'in hui*) and native-place associations (*t'ung-hsiang hui*) had developed out of familial and kinship relations, and that even commercial guild associations (*hang-yeh kung-hui*) used kin groups as their basis. Basing social relations upon a shared native-place is a familiar phenomenon in many immigrant societies. But the environment in the host country cannot serve as the sole reason for the importance of family and surname in Chinese immigrant organizations. When Francis L. K. Hsu read my report, he considered overseas Chinese society in New Guinea a good example of a society that uses the kinship system and cultural tradition to adjust to a new environment. In his view too, the society was an example of traditional culture overriding environmental influence on the form of social organization (Hsu 1982).

It occurred to me at that time that an explanation of family and kinship institutions for China proper would be inadequate and unconvincing if it relied solely on materials on overseas Chinese society. I set the paper aside for this reason. I wish now to take the rare opportunity provided by my attendance at this *Conference on the Chinese Family and its Ritual Behavior* to once again raise an idea I have about the growth of the *tsu* out of the *chia* in Chinese society, and to solicit advice on this idea from the many experts who are present. This essay tries to employ the rich new data on the Chinese lineage system in Taiwan and the explanation for it that anthropologists have been discussing in recent years. By so doing, I will attempt to confirm a hypothesis I have about the permanence of China's broadly defined clan institution. Beyond this, I also want to explain the flexibility of the "lineage" in extending out from the "family" by discussing the theoretical nature of "ethnic identity" and "ethnic relations."

As such, this essay will discuss three points. I will first briefly introduce the views of earlier writers and their various schools of thought on the family, clan, and lineage in mainland China and in migrant society in Taiwan. This is done to bring out the complex differences among the contending theories about the rise and decline of lineages. Second, I will broaden the scope of the study of Chinese clans and lineages by citing comparative data on overseas Chinese lineages. I do so to establish the common characteristics of Chinese lineages. Third, I will bring out the

shared nature of lineages and ethnic relations. I do so to stress that the key to understanding Chinese cultural behavior lies in studying the developmental processes of social groups, rather than in studying the structure of ethnic groups themselves.

Basic Conditions for the Foundation of Lineages

I use the term "lineage" (*tsung-tsu*) in this essay to distinguish it from "family" (*chia-tsu*) and "clan" (*shih-tsu*). In addition, and for convenience in exposition, I adopt neither the term "*shih-hsi-ch'un*," which is the common anthropological translation into Chinese for "lineage," nor "*fu-hsi chi-t'su ch'un*," which is the common anthropological translation into Chinese for "patrilineal descent group." Instead, I will use the simpler "*tsung-tsu*" for "lineage." Opening this discussion by defining terms shows that the Chinese themselves have lacked a clearly fixed term for the concept of "lineage." This is a problem facing anyone discussing Chinese families, lineages and clans.

For example, in his recent discussion of the definition of the Chinese family (*chia-tsu*) Hsieh Jih-chang (1981) maintains that the clan (*shih-tsu*) and lineage (*tsung-tsu*) are extensions of the concept of "family" (*chia*). He mentions Fei Hsiao-t'ung's view that in principle Chinese family structure is the same as the structure of the clan (i.e. *shih-tsu*, which Fei Hsiao t'ung [1948: 41] refers to as "lineage") insofar as the family can expand from a small to large size. Thus, the Chinese family "can even expand to the point where it refers to all people sharing a common surname, even though such people need not be genealogically related" (Hsieh 1981: 60). In addition, the Chinese family shares similarities with the lineage and tribe, and is an enterprise that "includes political, economic, religious, and other complex functions" (Hsieh 1981: 58). This is why it is necessary in studying the Chinese family to first set out an operational definition. The alternative would be chaos. We know that operational definitions facilitate research. But clarifying a definition cannot change the Chinese view of the "family" (*chia*) and "lineage" (*tsu*), nor their behavioral variability and flexibility. This is why Chuang Ying-chang emphasizes in his discussion of the family in a Taiwan fishing village that, "If we take the great variability of Chinese family form into full consideration, we might be more restrained, and refrain from rashly adopting rather set definitions for the Chinese family" (1981: 82).

If the Chinese family unquestionably forms the basic unit for the lineage, what then are the basic conditions for lineage formation? Everyone

is aware of the innovative insights of Maurice Freedman. Freedman, who based himself on lineage data from peasant villages in Kwangtung and Fukien provinces and adopted a socioeconomic functionalist stance, decided on corporately owned land as the basic condition for the existence of Chinese lineages. Freedman made use of rice cultivation (1958: 129-30), the need for agnatic cooperation in production, "frontier" society, and concentrated settlement in lineages for self-defense (1966: 159-65) in his explanation of why agnates are predisposed to form lineages into "single surname villages" in coastal southeast China (1958: 129-30). Also, for Freedman ancestor worship is a required ritual for lineages. The extension from ancestor worship by individuals and families to corporate ancestor worship by the lineage is also discussed in detail by Freedman (1970). Of the anthropologists who have done fieldwork on Chinese society in Taiwan, most use data from their own fieldwork to confirm and extend, or revise and change, Freedman's hypotheses. Basically, however, few scholars question Freedman's economic and environmental explanations. The most prominent challenges to Freedman's economic and environmental explanations are the discussions by Burton Pasternak and Huang Shu-min.

A model refuting Freedman's hypothesis that cooperation in irrigation produced lineage organization was offered as early as 1968 when Burton Pasternak published his paper "Agnatic Atrophy in a Formosa Village." At that time Pasternak used his data from Tatieh village in Pingtung county to report that, contrary to Freedman, cooperation between non-kinsmen is an important factor in establishing rice cultivation and irrigation. Pasternak thought that the people of Tatieh village use relations with non-kinsmen to set up cooperation and sharing in irrigation, land and labor, and mutual self-defense. This is due to ecological and sociological influences, and despite the rule of patrilineal affiliation. When I presented my essay "Kinship System of the New Guinea Chinese" in 1973 in Australia, I indicated the areas of basic conflict between Pasternak's and Freedman's respective theories. Afterwards, I read Pasternak's 1972 book, *Kinship and Community in Two Chinese Villages*, where he compared in detail a Hokkien village in Tainan County with a Hakka village in Pingtung County. An even more obvious refutation of Freedman's theory on frontier area, rice cultivation, and lineage organization can be seen in this book (see also Huang 1981).

Huang Shu-min (1981) has recently reviewed and discussed Freedman's theory from the dual perspective of semantics and history. He finds it difficult to reconcile Freedman's theory with social conditions in China.

Huang thinks that the written language of China has long lacked clear-cut semantic categories in this regard, and that it is hard to say which individual character or compound word, such as *tsung-tsu* (宗族), *shih-tsu* (氏族), *hsing* (姓), *shih* (氏), *tsung* (宗), or *tsu* (族), clearly represents Freedman's ideal lineage structure. Huang thinks that the lineage organization studied by Freedman referred to the "*tsung-tsu* organization" in China, but that *hsing* (姓), *shih* (氏), *tsung* (宗), and *tsu* (族) all include some of the characteristics of lineages which Freedman pointed out.

Second, citing studies by others, Huang finds in looking at semantic development through Chinese history that *tsu* (族) in the Han dynasty (206 B.C. to A.D. 220) simply constituted the scope of the five mourning grades (*wu-fu*). He also finds that up to the T'ang dynasty (A.D. 618 to 907) *tsu* (族) and *chia* (家) were identical in meaning, and only *hsing* (姓) and *tsung* (宗) referred to large agnatic groups.

In addition, Huang points out in regard to the history of China's social development that whereas Freedman thought lineage property an important basis for recent lineage organization, in reality sacrifice fields (*chi-ssu t'ien*) started serving as lineage property in the Sung dynasty (A.D. 960 to 1279). Further, the rule that sacrifice field offerings should be presented in ancestral temples to distant ancestors developed only comparatively recently in the Ming (A.D. 1368 to 1644) and Ch'ing (A.D. 1644 to 1911) dynasties. Finally, whether the area of southeast China covered by Fukien and Kwangtung provinces was still what Freedman termed a frontier down to the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties is debatable.

Huang shows in his history of social development in the Tachia area that Han migrants to Taiwan first developed regional ethnic, rather than lineage, organizations. This is actually quite similar to my findings in overseas Chinese immigrant society in early 20th Century New Guinea, even though the New Guinea Chinese developed commerce instead of rice cultivation (Wu 1982).

Many China ethnographers can support Huang's questioning of Freedman's view on lineage development in frontier society with data from their studies of Taiwan's social history. For example, there is Wang Sung-hsing's study of the history of Han settlement of the Cho-shui and Ta-tu river basins (1973, 1981). In addition, there is Chuang Ying-chang's study of lineage development and small town economics in Chushan (1977). Finally, there are Hsu Chia-ming (1973) and Chinben See's (1973) studies of regional organization of "religious spheres" (*chi-ssu ch'uan*) in the Changhua plain.

Wang Sung-hsing (1981) describes the stages of development in cultiva-

tion and settlement for Han Chinese in the Cho-shui and Ta-tu river basins. He clearly demonstrates how early Han migrant society in Taiwan during the K'anghsi (A.D. 1662 to 1722) and Yungcheng (A.D. 1723 to 1732) periods was organized into settlements on the basis of native place (*tsu-chi*) on the China mainland. Strong lineage development can only be seen following the Taokuang period (A.D. 1821 to 1850), by which time irrigation had been developed and paddy rice had become widespread. In addition Taiwan migrant society had gone through the sixty year Ch'ienlung (A.D. 1736 to 1795) period, during which time ethnic enclaves were consolidated and feuding broke out between ethnic groups (i.e., literally *fen-lei hsieh-tou*, or "armed affrays among diverse types" [Lamley 1981: 315]). By the Taokuang period migrants had become indigenous members of Han Chinese society in Taiwan society. Subethnic feuding was an important factor in the development of lineages (*ibid.*). We will return to this topic below.

The brief introduction to some of the grand theories of lineage development given above is directed at Freedman's hypothesis, and its revision or refutation. But we can see Freedman's influence also reaching partially into a second theoretical level. We can clarify this second level, which we will provide below, by referring to the large amount of data that fieldworkers have used when discussing some of the factors in the rise and fall of lineage development in Han society in Taiwan.

First, some researchers maintain that lineages arise where government rule is weak and official protection absent. Lineages then form corporate enterprises for ancestor worship in order to consolidate group strength to defend themselves against bandits. According to this line of reasoning, lineages arise from a need for local self-defense (Chuang 1973). Conversely, when government control is strengthened, such as during the period of Japanese rule in Taiwan, lineages lose their old defensive function and decline (Cohen 1969: 191). Nonetheless, we find defense was often provided by the formation of surname aggregates when areas were newly opened up to settlement in the early period of Han migration to Taiwan, and not by lineages (Lamley 1981: 288).

Second, there is a line of thinking which holds that lineage members have to live in nucleated villages and have land for coresidence before there can be a lineage organization (Ahern 1973). A lineage declines when its members migrate and disperse. We can first refer to Chuang Ying-chang (1973) on this point. Some descendants of Ch'en Fu-chiao whose intermediate ancestors had immigrated out to She-liao from Chang-hua and Chi-chi and maintained their membership in a corporate property

owning ancestor worship group had requested that the corporate property for ancestor worship (*chi-ssu kung-yeh*) be divided and that regular worship and corporate feasting (*kung-chih*) be discontinued. Moreover, Cohen found in his study of social development among the Hakka in P'ing-tung county that higher-order lineages were formed by uniting smaller lineages located in separate villages. Cohen also suggests in his discussion of family structure that joint investment by extended families makes their continued existence necessary, even though the family members need not live together (Pasternak 1981: 154-5). Finally, Cohen has also suggested that Chinese families and lineages include both characteristics of fusion and fission (1969, 1976).

Third, Freedman maintained from the start that corporately owned property in cultivated land and rents from lineage fields are used to cover ancestor worship expenses, and are a basic precondition for the presence of ancestral halls and lineages. Otherwise, as in fishing villages that lacks corporate paddy land (Diamond 1969), and as when corporate property for ancestor worship was taken over by the Japanese government (Chuang 1973), or lost through land reform (Cohen 1969), lineage ties weaken, ancestor worship and corporate feasting are dispensed with, and the lineage organization falls apart.

Actually, however, the corporate ownership of paddy land is not a precondition for lineage membership. Families that became wealthy by commerce could build magnificent ancestral halls or donate property to establish trusts for ancestor worship in order to maintain the lineage pattern (Chuang 1973, Cohen 1969). This is why lineages flourished in wealthy areas (Potter 1970: 134-5). This too is why lineages were abundant in those districts in Fukien and Kwangtung provinces where many remittances were received from overseas Chinese native to those districts (Freedman 1966: 116). The more money an individual donated to the ancestral hall, the greater the future status enjoyed by that person when worshipped as an ancestor (Ahern 1973: 131).

Fourth, some have held the view that if a lineage has talented leaders and the lineage organization is sound, then the lineage will be strengthened. But should there be no one to lead, and no one to mediate disputes, then the lineage will decline (Chuang 1973).

Fifth, westernization, modernization and industrialization used to be given as reasons for lineage decline. Local democratic elections also ought to be products of westernization and industrialization, but we find to the contrary that local political election activities both stimulate ancestral worship activities and promote lineage solidarity (Chuang 1973: 30).

Sixth, it has been asserted that lineage organization is a part of Chinese familial culture, is a historically transmitted social custom, and is not a consequence of frontier society (Huang 1981: 50).

The seventh point is that ethnic rivalry is a factor facilitating the creation of strong lineages. We have already mentioned this in reference to both the history of Hakka villages in Pingtung county (Pasternak 1981: 165) and the development of the Cho-shui and Ta-tu river basins. In other words, "ethnic consciousness" and "insularism" are important factors in promoting and sustaining lineages. In regard to this, Lamley makes a point of emphasizing the use of overseas Chinese data to make comparisons.

We can conclude that it is impossible to fully explain the conditions for the rise and fall of lineages through time and space by simply faithfully following fixed factors or seeking set structures. This point is equivalent to the difficulty mentioned earlier in defining the "family." Freedman long ago said that: "There can be no satisfactory study of the Chinese lineage which does not rest foursquare on the study of China as a whole" (Freedman 1966: 159). It will be impossible to see the holistic nature of lineages in Chinese society if we only study peasant society (cf. Harrell 1981: 146-7). I suggest for this reason that we expand the scope of our research to include overseas Chinese immigrant society when studying Chinese clan and lineage organization. As a matter of fact, historical data which has only recently come to light has brought to the attention of anthropologists their bias against comparing clan associations with lineages. This merits further discussion.

Overseas Chinese Lineages

Freedman mentions a special lineage organization in Singapore in *Chinese Lineage and Society* (1966: 166). He does not, however, admit that it is a lineage. The reason Freedman gave for refusing to believe it was a lineage was that, "It is a group of emigres who have formed themselves into a kind of colonial replica of the home lineage in which they continue to hold membership" (1966: 167). Willmott, when discussing the "Lanfang Kongsì" of Borneo, shares Freedman's opinion. Willmott (1970: 150) thinks it only possible to use exclusive membership in the native place lineage as the criterion, and that following this criterion the overseas lineages do not count. This arbitrarily limits the inclusive nature of Chinese cultural behavior by imposing a western viewpoint. We can see from the two studies of Nanyang (i. e. southeast Asian) Chinese

society given below that the basic structure of clan organization in Nanyang is similar to lineage organization in China proper.

Chinben See's recently published (1981) article on Chinese clan organizations in the Philippines shows that clan associations for the Chinese community in the Philippines are organized along traditional Chinese clan lines.

The article's opening remarks include the statement that,

Clanship emerged in a new form (as the village people of China moved to the cities of China or overseas) to cope with changes encountered in different milieus and continued to serve its functions. The transformation, however, has never really changed the clan to a club as its membership has remained restricted even if the organizational principle became a voluntary one. The clan associations retain enough kinship elements to function like a traditional clan. (See 1981: 224)

Chinben See goes on to say,

Roughly 85 per cent of the ethnic Chinese community in the Philippines today hailed from southern Fukien and the rest from Kuangtung. Ninety per cent of the Fukienese came from Chinchiang, Nan-an, and Hui-an *hsiens* of Chuanchou prefecture. Of these three *hsiens*, those from Chinchiang outnumbered the other two in an almost two-to-one ratio. In a community where most people came from the same place and speak the same dialect, regional or speech group affiliations are no longer useful as criteria for subgrouping. Clan ties thus offered the best alternative for organization within the community as a whole. (1981: 225)

This point is fundamentally different from anthropological discussions about the criteria for distinguishing clans and clan associations. For example, Chuang (1973) cites Fried's view on distinguishing clans from clan associations. Chuang indicates that the latter are still a loosely organized corporate group that can be participated in by those who merely share a common surname. This includes people from different areas, different regional languages and even different ethnic origins. To qualify for participation in "hometown associations" (i. e. native-place association or *t'ung-hsiang hui*), the Philippine Chinese must come "from the same village rather than a *hsien* or district" (See 1981: 230). For this reason the scope of clan associations for the Philippines Chinese shrank and became what Chinben See has called a "single-name hometown association" (1981: 231). Since the Philippine Chinese stress "ethnicity when organizing clans, if a *hui-kuan* or *kung-so* is organized by Fukienese then Cantonese will not join, and so clan association organization among

Philippine Chinese is actually quite like a system of localized lineages" (See 1981: 226).

The Cantonese population in the Philippines is too small and the surnames too few to be organized into separate clan organizations. They are only able to organize a united "Kwangtung Hui-kuan." For the same reason, numerically small Fukienese surnames were organized into a special "mixed surname association" which became the "Hokkien Merchant Hui-kuan" (See 1981: 225). It is noteworthy that although the Cantonese organized a "Loong Kang Kung So" composed of four surnames, four separate dormitories were built, which made it easy to house members of the four surnames, Liu, Kuan, Chang, and Chao, in separate accommodations (See 1981: 223, 226). Chinben See thinks this is sufficient to account for the great stress placed by early Fukienese in the Philippines on "clan" (referring here to lineage) relations based on shared "hometown" clan origins.

Chinben See goes on to say that the "crucial element in the coalition of hometown and clan associations, however, is the common kinship base..." whether the Philippine Chinese organize themselves into "hometown associations" or "single-name hometown associations" (1981: 231).

Chinben See says,

A single-name hometown association is not merely a miniature clan, but actually, a "true lineage" with definite agnatic ties among its members. Each of them knows the *fang* (房) or family branch he belongs to, and he often also bears the genealogical name (as part of his given name) to indicate his kinship rank. When a village organization is wealthy enough to build its own clubhouse with an ancestral hall to worship its founding ancestor, the agnatic corporate descent group in rural China is virtually transferred to the overseas community. (1981: 231)

The clan groups organized in the Philippines all possess corporate property, and the corporately owned buildings have ancestral halls that are used for ancestor worship. The function of the clan *kung-so* does not differ in nature from local clans or lineages in China, and as such include: 1) ancestor worship; 2) the offer of housing to elderly bachelor members; 3) provision of economic assistance to the poor, sick and members of their families; 4) intra-lineage disputes; and, 5) management of schools, education of lineage youth, and awarding of scholarships (See 1981: 234-6). Due to the existence of these functions—ancestor worship ritual, and corporate lineage property—the Chinese "clan" and "home-

town association *kong-so* [*Kung-so*]" described by Chinben See fully satisfy the basic structural conditions established for lineages by Maurice Freedman.

Clans and lineages similar to those within China and developed in Nanyang overseas Chinese society can also be seen in reports by historians on Singapore and Malaysia. Yen Ching-hwang (1981) describes the development of clans in Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaysia from early in the 19th Century to the early part of this century. He lists 38 clan organizations. Yen also cites the work of two anthropologists, Maurice Freedman's study of lineages in Fukien and Kwangtung provinces, and George P. Murdock's functionalist definition of clans as a second line of defense for the individual. Yen does so to demonstrate that overseas immigrants from China had a much greater need for clans than people within China. Overseas clans could protect individuals, satisfy the need of immigrants for traditional ancestor worship, arrange for immigrant repatriation and burial if they were poor or elderly and also offered a platform for leadership and political aspirations to those immigrants who became wealthy (Yen 1981: 62-3).

Yen Ching-hwang's report proves once again that overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia developed clan and lineage organizations that relied upon locality and surname, that these organizations were largely identical to native place lineage organizations in China's Fukien and Kwangtung provinces, and that they were similar in social form to those early migrants to Taiwan. The clans and lineages in Singapore and Malaysia reported on by Yen had "*tsu-chang*" ("lineage heads" or "lineage elders"), also termed "*chia-chang*" ("family heads") who were selected on the basis of genealogical generation and seniority. The emphasis put on genealogy can be seen in the division of clans and lineages into segments and sub-groups, and adherence to the use of a common character in personal names which identify members by generation.

The functions of the clans were also similar to those reported for the Philippines. The functions included building ancestral halls; worshipping ancestors and clan guardian gods (such as Ma-tzu); management of seasonal festivals (including *Ch'un-chie*, *Shang-yuan*, *Ch'ing-ming*, *Chung-yuan*, *Chung-ch'iu* and so forth); assisting the poor and sick; mediating disputes; setting up schools for education; witnessing marriages; and propagating the ancient virtues of China.

Yen Ching-hwang's conclusion is particularly worthy of emphasis. Yen says,

Most overseas clans were localized lineages based on geographical and dialect origins; they retained many characteristics of their parental bodies in structure and function. . . . But most important of all, they perpetuated Chinese descent lines, preserved Chinese tradition and Confucian values, maintained the identity of the Chinese communities, and served as an important transmitter of Chinese culture as a whole. Although they existed physically overseas they strove to mould a type of society similar to the one they knew in China. From this perspective, they lived in the world of China (1981: 87)

This conclusion clearly delineates the similarities between lineage organizations among overseas Chinese society and lineages within China. When comparing the material on the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia given above, all qualify as having lineages. This is so whether we use Fried's (1970) definition, which stresses that lineages must have demonstrable genealogical links, or Freedman's definition, where the basic precondition for lineage formation is the possession of corporate lineage property.

An aspect of lineage ritual that is neither explained nor noted by both Chinben See and Yen Ching-hwang, namely ancestral tablets and ancestor worship, deserves further discussion. See and Yen both emphasize ancestor worship in lineage ancestral temples, but do not mention *pai-shan* among overseas Chinese, where people gather at the graves of their common ancestors to worship. This ritual of ancestor worship can be seen in New Guinea and Hawaii, but its existence does not necessarily depend upon there being ancestral halls. It is interesting that Freedman long ago pointed out (1970: 172) that ancestral tablets are but one of two ways for the Chinese to care for ancestors. The Chinese use tablets to worship ancestors in the home at the domestic altar, in the family temple (*chia-miao*), or at the ancestral hall (*tsu-ts'u*). There is in addition another way, which is to worship ancestors at their graves. This is to *pai-shan* as a group, and is a means of commemorating ancestors. Lineages do not need to have ancestral halls, since worshipping ancestors at the ancestral graves has the same effect. But why Chinese families and lineages must be linked by ancestor worship, and why Chinese individuals worship ancestors is a problem social anthropologists have avoided discussing. Francis L. K. Hsu is an exception in emphasizing Chinese father-son psychological ties. I think this problem of why the Chinese worship their ancestors is closely linked with understanding the flexible concept in Chinese culture of clan and lineage.

Shared Ancestors and Common Origins, the Clan Broadly Defined, and Ethnic Relations

If we compare the reports by anthropologists about lineage and clan form with the conditions for the rise and decline of lineages and clans which we discussed above it is easy to see that no matter whether we are talking about lineages or clan associations, all are social groups that extend out from the family. Their various permutations all manifest Chinese culture's inclusivity with regard to the broadly defined clan institution. This makes it difficult for anthropologists to find a complete and absolute lineage organization by using structural principles. As Cohen says, "The relationships among chia members, then, were quite flexible; one might even say that the chia as a social group was highly adaptable" (1970: 36). Fried also sees that,

Our space is too short and our expertise too limited or we might attempt to look into the question of whether exactly such a process has occurred in previous epochs of Chinese history as UDG [i.e. unilineal descent groups] disappeared or underwent enormous contraction under very unfavorable circumstances, only to blossom again under a new set of conditions. (1970: 33)

What, then, finally constitutes the factors for the broadly defined clans—big and small, complete or fragmented—emphasized by the Chinese? Is there after all something distinctive about broadly defined clans compared with other kinds of social groups? These questions will be discussed later in this essay.

We can see from the generally agreed upon developmental stages for Han society in Taiwan, where Han migrants dwelt together on the basis of their native place and lineages were organized in the move from subethnic feuding and localized ties to consanguinal ties, that "shared ancestors and common origins" were the foundation for ethnic consciousness. But where were the common origins? And which ancestors were shared? The answers to these questions vary according to specific situations, and such answers ought to be sought in the context of that time. Depending on a particular situation, it might have allowed for either lenient or strict standards for either bigger or smaller groups on the basis of shared localized ties from having a common native-place on the China mainland, or from shared consanguinal ties. Standards are not fixed. Only in such a way could there be so-called clans, local clans, lineages,

lineage associations, and so on. Though they appear to differ, they all exhibit possession of a common infrastructure. Broadly defined clans unquestionably share properties which characterize "ethnicity" as discussed recently by anthropologists. This is the "insularism" mentioned above, and is a basic factor closely linked with lineage development, whether in Fukien, Kwangtung, Taiwan or overseas Chinese society.

The ethnic group concept in China can be expanded to quite a large scale. On a small scale it is the shared village, native place, and the shared branch or subgroup of a lineage. On a large scale it is the shared lineage, the shared surname, as well as the sense of different "species" of people. The ethnic group can even be as large as the category for nationality. If we only take the family as the starting point, then broadly defined clans may include extended families, lineages, clans with characteristics of clan associations, and such, which are social categories and on-the-ground organizations that possess the same common traits as "ethnic groups."

If we are willing to accept the results of recent anthropological researches on ethnic groups, ethnicity, and ethnic identity, and also admit that the importance of such research results lies in social processes of expansion and contraction, then it is easy to understand that the multiplicity of forms of the Chinese clan is a temporary sociological phenomenon and is part of the process of growth and decline or rise and fall of the same organization. The real content of groups and members is situation dependent, and can be either inclusive or exclusive. This is because the clan is like an ethnic group. Similar to the process of ethnicity, the members of a clan or lineage can initiate the practice of certain rituals, or agree upon consanguinal relations to a certain degree, because of certain vested interests associated with the group and in order to emphasize boundary markers (cf. Wu 1982b).

Although there are organizational and structural principles for the "clan," "ethnic groups" are less well organized. But if we view this from the perspective of membership, the way in which questions about a person's membership in a clan or ethnic group are answered, it will help us see the characteristics common to both the clan and subethnic group. We find at least four common preconditions (see Table 1) in comparing broadly defined clans with ethnic groups.

First, members of broadly defined clans and ethnic groups believe their respective memberships have a common origin in a founding ancestor.

TABLE I
Common Conditions for the Foundation of Lineages, Clans, and Ethnic Groups

Condition	Lineage/Clan	Ethnic Group
1. Common origin, shared founding ancestor	Yes (same surname, native place, ancestor worship)	Yes
2. Descent	Necessary (patrilineal genealogy can be fictive)	Necessary (generalogy simply can be claimed)
3. Sentiments of a common identity	Yes	Yes
4. Drawing boundaries	Yes (membership clearly defined)	Yes (not clearly defined)
5. Corporate property or trust	Yes, but not essential	Yes or no
6. Indigenity (territorial)	Yes or no	Yes or no
7. Common language	Important but not essential	Important but not essential
8. Legal corporation	Possible	Usually no, but possible
9. —	—	—
10. Cultural behavioral markers	Customs agreed upon (rituals, type of gods, dates of worship, etc.)	Customs and religious rituals

Worship of a founding ancestor is, therefore, a manifestation of a lineage's shared ancestors and common origins. The membership of the lineage determines the generation from which the founding ancestor is to be calculated. This is also a cause of the formation of Chinese clans, high-order lineages, lower-order lineages, and lineages. In the same way, the Han people are an ethnic group, since the members of this nationality believe themselves to be descendants of emperors Yen and Huang, and the membership stresses that they must have shared ancestors and common origins.

Second, since members share ancestors and have a common origin, they obviously have shared blood ties passed down to them. Chinese clans stress agnatic descent. Each generation passes genealogical records to their agnatic progeny to be used for clarifying consanguinal relations. In this way clans become consanguinal groups. However, the further back in time Chinese genealogies are pushed, the greater the possibility that connections have been fabricated. That is to say, descendants cannot find out

which ancestors were adopted and which ancestors changed their surnames. It is also characteristic of ethnic groups to firmly believe in the passing down of blood ties. Stress placed on the passing down of blood ties constitutes an important precondition for ethnic groups. This is why so many people have stereotyped ideas of the inherited physical characteristics of nationalities. In many situations, however, aboriginal peoples have been assimilated into Han culture and, aside from a few historians and ethnographers, there is no one who questions whether or not a certain person is a true descendant of the "Han nationality." In sum, the membership of certain groups are constrained to believe in a shared consanguinity, whether the group is a clan or a subethnic group. In reality, however, individuals can form consanguinal groups on the basis of fabricated consanguinal relations.

Third, strong sentiments of a common identity constitute an explicit precondition for the formation of clans and subethnic groups. These sentiments exist in the mind of each member. This mentality is an important factor in the primordial identities of individuals. This sense of identity soars in times of confrontation with outsiders and in conflicts over advantage. This is why the result of "running into old compatriots away from home" is the organization of clan associations (clan based) and native-place associations (ethnically based). Formation into mutual aid groups provides strength to withstand external encroachment.

Fourth, the drawing of social boundaries to distinguish other *tsu* from one's own *tsu* is another shared precondition for the formation of clans and ethnic groups. In other words, Chinese who want to determine a person's clan membership can easily do so by looking at that person's surname. The distinction between the Han and Hui (i.e. Chinese Moslem) nationalities in the view of these ethnic groups is usually quite clear. But boundaries can be blurred or uncertain in at least two situations. There are situations when an individual becomes assimilated and switches ethnic group membership, or even disguises and falsifies ethnic membership. Another situation is where boundary marking standards have changed. A necessary conceptual precondition for maintaining an ethnic group is the distinguishing of membership boundaries in social interaction. But when actually examining a member's qualifications, the yardstick for marking boundaries is a practical matter. For example, in early Taiwan immigrant society shared surnames were considered a sufficient basis on which to form a lineage. This is what Chuang Ying-chang and Ch'en Yuntung refer to when they distinguish "grand lineages" from "minor lineages" (1981).

In addition to the four major preconditions provided above, we can also find other secondary conditions. In some situations secondary conditions can attain a prominence that makes them appear essential. In other situations, however, these secondary conditions may not be necessary. We found these secondary conditions to be characteristics common to clans and ethnic groups.

Fifth, a lineage's corporate property and corporate trust are an important basis for lineage organization. This was discussed above. But we know that clans and lineages can still be established and continue even in situations where common corporate property and corporate trusts are lacking. In particular, most broadly defined clans sharing the same surnames can exist in the absence of corporate property. Subethnic groups sometimes also stress commonly held territory, although the legality of such corporate property is not as clear as it is with clan property.

Sixth, it is common knowledge that clans and lineages can create nucleated settlements. An obvious example is China's clan villages. But an ethnic group residing in a foreign country, region, or area is also a common phenomenon. Indigeneity or communal life is certainly not a necessary precondition for clans or subethnic groups.

Eight, clans sometimes form legal corporations because they have corporate property. We have previously described this. It is certain, however, that not all clans are legal corporations. They are usually not legal corporations if looked at from the perspective of the organizational nature of ethnic groups. Clans only form legal corporations in special circumstances in order to maintain their distinctive social and political activities. It is a fact that ethnic group organizations have legal status in an immigrant society in order to strengthen their competitiveness for social and political status.

If we were to speculate further, it would also be possible to find even more characteristics that serve as conditions for the organization of clans and subethnic groups. However, the points given above are sufficient to explain the shared characteristics, which of them are organizational preconditions, and which, while they might manifest themselves, are nonetheless not preconditions.

When many preconditions and secondary conditions occur in combination, the possibility of lineage organization manifesting itself is extremely strong. At the same time there can also be added many cultural behaviors which are group markers. For example, established custom makes for some compulsory rituals, or certain days of worship, for the people of that lineage. This is done to distinguish that lineage from other lineages

or subethnic groups. There is one point that must be stressed. It is the goal of lineage members to bring honor upon, and consolidate the status of "my people" and to create political and economic influence for the group to which they belong. This is done whether or not it is the status of the "lineage," or the special character of the "subethnic group" which is being stressed.

After having listed the characteristics and preconditions in the formation of broadly defined clans by using the concept of ethnic group, we can go one step further. We can say that in different environments, and when under the influence of different political and economic factors, a group of people can establish clans of differing scale. This is because it is possible to have wet rice cultivation, frontier society, commercially acquired wealth, industrialization, and local elections for self-government, where all can become factors in the appearance or disappearance of clans. None, however, are long term basic conditions for the existence or disappearance of clans.

We return now to the question raised by Jack Potter which I cited at the beginning of this essay: Why do Chinese peasants consistently use lineages to organize social groups? Actually, we can broaden the question and ask: Why do the Chinese not do away with the clan in China or overseas, either conceptually or organizationally? I would like to propose a hypothesis to answer this question. We can hypothesize that for many people the lineage is closely linked to their heritage of cultural values and their integration in society.

As long as the Chinese continue to stress their cultural concept of ancestors, the memorialization of their ancestors down through the generations, the central position of fathers and sons in the continuation of the family line and in the socialization process of childrearing, and the ethnic identity of native places and surnames in social interaction, then the existence of clans, though in varying forms, will continue. Clans will only disappear when the fundamental conditions outlined in this essay and summarized above in Table 1 have all disappeared.

Lineage Development and the Family in China

Myron L. Cohen

Sinological anthropologists working in Taiwan and in Hong Kong commonly share a deep interest in traditional Chinese society, and indeed seem determined to use their contemporary data to learn as much as they can about the past.¹ Yet there certainly remains room for far more in the way of sustained comparative analysis with respect to those aspects of traditional society that by now are well understood. My interest in such comparisons derives in the first instance from my Taiwan research, which has focused mainly on traditional family and community organization. My own findings, especially those concerning the importance of the family estate for family organization and development (Cohen 1976), have led me to consider here certain aspects of lineage organization, a subject which continues to be the dominant interest of our colleagues working in Hong Kong, especially those doing research in Hong Kong's New Territories.

In this paper I want to apply perspectives gained in the first instance through research in Taiwan to a discussion of the highly developed lineages of the kind that were found in the New Territories and in other areas of mainland southeastern China. Such lineages were powerful, well endowed, had a long history and a relatively large and compact membership; in other words, they were Freedman's "type Z" (Freedman 1958: 132). It is clear that in such lineages the patterns of everyday social life and the ceremonies that highlighted them differed in important ways from those of other rural communities. Type Z lineages did not develop in Taiwan, and Freedman showed many years ago that on the mainland such lineages coexisted with smaller and weaker lineages and with agnatically mixed settlements.

It is not necessary for me to deal in any detail with the by now well known characteristics of type Z lineages, such as large corporate estates,

segmentation, well-endowed ancestral halls, etc., for such attributes go into defining the type. Rather, I begin by noting that as communities type Z lineages appear to have been characterized by patterns of family organization, residence, marriage, adoption, and general social interaction quite different from those found in other villages. These differences were neither cultural nor regional, since type Z lineages did not comprise the entire countryside of the New Territories or any other part of rural China. These differences, I will try to suggest, reflected rather the impact on social life of the collective land holdings of lineages and lineage segments.

A type Z lineage was, among other things, a community, but one rather different from most Chinese communities in that the individual family was far more closely linked to other families: The family in such a lineage had as a portion of its family estate shares in the corporate holdings of different lineage segments or of the lineage as a whole; furthermore, due to the high tenancy rates in such lineages, the chances were that for most families such shares made up the entirety of their family holdings. The obvious contrast here is with a village where corporate lineage development was weak or not at all in evidence. In the latter village there was a direct relationship between the family and its own estate: such a family, although having many vital ties with other families in the community, was in a fundamental way an isolated economic unit, one whose survival largely was an expression of its immediate control and management of the productive resources it owned or otherwise had access to, such as through contractual tenancy. The contrast between such a family and one in a type Z lineage could not have been greater. A family in a type Z lineage owned abstract shares in a lineage common property, so that its livelihood to a large extent was linked to the management of this lineage corporation and to the standing of the lineage in society at large. Such a family had intimate links with its agnates, created through the common benefits they enjoyed by dint of their membership in a larger collectivity. Therefore, I would suggest that in the strong Chinese lineage there was a blurring of what in other community contexts was a very clear demarcation between the family on the one hand and wider society on the other.

As is well known, the benefits of lineage membership could include the cash dividends paid shareholders in lineage corporations, the distribution of pork and other food and, perhaps most important, preferential access to land for rental. Again, education tended to be more widely available in lineage communities, as was the protection afforded by local militia. Although the particular array of benefits might differ from one

type Z lineage to the next, what all such lineages had in common was the availability of corporate wealth which could be used for a variety of purposes, opening up possibilities which were not present in a village whose wealth largely was under the control of individual landlord or peasant families.

Due to the nature of lineage segmentation and to differences in the population of the various lineage branches, it is of course true that some families obtained more income from their shareholdings than did others. Such circumstances, although resulting in important wealth differentials within a lineage, did not as such change the basic connection between family estate and corporate holdings that I have suggested. Thus, while it might commonly be the case that the majority in a type Z lineage were members of poor tenant families (see R. Watson 1981), such families had as their only assets whatever their shares in the main lineage estate might have been. Among such families, therefore, it could be expected that the demarcation drawn between family and lineage was weakest. Likewise, it is also to be expected that the wealthiest families benefitted most from their shares in the lineage and segment corporations, as well as from their private holdings. Because of their larger private estates, the richer families tended to be more sharply defined as individual economic units; at the same time, their personal wealth gave them the influence and social standing that placed them in a leadership position with respect to the lineage as a whole. While in all communities the social and political activities of the elite had several dimensions—directing community affairs, representing the community to the outside world, the outside world to the community, and protecting their own interests—in a type Z lineage these various roles of the elite were held within the context of their control over corporate resources.

Later in this paper I will have more to say about the relationship between a family's wealth and its involvement in lineage leadership. But first I would like to consider several characteristics of type Z lineages that reflected the impact of corporate arrangements on the ties between families. If, as has been shown in the literature often enough, peasant families in an agnatically mixed community were linked through affinal, matrilineal, and other ties to families in other villages, and to families in their own community both through agnatic ties and as neighbors, the social network of the male peasant in a type Z lineage was largely restricted to members of his own agnatic community. In his study of one lineage in the New Territories, Potter (1968: 27) describes the "*su-po hsiung-ti*," or the group of agnates "descended from a common grand-

father," as the "unit in which the members have frequent and intimate obligations to each other." The contrast, both in terms of mourning obligations and with respect to social relationships in general, is with the *wu-fu* or mourning circle which, although there were variations in local practices, defined what essentially was a true bilateral kindred, albeit one with an often strong agnatic bias (cf. Baker 1979). Again, R. Watson describes social relationships in another New Territories lineage as characterized by a "general reticence toward and avoidance of affines" (1981: 598). If such affinal ties lost much of their significance in a type Z lineage community, it can be added that in the creation of such ties family autonomy might have had to give way to lineage interests. Since powerful lineages often were in conflict with each other, marriages of course were determined in part by the prevalent pattern of inter-lineage hostilities and alliances (cf. Baker 1968, 1979).

Another manifestation of the close connections between the lineage and the family was with respect to adoption, which in most of China was a domestic act expressing family interests. As J. Watson (1975) shows, the situation could be quite different in a strong lineage. Although according to his interpretation a child from outside the lineage might be preferable from the point of view of the family wanting to adopt, for the lineage such acceptance of outsiders posed an obvious threat to the lineage's control over its corporate resources (cf. Wolf and Huang 1980: 208-11). In the lineage studied by Watson, the ceremonial requirements regulating adoption of an outsider were such that the recruitment of a new family member in this fashion was a humiliating and desperate act. Now, while the fact that such forms of adoption were possible at all represented a compromise between lineage interests and the most fundamental interest of a family in its own reproduction, we see in the very existence of such a compromise powerful evidence of lineage intrusion into the family sphere.

The relative weakness of the family as an independent unit within the lineage population was not expressed simply by the greater authority held by the lineage leadership or by the lineage as a collectivity. Given the shared interests of agnates, there was an agnatic solidarity which weakened that of the family unit. Interesting evidence for this in many type Z lineages was the so-called "bachelor house," a structure often attached to an ancestral hall. Such houses served as the sleeping quarters for unmarried young men and were the subject of an article appearing over thirty years ago in the *American Anthropologist* (Spencer and Barrett 1948), which describes them in a village in the Pearl River delta; more

recently, they have been noted again in a work dealing with contemporary Kwangtung Province (Parish and Whyte 1978). Although to my knowledge they are not mentioned in any of the published Hong Kong field studies, they indeed were to be found in all the major New Territories lineages (James Watson, personal communication). Parish and Whyte report such houses in eight villages, again mainly in the Pearl River delta, but add that they made no systematic inquiry as to the overall distribution of such structures within their total sample of Kwangtung communities (1978: 231-2, 393). I take the bachelor house to represent the extension to a larger group of agnates of what otherwise would be family-centered relationships and solidarities. Such extensions clearly followed the distribution of corporate holdings, for Spencer and Barrett report that these houses might be attached both to lineage and to branch ancestral halls, adding that the "bachelor house itself is important in creating a sense of family (*sic*) solidarity and in promoting a close bond between the individual members of one generation in the clan" (1948: 473).

Spencer and Barrett (1948: 477) note that an informant had heard of some villages with special houses for unmarried girls and young women, and Parish and Whyte confirm this in a general way, as does Topley (1975). Such "maiden houses" also represented the intrusion of the larger agnatic group into the domestic sphere. I suggest that they also were linked to the development of the female networks whose importance is stressed by R. Watson (1981); she describes how in at least one type Z lineage village affinal ties found expression almost exclusively through the movement of women, both in ceremonial and in more mundane contexts. Likewise, I follow the lines of analysis suggested by Topley (1975) and see in these maiden houses one of the preconditions for the development, especially in the Shun-te area, of the strong sororities linked to the anti-marriage movements and to other expressions of female solidarity. As Topley shows, there were other factors encouraging the female alliances; but agnatic solidarity, by weakening domestic control over women, helped form the very environment that made it all the more easier for them to reject the domestic system as a whole.

The merging of familial and larger agnatic economic and social interests in highly developed lineages also led to the emergence of what might be called hereditary or caste-like social patterns, where circumstances of birth played a far larger role in status definition than was the case in most late traditional Chinese communities. In the literature on type Z lineages, there commonly are references to two major categories of relationship as between members of a dominant lineage on the one hand, and persons

of inherited subordinate status on the other. One category involved the hereditary slaves in wealthy lineage households, and the other the satellite villages whose members characteristically were in a position of hereditary subordination to the dominant lineage controlling the land. In two important papers J. Watson deals respectively with each category of hereditary inferiority; in both papers he summarizes the earlier data which, taken together, indicate quite convincingly that there was a common association between type Z lineages, hereditary slaves, and satellite villages (J. Watson 1976, 1977). It would appear that type Z lineages generated, as it were, such relationships of hereditary superordination and subordination. In the case of the slaves, it should be noted that while they might have belonged to individual families, their low social status was with respect to the lineage community as a whole; in this sense all lineage members were their masters, and only because of their servile position were they accepted as low-status members of an otherwise agnatically exclusive community. If, for the slaves, acceptance of their status was the price they paid for whatever advantages and security community membership provided, for the dominant lineage it was the deep interpenetration of agnatic and family relationships that defined non-agnatic relationships within the territorial community in terms of hereditary subordination. Likewise with the satellite villages: although in the first instance the relationship here was between landlord and tenant, both parties often were constituted as corporate groups. The satellite villages might comprise one or more smaller lineages whose corporate resources consisted precisely of their tenancy rights, a situation which had built into it a structure of permanent subordination. Under such circumstances the more narrowly defined contractual agreements characteristic of ties between landlord and tenant in much of China gave way to a hereditary relationship, in which status definition on both sides transcended family boundaries and was vested in the agnatic group.

Although the ethnographic record cites many instances of the displacement or extinction of lineages, they were, obviously, much longer-lived than individual families. The very process of family reproduction had built into it family extinction, for a family which succeeded in realizing the goal of many sons brought to maturity and marriage set the stage for its own demise through family division. Unlike the family, the lineage in accumulating wealth did not of necessity face the destructive impact of partition. The contrast between even that most unusual family meriting state recognition for having achieved the goal of "five generations under one roof" and the type Z lineages with which I am primarily concerned

was especially marked, for it is clear that a long history of development was required for a lineage to take on the special type Z characteristics. Thus, what we might characterize as the "social mobility" of entire lineages was a very different phenomenon from that of individual families. But since I have tried to show that the ties between families took on special features in the context of a strong lineage community, I would like now to briefly consider how the lineage might influence upward and downward mobility.

It has been suggested frequently enough in the literature that lineage- or segment-endowed schooling provided greater opportunities to peasant families for advancement through learning than was the case in communities where lineages were not well developed. The corporate community as a whole would benefit from the degree-holding status that might be achieved by members of any of its constituent families; likewise, the inability of particular families to maintain their status as degree-holders across the generations could, as far as the lineage or lineage branch was concerned, be offset by the scholarly achievements of other agnates. Although this distinction between lineage and family is sometimes not carefully drawn by commentators on social mobility in China as a whole, the major elements involved in the relationship between lineage organization and advancement through education are well understood (cf. Beattie 1979). Of course, there was an important connection between education and wealth in late traditional China. But if I now restrict my attention to social mobility through success in commerce, land accumulation, and other economic undertakings, I will be able to suggest how there might have been a seemingly paradoxical relationship between a family's advancement, on the one hand, and its social involvement with its lineage, on the other.

In her important paper on economic differentiation within the New Territories' Teng lineage, R. Watson notes that in 1905 49 percent of "Teng owned" land was held by "lineage ancestral estates" and another 36 percent was in the hands of a mere six families (1981: 596), with the remaining 15 percent presumably distributed as small holdings among other lineage families. From her data, and from earlier discussions (i.e., Freedman 1958: 51ff.) it is clear that high social standing and power within a lineage, including a controlling power with respect to the management of lineage and segment property, were associated with independent family wealth; I refer to wealth not in the form of shares in a corporation, but consisting of directly owned family assets—land, enterprises, etc.—which would be fully liable to subsequent distribution through family

partition. In other words, it was precisely among the families that played a leading role in lineage and lineage branch affairs that there was the greatest development of those independent family estates which tended to promote a focus on family interests, rather than on those of the larger agnatic group. Therefore, it is to be expected that the social relationships which I have suggested as being especially characteristic of type Z lineages would receive less emphasis among such families of greater wealth. Thus, R. Watson contrasts in general terms the peasant men, who "were encapsulated within the lineage," with the merchants and landlords, whose success "was in large part due to their many contacts with non-agnates," and she describes in detail how affinal ties were well developed among the rich and gave way to a strong agnatic bias only among other lineage members. However, she also notes that in weddings the non-participation of male affines characterized the ceremonies of rich and poor alike (1981: 599; also cf. Spencer and Barrett 1948: 474). For the rich there thus was an important distinction between what we might characterize as the public and private domains of kinship behavior. For the poor, however, whose family interests were largely or entirely defined by their rights to larger multifamily corporate holdings, there could be no such distinction.

The separation of the rich from their less fortunate agnates received architectural expression. R. Watson notes that "the large houses of the wealthy were clustered in a special part of the village," and it is likely that in such homes joint families could develop. Also, that younger members of richer families did not sleep with their agnatic age-mates in the "bachelor houses" or "maiden houses" is suggested by Spencer and Barrett, who describe how "if the individual family owns a fairly large house with several bedrooms, the unmarried men of the household need not take up residence in the men's house" (1948: 475); the noninvolvement of the rich in such lineage or lineage-segment dormitories for young men and women is confirmed by J. Watson for the large New Territories lineages (personal communication).

It is not surprising that the wealthy controlling elite of a type Z lineage resembled in their behavior the similarly dominant strata of other Chinese communities; what is of interest is that in departing from the social patterns followed by the majority of their agnates, the behavior of such wealthy families more closely approximated that of the majority of Chinese who were not members of strong lineages. Thus it seems clear that for a member of a well endowed agnatic corporation upward economic mobility required more than remaining "encapsulated within

the lineage''; rather, it necessitated the same array of strategies used by other Chinese attempting to advance their fortunes, strategies which to a significant degree involved the coordinated deployment of family members. What remains to be determined is the impact of the special circumstances connected with membership in a type Z lineage community on such mobility strategies and on social mobility rates. Here, I can only note that one such set of circumstances involved the means employed by individual families to gain privileged access to the corporate resources of the lineage and its segments.

What is well known is the relationship between individual family wealth and the process of endowing separate ancestral estates, such that within the larger lineage community smaller groups of more closely related agnates had at their disposal additional sources of corporate wealth. This procedure, which gave rise to differentially endowed lineage "segments," certainly was not confined to type Z lineages, and has been widely documented both for the mainland and for Taiwan (i.e., Pasternak 1972). Nevertheless, in the type Z lineages segmentation was most pronounced. Among other things, the establishment of the ancestral estates that defined lineage segments involved the transformation of family property into the corporate holdings of larger agnatic groups. These estates, if they were preserved intact, also represented the removal of land from the "open" market (a market which in any event might, in principle at least, be restricted to fellow agnates). Such removal of land therefore was most apparent in type Z lineages, where it was the ongoing effect of the relationship between upward mobility on the part of individual families and the endowment of new ancestral corporations. If, for the average peasant, the adverse effects of downward mobility were ameliorated somewhat by dint of his continuing membership in the lineage, for the wealthy a response to the potential damage forthcoming from family partition was the creation of new ancestral estates. For the rich, having achieved a position of controlling influence in the community through the private accumulation of wealth, the endowment of new corporations made most sense as a mobility strategy where well endowed corporations were already in place. Precisely because the large lineage community had corporate wealth available for those who would control it, the creation by the wealthy of new corporations can be seen as a means of assuring their continuing control or influence over the older ones as well.

Part Five

RELIGION AND RITUAL

The Impact of Different Religions on the Chinese Family in Taiwan

Chu Hai-yuan

Traditional Chinese folk religion, which takes ancestor worship as its most important feature, is in many ways analytically inseparable from the family. For instance, one can not expect to understand either the Chinese family or Chinese folk religion without first understanding ancestor worship. It is not surprising, then, that the extant literature has, in general, had difficulty in finding conceptual and empirical distinctions between the family and its ritual behavior.

The sociologist C.K. Yang (1961) draws upon a wealth of diverse data on ethics, politics, and religion covering the length and breadth of China, and makes substantial use of quantitative data in the process of discussing the relationship between Chinese folk religion and Chinese social institutions in his book *Religion in Chinese Society* (1961). This book offers both the conceptual and methodological starting points for the study of the Chinese family and Chinese folk religion in Taiwan. First, C.K. Yang advances the concept of diffuse religion (1961: 300), including most importantly the insight that Chinese folk religion cannot be divorced from other Chinese social institutions in function and historical distribution.

Taiwan provides a good example of China's traditional religious homogeneity. Chu Hai-yuan and Wen Ts'ung-i report that over 90 percent of Taiwan's rural Hokkien residents are either self-described animists (i.e. practitioners of Chinese folk religion), Buddhists, or Taoists (1975: 104).¹ Grichting's 1970 island-wide survey (1971) reports that 92 percent of Taiwan's rural respondents (without controlling for subethnicity) identify themselves as animists.

Differences in approach by C.K. Yang and the literature on religion in Taiwan may be more properly indicative of differences in approach between sociologists and anthropologists. Even so, C.K. Yang's con-

ceptual analysis of the diffuseness of Chinese folk religion is also supported by anthropological studies of religion and the family in Taiwan. In other words, the affinity between beliefs and rites of Chinese folk religion and familial ideology is evident.

It is obvious even to the unpracticed eye, however, that not all Chinese in Taiwan are animists. Chu Hai-yuan (1981, 1982) finds 3.5 percent of Taiwan's total population either Catholic or Protestant, and 12 percent agnostic. Grichting reports that 6.6 percent of his questionnaire respondents from across Taiwan are either Catholic or Protestant (1971: 57). The second valuable starting point that C.K. Yang provides for studying the Chinese family and religion in Taiwan is the use of a broadly based data base when attempting to make generalizations about religion and society.

Christianity, for example, might have a major impact on the cultural values and social relations of Chinese Christians. That is, Chinese Christians are very likely to see and relate to the family in ways different from animists, Buddhists, and Taoists. Likewise, Taiwan's sizable agnostic population might also show a tendency to differ from animists by being, for example, more open-minded in familial ideology and behavior. This might be especially true of who are agnostic because of the impact of the introduction of modern education, although there are certainly also other agnostics whose religious preference can be traced to Confucianism's traditionally passive attitude toward religion.

This essay examines the impact of different religious persuasions on familial ideology and behavior in Taiwan. With a broad based sample, an intracultural comparison of familial ideology and behavior across different religious persuasions would help clarify the relationship between religion and the Chinese family. Most data used in this essay come from my reanalysis of data in W. Grichting's research report *The Value System in Taiwan, 1970* (1971).² Since Grichting only provides percentages and the original data set unfortunately remains unavailable, I am only able to conduct a series of bivariate analyses on his published data.

In my reanalysis I use nineteen of Grichting's forty-four questions. Questions not used are either not directly related to the family, or touch only on such matters as suitable marriage age, dating behavior and decision-making. The questions used fall into four categories: 1) perceptions and assessments of family relations, 2) child-rearing values, 3) premarital and extra-marital sex relations, and 4) parental aspirations for their children.

In the absence of previous research on the influence of religious belief on familial indeology in Taiwan, a precise hypothesis is impossible. I hope

instead to make an empirical and methodological contribution by reporting and discussing the more significant results of my reanalysis. I suggest that Catholics, Protestants and agnostics show a weaker and animists a stronger correlation between their respective religious values and traditional Chinese social values. My specific hypothesis is that animists will tend to place more emphasis on traditional child rearing values (i.e., demand obedience and put less insistence on independence), prefer more sons, express a larger ideal number of children, have lower aspirations for the education of their children, and put greater emphasis on stable family relations. I discuss the parts of my hypothesis below individually under the topics of family relations, child rearing, sex relations, and parental aspirations for their children, and as a whole in a conclusion at the end of the essay.

Family Relations

What is here called the perception and assessment of relations between family members refers to those judgements by questionnaire respondents of perceived (1960 to 1970) or anticipated (1970 to 1980) improvement or deterioration in the state of husband-wife, father-son, mother-child, sibling relations, and perceptions of family relations in Taiwan versus impressions of family relations in the United States.

My reanalysis documents an attitudinal rift in respondent perception of family relations in Taiwan, with Buddhists and animists lined up against Protestants, Catholics, and agnostics. Respondents close ranks, however, when it comes to their impression of family relations in the United States: when comparing family relations in Taiwan versus American family relations, differences among Taiwan's questionnaire respondents along lines of religious persuasion became conspicuous by their absence. My reanalysis shows a widely shared perception across different religious faiths (approximately 90%) that family relations are better in Taiwan than the United States. The apparent significance of this is that in Taiwan not only greatly value harmonious and stable family relations, but they also take Chinese-style family relations to be a kind of ideal.

Table 1 documents differences in the evaluation of family relations by religious persuasion both retrospectively for the years 1960 to 1970 and projectively for the years 1970 to 1980. First, animists, whether their assessments are retrospective (i.e. 1960 to 1970) or projective (1970 to 1980), tend to have seen or look forward to either no change or an

TABLE 1 Evaluation of Family Relations and Religious Persuasion

	N	χ^2	df
<i>Father-son</i>			
1960—1970	1594	104.59***	8
1970—1980	1594	43.45***	8
Chinese-American	1594	10.96	8
<i>Mother-child</i>			
1960—1970	1594	98.09***	8
1970—1980	1594	43.69***	8
Chinese-American	1594	12.42	8
<i>Husband-wife</i>			
1960—1970	1595	87.05***	8
1970—1980	1595	43.46***	8
Chinese-American	1595	24.56	8
<i>Ethnic</i>			
1960—1970	1594	84.46***	8
1970—1980	1594	37.71***	8
Chinese-American	1594	12.96	8

1. 1960—1970 shows that relations in 1970 were either better or worse than in 1960. The other category for 1970—1980 follows the same principle.

2. *** $P < .001$

Source: Computed from Wolfgang Grichting, *The Value System in Taiwan, 1970* (Taipei: privately printed, 1971), pp. 231, 239–41, 274–78.

improvement in each type of family relationship. Second, over 25 percent of the Protestants sampled feel that each type of family relation will deteriorate over time. Third, though the percentage of those making a negative assesment of family relations is less pronounced, over 20 percent of the Catholics still feel that each type of family relation will deteriorate over time. Finally, fully 30 percent of the agnostics express a pessimistic perception of change in family relations. In fact, 40 percent of the agnostics perceived a worsening trend over the 1960 to 1970 period in mother-child, father-son, and husband-wife relations. This latter assessment is the most pessimistic one for the 1970 to 1980 period.

Though the questions are phrased in terms of family relations in general, the above results are probably also applicable to respondent perceptions of their own family relations. On the basis of this premise, three points can be made about why animists put greater emphasis on family stability.

First, Chinese folk religion emphasizes stability and harmony rather than change. Chinese have long emphasized the importance of order in interpersonal relations in the real world, and the maintenance of stable and harmonious order is a major theme in Chinese folk religion. As

Feuchtwang (1974) points out, the ranking of the spirit world into three levels is an important metaphor of social relations among the living. This traditional cosmology, ancestor worship rites, and visits to shamans (*tang ki*) can all help to sustain the hierarchical order between family members (Chang 1980, Wu *et al* 1980: 19–38). The multifaceted impact of Chinese folk religion starts with child rearing and continues across the life cycle. In short, though there doubtless are factors other than religion which emphasize stability and harmony within the family, the stress on harmony and stability in Chinese folk religion is still one of the main ingredients which nurture harmony and stability within the family (Yang 1961: 298).

Second, Grichting's research findings support C.K. Yang's (1961: 296) thesis that Chinese folk religion is a major force pushing for more coherent family ethical relations. Catholicism, Protestantism, and agnosticism transform the functional relation between religion and the family. Protestants forbid idol worship and so as a rule do not perform ancestor worship rites. Even among those Christian denominations that take a more accommodating position on ancestor worship, the religious role of ancestor worship is still fundamentally undermined. Also, although often still performing Chinese folk religious rituals that relate to the family (including ancestor worship rites), agnostics by definition reject Chinese folk religion as a belief system. It is thus not surprising to find that while self-proclaimed agnostics are often practitioners of ancestor worship they nevertheless exhibit familial attitudes quite different from animists and frequently similar to other religious persuasions.

Third, Animist family form seems to differ from that usually found for other religious persuasions. Unfortunately, Grichting does not provide direct information on family form. My point here is thus less secure since it rests on the uncertain premise that I can use Grichting's data on family size as a measure of family form. Nevertheless, assuming that family form can be assumed to be a direct function of family size, then an average family size of 6.33 members for animists indicates a far higher incidence of complex families in Animist families. Christians fall in the middle of the distribution of family forms by religious persuasion. Catholics have an average size of 5.50 members, followed closely behind by Protestants with an average family size of 5.34 members. Agnostic family size lags well behind other religious persuasions at 4.63 members, suggesting the highest ratio of nuclear families. These results are consistent with the explanation that traditional Chinese folk religion makes family relations in complex families more stable and delays family division.

Child Rearing

This section reports on the results of my reanalysis of the following five questions in Grichting's questionnaire (quoting Grichting's own English versions):

- 1) Would you say it's easier, about the same, or more difficult to raise children these days than it was a generation ago?
- 2) Suppose a boy is able to go to college. What do you think is the main thing he should get out of his education in college?
- 3) In bringing up one's children one can emphasize different things. From among the following values 1) obedience, 2) cooperation, 3) self-discipline, and 4) independence which one would you stress most, second, third and least in raising your children?
- 4) Every man would like his son to be successful, but people differ in what they mean by success. What does being successful mean to you?
- 5) Do you expect your children to turn in the money they earn so that it can be used for general family expenditures?

Table 2 shows that animists, Buddhists, Catholics, Protestants, and agnostics all hold quite different child rearing values. Responses to Grichting's first question reveal that more than 50 percent of the survey respondents from each religious persuasion consider child rearing more troublesome than in the past. Animists tend more than others to think child rearing either easier or the same as before. Catholics, Protestants, and agnostics feel that child rearing is much more difficult than in the past. Erosion of child obedience is the usual reason given by animists to account for the increase in child rearing difficulty. Few animists (14%) fault the wider society. In contrast, more Catholics (40%), Protestants (26%), and agnostics (37%) fault the wider society. Attitudes toward childrearing are reversed, however, for Animist informants who give a positive evaluation of wider social conditions (cf. Grichting 1971: 249). Answers to Grichting's third question indicate that cooperation is held to be the most important virtue regardless of religious persuasion when ranking the four forms of good behavior (obedience, cooperation, self-discipline, independence). In this, Animist emphasis on child obedience at the expense of independence and self-discipline is distinct from other religious persuasions.

When it comes to Grichting's fourth question, animists emphasize income and occupation when ranking child achievement, while respondents of other religious persuasions stress specialized skills, education and civic duty. In other words, Animist pursuit of divine protection shows a

very concrete and utilitarian function when it comes to parental aspirations for child achievement. Animists clearly judge success by such concrete yardsticks as income, but Catholics, Protestants, and agnostics put more weight on education, knowledge, skills and good citizenship.

TABLE 2 Child Rearing Attitudes and Religious Persuasion

	N	χ^2	df
The difficulty of raising children	1835	82.71***	8
The reason for such difficulties	1070	173.89***	28
Demands on one's children	1834	124.65***	12
Purpose of sending children to university	1837	219.19***	32
The criteria for one's child's success	1809	194.59***	26
How to handle money earned by one's children	1792	167.55***	8

***P < .001

Source: Computed from Wolfgang Grichting, *The Value System in Taiwan*, 1970 (Taipei: privately printed, 1971), pp. 247-49, 251, 254-56.

Finally, Grichting's data from his fifth question show that Animist parents tend to hope that money earned by their children will be contributed to family savings. Results to this fifth question are closely bound up with the traditional Chinese emphasis on maintaining harmonious family relations.

Briefly put, I would like to argue that Animist responses to Grichting's five questions on child rearing values are best explained by Chinese folk religion's unique utilitarian character. Animists tend to seek peace and security, and accordingly appeal to spirits to ensure that their businesses run smoothly.

Studies of divination show this utilitarian content of Chinese folk religion to be quite explicit. C.K. Yang (1961: 15) arrived at this conclusion some time ago for mainland China using L. Newton Haye's material (1924: 97, 103; cited in Day 1940: 13). Ts'ai Wen-hui (1968) has found a similar situation in Taiwan. Ts'ai Wen-hui's observations show that inquiries about fate and career are the two most common reasons given for divination. That portion of his total observations given over to questions of fate rises first to 58 percent when inquiries about wealth are included, and finally 66 percent when examination results are added (1968: 87). I discovered by administering a questionnaire in Kui-shan village in Taiwan's T'ao-yuan county that approximately 25 percent of those who admitted to seeking advice through divination did so because they were looking for good fortune, better employment, or good examination results (Chu 1976: 112).³

Chinese folk religion's utilitarian ethos can be contrasted with that of other religious traditions. For Catholics and Protestants, transactions between man and God differ in that they transcend the material level. Catholics and Protestants approach God for personal redemption, not for wealth and achievement. Accordingly, in Max Weber's theory of the Protestant ethic, Protestantism did not usher in the formation of capitalism as a result of praying to God for wealth. It was, rather, the work ethic which caused the continual struggle of capitalists. It was this struggle which became the ideological driving force behind Western civilization. According to Max Weber (1958: 170), Protestant accumulation of wealth for the glory of God is clearly connected with the rise of the spirit of capitalism. But the increase of material goods has exercised an enormous influence over human productivity, and Protestants no longer link the active pursuit of material success to religious belief (*ibid*, p. 181).

The above discussion suggests a tantalizing possibility. Apparently there is a cultural gap between agnostics and animists, and a religious gap between animists and Christians. I suggest that Christianity's failure to offer the same sorts of guarantees of concrete economic advantage found in Chinese folk religion points to a major difference in ethos between Christianity and Chinese folk religion. Direct support for this generalization can be found in the gap between Christians and animists in parental aspirations for their children. I also suggest as indirect evidence that, whether the intellectual source for agnosticism in Taiwan is Confucian, western technological civilization, or both, a religious similarity between agnostics and Christians certainly cannot be used to explain the convergence of agnostics and Christians in child rearing values. The common ground shaping the attitudes and behavior of Taiwan's agnostics and Christians toward the family is cultural rather than religious.

Sex Relations

The great majority of Grichting's respondents condemn extra-marital sex relations regardless of their religious persuasion (see Table 3). Only about 23 percent of the animists, 23 percent of the agnostics, 21 percent of the Protestants, and 13 percent of the Catholics agree that, "If two people are deeply in love then their having sexual relations prior to getting married does not matter." Over 93 percent of all respondents disagree with the statement, "There is nothing wrong with an unmarried man having sexual intercourse with several girls as long as he pays for them."

Religious persuasion is extremely significant, however, in the distribution of the remaining 7 percent who agree with the statement that there is "nothing wrong" with males having sexual relations with more than one woman. Six percent of the animists, 3 percent of the agnostics, and only 1 percent of the Protestants approve. Not one Catholic agreed with the statement (Grichting 1971: 259-60).

TABLE 3 Sexual Attitudes and Religious Persuasion

	N	χ^2	df
Who takes responsibility for premarital pregnancy?	1835	145.08***	20
Should two people in love have premarital sexual relations?	1839	113.75***	4
Should a man have premarital sexual relations?	1834	19.96***	4
Should a man have extra-marital sexual relations?	1835	93.17***	4

Source: Computed from Wolfgang Grichting, *The Value System in Taiwan*, 1970 (Taipei: privately printed, 1971), pp. 258-61.

The response by Catholic respondents is easily accounted for since the Catholic church imposes strict and conservative restrictions on sex relations. Although there maybe a trend toward a gradual closing of the gap in birthrates between Protestants and Catholics in the United States, the Catholic church still remains staunchly opposed to abortion (Westoff 1979). Except for their strong support (approximately 78.9 percent) for family planning, Taiwan's Catholics are more conservative in sexual attitudes and behavior than American Catholics.

Respondents split sharply along religious lines in their answers to questions measuring sexual attitudes and behavior. The split is widest in responses elicited for the statement, "As long as a married man has the financial means, it does not matter whether he has a mistress." Fourteen percent of the animists and 12 percent of the agnostics agree with the statement. Only 4 percent of the Protestants and but 2 percent of the Catholics share this view.

Similar results were obtained on three other questions about sexual attitudes and behavior. Apparently the agnostics are suddenly switching sides in matters of sexual attitudes and behavior. Agnostics generally side with Catholics and Protestants on matters relating to familial ideology and

behavior, but have more in common with animists when it comes to sexual attitudes and behavior.

Variation in sexual attitudes by religious persuasion also appears in other questions, and in at least one area remains significant even after controlling for subculture (Taiwan Hokkien, Hakka, etc.), region (urban versus rural), and gender (see Table 4). For instance, animists still show a greater tendency to express the opinion that the man should take responsibility in pre-marital pregnancies, but Catholics, Protestants, and agnostics thought it the responsibility of both the man and woman. The continued influence of religious persuasion notwithstanding, other factors are can be noticeably more significant. For example, Taiwan Hokkien respondents are the most tolerant of male sexual behavior, and are especially so in their attitudes toward keeping a mistress and engaging in extra-marital sex relations. About 16 percent of the Taiwan Hokkien subsample (without controlling for gender) agree that there is "nothing wrong" with such behavior. Also, Taiwan's rural respondents similarly show a more open attitude towards male extra-marital sexual behavior (cf. Grichting 1971: 261).

TABLE 4 Sexual Attitudes and Subethnic Group

Expressing Disapproval	Taiwan Mainlander	Taiwan Hokkien	Taiwan Hakka
Should a man be allowed to have premarital sexual relations?	97.6%	93.5%	96.6%
Should a man be allowed to have extra marital sexual relations?	94.6%	84.3%	93.5%

Source: Computed from Wolfgang Grichting, *The Value System in Taiwan, 1970* (Taipei: privated printed, 1971), pp. 260-61.

In each of these cases where influences other than religious persuasion can be detected for familial ideology and behavior, and even where a major realignment of groupings of religious persuasions occurs, I think the influence cultural.

Aspirations of Parents for their Children

Parent aspirations for their children can be divided into two parts. One concerns the ideal number of children, and includes attitudes toward family planning since family planning directly influences family size. The second part deals with parental aspirations for child achievement (see Table 5).

TABLE 5 Parent Aspirations for Children and Religious Persuasion

	N	χ^2	df
Expected number of sons	1835	226.64***	32
Expected number of daughters	1836	131.11***	32
Support for family planning	1834	33.44***	20
Hope for son's education	1836	201.76***	12
Hope for daughter's education	1836	237.73***	12

*** $P < .001$

Source: Computed from Wolfgang Grichting, *The Value System in Taiwan*, 1970 (Taipei: privately printed, 1971) pp. 245-46, 253, 262.

Although there is little indication that family planning *per se* is being objected to in Taiwan on religious grounds, degree of support for family planning varies by religious persuasion (see Table 5). These differences along religious lines are less marked, however, with a significance level of .05. Generally speaking, Catholicism and Animism stand out from the other religions. Though the Catholic church rejects family planning on doctrinal grounds, 78.9 percent of Catholic respondents approve of family planning and 34.6 percent do so strongly. Moreover, though Animist familial attitudes are influenced by ancestor worship, 79.3 percent of the animists still support family planning (cf. Grichting 1971: 262).

If family planning exerts a downward pressure on the ideal number of children, Animist religious values are still a major influence. Table 6 shows that animists still generally hope to have comparatively more children and more sons than daughters. Animism's influence on the ideal number of children and son preference exceeds the influence of all other factors. What is again important here is not simply that Animist attitudes not only differ from the other religious persuasions, but that the other religious persuasions approximate each other. Once again, Chinese folk religion is the exception. I think this adds further support to the conclusion that the distinctive influence of Chinese folk religion is best explained as the influence of ancestor worship.

This conclusion is not novel. It can be found in earlier ethnographies by Francis L.K. Hsu (1971) and Lin Yueh-hwa (1974), and in more recent ethnographic studies by Arthur Wolf (1974), David Jordan (1972), and Emily Ahern (1973). Time and again the ethnographies record that sons are the ones who typically and ideally succeed to the duty of insuring that a family's ancestors are properly worshiped. The importance of sons in ancestor worship and the importance of ancestor worship in Chinese folk religion is exhibited most blatantly in the correlation of the ideal number

of children and son preference with Chinese folk religion.

TABLE 6 Child Preference and Religious Persuasion

	N	Sons	Daughters	Sex Ratio
Buddhists	786	2.383	1.844	.539
Animists	693	2.403	1.965	.438
Protestants	72	1.804	1.502	.302
Catholics	53	1.756	1.472	.284
Atheists	232	1.903	1.606	.297

Source: Computed from Wolfgang Grichting, *The Value System in Taiwan*, 1970 (Taipei: privately printed, 1971), pp. 245-46.

My conclusion is also supported by earlier studies of the relationship between Chinese folk religion and the family. Li Yih-yuan reports in one study (1976) a zero-order correlation between religious attitudes, son preference, and ideal family size. He shows religious attitudes still influential after multiple regression analysis. Religious attitudes is one of only two variables that Li Yih-yuan was able to show affecting family size. Factors Li Yih-yuan finds affecting son preference include age, religious attitudes, and pressure from relatives. Religious attitudes have the greatest influence.

Animist parents also have distinctly lower educational aspirations for their children. This result is probably connected once more with the utilitarian content of Chinese folk religion, and especially with animists not seeing education as a goal in itself, but rather as a means to higher income and better employment. The difference between Animist parental aspirations for their children and those of the rest of the sample is a reflection of attitudinal differences about the purpose of education.

Conclusion

This study reanalyzes and discusses the relationship between religion and the family in Taiwan using data published privately in W. Grichting's *The Value System in Taiwan*, 1970 (1971). My reanalysis shows in greater detail how familial ideology and behavior vary by religious persuasion. My discussion suggests that the emphasis on harmony and stability in the Chinese folk religious world view partly accounts for the stress on harmony and stability in Animist families. I also argue that animists are distinct from other religious persuasions in Taiwan in that they stress the value of obedience, and measure achievement by employment and income.

Catholics, Protestants, and agnostics, on the contrary, stress the benefits of education and special skills. My discussion suggests that specific differences between animists and other religious persuasions turn on the utilitarian content of Chinese folk religion.

The influence of Chinese folk religion on sexual attitudes and behavior is less clear-cut. Except for the Catholic faith, Taiwan Hokkien subculture on the whole has a greater influence on sexual attitudes and behavior than religious persuasion. I attribute the similar responses of agnostics and animists to cultural rather than specifically religious continuities, and the distinctiveness of Catholics to the exacting restrictions Catholic doctrine places on sexual relationships. Lastly, I emphasize that ancestor worship is integral to Chinese folk religion, but that Chinese folk religion cannot be reduced to ancestor worship.

Chinese folk religion exercises in particular a distinct influence on the ideal number of children and lower educational aspirations of parents for their children. One possible implication is that long term educational investments will not bring about an immediate change in income. This is, except perhaps when prompting people to want to have a larger number of sons, the utilitarian aspect of Chinese folk religion is the more influential. The reason animists do not want their children to be even better educated is that they see the goal of education primarily as a means for securing higher incomes and better jobs.

Sworn Brothers: A Study in Chinese Ritual Kinship

(With an Appendix on Sworn Brotherhood and Folk Law)

David K. Jordan

Introduction

Overview. Both in literature and in ethnographic report, mention is made of the Chinese custom of "sworn brotherhood" (*chieh-pai hsiung-ti*).¹ Some men enter such a relationship to emphasize or prolong especially close friendships or in the interest of economic or political advantage. Sometimes political leaders, criminal societies or village headmen organize themselves into sworn brotherhoods. Some groups are very large, involving hundreds of people. Others include only two close friends. Although most groups are all male—hence the term "brother"—a few include women or are made up entirely of women. When its purpose is intimacy among close friends, sworn brotherhood stands on the border between friendship and kinship. It is analogous to other sorts of Chinese fictive kinship, particularly adoption of the god-parent type, and yet at the same time it is different because its fictive quality remains vibrantly in the consciousness of the participants, and no attempt is made to forget the artificiality of its creation. It is closer than friendship, not so close as kinship, different from both, and similar to both, and it generates secondary relationships that are different from itself, such as kinsmen of Ego's sworn brother, or sworn brother of one of Ego's sworn brothers. When larger groups are involved, friendship is less prominent than common goals; then sworn brotherhood can come to assume aspects of a religious association, of a common-origin society, of a trade guild, of a credit union, or even of a local government.

This custom raises a host of questions for the student of Chinese society. For example, when such relationships are undertaken by politi-

cians, local or national, they can have effects on the manipulation of political power. Among former schoolmates they can be a force for the vertical integration of society across differences of wealth and social class. When they are undertaken by merchants, they can result in changes in the way in which business is done. Among the poor, they can provide economic shelter in time of financial stress. When they are associated with secret societies, they seem to create serious problems in the maintenance of public order. And so on.

Problem. None of these functions technically *requires* the idiom of kinship, however. Political alliances, mutual aid societies, and the rest can be organized quite differently. In fact, both in China and elsewhere these functions usually are *not* phrased in the idiom of sworn brotherhood. If such functions can be adequately accomplished outside the custom of sworn brotherhood, then why should sworn brotherhood exist at all? Why should men who are already friends, colleagues, or comrades find it necessary or desirable to remold that relationship in the idiom of kinship?² Why is it better to be a Chinese brother than a Chinese friend?

Outline. In this paper, I shall try to answer that question by considering what sworn brothers I have interviewed have told me about their sworn brotherhoods. The paper has three parts. The first deals with the functions of sworn brotherhood. The second deals with the kinship metaphor and the logic that makes it better to be a sworn brother than a friend (or ally), and the third deals with the ritual by which sworn brotherhoods are established.

Background: The Functions of Sworn Brotherhood

The ideal case. According to my informants, sworn brotherhood normally occurs among people who are already close friends. The purpose of converting friendship into mock kinship is to allow the relationship to become "more intimate" and "longer lasting" than ordinary friendship, they maintain, and to provide mutual assistance in case of untoward events in the life of any partner to the alliance. The relationship is established by mutual consent in a ritual conducted in a temple at which an oath of mutual assistance and loyalty is sworn and incense is offered. The text of the agreement with the names of the contracting parties is burnt to place it forever in the celestial archives. A meal together, with wine, is also an integral part of the ritual. In the course of things, each brother cuts his finger and allows the blood to flow into a cup of wine, which is afterward drunk by all parties to the pact. The continuing

relationship among the sworn brothers is subsequently symbolized by the use of kinship terms among them, and kinship terms are also used for the members of each other's families. Similarly, other forms of kinship behavior are extended to each others' families, including most importantly (or most saliently) contribution to the dowry of a sworn brother's daughter or to the expenses of a funeral in a sworn brother's family, and formal mourning obligations upon the death of a sworn brother's parents.³

Some of these formal elements may be missing in any given sworn brother relationship. But considered together they do constitute a fairly tight functional unit, and it is not difficult to see how these elements create a relationship which is congruent with commonly held Chinese values, as well as with the material needs of Chinese individuals and families. The "traditional" sworn brother relationship which informants describe probably owes part of its credibility to this congruity with Chinese society as viewed by these same informants.

Their description, nevertheless, does not accurately represent any of the sworn brother relationships to which these same informants were parties. In other words, although they seemed to share a view of how such a relationship was established and of what the potential of such a relationship might be, they did not necessarily establish it this way, and did not necessarily exploit this potential. In some instances they did not apparently expect to do so even when the relationship was first established. Instead, I have the impression that different groups selected those elements of the relationship that were primary for them, and stressed ritual and obligations most harmonic with them.

The Gallins' typology. There is curiously little published specifically on the subject of sworn brotherhood in China, excluding brief notes in the course of discussing other topics. In a recent article Bernard and Rita Gallin (1977) have made an analytical distinction between two polar types of sworn brotherhood that they found in the course of fieldwork in Taiwan. Acknowledging that their informants, like mine, believe sworn brotherhood should include both mutual affection and mutual advantage, they still see one or the other of these as potentially dominant over the other, and they use this as the basis for a typology. At one pole lies an ideal type they describe as "affective sworn brotherhood," characteristically undertaken by young or by poor people seeking to tighten friendship ties and to expand members' networks of relationships. This is the kind of sworn brotherhood that figures most prominently in the anthropologist's field notes. At the opposite pole is "instrumental sworn

brotherhood," characteristically undertaken by older or higher status people and characterized by a more explicit goal of economic and sociopolitical gain through mutual aid. This is the kind of sworn brotherhood one is more likely to read about in newspaper accounts because it has wider social effects. The Gallins mention several distinguishable subtypes of instrumental sworn brotherhood. One subtype is found in the world of the *liu-mang* or "hoodlums," and can be used to provide moral guarantees of loyalty to a group practising dangerous activities. A second subtype involves businessmen organizing to minimize competition and maximize cooperation among themselves. Yet another is designed to maximize economic and sociopolitical opportunities for a heterogeneous membership. Here we enter the world of local political alliances, as well as mutual loans of money. Noting an increase in the number of sworn brotherhoods in Taiwan in recent years, the Gallins propose that a "decline in the effectiveness of certain large-scale associations" with modernization has resulted in a situation where "occupational and regional groups in Taiwan no longer appear to be able to protect and promote viably the interests of their members," leaving the members to the vagaries of individually contracted alliances.

Other functions. Earlier work includes material that illustrates some other functions for the instrumental sort of sworn brotherhood, functions that can no longer be found in Taiwan today. One of the most interesting of these is the use of sworn brotherhood to provide the basis of local government. In this case, the family heads of an entire community swear an oath of sworn brotherhood and use the occasion to make explicit the rules which are to govern the public life of the community. Two examples are to be found in an article by L. Ivanov (1914). Ivanov was apparently living on the Sino-Russian frontier, near modern Vladivostok, at the time when both the Chinese and the Russian empires were disintegrating at the turn of the century. There he collected sworn brotherhood oaths taken by elders of two communities. We may readily imagine a power vacuum in local level administration in such a circumstance, and each oath presents us with an entire "Code of Hammurabi" for the conduct of village affairs. (Because Ivanov's documents are particularly interesting, but have been available only in a relatively inaccessible Russian source, an English translation of them is appended to the present article.)

Sworn brotherhood is not necessary to ensure law and order in Taiwan today, and one no longer finds local law codes written into sworn brotherhood oaths. This function of the institution therefore cannot be studied ethnographically, but it has two morals for us which need to be

kept in mind. One is that *sworn brotherhood, like so many other cultural institutions, is an empty vessel, into which a very wide variety of different contents may potentially be poured*. There can be no closed list of the purposes to which it may be put. The other is that *the custom has a long history that provides a wide variety of models* from which latter-day sworn brothers may take inspiration. Historical and literary precedents provide a wealth of imagery which may be invoked in the rhetoric with which new fraternities are founded or from time to time renegotiated in the course of their use. The historicity of sworn brotherhood is one of its most salient qualities to many informants. In joining a brotherhood one is joining a tradition, or more exactly a group of traditions, which help to constrain and structure the expectations and aspirations of the participants.

The Kinship Metaphor: Why is it Better to be a Brother Than a Friend?

Whatever other functions sworn brotherhood may accomplish, the function that is most important for most informants, is preserving intimate relations among the parties to it. They stress that a friendship which is turned into a sworn brotherhood lasts longer and is more intimate than ordinary friendship. It is intimacy and stability which participants seek to preserve when they undertake a sworn brotherhood, especially when they assume it on the basis of a friendship which is not of very long standing and which has not yet shown itself already characterized by these qualities. One informant described the situation when he joined a sworn brotherhood in the army:

They thought everyone's relationships were pretty good, and we ought to become sworn brothers. Everybody's relationships would be maintained longer that way.

Another described her group of sworn sisters at the time of their union:

Swearing sisterhood is nothing very special. It is just that reciprocal feelings are a little warmer. . . . What makes it a little different [from friendship] is that this sort of friendly feeling stays in one's mind longer. It's not like ordinary friends, who are forgotten after a few years.

There is good agreement that sworn sibblingship occurs when and because the participants feel a need to preserve an intimate relationship over a longer time than ordinary friendships: to increase its longevity.⁴ But how

exactly does swearing an oath of brother—or sisterhood actually contribute to this goal? What is there about the custom that could have such a result? It seems to me that sworn brotherhood is stronger than friendship for at least six reasons: 1) The idiom of brotherhood carries with it an ideology that mutes conflicts; 2) it provides an ideological basis for greater assistance to friends in need; 3) it prohibits competition and exploitation; 4) it provides a weak, but sometimes useful, mechanism for dispute settlement through appeal to fraternal hierarchy; 5) it interests the families of sworn brothers in the longevity of the relationship and makes a public statement of permanent commitment to it; and 6) it provides boundaries within which obligations and rights may be explicitly stated and honored.

Muting conflict. When discussing friendship, Chinese informants will sometimes allude to the dissolution of friendship when the parties to it become estranged by distance or by quarrels. These forces are also dangerous to a sworn brotherhood. Sworn brothers take particular care to avoid quarrels and to nullify the effects of distance. We shall see how the availability of economic resources of one's sworn brothers can reduce the probability of a strain on the relationship in time of economic difficulty. This in itself may reduce the likelihood of a quarrel. But there are in addition direct ideological supports to the notion that quarreling is not allowable. Part of the logic of the familial metaphor seems to be that both parties' interests and ideally their opinions are nearly identical, and that therefore disagreement should be minor.

Before we became sworn sisters, the three of us had really become very close; our attachment seemed much deeper than among most people.... Our three outlooks were not dissimilar, and our attachment was no less congenial than for our own sisters.

The keyword for many informants is *t'ou-chi* (Hokkien: *tau-ki/tau-ki*), which means to get along well, specifically including the idea of agreeing with each other. (Thus not to *t'ou-chi* means to have a dissidence of opinion which results in estrangement.)

Our mutual affections were very friendly, and we got along well in conversation (literally: "our speech was *t'ou-chi*"). At that time we were all as one; as the proverb says, "When there was fortune it was enjoyed together; when there was sorrow it was borne together." Indeed one sworn brother advises against undertaking a brotherhood for exactly this reason: it is a nuisance to have to restrain oneself from disagreement because of someone being one's sworn brother!

Using family resources. If being a sworn sibling provides a rationale for avoiding conflict of opinion, it also provides a rationale for helping one's transformed friend. In fact, among the sworn siblings I have interviewed, economic assistance of any very great scale is rare. On the other hand, it is uniformly and eagerly described as inherent in the relationship, and this is often given as one of the axes of difference from relationships of friendship. Although the issue may be academic and aid may rarely be needed or offered, the relationship of sworn brotherhood permits it to be offered more easily than the relationship of friendship does, and this seems to contribute to the constancy of the relationship.

Friendships take second place to family responsibility in China. If Huang needs money and Wu is his friend, then Wu may lend him a little money, or, if Wu is wealthy, he may give Huang a little money. But in no case will Wu endanger his family's resource base to do so. This is as true if Wu is a *paterfamilias* as if he is a small child, for the familial resources do not properly *belong* to any single individual (Freedman 1966: 49f). Brotherhood, on the other hand, implies a certain amount of resource sharing. If Huang and Wu are sworn brothers, Wu may very well go much further toward helping Huang, including possibly imposing hardships on the Wu family (or, fictively, on the rest of "their" family). As a friend, Wu may wish to help, but he may have no good "excuse" to offer, particularly to his own family, for doing so. As a sworn brother, Wu therefore has ideological supports to help Huang weather an economic crisis.

There is morality to a friendship, to be sure. You help him as far as you can. But with [sworn] brothers, that is not enough: it becomes an obligation; it becomes compulsory. When there is nothing you can do, you still have to think of a way to help him. . . . If you don't help a sworn brother, people will criticize you. Sworn brotherhood provides a legitimation at least at the time of swearing the oath for treating a friend as one wishes one could treat him.⁵

In a group of more than two or three members, the economic aspect of the relationship rapidly becomes considerably more important, and money changes hands more often than in the case of pairs or trios of sworn brothers. The point I want to make, however, is that the kinship idiom in which such assistance is phrased overcomes the argument that a person is helping his friend at the expense of his natural family, since his sworn brother may arguably constitute part of his family. Sworn brothers are less likely than mere friends to stand around and watch one's

fortunes deteriorate in an emergency and are more likely to help, since they have a rationale for helping which may be offered to anyone who doubts the wisdom of their stepping in and risking their own family's resources: they are, after all, brothers.

Competition and cooperation. The same logic that allows sworn brothers to marshal their private resources to help each other also allows them to restrain themselves from competition with or exploitation of their sworn siblings, even when such competition would be to their private advantage. Such restraints do not operate as clearly in the case of friendship. One informant explained this with an example.

Let us suppose that I am thinking about setting up a noodle stand on a certain corner. I may ask a friend whether he thinks it is a good idea. If he thinks it is, he may tell me it is not, and then when I abandon the project, he may set one up himself and make a lot of money. A sworn brother could never do that. If he thinks it is a good idea, he must tell me, and not use it himself.

Restraint of competition is implicit in family relationships, and hence in sworn brotherhood relationships, and this makes sworn brotherhoods a beneficial form for merchants in many circumstances. But the point to be noted in connection with the longevity of the relationship is that it also avoids an important source of eventual destructive quarreling, which could endanger the relationship.

Hierarchy. Quite aside from a rule to the effect that one ought not to argue and disagree, sworn brotherhood brings about a change in the relationship that may have some effect on the way in which potential disagreements may be resolved. Chinese friends are equals. Chinese brothers are junior and senior. Traditional wisdom distinguishes friendship and brotherhood as two different items of the set of Confucian five relationships (*wu-lun*). The stress in the Confucian texts is upon finding friends whose example is worthy for one to follow. One seeks friendship, ideally, with morally superior people, with whom one seeks a mutually edifying association. Should a given individual prove unworthy, one discontinues the relationship. Disruption of friendship which has ceased to be either uplifting or profitable is thus encouraged.

Brotherhood, on the other hand, involves inequality. Fraternal love (*ti*) is a complex relationship. It is true that one can treat friends with brotherly love, and that brothers are friendly toward one another, but Confucius also speaks of "serving" (*shih*) one's elder brothers in a way similar to the way one serves one's father. (Analects IX, 15). In their

article, the Gallins stress that sworn brotherhood is normally undertaken by a group of status equals, and my cases agree with this. It is intriguing therefore to note that by changing the relationship from one of friendship to one of brotherhood, one is theoretically changing it from a relationship of equality to one of hierarchy. The older (or eldest) friend becomes First Brother, and the rest are numbered after him in chronological order of birth. Though usually ignored in practice, the theoretical rule is that first brother's opinion is normally to prevail; he is to be given precedence in passing through doors, sitting at tables, and etc.; the other brothers follow along, theoretically in numbered order. Kinship terms, among sworn brothers as among ordinary brothers, signal these distinctions at every turn, and their salience is witnessed also by the fact that every sworn sibling I have interviewed could easily tell me the ordering of the sibling set. In theory the younger brother owes his elder brother obedience and, eventually, nurture. Within limits, this means that it is the elder brother's will which is to prevail in the event of disagreement, though of course the younger brother may be able to argue persuasively enough to bring his senior around to his point of view. Among sworn siblings, as among natural siblings, this hierarchical ordering is self-conscious but weak. Can it then have any effect upon the longevity of sworn siblings' relationships?

A particularly interesting paper by Eugene Anderson (1972) on "Some Chinese Methods of Dealing with Crowding" provides a very useful perspective on hierarchy that we can apply quite well in the present case. Anderson argues (p. 68) that "...seniority hierarchy is often abused, but it gives a solid structure of life; everyone knows how he stands relative to almost everyone coming into the household." In other words, interpersonal conflict is avoided when a cultural rule prescribes that one person's opinion is to take precedence over the other's. Sworn brotherhood establishes the convention that one "brother's" opinion is superior to the opinion of another "brother," and the same mechanism for avoiding conflict that Anderson argues helps allow Chinese to live in crowded conditions without serious mishap assures the group of sworn brothers that they will have fewer serious arguments. To the extent that arguments lead to estrangement and that fraternal hierarchy, however muted, helps to avoid arguments or reduces their intensity, establishing a pact of sworn brotherhood contributes to the longevity of good relations among the participants.

In practice, so far as I can tell, this hierarchical principal, although strongly in focus in describing the general theory of brotherhood, sworn

or natural, is seldom very prominent in actual dispute settlement. Unlike subordination to a father, subordination to an elder brother seems to be only rarely a basis for action, despite its being marked in differentiated terms of address and reference. The difference between close friends and close brothers is slight as far as the overt hierarchical quality of their daily interaction is concerned. The point is, however, that there is potential for dispute resolution that would not exist for a pair of friends. The fact that the ideology of hierarchy is shared and is continuously being marked in speech and etiquette means that it is available for appeal when disagreements do not seem to be resolvable in other ways, that it is a rhetorical resource that friendship lacks and sworn brotherhood possesses. If all else were equal—and it is not—this would still give sworn brotherhood a slight competitive advantage over friendship alone as a long-lasting relationship.⁶

Families of sworn brothers. There is yet another way in which sworn brotherhood represents a bond of greater durability than the bond of friendship. Sworn brothers assume an obligation towards the family members of their fictive brethren. Informants uniformly stress this, putting particular emphasis upon the formal symbols of this wider set of obligations: kinterms, wearing mourning garb, contributing money at marriages and the like. We called our sworn brothers' parents by the same terms our sworn brothers used, and if the parent of a sworn brother dies, then the rest of us sworn brothers must wear hemp and mourn.

A sworn brother's wife was called *a-so/a-sou* (EBrWi). Children were to address the sworn brothers as *a-peh/a-peq* (FaEBr) or *a-chek/a-ciek* (FaYBr), and the same with the sworn brothers' wives, whom the children were to call *a-m/a-m* (FaEBrWi) and *a-chim/a-cim* (FaYBrWi). Further, when a sworn brother's child got married, we were to give a "red package" [of money], the same as one must give in the case of "real" brothers. If the father or mother of a sworn brother should die, we were to wear hemp and mourn.

It is important to maintain a degree of skepticism about the claim that kinship terms are extended identically to their usage in natural kinship. The Hokkien terms *a-chek/a-ciek* and so on are used also with close friends of one's parents, and their use in sworn brotherhood relationships does not distinguish sworn brotherhood from close friendship very clearly. (In Mandarin, parents' close friends are often addressed by surname plus kinterm, while parents' sworn siblings are normally addressed by kinterm alone. In Hokkien, the kinterm alone is normal in both cases.) Bruce Holbrook (personal communication, 1976) points out that the relationship

differs both from natural kinship and true adoption in that the term "brother" or "sister" in sworn siblingship is not conceived as "same parents' child" and therefore the extensions of kinship terms are very limited. He writes:

I have found exceptions . . . in which even sworn brothers' parents are not called (in reference or even address) *fu/pa*, *mu/ma*. Rather what I would call the "familiar" terms are used, i.e. those used for natural father's or mother's friends, *po-fu* and *po-mu/po-po*. In either case it is clear that the use of parental terms derives from the use of brother (or sister) terms . . . This is the weakest variety of such extension, as is symptomized by the fact that extension to natural kinsmen of sworn kinsmen is most delimited . . . For example, one does not . . . call one's sworn brother's natural brother's son (not living with sworn brother) *chih-erh*. In the same vein, although there may be mourning obligations, . . . natural son's sworn brother is not . . . able to inherit nor expected to perform *fully* as a natural son.

In other words, sworn brotherhood is not quite like brotherhood; in formal terms, it is a much watered down version.

Nevertheless a relationship is set up with the family of a sworn brother, and the relationship can be an important one in preserving the longevity and intimacy of the sworn brotherhood. To the extent that parties to the brotherhood actually interact with each others' families (which is partly a function of geography), an intimacy can build up between a brother and the family of his sworn brother which may contribute to the maintenance of the relationship between the brothers themselves. One village informant, discussing the problems of maintaining the necessary intimacy with sworn brothers living in other parts of Taiwan, was quite clear on the importance of his sworn brothers' families in keeping ties alive.

However when they are separated too far apart, their mutual feelings can gradually become distant, and although you occasionally write a letter, still your feeling aren't really the same as they were earlier when you were both doing military service. If you have some period of contact with each other, then the feelings don't change. Or if the sworn brothers introduce us so their parents know us, then relationships are a little more familial; if we go to our sworn brother's house and he is not there, but his parents know us, then they treat us like their own son, and moreover we don't feel unnatural about it. But if you don't know your sworn brother's parents, so that when you go to his house you are regarded as an unfamiliar person, then no matter how intimate you were with him there well

be a deterioration of your feelings. As the time gets longer, all that remains is the form of the sworn brotherhood.

My informants universally report undertaking oaths of sworn brotherhood without consulting their families ahead of time. One man said: "My father brought a man home and told us we were to call him 'uncle,' so we called him 'uncle'; I didn't know just who he really was." Another man said: "When I brought my sworn brother home and introduced him, all my father said was, 'Oh yes, you young people do that a lot.'" Here is evidence, if any were needed, that at least initially the promise of real familial integration of the sworn brother is more potential than actual. Still, the celebration of the founding of the brotherhood with oaths in a temple, witnesses, feasting, and the like would presumably have helped force the undertaking into the open enough that the related families are probably rarely entirely unaware of the enterprise. Obviously a sworn brotherhood undertaken without the knowledge of the families would have the weakness that the brothers would be prevented from behaving toward each other as true brothers if their families did not agree to such behavior. Particularly if real economic sharing came into question, this could be awkward. Given these constraints, it seems clear that a sworn brotherhood, like a friendship, must continue to be cultivated and must mature over time and gain family acceptance if it is to realize its full potential. On the other hand, family commitment is potentially involved, and when the new "brothers" start using kinship terms for each other's families, it is hard for the relationship to be unnoticed. This can make the family and neighbors moral enforcers of the implications of sworn brotherhood. To quarrel with a sworn brother is perhaps not so serious as to quarrel with a brother, but because it is a breach of contract in another respect it is a great deal more serious than quarreling with a friend, and this can bring on not merely a feeling a guilt, but broader moral censure.

Boundaries of obligation. Friendship is an amorphous thing. Some friends are closer than others, and it is not entirely clear where friendship grades into mere acquaintance. Siblingship is different. One is or is not the sibling of a given person. Whatever the state of human relations, the fact of kinship, if not quite immutable, is nevertheless a great deal more clearly defined than the fact of friendship. This makes it preadaptive to the administration of rights and obligations in a way that friendship cannot be. (This principal applies to all sorts of organizations, of course, one Tainan informant was approached to join the Rotary Club, which

was described as "barbarian sworn brotherhood" (*hoan-a kiat-pai/huana kiat-pai*). An obligation undertaken with this, he was told, would be *always* to patronize the businesses of fellow Rotarians in preference to others. Such a rule is possible only because it is clear who is and who is not a Rotarian.)

None of the village cases I collected had, to my knowledge, involved any sort of economic exchange at all. On the other hand three of the urban groups (F, G, and H) exchanged money continually. They provide a perfect example of the Gallins' "instrumental sworn brotherhood." Group F was founded in Taipei in 1954 by eight migrants from various southern cities. It was eventually expanded to twelve, then two members were expelled for "outrageous behavior," reducing it to ten, from which it has gradually grown to over twenty members, including two women. The group established a rule which outlawed money lending between any two members, but encouraged those in need to bring their problems to the group as a whole in a regular and secret bimonthly meeting, where money lent was registered in an account book for later repayment. The logic of the arrangement was that this would prevent disputes between individual members over money and would allow group pressure to come to bear effectively upon the late payer who had no good excuse to offer. Two other groups in Tainan City (H and G with five and twelve members respectively) allowed money lending between individuals, through group efforts had also occurred. Only one of the members of Group F lives in Tainan. Although he is proud of his membership, so attenuated is the sense of intimacy with the other members of the group that new members have sometimes been admitted whom he has approved by letter and met face to face only after they had become his "siblings." So taken was this man with the principle of a group of reciprocal money lenders based on metaphorical kinship that he founded another, similar, group, Group G, in Tainan, originally consisting of six small businessmen, and later expanded to twelve, including five from outside Tainan. The charter members swore an oath in 1966, burned a list of their names, birthdays, and addresses in a local temple, and have engaged in mutual feasting and reciprocal money lending ever since.

In a group of this kind, with clear financial rights and confidential meetings at which the finances of the constituent families are discussed and loans made, it is crucial to maintain clear boundaries of membership. Sworn brotherhood, unlike friendship, provides a mechanism for doing this, both by clarifying who is and who is not a member, and by setting up constraints on exploitation that make candid discussion of the affairs

of constituent families a possibility.⁷

Thus even when there are no fraternal emotions to be preserved against the ravages of time, the same mechanisms which help to preserve intimate feelings of a personal kind can also help to maintain a support group for constituent families based on mutual advantage rather than sentiment. The idiom of metaphorical kinship, by stressing various aspects of Chinese brotherhood, far surpasses friendship alone in making relationships lasting and satisfying, whether that satisfaction is "affective" or "instrumental."

Intersecting Membership and the Case of Bully Ts'ai

One of the members of Group G was already a member of Group H when he joined Group G. Group H, founded in 1961, consists of five Tainan men, four of whom were originally from outside of the city. All of them work or have worked in the carpentry and roof tile repair business at one time or another, and three of them are in the same firm.

All three of these groups—F, G, and H—exchange money at various times, and all seem more instrumental than affective in tone. Nevertheless many of the same mechanisms for the avoidance of conflict and the mediation of human relations that we saw inherent in the metaphorical extension of kinship are found here as well. An interesting case arose in 1976 that illustrates both these points as well as another problem: that of intersecting memberships. If the family of my sworn brother is my family, what of the families of my sworn brother's sworn brothers in another group? We can gain some insight into this through the case of Bully Ts'ai.

We saw that Groups G and H in Tainan have a member in common. We may name the linking member Wang. Because Wang was a member of both groups, several other members of each had a chance to meet members of the other group and knew each other slightly. A man whom I shall call Bully Ts'ai is a member of Group G. In the early 1960s Bully Ts'ai had also been a member of a group of a hundred or so young toughs (*liu-mang*), but the group had been forced by the police to disband. In 1976 Wang and two other members of Group H completed a carpentry job at a local temple and were unable to collect their fee. Because Wang was also a sworn brother of Bully Ts'ai, Ts'ai volunteered to help them. He rounded up a friend from his Young Tough days and went to call on the man who had refused payment. He collected NT\$5,000 (about US\$130) for the three carpenters. In gratitude they made him a gift of

NT\$1,000.

A few weeks later, Bully Ts'ai, apparently in need of money, asked Wang's permission to go and help collect the rest of the debt. Permission was granted, and Ts'ai and his Young Tough friend went again to the recalcitrant temple keeper and collected NT\$1,000. However this time he did not repay the carpenters of Group H, but rather spent the money and did not say anything more about it. The matter lay quietly for three weeks. Sworn brothers of both groups were disturbed about it, however, for in effect it constituted a theft from the carpenters. But the carpenters themselves declined to take action.

Maybe poor old Ts'ai needed money—again—and took it as a loan. Maybe poor old Ts'ai had to pay a debt of some embarrassing sort to some of his old Young Tough associates and the borrowing was unavoidable. Since he is Wang's sworn brother, he will certainly repay it eventually. We cannot object to helping a sworn brother [sic!] even if he took our money without asking for it.

In Ts'ai's own Group G the same sort of reasoning prevailed. But, better acquainted with Ts'ai, they were more worried. The unauthorized "borrowing" of a thousand dollars was a small thing, they maintained, but their concern was that this was more and more typical of Bully Ts'ai. "Alas, poor old Ts'ai is falling back into his evil old ways."

The case was interesting for a number of reasons, but what is germane to present purposes is that great circumspection was displayed about condemning Ts'ai as a thief, and rationalizations were being made up on his behalf to avoid becoming openly angry with him. The surface attitude all around was more like concern and disappointment than anger. Yet the situation was tense, and the annoyance that they individually felt did not seem to me to lurk very deep beneath the surface. (It is true that any attempt to force Bully Ts'ai to repay the money might have been met with rebuff by his Young Tough friends. On the other hand, also in danger were the delicate relations between the two groups, which were linked by the almost innocent person of poor Wang.)

Wang had been remodeling his house, and in celebration of its completion the sworn brothers of Group G held a dinner in his new front parlor. Some members of both of Wang's sworn brotherhoods attended. Ts'ai conspicuously and predictably absented himself and sent his wife instead, who announced that he was unable to come because he had to work that evening. This was interpreted by all as a confession of his awareness of his wrongdoing. Two weeks later his brethren of Group G

held a meeting to discuss his problems with him and to "urge him to be a better person." I was not permitted to attend the meeting, which was formally secret, but I was given to understand that Ts'ai submitted himself gracefully enough to this. He was, after all, their "brother," and in fact their "youngest brother," and their interest in his "borrowing" of NT\$1,000 had to be construed by him as fraternal concern rather than nosy prying. I was eventually told that the money had been paid back.

Bully Ts'ai was introduced into the carpenters' business because of a connection through Wang, the linking member of the two groups. His misbehavior reflected an underappreciation of the delicacy both of metaphorical kinship and of intergroup relations. Care was taken not to hold Wang responsible, but for that matter care was also taken on the part of the members of Group H not to hold Ts'ai responsible. It was, in the end, his own group of sworn brothers, Group G, stirred by their loss of face before Group H and by their concern about Bully Ts'ai's morality, that led to action. The interest in protecting the relationship between the two groups was more than merely an interest in saving Wang's or Ts'ai's face or money. All members of both groups had become involved with the matter: the groups had earlier decided that, since all members were sworn brothers with Wang, they were *ipso facto* sworn brothers with each other, or at least sworn half-brothers. Kinship terms were extended to the members and families of the "other" group (though mourning obligations were not), and small favors of various kinds were apparently justified on the basis of this logic. When the action came, it took the form of a "familial" inquest, with Ts'ai's place as youngest brother playing neatly into their hands as an additional reason for him to listen to them. The resolution in the end was satisfactory to all concerned. And the carpenters had successfully collected the bulk of their bill.

The Rituals of Sworn Brotherhood

Several references have been made so far to the ritualism of sworn brotherhood. Not only are certain ritualistic obligations assumed by sworn brothers (the red envelopes, kinship terms, mourning clothing, and so on that we mentioned earlier), but ritual is involved in the establishment of the relationship. The Taiwan informants did not, for the most part, practice as much ritual as they knew about, but almost all of the brotherhoods involved at least some.

The full form. The full form described by informants involves a feast,

including wine and an oath, ideally sworn in a temple. The oath is sometimes written, with the participants' names and birthdates (and hence birth order), and burned for registration in heaven. In some cases (though none from Taiwan, to my knowledge) participants take on new names in these documents, so that the entire sibling set may share a common syllable in the given names, as sets of natural siblings often do. Some informants, as indicated earlier, mention cutting their fingers and mixing the blood of the new siblings in the wine. Chinese social compacts in general are sealed with feasts, and temples are used to send all sorts of messages about changing social relationships for registration by supernatural, whether gods or ancestors. Accordingly none of the sworn brotherhood ritualism is bizarre; rather it is especially appropriate, in the context of Chinese symbolic expression, to the purpose at hand. For the analyst it illustrates many of the points we have already made concerning the way in which the idiom of kinship serves to meet the goals of the sworn brotherhood. Family involvement is almost inevitable, given the adoption of kinship terms at the time of the initiation ritual. The introduction of hierarchical potential is assured by incorporating birthdates in the charter documents. The boundaries of the relationship are firmly established by the introduction of blood into the wine, by the adoption of new names with a common syllable or simply by the fact of jointly subscribing to the vows and eating the feast. Mutual aid is also symbolized by communal feasting, for the cost of the feast is shared.

Models. We mentioned earlier the influence of literary and historical models upon these rites. By far the most important model and most famous of all sworn brotherhoods is the union of Liu Pei, Kuan Yu, and Chang Fei, heroes of the Warring States period and subjects of the brilliant romantic novel by Lo Kuan-chung (ca 1330-1400) *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* (*San-kuo yen-i*), set in that period. The text, as represented in that novel, reads as follows:

We three, Liu Pei, Kuan Yu, and Chang Fei, though of different families, swear brotherhood, and promise mutual help to one end. We will rescue each other in difficulty, we will aid each other in danger. We swear to serve the state and save the people. We ask not the same day of birth, but we seek to die together. May Heaven, the all-ruling, and Earth, the all-producing, read our hearts, and if we turn aside from righteousness or forget kindness may Heaven and man smite us! (Translated by Brewitt-Taylor 1925: 5-6)

Kuan Yu was canonized in 1594, and his temples are particularly popular

places to swear oaths of sworn brotherhood. This alliance for deeds of derring-do (and others as well) lends to the institution of sworn brotherhood literary precedent for social rebellion and probably contributes to its popularity among delinquents, soldiers, and other young men intrigued by common efforts and courageous deeds. A quite different model is provided by, for example, the tale of Yu Po-ya and Chung Tzu-ch'i of the Chou dynasty, who met on a boat, discovered a common love of music, and despite differences of social class swore to be brothers till death. In this case personal affection, not really common purpose, provide a Chinese equivalent of the Old Testament friendship of David and Jonathan, and the martial theme is missing entirely. This model too is popularly available, for the tale is found in the popular collection *Chin-ku ch'i-kuan* (Wonderous sights past and present) which circulates in Taiwan both in the original Ming dynasty version and in modern colloquial redactions. Popular literature provides a range of intermediate models as well. Hsu Yu's (1972) *T'ai-wan min-chien liu-ch'uan ku-shih* (Traditional folktales from Taiwan), for example, is made up of a series of stories about two sworn brothers and their adventures, and even the popular temple figures, General Fan and General Hsieh are sworn brothers famed for their fidelity to each other. (Some groupings of locally important gods are also described as sworn brothers, but people less often know tales about them that could serve as models for human sworn sibblingship.)

"Gold and Orchid" oaths. In Taiwan the taking of oaths is quite various. One village informant told me simply that "We just said we'd do it, and that was that." Another, who became a sworn brother to a number of fellow soldiers during military service in Kinmen, reports that the group went to a local temple, where a pre-printed oath was administered to them by a temple attendant. The oath was so literary that, according to my informant, none of the participants actually understood what it said. A third informant reports an oath taken at the banquet. No temple was involved. He paraphrased it as follows:

After we have become sworn brothers, no brother may violate the blessings of brotherhood, nor turn his back upon fraternal loyalty. If any forgets the blessings or violates the blessings or turns his back upon the pledge, he shall...

At this point a bystander to the interview interrupted to complete the (apparently familiar) sense of the commitment: "...be struck dead by lightning, have no descendents, and suffer a generation of poverty."

Chinese at other times and in other places seem to have favored more elaborate oaths, a few of which are preserved. The written form is called a *Chin-lan p'u*, probably best translated as "Register of Gold and Orchids," where gold and orchids are somewhat threadbare symbols of the durability and "fragrance" (attractiveness) respectively of the sworn brotherhood relationship.⁸ Such a document includes the names, addresses, and birthdays of all participants, listed in order of age seniority, preceded by the text of the oath itself. A Russian observer, writing from Manchuria in 1910 and signing himself simply I.D., comments as follows about them:

The content of the oath was essentially always the same, but varied in expression depending on the extent of the author's knowledge of the flowery language of the classical books. (I.D. 1910: 186) He then adds a translation of a "typical" variant, presumably from Manchuria:

We, people of the same thoughts and aspirations, burn incense before Buddha, and wish to bind ourselves with the fragrance of golden orchids, in accordance with the example set before us in the Peach Garden. Though born at different times, we wish to die at the same time, year, month, and day. If there be riches, we shall spend them together. If there be misfortune, we shall suffer together. If happiness shine upon us, we shall enjoy it together. If our hearts be not one, but two, then let the spirits punish us. (1910: 186f)

The phrase *chin-lan*, by the way, while clearly designating sworn brotherhood, is sometimes loosely used. After World War II, Tainan area soldiers returning from the front founded a *Chin-lan Sheng Hui*, or "Gold and Orchids Victory Association," which met once a year for commemorative feasting.⁹ Although a metaphor of sworn brotherhood (itself a metaphor of brotherhood) was applied, there was not, so far as I have learned, any oath of sworn brotherhood in the sense that concerns us here.

A rather more prolix *Chin-lan p'u* document, sworn to in Amoy in 1888, came into the hands of Henri Borel, who has provided a full French translation, including some notes on the Chinese, but not the full Chinese text (Borel 1893). The oath was taken by four nineteen-and twenty-year-old men. In this text the candidates first invoke the precedents of Kuan Chung and Pao Shu-ya, men of the Eastern Chou dynasty famed for maintaining an intimate friendship despite enormous differences in wealth, and of Lei I and Ch'en Chung, two Han dynasty scholars whose devotion was said to have made them as inseparable as lacquer mixed with glue.¹⁰

.... We live in the same village and we follow the same occupation. We have been attached to each other since long ago, and furthermore ours is an acquaintance of not merely a day. But fearing that time may interrupt the continuation and that our friendship shall be loosened over time, we open our hearts and take a blood oath, respectfully informing the gods (as follows): Our relationship shall be eternal, like metal or rock, and we shall be no less intimate than the sounds of the ocarina and the bamboo flute.

Your father shall be my father, and we shall inquire after their sleep when we mount to their quarters. Your children shall be mine, and they shall follow me when I am walking and they shall embrace my knees in their turns.

We shall respectfully salute our mothers and our sisters-in-law on holidays, and shall respectfully congratulate them, following the traditional propriety [due to one's own family]. We shall entertain each other's elder and younger brothers and shall drink and have banquet. We shall not show ourselves disrespectful. Friends must follow their hearts, and it is better to exhort each other to follow the way and apply oneself entirely to it than to oppose one another.

When the circumstances of our lives are no longer the same, he who is honored shall not forget him of low condition. And even though there be between them such distance as lies between the clouds and the mud, they shall not because of this seek new friends. We shall share our likes and our dislikes. We shall not be envious of one another, but shall love each other always. In affliction and in sorrow we shall sympathize. Our surnames are different, but there shall be no difference among our hearts. We shall not wait until we have read the text of *T'ang Ti* [Book of Songs II.i.IV.1 in Legge's translation, Legge 1872: 250] to obey the law of brotherhood of carriages [i.e., of the rich] and of straw hats [i.e., of the poor]. Henceforth we shall scrupulously observe these words. Should one forget and transgress the law of brotherhood, Heaven and Earth shall condemn and chastise him and the gods and buddhas shall see him and judge him. (Borel 1893: 421-424)

At the end of this text are added the names of the five sworn brothers together with their dates and hours of birth and their *noms de fraternite*, taken at the same time and designed to include a common syllable.

With the exception of the adoption of this new set of names, there is little in this oath that is not part of the conception of sworn brotherhood we have already described for Taiwan. What is being ritualized is the same prior friendship and the same desire to extend this over time and add to its effectiveness and stability. We note the same injunctions against unfilial behavior once the relationship is established, and the same stress on the "adoption" of one sworn brother's family by another. Obligation to the children and parents of a sworn brother are mentioned. The reference to maintaining the relationship even when the participants come

to differ in wealth and social standing, stressed more by the Gallins' informants than by my own, is also found in Taiwan.

This does not mean that the Taiwan brotherhoods are traditional in every detail, but it does suggest that many of the objectives and understandings about sworn brotherhood which Taiwan informants express are traditional ones, and that there is ideological continuity between the institution in contemporary Taiwan and the institution as a feature of late imperial Chinese society.

Conclusion

We began this inquiry by asking why it was better to be a brother than a friend. In the course of our exploration of this topic, we have seen that the custom of sworn brotherhood uses the metaphor of kinship to create a social form of great flexibility, which can help to sustain intimate relationships over a long period or can create alliances that promote the well-being of participants' businesses, political goals, or family affairs. Brotherhood is an appropriate and useful metaphor—though it is only a metaphor—because 1) it allows associated families to treat selected outsiders as insiders, 2) it obviates commercial competition, and 3) it includes a provision for dispute settlement through the assertion of an ideology of agreeableness and through the imposition of hierarchy. A friendship strengthened into a sworn brotherhood is perhaps not brotherhood as such, but it is friendship indeed.

Sworn brotherhood, in other words, works. But that is only the beginning of what we need to know about it. Does it have any relationship to modernization? Are there different patterns across social classes? How does it affect political life? How closely do the relationships it engenders resemble adoptive (*i* or *kan*) relationships? How in fact do individuals choose which friends they want to convert to sworn brothers? Are such relationships commoner or less common than they were a generation or two ago? How much are they affected by fashion? The data are still lacking to answer these questions. Yet the distributional ones in particular are crucial if we are to understand the full implications of this flexible and long lived custom.

Appendix:

Two Community Contracts in the form of Sworn Brotherhoods

The following two contracts were collected by L. Ivanov in Manchuria at the turn of this century and published in Russian translation (Ivanov 1914). They are of interest here because they represent an extreme example of the instrumental use of sworn brotherhood, in this case to provide a simple legal system for the governance of a community. They are reproduced here partly in the hope that they may also interest students of Chinese law. In his introduction, Ivanov explains that:

The two documents given below, one from the Su-ch'ang valley, and the other from the Iman river valley, are in essence the same, differing only slightly in character. Thus in the first one, punishments for crimes are somewhat lighter, the death penalty is absent; whereas in the second one, burying the offender alive is one of the major punishments for a crime such as stealing more than five sable furs. The first document also acquaints us with the administrative structure (if this term may be used) of the sworn brothers. (Ivanov 1914: 7)

I have not located Su-ch'ang, the town where the first document was in force. Iman, mentioned in the second document, seems to be located near modern Guberoovo, on the Ussuri, south of Khabarovsk, USSR, on the border of Hokiang province. The Orochens mentioned in the same text are apparently a Tungus group. The most likely identification seems to be with the Orochon (Chinese: *E-lun-ch'un* or *Ch'i-le-erh*), an eastern Tungus group now living in small pockets in northern China, principally Mongolia and Heilungkiang, and presently estimated to number about 3,200.

Both documents (and other Russian translations in this paper) were translated from the Russian by the UCSD translation service, and slightly corrected by me. Ivanov occasionally adds explanatory notes in parentheses. Clarifications of my own are added in brackets []. Tones

and characters have not been added to Ivanov's transcriptions from the Chinese, since I am not sure which Chinese words are intended in every case.

* It needs to be noted that a common word throughout the Russian text in the second document is *khozyain*, which can refer indifferently to a master, boss, property owner, proprietor, host, or landlord, and by extension to a manager or master of a situation. I have employed the awkward translation "master" consistently for *khozyain*, but the exact relationship between the "masters" in question and the rest of the community is not entirely clear. This document is clearly part of a sworn brotherhood among these masters, however. Apparently it was enacted subsequent to the establishment of the sworn brotherhood itself as a supplement to the original *Chin-lan p'u*. Note that article 23 prohibits similar brotherhoods among their subordinates.

First Document

(Ivanov 1914: 7-11)

Pledge of Brotherhood

In the eighteenth year of the Kuang-hsu reign [1892], first moon, twenty-sixth day, we established a collective agreement (pledge of brotherhood).

Everyone knows that in China there are five family and social relations. The allies, binding themselves with an oath, hereby begin a friendship by which those who were not born together are willing to die together. Let us follow the example of the Three Sages in the Peach Garden, who established a union and drew the respect of even the wisest people in those ancient times.

Let the law of the T'ai Yuan dynasty live 1,000 years, and let us, its lesser brothers, also live 100 years. Let us not scatter, as they did during Sui-chou but boldly declare a union, as they did during Ku-ch'eng, and let our truth be as deep as four seas. Here at Su-ch'ang many of us allies

gather, having made this Su-ch'ang agreement, consisting of the following:

1. If anyone steals ginseng from another man who has discovered the place where it grows, and there is a witness to this crime, then the guilty one shall be punished by a stick beating without mercy.
2. During the time of the sprouting of rice and millet, it is forbidden to let cows, horses, and other livestock into the fields. If the owner of the fields catches even one animal in these fields, then the guilty one responsible for this shall pay four ounces of silver.
This law is valid until the Han-lu holiday [October 8]. After that it is legal to graze the cattle.
3. If anyone burns wastelands at an inappropriate time and in doing so burns farming tools and other things, or if anyone, during the burning of seaweed, burns boats, goods, or an earth-dwelling or the like, then the guilty one, according to the deed he has committed, shall pay a fine of 100 tiao and shall not receive any mercy. After the Ku-yu holiday [April 20], when posters have been hung, then it is legal to burn wastelands.
4. If anyone has taken a loan, and this fact should be recorded in a book, and he ignores the request of the lender for the return of the money or delays the repayment of the loan and in addition argues and shouts, then he shall be relieved of a horse or a cow, and also of a rifle, which is valued at 30 ounces, and of a short gun, in place of two ounces [of silver].
5. Anyone not obeying the laws, deceiving older brothers and cursing younger brothers, plotting and scheming, drinking vodka and brawling in a drunken state, after being punished with bamboo sticks, must be banned from Su-ch'ang as one not complying with the law.
6. Anyone who wishes to exchange grain shall abide by the following rules: One *garnets* [= 3.28 liters] of wheat and shu-tzu [?] [glutinous millet?] exchanges for eight handfuls of rice.
One *garnets* of bread grain, millet, corn, and peas exchanges for one-half *garnets* of rice.
One *garnets* of yellow beans exchanges for six handfuls of rice.
One *garnets* of barley exchanges for four handfuls of rice.
One *garnets* of buckwheat exchanges for three handfuls of rice.
7. If anyone plots to mislevel his scales or standard containers (in the presence of an official standard *garnets* of the size of sixty pounds and scales of sixteen ounces, leveled at both markets) or if improper scales, namely too large a *garnets* or too small a pound (too small

- a pound, too small a weight), or scales created by the merchant himself are found in a market or a home, then the guilty one is punished with a fine of 100 *tiao*.
8. If anyone in Su-ch'ang does not permit the opening of a gambling house (under threat of report) and if he, knowing (that the house is opening) desires to prevent the house from opening, then he is entitled to a bribe of one cow or 400 *tiao*; however, if he, after accepting the money, comes to play at the house, then he shall be punished with 40 lashes of the bamboo.
 9. If anyone in Su-ch'ang decides to disobey the law and steal, although it is forbidden to take food, vodka, flour, and other things, the guilty one must pay for the things and will receive 40 lashes of the bamboo.
 10. It is forbidden to go to the storehouses where flour, rice, and vodka are kept and take things without asking permission. If a man secretly takes things and there is a witness, then he shall be punished with 20 lashes. It is also forbidden to take *chumiza* [?], and if someone needs it he must first ask the manager. It is also forbidden to wander for no reason around the storehouses. If another man sees this and reports that this wandering was with the intention of stealing, and if in fact a theft does occur later, then the man seen wandering around the storehouses must pay for the things, he will receive 40 lashes, and his appeals for mercy will not be heeded.
 11. Anyone in Su-ch'ang who has a very important message to relate must warn his comrades, and all must come immediately and listen to him whether they are busy or not. If anyone refuses and does not come, then he shall be punished with a fine of 200 *tiao* and, in addition, 20 lashes. For this law it makes no difference whether it is an older brother who has refused to come with the excuse of having work to do or a younger brother. In any case, it is forbidden to request violation of the law. In this case the most important ones from the meeting (the oldest) are punished with a fine of 400 *tiao* but not with lashes. The second oldest comrades will be punished with both a fine and lashes, depending upon the wish and the number. The last category of brothers shall be punished with lashes only, 40 in number, but never by a fine.
 12. If any man in Su-ch'ang, renting an apartment, makes a disturbance, creates disorder, or changes things, then the master of the house must preside at the hearings of this deed. Since there are people in Su-ch'ang who do not work and who live in private apartments, then each month they must pay the owner of the house six *garnets* of flour,

and each New Year they must pay five ounces. They must also pay three ounces of silver for heating. Tillers of the soil, having worked hard for eleven months, arrange a large, general feast on the first of the month [=in the first month?] for the purpose of gathering together as friends. If any man is present who does not live in that house, then on New Year's he must pay five ounces to the owner of the house.

All of this should be strictly followed.

Below are numerous signatures, divided into categories, depending upon the ages of the participants:

Assignment of Positions

- 1 Chung-ta-yeh
- 1 Pang-lao-ta
- 1 Pang-pan-lao-ta
- 4 Hsieh-pang-lao-ta
- 1 foreman, the same man being an interpreter
- 2 Pang-pan-lao-ta
- 4 Tsun-chung-wen-kuan-lao-ta
- 1 Hsueh-shih-wen-kuan-lao-ta, the same man being in charge of the marine department
- 1 Hsueh-shih-wen-kuan-lao-ta
- 4 T'ieh-t'ou-lao-wu
- 4 P'ao-kou-lao-wu
- 2 Hsueh-shih-wen-kuan
- 1 Tung-hsi-hai-yen-tsun-kuan
- 2 Shan-kou-hsi-ch'a-kuan-shan-lao-ta
- 2 Tung-ch'a
- 1 T'ung-kung-kou-chung-shan-shang-tsung-wen-kuan
- 2 Ping-lang-pieh-kuan-shang-lao-ta
- 1 P'ao-kou-lao-wu
- 1 Hsiung-ch'a-shang-kou-lao-ta

Chung-ta-yeh, or the oldest brother, is in charge of all matters, having at the same time the legislative power. He is, so to say, a president in the small Su-ch'ang republic, the only difference being that he cannot be replaced. He has a large staff of all kinds of assistants and executors of his wishes. Orders given by Chung-ta-yeh go first to Pang-lao-ta and then to Pang-pan-lao-ta. These latter ones, being the executive power, bring the orders of the older brother into effect.

In charge of relations with the Russians, with the government, as well as with individual citizens, is the foreman (who, by the way, now holds the position of interpreter in the Vladivostok police department). This is a man well acquainted with the Russian language. His assistants are two Pang-pan-lao-ta. There are four Tsun-chung-wen-kuan-lao-ta for carrying out hearings. The chairman of the court is Chung-ta-yeh. Serving more or less as our police are two Hsueh-shih-wen-kuan-lao-ta. One of them is in charge of the marine department.

In charge of bringing the brothers to meeting and relaying information are four T'ieh-t'ou-lao-wu and four P'ao-kou-lao-wu. Both the former and the latter are recruited from young Chinese; the first ones serve as messengers and the second ones are announcers. Both are called "inviolable" because they cannot be punished with bamboo.

It is characteristic that a servant of Chung-ta-yeh is also inviolable.

Further down, there are two junior police ranks which are called Hsueh-shih-wen-kuan.

Working with them is the chief Tung-hsi-hai-yen-tsun-kuan, who relates directly to the Hsueh-shih-wen-kuan-lao-ta. On the western side of the Su-ch'ang valley there is a separate manager who, together with the eastern executive, Tung-ch'a, is under the T'ung-kung-kou-chung-shan-shang-tsung-wen-kuan.

In the Ping-lang-pieh region, there is a separate executive manager, P'ing-lang-pieh-kuan-shang-lao-ta. Working with him is P'ao-kou-lao-wu, whose function is transmitting messages from Chung-ta-yeh.

The entire list ends with one Hsiung-ch'a-shang-kou-lao-ta, or a spy.

Second Document

(Ivanov 1914: 11-16)

Brethren, we swore before Heaven to rule the valley of the Iman river from its mouth to its end, and all the adjacent territories, to rule the Chinese and Orochens as well as all newcomers and people wishing to live there. Let the law described below be the law for everyone; therefore any man who commits a crime or practices oppression and disobeys the law shall be punished in accordance with the law listed here without any mercy from justice.

In the entire valley of the Iman river and its surroundings the opening of gambling places (such as the bank game, card games, etc.) is permitted

only during one month, namely from the 15th of November to the 15th of December each year. Those violating the law by not playing within the prescribed term, and also those who open games whose names are not given in the list of pledged brothers, even if it is within the outlined term, are sentenced to a fine of 400 pounds of movable possessions, one fat pig, and 20 bamboo lashes. All players shall receive the same punishment, the dealer, scorekeeper, and the master who opened the secret gambling place.

Section 1: If anyone, at night, with a premeditated purpose, steals sable furs from the trap of another person at that person's home, in the mountains, or in any other place, then he shall be buried alive.

Section 2: If anyone steals ginseng from another he shall be drowned in the river without mercy or leniency.

Section 3: If anyone steals from another young deer antlers, no matter where, he shall be buried alive without mercy.

Articles

1. If anyone, no matter where, steals less than five sable furs, then he shall receive 40 lashes by a stick, and he shall be banned from the valley, and if more than five, then he shall be buried alive.
2. If anyone steals from another an unknown amount of ginseng, then he shall be punished by 40 lashes of the stick and banned from the valley, and if he steals a known amount, then he shall be buried alive.
3. If anyone steals from another food, money, or anything worth more than 100 rubles, then he shall be punished with 40 lashes of the stick and banned from the valley.
4. If anyone discovers that thieves are plotting to steal, and fails to report this, then he shall receive the same punishment as the thieves.
5. If anyone sells an animal fur secretly from the master, then he shall be punished with 40 lashes of the stick and banned from the valley.
6. If anyone finds something in the forest and sells it secretly from the master, then he shall be punished with 40 lashes of the stick and banned from the valley.
7. If someone from the Orochen hides young deer horns in the house or in the forest secretly from the master, then he shall be punished with 40 lashes of the stick, whereas the buyer shall be fined three times the price he paid for the antlers.
8. Every newcomer has the right to live in anyone's house for three days without paying. Beyond this term he must pay 40 kopecks a day for

food. If he arrives at New Year's then he must contribute 15 rubles to celebrate the New Year.

9. For any quarrel and abuse among each other, the guilty ones shall be sentenced to a fine of 2,000 pounds of movable possessions and shall be punished with 40 lashes of the stick.
10. Anyone who, during a fight, inflicts a light wound upon someone with a stick or a knife, shall be punished with 40 lashes of the stick and banned from the valley. Anyone who allows the guilty party into his house or who stands up for him shall receive the same punishment as the guilty one. If the wound happens to be heavy, and if the wounded person does not recover within 15 days, then the guilty party must pay all expenses and in addition shall be fined 400 pounds of movable possessions and be punished with 20 lashes of the stick.
11. If anyone provokes another to a quarrel, abuse, or a fight, he shall be punished with 40 lashes of the stick.
12. If there is a sick person staying in a house, and if the master does not report this to the proper authority, and if the ill person dies (his corpse will be witnessed by the judges), and if there are no signs of a violent death, then for the failure to report this in time the master shall be punished by 40 lashes of the stick and banned from the valley.
13. Prices for sable furs are the following: In the area of Miao-lin, 5 ounces; in Hsiang-sui-ho-tzu, 7 ounces; and in Liao-liu, 12 ounces.
14. The standard measure for portable substances is 70 pounds by the scales at Nartung. For the violation of this article, the guilty party is fined 200 pounds of movable possessions and is punished with 20 lashes of the stick.
15. No one, no matter if he is Chinese, Orochen, newcoming merchant, or traveller, may violate or neglect the law. For a violation of the law, the guilty party shall be punished with 40 lashes of the stick.
16. No one may secretly build a fishing place without notifying the authorities. The guilty party shall be punished with 20 lashes of the stick.
17. Every Orochen cargo, whether it is on a boat or a sleigh, must be weighed in advance, and once having sold it to a merchant (outsider), he must be paid for it in cash. For the violation of this law, the guilty Orochen shall be punished with 40 lashes of a switch.
18. Everyone is obligated to keep dogs at home, and if he does not have dogs, then he must borrow them from a neighbor, and in the case that the dog dies, the owner must not reproach or suspect him in the death of the dog. Those violating this law shall be punished with

40 lashes of the stick.

19. If an Orochen, without the master's knowledge, exchanges an animal fur for his own debt, he shall be punished with 40 hard lashes of the stick.
20. Workers and sharecroppers have no right to leave until fall, that is, before the completion of the agreement and the complete yielding of the crop. Otherwise they shall be deprived of their salaries as well as the borrowed land. If any of them, upon completion of the contract, wishes to stay on for another year, then he must contribute 30 rubles toward the celebration of the New Year.
21. If someone rents a house and leaves before expiration of the term, then he is subject to the same laws as the others. The term must be specified in the contract.
22. Chinese and Orochens who wish to sue each other must declare this to a judge, and upon completion of the trial the losing side must compensate the other for losses suffered while absent from home.
23. If workers or tenants wish to pledge brotherhood to each other, and the master fails to report to the proper authority, and the workers or tenants still manage to pledge, then the master shall be fined 400 pounds of movable possessions and be punished with 20 lashes of the stick.
24. Chinese may demand payment of debts from Orochens only at a specified time, and men are allowed to walk about armed only from the first of the year to the 16th of March.
25. When hiring a worker, the master must demand a reference, and if the worker, after being hired, commits a crime, then the person who gave the reference shall also be punished depending upon the seriousness of the crime.
26. If an Orochen lives in the house of his master [or boss or landlord], then all things killed by him in hunting and all fish caught by him are divided in half; he is also allowed to keep opium and all smoking appliances in the house, although the amount of opium must not exceed two lots. But if the Orochen lives separately from the master, then everything earned by him, and also killed and caught by him in hunting, shall be taken away from him and given to the master in payment of his debt according to the account books. For the violation of this law, the guilty party is fined 400 pounds of movable possessions and punished with 40 lashes of the stick.
27. In December of each year all workers and all craftsmen must return home from work; if a person happens to be ill and the master does

not send for him, then the master shall be fined 200 pounds of movable possessions and punished with 20 lashes of the stick.

28. Common merchants are not permitted to carry sulya [?] for sale to Orochens in the mountains and force intoxication on them with it. It is also forbidden to carry more than 10 pounds of sulya. The guilty party shall be fined 200 pounds of movable possessions and punished with 20 lashes of the stick.
 29. A merchant who comes to the valley to buy furs and goods must pay the price established by local authorities for each day he stays on the premises, namely: In Liao-ling, 50 kopecks; in Ch'eng-tsu and Hartung, 60 kopecks; in T'ai-tieh-pieh, Hsi-pieh, and Hsiang-sung-ho-tzu, 70 kopecks; in K'ung-ku-e-tzu, 80 kopecks; in Hsi-ta-tung, one ruble; in Sha-ho-tzu, one ruble 20 kopecks; and in Hang-lu-pieh and San-chih-tzu, one ruble 20 kopecks. If the merchant stays more than two versts from the listed places, then no payment is required. [1 verst = slightly over 1 km.]
 30. No one has the right to sell goods in cities or to exchange them for sable furs. The guilty party shall be fined 200 pounds of movable possessions and one fat pig, and also shall be punished with 20 lashes of the stick.
 31. All people from Piah-li to Tiah-hsing are permitted to ask for the payment of debts from the Orochens in the mountains. But it is permitted to ask only for old debts, not to give new loans. A person who makes loans somewhere else has no right to ask for repayment. In addition, it is permitted to ask for repayment along the shores of the entire Iman river. Anyone who makes a new loan and then forces repayment of the new debt shall be fined 20 pounds of movable possessions and one fat pig and shall be punished with 20 lashes of the stick.
 32. When asking for repayment of a debt from an Orochen, no man may threaten him with weapons, beat him, or remove his clothes. The guilty party shall be fined and punished as in the previous article.
- Third Year of the Kuang-hsu Reign [1877], Third Moon, Fourth Day.

On Conflicting Interpretations of Chinese Family Rituals

Li Yih-yuan

Introduction

The past two or three decades have witnessed a flurry of intense field research into the Chinese family, lineage, and associated ritual activities. This increase in fieldwork has both broadened and deepened our knowledge of a host of related issues. Although many questions have been answered, the answers have in turn raised new questions.

For example, some noteworthy disputes have arisen over the interpretation of ancestor worship: first, do Chinese believe that ancestors always protect their descendants or might ancestors also sometimes harm their descendants (Hsu 1963: 45-6 and 1979: 527; Freedman 1966: 143-54 and 1979a: 301-5; Wolf 1974: 167-8; Ahern 1973: 199-203)? Second, is ancestor worship dependent upon property inheritance (Ahern 1973: 212ff; Harrell 1976: 379-81; Chen Hsiang-shui 1973: 144-58)? And third, is it possible that grave-side geomantic rituals are directed toward the manipulation of ancestors' bones (Freedman 1979a: 298-300; Li 1976: 239-338)?

These controversies relate not just to religious ritual. They are also closely bound up with the family and lineage (including kinship ideology and kinship behavior). Further inquiry into these controversies should, then, also help us to better understand the Chinese family and lineage. In this essay I will evaluate these disputes and propose a reinterpretation of ancestor worship that I hope will offer the conceptual means for transcending these controversies.

Differences Between Ancestor Worship in Africa and China

Meyer Fortes offers a most creative interpretation of the essential features of ancestor worship in his essay "Some Reflections on Ancestor Worship in Africa" (1965). In a nutshell, Fortes' argument is that ancestor worship in Africa expresses only one component of kin relations between successive generations. This being the case, ancestor worship is unable to give full expression to ties between parents and their children, expressing only "jural authority" and the "politico-jural domain." Kinship relations between successive generations can also include as components such things as child-rearing, sentiment and protection as well as descent and rights and duties over property. It has been difficult in practice, however, to distinguish sentiment from jural authority in patrilineal societies, since the two usually overlap.

Fortes found a clear distinction being made between descent and sentiment among the matrilineal Ashanti. An Ashanti son becomes a member of his mother's brother's lineage. Any property which he may inherit comes from this same uncle. A son's ancestor worship activities are directed at his mother's brother and other matrilineal ancestors insofar as in death an Ashanti father is not worshiped by his son, even though in life they have close affective ties. It is for this reason that Fortes is led to conclude that,

Ancestor worship is a representation or extension of the authority component in the jural relations of successive generations; it is not a duplication, in a supernatural idiom, of the total complex of affective, educative, and supportive relationships manifested in child-rearing, or in marriage, or in any other forms of association, however, long-lasting and intimate, between kinsmen, neighbours, or friends. It is not the whole man, but only his jural status as the parent (or parental personage, in matrilineal systems) vested with authority and responsibility, that is transmuted into ancestorhood. (1965: 133)

Fortes has clearly shown by his study of the Ashanti that domestic and lineage ancestor worship is concerned with but one component of kinship relations. This distinction helps us uncover and grasp the complex nature of Chinese domestic ancestor worship. But perhaps ancestor worship in Africa is more straightforward than Chinese ancestor worship insofar as Chinese ancestor worship is made more complicated by the fact that it also expresses the contingencies that surface in distinct kinds of everyday life.

Following, then, the spirit, if not the letter, of Fortes' analysis of

ancestor worship among the Ashanti and other African societies by examining the contrast between kinship components as manifest in different rituals, I would like to suggest three different components of kin relations between successive generations that are expressed in various aspects of Chinese ancestor worship:

1. Sentiment component: including caring/offering, affection/dependence, and protection/respect.
2. Descent component: including jural authority between kin of successive generations and their respective rights and duties in the inheritance of property.
3. Authority component: including politico-jural authority in fission, fusion, competition and opposition within and between kin groups and their members.

I think these three different components of kin relations are not only revealed in domestic rituals, but also manifest themselves in differing mixtures across the wide range of contrasting social contexts in China. That is, whereas Fortes makes his comparisons between different African societies, I am making comparisons between different variants of a single society. Having said this, I shall demonstrate my point by turning to a review of three major controversies which relate directly to different rituals in different dimensions of domestic ancestor worship.

Are Chinese Ancestors Benign?

The first dispute is about the Chinese concept of what an ancestor is; that is, do ancestors always protect and help their descendants? Or might they also punish their descendants? Anthropologists have given three sorts of answer: the first has it that Chinese ancestors are kind and compassionate and never harm their descendants; another expresses the opposite view that ancestors not only harm their descendants, but do so capriciously; and the third takes the middle ground by suggesting that ancestors are generally benevolent, but may punish or harm their descendants under certain circumstances.

The leading advocate of the first position is Francis L.K. Hsu. In two of his books, *Under the Ancestors' Shadow* (1971: 241-2) and *Clan, Caste, and Club* (1963: 45-6) as well as in his more recent essay "The Cultural Problem of the Cultural Anthropologist" (1979: 527), Hsu clearly argues that Chinese think their ancestors are always and only benevolent and protective toward their descendants, and that ancestors would never do anything which might bring harm down upon their living descendants.

In Under the Ancestors' Shadow, for instance, Hsu points out that people prayed to various gods in different cults, not their ancestors, when an epidemic struck West Town in Yunnan province during the course of his fieldwork there. Hsu claims that this is because ancestors are not considered to be the source of troubles which afflict humans (1971: 241-2). Citing data from Hankou in *Clan, Caste, and Club* (1963: 45-6), Hsu also argues that ghosts may harm others but they would never harm their own descendants. On the contrary, the spirits of the deceased sometimes even try to intercede with the gods on behalf of their descendants.

Maurice Freedman and Arthur Wolf take a less unequivocal position. Freedman summarizes his earlier writings on Chinese ancestors (1958: 88-9, and 1966: 151, citing Wolf 1964) when he compares Chinese and African ancestor worship in his essay "Ancestor Worship: Two Facets of the Chinese Case." After observing that in reading the general ethnography "one may be struck not simply by the harshness of the behavior of ancestors but, more important, by its capriciousness," Freedman goes on to say of Chinese ancestors that,

While they will certainly punish their descendants if they suffer neglect or are offended by an act of omission which affects them directly (chiefly, the failure to secure for them a firm line of descent), they are essentially benign and considerate of their issue. Before taking action against their descendants they need to be provoked; capricious behavior is certainly alien to their benevolent and protective nature. (1979: 302-3)

Wolf shares Freedman's view of Chinese ancestors (which is not surprising, since Freedman based his statements on Wolf's dissertation [1964]) insofar as he believes that even if capable of punishing their descendants when provoked, Chinese ancestors are nevertheless not endowed with the capacity to inflict serious catastrophes or call down epidemics upon their own descendants. In his essay "Gods, Ghosts, and Ancestors" Wolf (1974) provides evidence in addition to that which Freedman cites from his dissertation.

Additional data on the question of whether ancestors are benign or not is also available in literature on shamanistic curing practices. Many anthropologists who have done fieldwork in Taiwan have come across these shamanistic curing practices, and most of these anthropologists have often noted in discussing these divination sessions that illness is often attributed to the work of angry ancestors. The results of my own researches into shamanism in Ch'uan-chou ts'uo in Chang-hua county's

Shen-kang township and in She-liao in Nan-t'ou county's Chu-shan township show that nearly half of the illnesses recorded in such divination sessions were attributed to the intervention of angry ancestors (Li 1976: 331-2). The ethnographic literature clearly shows that ancestors in rural Taiwan have the capacity to harm their descendants.

The ethnographic data which Emily Ahern gathered in Ch'i-nan village in Taipei county's San-hsia township provide an extreme example in this regard. She found that, "With respect to the characteristic of capriciousness, ancestors in Ch'ian rank rather high" (1973: 200). Ahern agrees that the people of Ch'i-nan believe most cases of punishment inflicted by ancestors to be attributable to ancestors having been provoked. Nevertheless, Ahern also found examples of ancestors "causing misfortune even in the absence of neglect on the part of their descendants" and even recounts that she "encountered cases in which ancestors were said to have brought about serious debility or even death" (1973: 200-1).

The three typifications of Chinese ancestor temperament provided first in Hsu, then in Freedman, Wolf and my own work, and finally in Ahern seem to contradict one another. Examined from a slightly different angle, however, not only is the data explicable, but it is the contradictions themselves which reveal the adaptability of Chinese domestic rites. The data which Francis L.K. Hsu recounts clearly shows Chinese ancestors to be benevolent. In my view this manifests the most basic component in Chinese ancestor worship—the sentiment component. That is to say, the sentiment component expressed in Chinese ancestor worship is based on the image of the benevolent ancestor. This ritual expression makes it possible to further affirm that the *lun-li* spirit as stressed in Confucian thought is the point at which Chinese society differs from the descriptions of African peoples by British anthropologists. This is clear in Fortes' statement that,

What must be particularly stressed is that ancestors behave in exactly the same ways, in the ways expected of them and permitted to them in the ancestral cult, quite irrespective of what their lifetime characters might have been. All ancestor spirits exact ritual service, and propitiation in accordance with the same rules of unpredictable and more commonly persecutory rather than beneficent intervention in their descendants' lives. From this it is evident that a lore or doctrine of an after-life in which rewards and punishments are meted out to the dead according to their moral deserts in life, concerns a different sector of religious thought and behaviour than does ancestor worship, as we find it among peoples like the Tallensi. And again the reciprocal conditions apply. The troubles and

misfortunes attributed to the mystical intervention of ancestors are the same for descendants who are upright and scrupulous in their moral conduct and social relations as for descendants who are wicked and lax. (1965: 134-5)

My point, then, is that Fortes' generalization does not apply to Chinese ancestor worship; the sentiment component in Chinese kinship relations—caring/offering, affection/dependence, protection/respect—commonly finds its full expression in Chinese ancestor worship with the result that Chinese ancestors are pictured as being as benevolent toward their descendants in death as parents and grandparents are seen to be toward their descendants in life.

The kind of affection between ancestors and their descendants noted in Taiwan by Freedman, Wolf and myself is conditional. Ancestors will be "unstinting" in upholding their end of domestic relations and in keeping up their protection of descendants so long as the descendants neither neglect their responsibilities nor offend their ancestors. Alternatively, however, ancestors may also punish descendants until the descendants repent of and make amends for such misdeeds as failing to fulfill their obligations to punctually perform worship or in other ways daring to offend or anger their ancestors. We see the manifestation of the descent component—which includes in particular the jural authority between kin of successive generations and their respective rights and duties in the inheritance of property—when ancestral affection is conditional.

The sentiment component and descent component overlap in Chinese ancestor worship. The view from the inside is that these two components are complementary. There is usually little room for change in the rights and duties of different roles. Accordingly, the punishment of descendants by ancestors for neglect of ancestor worship duties is played down. Although the descent component is latent, this does not mean that it is absent, however. Descent is the most prominent kin component in ancestor worship in Africa. Under certain special circumstances such as, for example, during periods of frontier expansion and immigration, opportunities for altering the rights and duties of different roles may increase and descent may come to be expressed more strongly. Han Chinese society in Taiwan was for a long time a frontier society, the family descent line was frequently continued under diverse conditions, and so the descent component became stressed. This stress on descent in turn came to be expressed in ancestor worship in Taiwan with the appearance of a form of capricious ancestor.

Ahern's data from Ch'i-nan village is an extreme example of this course

of development. Ch'i-nan ancestors are thought to be extremely inflexible in their handling of relations with the living and almost tyrannical when passing judgment on them. This is not simply a matter of ancestral sentiment; it extends to property relationships and matters concerning ancestor tablets. The people of Ch'i-nan seem to consistently stress descent at the expense of sentiment in their relations between ancestors and their descendants.

Ch'i-nan ancestors do not stop here. Ahern describes two rather special cases in one of the four lineages in Ch'i-nan where descendants "invoked" the ancestors to "punish" people. In these two cases the ancestors were treated almost as though they belonged to that "semi-illegitimate" category of gods like *Iu Ieng Kong* (or *Yu Ying Kung* in Mandarin), who are worshiped largely by beggars, thieves and prostitutes (cf. Wolf 1974: 178; Harrell 1974), and who are thought to be obligated to meet the demands of his worshippers. Ahern reports,

One case, confided to me by the Li *tang-ki*, involved the wife of a man in the Li lineage. When, after her husband died, she began to sleep with his elder brother, the rest of the family became very upset by her unseemly behavior. Shortly thereafter, she lost her senses and tried to commit suicide by jumping into the river. At this point, the *tang-ki* was called in to determine the cause of her insanity. He discovered that some member of the family had burned a charm in the Li ancestral incense pot, asking the ancestors to punish the woman. After the *tang-ki* burned another charm in the pot, one designed to "talk peace" with the ancestors, the woman recovered.

In the second case, my informant, Ong A-cui, admitted that he himself had attempted to invoke the aid of the ancestors in his running battle with Ong A-iong. He told me that he had burned incense before the tablets, had explained to the ancestors that A-iong's house protruding in front of the hall had a bad influence on the hall, the ancestors, and the lineage members, and then had implored them to return and cause trouble for A-iong, making his household full of discord and sickness. According to A-cui, other Ongs had attempted the same sort of invocation. Although nothing striking had happened to A-iong, A-cui assured me that he was not in good health and that things could get worse. (1973: 201-2)

These two cases show how far the emphasis on descent can go in Taiwan. In this respect ancestors in Taiwan are often thought to be transgressing standard expectations for correct behavior. It is thus not surprising to hear that the general subject of invoking ancestors counts as a "touchy subject" even in Ch'i-nan (*ibid*). Reference to the three above mentioned components in kin relations show in the two cases from

Ch'i-nan that the residents are actually invoking in their ritual behavior the third component; that is, the authority component, including specifically the politico-jural authority in fission, fusion, competition and opposition within and between kin groups and their members. Both victimizer and victimized in the two cases Ahern provides belong to the same lineage, and I interpret their respective interactions with punitive ancestors as being expressive of intra-lineage politico-jural relations. Considered in light of the facts, Ch'i-nan ritual behavior falls within the conceptual range of Chinese ancestor worship.

Need Descendants Only Erect Tablets for Deceased Who Leave Property?

The second dispute concerns the relationship between ancestor tablet worship and eligibility for inheritance. To Chinese, rituals of ancestor worship are interwoven with and inseparable from family life. As Francis L.K. Hsu has said about "spirits of members of the same kinship group and of the group of relatives by marriage":

They are always well disposed and never malicious toward the members of the families to which they are related. In fact, the question does not arise at all. Their good will is so taken for granted that any inquiry on that point appeared to my West Town informants as pointless and ridiculous. (1971: 244-5)

Hence, ancestor worship is neither determined by nor reducible to the inheritance of property; in other words, ancestor worship is a ritual which binds people emotionally with their lineal ancestors. Ahern, however, once again takes a different stand. Her Ch'i-nan data (1973: 139-48) shows a close relationship between establishment of an ancestor's tablet and inheritance. Data obtained elsewhere in Taiwan supports Ahern's interpretation (Ch'en Hsiang-shui 1973: 141-60; 1978: 32-29).

Other data on Chinese ancestor worship in Taiwan, however, contrasts sharply with the respective findings of Ahern and Ch'en Hsiang-shui. For example, in "Ploughshare," a village in Sanhsia township close to Ch'i-nan, and the major site of Stevan Harrell's field research in the 1970s, the setting up of ancestor tablets is unrelated to inheritance. Because Ploughshare is a very poor village, the majority of inhabitants have no estate and consequently there is no inheritance problem as such. I do not however agree with Harrell's interpretation of the significance of his findings because I do not think that what Harrell describes is the

prototypical form of Chinese ancestor worship. Harrell believes that the reason why ancestor worship in Ploughshare is not tied to inheritance is that there is a lack of heritable land. I feel that this conclusion is drawn in reaction to Ahern's work and quite unnecessary.

The ritual for worshipping the ancestors' tablets which Harrell encountered in Ploughshare is unrelated to matters of inheritance and far removed from what one usually finds in Chinese ancestor worship. Typically, ancestor worship in Ploughshare is founded more purely upon the sentiment component in kinship relationships and the Chinese notion that "careful attention must be paid to all aspects of funeral rites and subsequent ancestor worship activities." This is what Freedman earlier termed "memorialism" (1958: 84), but later called "the cult of immediate jural superiors" (1966: 144ff). This depiction of ancestors found by Harrell in Ploughshare has the same significance as Francis L.K. Hsu's description of "thoughtfully benevolent" ancestors. Both succeed in fully expressing the first of the three components in kinship relations in ancestor worship, the sentiment component. Only under certain unique conditions such as can be found in Ch'i-nan, when the domestic kin relationship is by itself inadequate, will the other two components in kinship relations emerge to act in a supplementary capacity in ancestor worship.

The ancestor worship which Ahern describes in Ch'i-nan is novel and far from straightforward. First, Ahern divides Ch'i-nan ancestor worship into several parts, the more important of which are: 1) establishment of the ancestor tablet, and 2) burning incense for and offering sacrifices to the ancestor. These two parts are separable insofar as one need not have an ancestor tablet in order to make offerings to that ancestor. Each of these two main components has its own significance; one is not in any sense determined by the other (Ahern 1973: 147-9).

Ahern's contention that establishment of ancestor tablets and questions of property inheritance are intimately tied to one another—or more specifically, that upon inheriting the estate a descendent then becomes obligated to erect a tablet in the deceased's name—has created the most controversy. Of 75 cases investigated by Ahern in Ch'i-nan, 11 involve ancestors who have no tablets. All of these 11 are cases in which ancestors died without bequeathing any estate to their descendants. Of the 64 ancestors who have tablets, 51 had bequeathed estates to their descendants, while only 13 failed to do so. Ahern concludes on the basis of this evidence that property inheritance and the erection of an ancestor tablet

are closely linked (1973: 145).

The examples which Ahern provides for this linkage are quite complicated because of the special marriage and adoption arrangements with which they are associated. The most extreme example in this regard is that of a Ch'i-nan man surnamed Li who became acquainted with an unmarried officer while serving in the army. When the officer was about to die he agreed to leave his property to this man (without specifically indicating that the property was real estate). According to their agreement the man was obliged to bury the officer's body, establish a tablet in his name and make offerings to him, just as though he were the man's real ancestor (Ahern 1973: 139). Such a relationship is almost without precedent in the ethnography of China, and I imagine it is something which other Chinese in other villages would find difficult to accept.

Although not necessarily related to the inheritance of land *per se*, ancestor worship is also linked with certain duties. Ahern (1973: 149) has identified the following principles which may be applied in determining ancestor worship duties for the people of Ch'i-nan:

1. If X inherits property from Y, he must worship Y.
2. If X is a direct descendant of Y, he may or may not worship Y. a. If X is Y's only descendant, he must worship Y. b. If X is the most obligated descendant, he must worship Y.

The first item in Ahern's analysis which might be questioned is her claim that, "The dead who are not given tablets because they fail to pass on paddy land to the living may still receive offerings in the afterlife, when they are dependent on the living for sustenance" (*ibid*). In other words, can ancestor worship be considered independent of the ancestor tablet; are the two separable?

There are two different ways of approaching this question. First, "modern" ancestor tablets in Taiwan differ from "traditional" Chinese ancestor tablets in that for the latter a separate tablet was erected for each deceased couple, such as one's parents, patrilineal grandparents, and so forth. Two new tablet forms have been introduced into Taiwan through Japanese colonial era influence: the sanctuary tablet and the composite ancestor tablet. Both of these introduced forms are related in turn to collective ancestor tablets (Ch'en Chung-min 1967: 173). Here, single aggregate tablets may represent a group of ancestors collectively in place of many traditional separate ancestor tablets that represent ancestors individually. Tablets introduced through Japanese influence

make possible the offering of incense and the making of sacrifices to individual ancestors who then need not have their own separate tablets. Worship cannot be separated from the tablet when a more traditional personalized ancestor tablet is used.

Furthermore, Ahern's description of Ch'i-nan ancestor tablet rituals is apparently confined to the tablets which have been placed in lineage temples or corporate halls; few tablets are kept at home. Obviously, worship before tablets in a lineage hall is quite different from worship before tablets at home. Freedman referred to the latter as "domestic worship" and the former as "hall worship" (Freedman 1958: 81-5), but Wolf suggested, partly in response to Ahern's data from Ch'i-nan, an alternate tripartite distinction of "domestic rites," "communal rites," and "corporate rites" (Wolf 1976: 345). Ahern's analysis of ancestor tablets is based upon data collected from lineage halls, while her analysis of ancestor worship ritual is based mostly upon rituals performed at domestic altars. It is in this manner that the two appear to be separate and separable.

Ch'i-nan differs dramatically from what is generally understood to be true elsewhere in China, both in the erection of ancestor tablets and in the conduct of ancestor worship. The people of Ch'i-nan seem to lack the traditional Chinese belief expressed in the idiom "careful attention should be paid to all aspects of funeral rites and subsequent ancestor worship activities." Ch'i-nan residents seem devoid of feeling when it comes to their ancestors; they quibble over trivial matters and appear consumed by a desire for private advantage. This problem is no longer merely a disputed bit of ethnographic data; the dimensions of the problem are such that it has wrought much confusion among those attempting to get a conceptual handle on ancestor worship in China.

Debate and confusion notwithstanding, I still feel that the solution to this controversy can be found in the conceptual scheme I am proposing. Under normal circumstances, ancestor worship should express the commemoration of ancestors. This is where the sentiment component is stressed. This component not only projects the sentiments of daily life, but normatively speaking should express and affirm Confucian ethical thought as well. The traditional focus of ancestor worship common in mainland China and evident in Stevan Harrell's description of Ploughshare follows this pattern. Although the phenomenon which Ahern has described may come as something of a shock to traditionalistic Chinese, I contend that it does not contradict the traditional view of ancestor worship—in other words, the two are not in conflict. Rather, I view the

Ch'i-nan situation as a demonstration of the inherent flexibility of Chinese kin relations. A greater emphasis has been placed in Ch'i-nan upon descent in an attempt to adapt to novel conditions. Ch'i-nan ancestor worship fully reflects this special emphasis on descent.

This greater emphasis upon descent in Ch'i-nan is closely related to the high incidence of certain special forms of marriage among Ch'i-nan residents. Uxorilocal marriage, remarriage, adoption and agnatic adoption all testify to the flexibility intrinsic to the mix of the components that make up Chinese kinship—a flexibility which allows for the continuation of a family's descent line in the face of exceptional circumstances. These variations on the traditional ideal allow, for instance, for greater adaptability, especially in immigrant society or in societies representative of the "little tradition."

Ch'en Hsiang-shui's research on ancestral tablet worship in Huang Ts'uo in Changhua county's P'u-hsing township can be cited in support of my interpretation (1973 and 1978). Huang Ts'uo ancestor worship can be divided into two distinct types of ritual behavior: the first is that of landlord families and the second is that of gentry families and that of tenant farmer families. Landlord and gentry families put more stress on ancestor worship in lineage halls. Tenant farmers simply worship in domestic halls. Many examples of tablets being erected or ancestor worship performed in association with the inheritance of property occurred in tenant families. This is also why there are so many domestic halls with ancestor tablets that have several surnames represented.

Ch'en Hsiang-shui concludes (1978: 36-7):

This essay divides ancestor worship into two kinds. Generally speaking, most gentry or wealthy families observe orthodox ancestor tablet worship. . . . Presence of ancestor tablets with different surnames is often associated with uxorilocal marriage or gifts of property. That is, aside from ancestor tablets being brought in by a daughter-in-law from her natal family faced with the termination of their descent line, worship of different ancestor tablets can be brought about by ancestor tablets being brought in "on the back" of a uxorilocally marrying male. . . . A reciprocal relationship can be said to be formed out of gifts of property and ancestor worship. (1978: 36-7)

An atypical stress on jural authority in descent is thus likely to occur in association with tenancy, and especially in communities that belong to the "little tradition." This should not be interpreted as an innovation, however. It is rather a matter of emphasizing an otherwise submerged

component in kin relations. As we have seen in the previous section, the people of Ch'i-nan put great stress on the descent component when deciding whether a descendent is being punished by an ancestor, or whether to call upon an ancestor to punish a descendant. Either this shared emphasis on descent in Ch'i-nan is a response to common local conditions, or the relationship between ancestor worship and property inheritance is inexplicable.

Do Descendants Exploit the Deceased with Geomancy of the Grave?

The controversy dates back at least to Maurice Freedman's discussion of the problem of geomancy in his book *Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwangtung* (1966) and his essays "Ancestor Worship: Two Facets of the Chinese Case" (1979a) and "Geomancy" (1979b). In the first essay, Freedman puts forth his thesis that Chinese ancestor worship and geomancy must be considered as part of a conceptual whole. He says also that, "As a set of bones, an ancestor is no longer in command of his descendants; he is at their disposal. They no longer worship him; he serves their purposes" (1979a: 297). Freedman then goes on to say that:

By Geomancy, then, men use their ancestors as media for the attainment of wordly desires. And in doing so they have ceased to worship them and begun to use them as things. The authority implied in descent is ritualized in the worship of ancestors. In geomancy the tables are turned: descendants strive to force their ancestors to convey good fortune, making puppets of forebears and dominating the dominators. In ancestor worship, the ancestors are revered; in *feng-shui* they are subordinated. (1979a: 299)

Do Chinese regard ancestors as puppets subject to geomantic manipulation? Do Chinese instead not respect their ancestors and treat them as subordinates? One does not have to be motivated solely by a desire to "uphold public morals" to feel that Freedman's position is excessively influenced by western academic functionalist-utilitarian thinking.

Freedman's position is worth discussing from the perspective of the practitioner. From that perspective, ancestors and their descendants are of but one corpus. The concerns of the one are inseparable from the concerns of the other. In geomancy, the living and the dead both cooperate as kin for the benefit of the whole family. The search for a geomantically appropriate grave-site is not only for the benefit of descendants; the ancestors themselves wish to be buried in a place with good

geomancy. For, if the site is good, and descendants do indeed prosper, then the ancestors will also benefit. In late traditional China at least, deceased members attained posthumously a rank or degree comparable to that of any of their descendants who had succeeded in attaining a high official rank or academic degree.

Such an evaluation is not simply a subjective one. Even when an objective, conceptual stance is adopted toward the problem of geomancy, Freedman's position still seems superficial and mechanical. I argued in my 1976 essay "Chinese Geomancy and Ancestor Worship: A Further Discussion" that geomancy is not restricted to the practical problem of insuring the equal benefit by descendants of their ancestors' geomantic sites. The Chinese practice of geomancy in the siting of graves reveals, in addition to reciprocity between family members, a sentiment component such that children feel they can continue to make demands upon their parents. Data collected in She-liao in Chu-shan township and Sung-po-k'eng, both of which are in Nan-t'ou county, were presented in my article on geomancy in support of this thesis (Li 1976: 326-37). In brief, I presented data showing that 202 cases of shamanistic diagnoses were recorded in the course of research in She-liao. Of these 202 cases, 96 were attributed to the actions of deceased relatives, and 35 of these latter 96 cases were attributed to dead relatives who were upset for reasons that related to geomancy. Making the descendants ill is viewed as a way to prompt descendants to improve the grave's geomancy. Among the 52 cases collected from Sung-po-k'eng, 15 are similarly related to geomantic concerns.

Thus, we have a total of 50 geomancy-related cases from She-liao and Sung-po-k'eng. In each of these 50 cases, descendants' troubles are attributed to either parents or grandparents who are unhappy with the geomancy of their graves. This is a means for ancestors to prod their descendants to make improvements on their graves. In each of our cases this is a matter between successive generations; that is, there are no instances of this sort of behavior where the living and dead are collateral relatives. Diagnosis of ancestor dissatisfaction over a grave's geomancy invariably attributes it to senior lineal ancestors, usually a parent, or failing that a grandparent.

Geomancy is related to people as family members by giving expression to the sentiment component in kin relations. If not seen through the perspective of the kinship system itself, the sentiments of affection and dependence, and even the tendency to make demands upon deceased parents, could easily be misunderstood and interpreted as the puppet-like

manipulation of ancestors, such as Freedman does in his portrayal of geomancy.

The authority component is also expressed in geomancy. Members of separate families who were once part of a single family may quarrel over the geomantic siting of their parents' graves. Grave sitings might not always benefit all brothers equally. Competition between brothers over geomancy can resemble competition in seeking their parent's approval and affection. Freedman gives a summary of his thinking in this aspect of geomancy in his essay "Geomancy" (1979: 317-8):

Writing on *feng-shui* in the last few years, I have confined myself for the most part to discussing the connections between the geomancy of tombs and ancestor worship, arguing (to compress a series of points) that they together form a system in which forebears are on the one hand looked up to and worshiped and on the other looked down on and manipulated. In ancestor worship Chinese express solidarity with their agnates; in the *feng-shui* of graves they give reign to their impulses to assert their independence of, and competition with, the same agnates (cf. Freedman 1966: 118-43; 1979a: 298f).

I agree with what Freedman says here about geomancy, but feel that he is not entirely correct in his interpretation of tablet worship. In one sense, tablet worship within a domestic hall does tend to be corporate and worship at an ancestral hall certainly is an expression of solidarity. However, opposition, segmentation, and a tendency toward fission may likewise be expressed in such worship, though perhaps only obliquely. We will take up this matter in the final section.

What is the Distinction Between Clans and Lineages in Unilineal Descent Groups?

I see a tie between the three kinship components and another famous dispute over Chinese kinship in Chinese society: the debate between Freedman and Fried over how to distinguish between lineage and clan. I believe that this dispute can be cleared up by tying together what I have already said about Chinese kinship and ancestor worship with the more recent contributions of Chuang Ying-chang and Ch'en Ch'i-nan on the study of Chinese descent groups.

Freedman was the first to put forward an opinion on how the lineage and the clan might be distinguished. In his book *Chinese Lineage and Society*, Freedman (1966: 21-2) argues that the key distinction lies in whether or not the descent group holds any corporate property. In other

words, the difference between clan and lineage is not determined by the specific character of the kin relationships. Descent groups which hold common property are lineages. Those which do not are clans. Freedman's advocacy of this position derives from his views on the processes in unilineal descent group fission in southeastern China. He thought that a unilineal descent group must come equipped with two conditions, one economic and the other ritual: 1) it should possess both an ancestral shrine and an estate or some other form of property from which it can earn the capital necessary for maintaining the shrine and, 2) it should participate in some common ancestor worship activity. If the unilineal descent group does not own corporate property, then it will not manifest internal segmentation (Freedman 1958: 46-9). Many anthropologists who have conducted research in Hong Kong and in Taiwan have cited Freedman's theory in support of their own research findings. For example, Jack Potter, who conducted his field research in Ping Shan, Hong Kong (1968: 23-7, 1970: 121-9), and Hugh Baker, who did his fieldwork in Sheung-shui (1968: 99-117), agree with Freedman. With regard to Taiwan, Myron Cohen (1969: 171-8) and Burton Pasternak (1972: 87-8) have gathered data which support Freedman's claim that the presence of corporate property is a necessary condition for internal lineage segmentation.

Morton Fried has voiced a dissenting opinion, however. He argues that the distinction lies in whether or not the members of a descent group are able to demonstrate a genealogical connection which relates all members to one another. A true lineage is a descent group whose genealogy and ancestry can be clearly "demonstrated" and agreed upon by all members. A clan, on the other hand, is a descent group which "stipulates" a relationship but is unable to trace clear, unambiguous genealogical connections. Members of the clan share a common surname, but their true genealogical ties are uncertain (Fried 1970: 76). Fried goes on to argue that a lineage cannot be arbitrarily expanded to include new members. Qualifications for clan membership are, by contrast, more flexible. It can expand as necessary in order to accomplish or fulfill various social functions (Fried 1970: 33).

Chinese anthropologists have recently conducted in-depth research into the problem of lineage structure in Taiwan.¹ They are now able to provide us with far richer data and interpretations that shed new light on the Freedman-Fried debate. In a recent essay Chuang Ying-chang and Ch'en Ch'i-nan argue that:

The analytical concepts "lineage property" and "demonstrated descent" maintained respectively by Freedman and Fried are in reality necessary to the understanding of Chinese lineages (Wang Sung-hsing 1972; Ch'en Ch'i-nan 1975; Chuang Ying-chang 1975). Organizational principles require some unilineal descent groups to not only possess property but also to have demonstrated descent as well, such as with the previously mentioned small lineages and their per stirpes allocation. Other unilineal descent groups that lack property and for whom actual demonstrated descent is irrelevant need not be what Fried calls "corporate unilineal descent groups," nor need they go beyond what Freedman calls same surname ties outside the "lineage." Actually, many fellow unilineal descent group members share ties beyond the five mourning grades (*wu-fu*), and such ties cannot be fully explained by what is usually termed the "clan" because such ties are also localized. Other unilineal descent groups have property, but do not rely upon demonstrated descent as the [sole] criterion for enjoying rights and duties over property. These unilineal descent groups are the *per capita* and *per stirpes* unilineal descent groups referred to previously. Ch'en Ch'i-nan for this reason proposes that unilineal descent group organization in China be broken down into three types of relations, those in small lineages, higher order lineages and common surname groups, and that these three terms replace the opaquely defined terms "lineage" and "clan." There are at least three types of relations in the distribution of rights and duties in lineages, namely: *per stirpes*, *per capita*, and shares. (Chuang and Ch'en 1982: 291, quoting Ch'en 1975: 131)

I think this redrawing of the contrast between types of Chinese descent groups is a significant contribution to kinship studies. The recognition that both "estate" and "genealogy" are necessary for explicating the concept of lineage, and that the form taken by a given descent group will inevitably represent an adaptation to local conditions, is especially significant. From the perspective of this essay we can say that the three fundamental kinship components upon which a Chinese lineage is organized are identical to the kinship components which pattern family relationships. But as a descent group, the lineage must encompass a range broader than the family. Accordingly, the sentiment component in kinship relations recedes in significance while the descent component comes to the fore. Continuation of the descent line and matters of inheritance take on great importance. Nonetheless, some descent groups may place equal weight on both components, while others value one more highly than the other. The exact nature of their presence varies according to local conditions.

Paraphrasing Chuang and Ch'en (1982: 294, quoting Ch'en 1975: 112-3), we can see an alternate model of lineage organization which is

the opposite of segmentation, i.e. fusion or amalgamation. Descendants of different Taiwan pioneer ancestors joined together to form a single lineage which took as its object of worship a common mainland China ancestor. These lineages distributed rights and duties over lineage property by means of either a *per capita* or a shares principle. Segmentation occurred with subdivisions developing within a lineage according to the *per stripes* principle. By adopting a *per capita* division of rights and duties, a lineage formed through a process of amalgamation took leave of these fetters of segmentation to form a quasi-volunteer organization. This can be said to be the most profound difference between lineage development in indigenous versus immigrant communities.

The research and analysis of Chuang Ying-chang and Ch'en Ch'i-nan represent a true breakthrough in our understanding of Chinese lineage organization. However one point remains to be discussed. Chuang and Ch'en argue that descent groups which tend toward fusion, those typical of the pioneering groups in Taiwan, adopt an ideology of "non-familialism" which is markedly different from traditional lineage ideology. If we adopt the perspective put forward in this essay, however, this process of lineage fusion need not be construed as a denial of the significance of familialism. The process of fusion is one kind of adaptation provided for by Chinese kinship ideology. Here integrative tendencies override fissive tendencies. For this to happen, the third of the three kinship components discussed above, that dealing with authority, must be brought into play. Some may argue that authority is indicative of non-familial ideologies, but I contend that authority is also an important component in kin relations outside the limits of the traditional Chinese family.

We can see from this analysis of lineage and clan that the fundamental components of kin relations are formulated according to a rational plan. Ritual behavior and the behavior of everyday life need not express all the components all of the time. At any given time or in any given situation some may be latent and unexpressed. However, these may be called upon as needed in order to accommodate to changing circumstances.

In conclusion, kinship is the core of Chinese social organization and Chinese kinship relations include a mix of three components—sentiment, descent, and authority. Although these three components are weighted differently from locale to locale such that their exact mix may vary and such that we should not be surprised to find this variation expressed in ancestor worship, taking China as a whole the sentiment component still stands out and remains the dominant component expressed in Chinese

ancestor worship. In this respect Chinese ancestor worship differs significantly from ancestor worship in Africa, at least as Fortes describes it, insofar as in the former descent is one of several components, and is not even the dominant one, whereas in the latter it is the *sole* kinship component.

Chinese ascribe to their ancestors a temperament made more moderate in part by the sentiment and authority components in Chinese kin relations. It is particularly the sentiment component, and above all the inclusion in the sentiment component of the Confucian model for human relations, that makes Chinese ancestors typically benevolent. The more weight is attached to descent, as in Ch'i-nan, the more the Chinese ancestor will resemble ancestors in Africa. Overall, however, much more of the whole person is transmuted into ancestorhood in China than in Africa, and even the more capricious Chinese ancestors will not be wholly free of the moderating influence of sentiment. This is why most ancestors in most places in China are thought to be benevolent. As might be expected, and contrary to what Freedman has argued, all ancestor worship rituals express all three kin components, though greater prominence might be given to one or another component in a specific ritual.

REFERENCE MATTER

References Cited

ABBREVIATIONS

AA: *American Anthropologist*

BIEAS: *Chung yang yen chiu yuan min tsu hsueh yen chiu so chi k'an* 中央研究院民族學研究所集刊 (Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica)

IEAS: *Chung yang yen chiu yuan min tsu hsueh yen chiu so* 中央研究院民族學研究所 (Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica)

IEASM: *Chung yang yen chiu yuan min tsu hsueh yen chiu so chuan k'an* 中央研究院民族學研究所專刊 (Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica monograph)

IEASMSB: *Chung yang yen chiu yuan min tsu hsueh yen chiu so chuan k'an i chung* 中央研究院民族學研究所專刊乙種 (Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica monograph, series B)

TW: *Ssu yu yen* 思與言 (Thought and Word)

Wolf: The Study of Chinese Society on Taiwan

Barnes, J.A. 1962. "African Models in the New Guinea Highlands." *Man* 62: 5-9.

Buck, John Lossing. 1937. *Land Utilization in China*. Nanking: Univ. of Nanking.

Fei, Hsiao-tung 費孝通 (Fei Hsiao-t'ung). 1939. *Peasant Life in China*. New York: E.P. Dutton and Co.

Fortes, Meyer. 1953. "The Structure of Unilineal Descent Groups." *AA* 55, no. 1: 17-41.

——— 1965. "Some Reflections on Ancestor Worship in Africa." In Meyer Fortes and G. Dieterlen, eds., *African Systems of Thought*. London: Oxford Univ. Press.

- Fortes, Meyer and E.E. Evans-Pritchard, eds. 1940. *African Political Systems*. London: Oxford Univ. Press.
- Freedman, Maurice. 1958. *Lineage Organization in Southeastern China*. London: Athlone Press.
- . 1966. *Chinese Lineage and Society*. London: Athlone Press.
- . 1979 (1964). "What Social Science Can Do for Chinese Studies." In G. William Skinner, ed., *The Study of Chinese Society: Essays by Maurice Freedman*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Fried, Morton H. 1970. "Clans and Lineages: How to Tell Them Apart and Why." *BIEAS* 29: 11-36.
- Goody, Jack. 1973. "Bridewealth and Dowry in Africa and Eurasia." In Jack Goody and S. J. Tambiah, eds., *Bridewealth and Dowry*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Grichting, Wolfgang. 1971. *The Value System in Taiwan, 1970*. Taipei: privately printed.
- Lang, Olga. 1946. *Chinese Family and Society*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
- Olsen, Nancy J. 1975. "Social Class and Rural-Urban Patterning of Socialization in Taiwan." *Journal of Asian Studies* 34, no. 3: 659-74.
- Radcliffe-Brown, A. R. and Daryll Forde, eds. 1950. *African Systems of Kinship and Marriage*. London: Oxford Univ. Press.
- Rosaldo, Michelle Zimbalist and Louise Lamphere, eds. 1974. *Woman, Culture, and Society*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Strathern, Andrew. 1972. *One Father, One Blood*. London: Tavistock.
- Watson, James L. 1982. "Chinese Kinship Reconsidered: Anthropological Perspectives on Historical Research." *The China Quarterly* 92: 589-622.

Hsu: Field Work, Cultural Differences and Interpretation

- Frankly, Viktor E. 1963. *Man's Search for Meaning*. New York: Pocket Books.
- Hsu, Francis L.K. 許烺光 (Hsu Lang-kuang). 1965. "The Effect of Dominant Kinship Relationships on Kin and Non-kin Behavior: A Hypothesis." *AA* 67, no. 3: 638-61.
- . 1971. "Psychosocial Homeostasis and *Jen*: Conceptual Tools for Advancing Psychological Anthropology." *AA* 73, no. 1: 23-44.
- Lu, Hsun 魯迅 (Chou Tsou-jen). 周作人 1947 (1923). *A Q Cheng-chuang* 阿Q正傳 (The true story of Ah Q). Shanghai. 魯迅三十年集之八：吶喊
- Lu, Yu. 陸游 1971. "Shih Erh." 示兒 (Reprinted in Ting Ying, 丁櫻 ed., *Chung-kuo li tai shih hsuan*. 中國歷代詩選 [Anthology of Chinese poetry through the ages]. Taipei: Hung-yeh Shu-chu.)
- McCreery, John L. 1982. "The Distribution of Ritual Experience in Con-

- temporary Taiwan." Paper presented at the Conference on the Chinese Family and Its Ritual Behavior, Taipei.
- Murdock, George Peter. 1945. "The Common Denominators of Culture." In Ralph Linton, ed., *The Science of Man in World Crises*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
- Saso, Michael R. 1972. *Taoism and the Rite of Cosmic Renewal*. Pullman, Washington: Washington State Univ. Press.
- Wu, David Y.H. 吳燕和 (Wu Yen-ho), ed. 1982. *Ethnicity and Interpersonal Interaction: A Cross-Cultural Study*. Hong Kong: Maruzen Asia.

Wolf: Chinese Family Size

- Buck, John Lossing. 1937. *Land Utilization in China*. Nanking, Univ. of Nanking.
- Chiao, C.M., Warren S. Thompson, and D.T. Chen. 1938. *An Experiment in the Registration of Vital Statistics in China*. Oxford, Ohio: Scripps Foundation for Research in Population Problems.
- Dickinson, Jean. 1924. *Observations of the Social Life of a North China Village*. Peking: Yenching Univ.
- Fairbank, John K. 1979. *The United States and China*. (Fourth edition.) Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press.
- Feng, Tzu-kang. 1935. *Lan-ch'i nung-ts'un tiao-ch'a* 蘭谿農村調查 (Rural survey of Lan-ch'i hsien). Kuo-li Che-chiang Ta hsueh.
- Freedman, Maurice. 1958. *Lineage Organization in Southeastern China*. London: Athlone Press.
- 1966. *Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwangtung*. London: Athlone Press.
- 1979 (1963). "The Chinese Domestic Family: Models." In G. William Skinner, ed., *The Study of Chinese Society: Essays by Maurice Freedman*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Hammel, E.A. and Peter Laslett. 1974. "Comparing Household Structure Over Time and Between Cultures." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16, no. 1: 73-109.
- Hsu, Francis L.K. 許煥光 (Hsu Lang-kuang). 1943. "The Myth of Chinese Family Size." *American Journal of Sociology* 48, no. 5: 555-62.
- Kajiwar, Michiyoshi. 1941. *Taiwan nomin seikatsu ko* (An examination of the life of Taiwanese peasants). Taipei: Ogata Takezo.
- Levy, Marion J., Jr. 1965. "Aspects of the Analysis of Family Structure." In Ansley J. Coale, et al., *Aspects of the Analysis of Family Structure*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.
- 1974. "New Uses of Demography." *Comparative Studies in Society and*

- History* 16, no. 1: 110-16.
- Laslett, Peter. 1972. *The Household and Family in Past Time*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Li, Ching-han. 李景漢 1930. "Chu tsai nung-ts'un ts'ung-shih she-hui tiao-ch'a so-te-ti yin-hsiang" 住在農村從事社會調查所得的印象 (Impressions gained from living in a village while conducting a social survey). *She-hui shih-chieh* 社會世界 4: 1-14.
- . 1933. *Ting hsien she-hui kai-k'uang tiao-ch'a* 定縣社會概況調查 (Survey of social conditions in Ting hsien). Hopei: Chung-hua p'ing-min chiao-yu ts'uchin hui.
- Okada, Yuzuru. 1949. *Kiso shakai* (Elementary groups of society). Tokyo: Kobundo.
- Sun, Te-hsiung. 孫得雄 n.d. *Pa-tou-tzu yu-tsun tiao-ch'a pao-kao* 八斗子漁村調查報告 (Report of research in the fishing village of Pa-tou-tzu). (Publisher not given.)
- Wolf, Arthur P. 1984. "Family Life and the Life Cycle in Rural China." In Robert McC. Netting, Richard R. Wilk, and Eric J. Arnould, eds., *Households: Comparative and Historical Studies of the Domestic Group*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
- Wolf, Arthur P. and Chieh-shan Huang. 1980. *Marriage and Adoption in China, 1845-1945*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.

Wang: On the Household and Family in Chinese Society

- Chuang, Ying-chang. 莊英章 1972. "T'ai-wan nung-ts'un chia-tsu tui hsien-tai-hua ti shih-yin: 臺灣農村家族對現代化的適應：一個田野調查實例的分析 i ko t'ien-yeh tiao-ch'a shih-li ti fen-hsi" (The adaptation of the family to modernization in rural Taiwan: analysis of an example from fieldwork). *BIEAS* 34: 85-98.
- . 1981. "Nan-ts'un ti yu-yeh fa-chan yu chia-tsu chieh-kou ti pien-ch'ien" 南村的漁業發展與家族結構的變遷 (Development of Nan-ts'un fisheries and structural change in the family). In Li Yih-yuan 李亦園 (Li I-yuan) and Chiao Chian 喬健 (Ch'iao Chien), eds., *Chung-kuo ti min-tsu, she-hui yu wen-hua* 中國的民族·社會與文化 (China's people, society and culture). Taipei: Shih-huo.
- Freedman, Maurice. 1958. *Lineage Organization in Southeastern China*. London: Athlone Press.
- Horie, Shunichi. 堀江俊一 1981. "Taiwan Kanzoku no 'Kazoku'—jia ideology to jia shudan" 台灣漢族的"家族"—Jiaイデオロギーとjia集團 (The family of Chinese in Taiwan—chia ideology and chia group). *Minzokugaku-kenkyu* 民族學研究 (The Japanese journal of ethnology) 46, no. 3: 299-314.

- Hsieh, Jih-chang 謝繼昌 [Chester] (Hsieh Chi-ch'ang). 1981. "Chung-kuo chia-tsu ti ting-i: ts'ung i ko T'ai-wan hsiang-ts'un t'an-ch'i" 中國家族的定義：從一個臺灣鄉村談起 (The definition of the Chinese family: from the perspective of a rural village). In Li Yih-yuan 李亦園 (Li I-yuan) and Chiao Chian 喬健 (Ch'iao Chien), eds., *Chung-kuo ti min-tsu, she-hui yu wen-hua* 中國的民族社會與文化 (China's people, society and culture). Taipei: Shih-huo.
- Kulp, Daniel Harrison. 1925. *Country Life in South China*. New York City, Bureau of Publications: Teachers College, Columbia Univ.
- Li, Yih-yuan 李亦園 (Li I-yuan), 1967. "T'ai-wan ti min-tsu-hsueh t'ien-yeh kung-tso 臺灣的民族學田野工作 (臺灣研究研討會紀錄) (T'ai-wan yen-chiu yen t'ao-hui chi-lu)" (Ethnological field research on Taiwan [Proceedings of the Symposium on Research in Taiwan]). (*Kuo-li T'ai-wan ta-hsueh k'ao-ku-jen-lei-hsueh chuan k'an* 國立臺灣大學考古人類學專刊 [Occasional papers of the Department of Archeology and Anthropology, National Taiwan University] 4). Taipei: Kuo li T'ai-wan ta-hsueh k'ao ku jen lei hsueh hsi.
- Wang, Sung-hsing. 王崧興 1967. *Kuei-shan Tao: Han-jen yu-ts'un she-hui chih yen-chiu* 龜山島：漢人漁村社會之研究 (Kuei-shan Island: A study of a Chinese fishing village community). (IEASM 13.) Taipei: IEAS.
- Wolf, Arthur P. 1980. *Marriage and Adoption in China, 1845-1945*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Wolf, Margery. 1972. *Women and the Family in Rural Taiwan*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Uchida, Tomoo. 內田智雄 1956. *Chukoku Noson no Bunke Seido* 中國農村的分家制度 (The family division system in Chinese peasant villages). Tokyo: Iwanami.

Hsieh: Meal Rotation

- Chen, An-chih. 陳安治 1969. "T'ai-wan tu-shih chin chiao nung chia fen chia chih yen chiu" 臺灣都市近郊農家分家之研究 (A study of family division in suburban farm families in Taiwan). M.A. thesis, National Taiwan University.
- Chen, Chung-min. 陳中民 (Ch'en Chung-min). 1977. *Upper Camp: A Study of a Chinese Mixed-Cropping Village in Taiwan*. (IEASMSB 7). Taipei: IEAS.
- Chuang, Ying-chang. 莊英章 1971. "Ch'i-lou: i-ko nan T'ai-wan yu-ts'un ti she-hui jen-lei-hsueh yen-chiu" 崎漏：一個南臺灣漁村的社會人類學研究 (Ch'i-lou: A social anthropological study of a southern Taiwan fishing village). M.A. thesis, National Taiwan Univ.
- 1972. "T'ai-wan nung-ts'un chia-tsu tui hsien-tai-hua ti shih-ying: i ko t'ien-yeh tiao-ch'a shih-li ti fen-hsi" 臺灣農村家族對現代化的適應，一個田野調查實例的分析 (The adaptation of the family to modernization in rural

- Taiwan: analysis of an example from fieldwork). *BIEAS* 34: 85-98.
- 1976. "She-liao nung-ts'un ti ching-chi fa-chan yu chia-tsu chieh-kou ti pien-ch'ien" 社寮農村的經濟發展與家族結構的變遷 (Economic development and structural change in the family in the agrarian village of She-liao). *BIEAS* 41: 61-77.
- 1981. "Nan-ts'un ti yu-yeh fa-chan yu chia-tsu chieh-kou ti pien-ch'ien" 南村的漁業發展與家族結構的變遷 (Development of Nan-ts'un fisheries and structural change in the family). In Li Yih-yuan 李亦園 (Li I-yuan) and Chiao Chian 喬健 (Ch'iao Chien), eds., *Chung-kuo ti min-tsu, she-hui yu wen-hua* 中國的民族, 社會與文化 (China's people, society and culture). Taipei: Shih-huo.
- 1982. "She-hui pien-ch'ien chung ti Nan-ts'un chia-tsu: wu ko chia-tsu ti ko-an fen-hsi" 社會變遷中的南村家族: 五個家族的個案分析 (The Chinese family in the midst of social change: analysis of five Nan-ts'un family cases). *BIEAS* 52: 1-33.
- Freedman, Maurice. 1958. *Lineage Organization in Southeastern China*. London: Athlone Press.
- Gallin, Bernard 1966. *Hsin Hsing, Taiwan: A Chinese Village in Change*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
- Hsieh, Jih-chang. 謝繼昌 [Chester] (Hsieh Chi-ch'ang) 1982. "Chung-kou chia-tsu yen chiu ti chien t'ao" 中國家族研究的檢討 (Discussion of studies of the Chinese family). In Yang Kuo-shu and Wen Chung-I (Wen Ch'ung-I), eds., *She hui hsing wei k'o hsueh yen chiu ti chung-kuo-hua* 社會及行爲科學研究的中國化 (The sinicization of social and behavioral science research). (*IEASMSB* 10.) Taipei: IEAS.
- 1984. *Yang-chih ts'un ti chia tsu tsu-chih* 仰之村的家族組織 (Chinese family in Yang-chih village). (*IEASMSB* 12.) Taipei: IEAS.
- Hsu, Chia-ming. 許嘉明 1971. "Wa-yao chuang chih fen chia yu chi-ch'eng" 瓦硐庄之分家與繼承 (The division of the family and inheritance in Wa-yao village). *BIEAS* 32: 343-65.
- Huang, Wei-hsien. 黃維憲 1972. "Hu-nei: i ko pei T'ai-wan ch'a chuang ti she hui jen lei hsueh yen chiu" 湖內: 一個北臺灣茶庄的社會人類學研究 (Hu-nei: an social anthropological study of tea gardens in north Taiwan). M.A. thesis, National Taiwan University.
- Li Yih-yuan 李亦園 (Li I-yuan). 1967. "T'ai-wan ti min-tsu-hsueh t'ien-yeh kung-tso (T'ai-wan yen-chiu yen t'ao-hui chi-lu)" 臺灣的民族學田野工作 (臺灣研究研討會紀錄) (Ethnological field research on Taiwan [Proceedings of the Symposium on Research in Taiwan]). (*Kuo-li T'ai-wan ta-hsueh k'ao-ku-jen-lei-hsueh chuan k'ao* 國立臺灣大學考古人類學專刊 [Occasional papers of the Department of Archeology and Anthropology, National Taiwan University] 4). Taipei: Kuo li T'ai-wan ta-hsueh k'ao ku jen lei hsueh hsi.
- Tai, Yen-hui. 戴炎輝 1963. "Ch'ing tai T'ai-wan chih chia-chih chi chia ch'an" 清代臺灣之家制及家產 (The family system and familial property in Ch'ing era

- Taiwan). *T'ai-wan wen-hsien chuan-k'an* 臺灣文獻專刊 (Taiwan folklore monographs) 14, no. 3: 1-9.
- Wang, Sung-hsing. 王崧興 1967. *Kuei-shan Tao: Han-jen yu-ts'un she-hui chih yen-chiu* 龜山島：漢人漁村社會之研究 (Kuei-shan Island: A study of a Chinese fishing village community). (*IEASM* 13.) Taipei: IEAS.
- Wen, Chung-I 文崇一 (Wen Ch'ung-I), Hsu Chia-min, 許嘉明 Chu Hai-yuan 瞿海源 (Ch'u Hai-yuan) and Huang Hsun-erh. 黃順二 1975. *Hsi-ho ti she-hui pien-ch'ien* 西河的社會變遷 (Social change in Hsi-ho). (*IEASMSB* 6.) Taipei: IEAS.
- Wolf, Arthur 1981. "Domestic Organization." In Emily M. Ahern and Hill Gates, eds., *The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Yanakisako, Sylvia Junko 1979. "Family and Household: the Analysis of Domestic Groups." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 8:161-205.

Tang: Equal Right and Domestic Structure

- 1979a (1961). "The Family in China, Past and Present." In G. William Skinner, ed., *The Study of Chinese Society: Essays by Maurice Freedman*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- 1979b (1968). "Chinese Family Law in Singapore: The Rout of Custom." In G. William Skinner, ed., *The Study of Chinese Society: Essays by Maurice Freedman*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- 1979c (1950). "Colonial Law and Chinese Society." In G. William Skinner, ed., *The Study of Chinese Society: Essays by Maurice Freedman*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Hsieh, Chen-ming. 謝振民 1948. *Chung-hua Ming-kuo li-fa shih* 中華民國立法史 (History of legislation in the Republic of China). Shanghai: Cheng-chung.
- Hsu, Francis L.K. 許烺光 (Hsu Lang-kuang). 1963. *Clan, Caste and Club*. Princeton: Van Nostrand.
- Lang, Olga. 1946. *Chinese Family and Society*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
- Niida, Noboru. 仁井田陞 1967. *Chugoku shakai no ho to rinri* 中国社会の法と倫理 — 中国法の原理 (Chinese law and human relations). Tokyo: Kobundo.
- Tai, Yen-hui. 戴炎輝 1970. *Chung-kuo ch'in-shu fa* 中國親屬法 (Chinese kinship law). Taipei: T'ai-ta fa hsueh yuan shih-wu-tsu.
- Tang, Mei-chun 唐美君 (T'ang Mei-chun). n.d. "Law and Kinship: A Study of the Legal Aspect of Wu-fu." Unpublished manuscript.
- n.d. "An Analytical Study on Type and Structure of the Chinese Family." Unpublished manuscript.
- 1976. "Parental Authority and Family Size: A Chinese Case." In Estelle Fuchs, ed., *Youth in a Changing World*. The Hague: Mouton Publishers.
- 1978a. *Urban Chinese Families: An Anthropological Field Study in Taipei City, Taiwan*. Taipei: National Taiwan Univ. Press.

- 1978b. "On the Political Functions of the Chinese Familial Institution." *T'ai-ta wen shih che hsueh pao* 臺大文史哲學報 (National Taiwan University bulletin of literature, history, and philosophy) 27: 373-87.
- Yang, Martin C. 楊懋春 (Yang Mao-ch'un). *A Chinese Village, Taitou, Shantung Province*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.

Newell: Structural Conflicts Within the Chinese Family

- Befu, Harumi. 1980. "The Group Model of Japanese Society and an Alternative." *Rice University Studies* 66, no. 1: 169-87.
- Cohen, Myron L. 1970. "Developmental Process in the Chinese Domestic Group." In Maurice Freedman, ed., *Family and Kinship in Chinese Society*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Gallin, Bernard. 1960. "Matrilateral and Affinal Relationship of a Taiwanese Village." *AA* 62, no. 4: 632-42.
- Newell, William H. 1962. *Treacherous River*. Singapore: Univ. of Malaya Press.
- 1976. "The Ancestors at Home." In William H. Newell, ed., *Ancestors*. The Hague: Mouton Publishers.
- Tang, Mei-chun 唐美君 (T'ang Mei-chun). 1978. *Urban Chinese Families: An Anthropological Field Study in Taipei City, Taiwan*. Taipei: National Taiwan Univ. Press.
- Lin, Yueh-hwa 林耀華 (Lin Yu-hua). 1974 (1948). *The Golden Wing: A Sociological Study of Chinese Familism*. London: Kegan Paul.
- Hsu, Francis L.K. 許烺光 (Hsu Lang-kuang). 1971 (1948). *Under the Ancestor's Shadow*. (Revised edition.) Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Watson, Rubie S. 1981. "Class Differences and Affinal Relations in South China." *Man* 16, no. 4: 593-615.
- Wolf, Arthur P. and Chieh-shan Huang. 1980. *Marriage and Adoption in China, 1845-1945*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Wolf, Margery. 1972. *Women and the Family in Rural Taiwan*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.

Gallin and Gallin:

Matrilateral and Affinal Relationships in Changing Chinese Society

- Ahern, Emily. 1974. "Affines and the Rituals of Kinship." In Arthur P. Wolf, ed., *Religion and Ritual in Chinese Society*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Blau, Peter Michael. 1964. *Exchange and Power in Social Life*. New York: John

- Wiley and Sons, Inc.
- Croll, Elisabeth. 1981. *The Politics of Marriage in Contemporary China*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Fei, Hsiao-tung 費孝通 (Fei Hsiao-t'ung). 1939. *Peasant Life in China*. London: G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd.
- Freedman, Maurice. 1958. *Lineage Organization in Southwestern China*. London: Athlone Press.
- . 1970. *Family and Kinship in Chinese Society*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Fried, Morton H. 1953. *Fabric of Chinese Society*. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Gallin, Bernard. 1959. "A Case for Intervention in the Field." *Human Organization* XVIII, no. 3: 140-44.
- . 1960. "Matrilateral and Affinal Relationships of a Taiwanese Village." *AA* 62, no. 4: 632-42.
- . 1966. *Hsin Hsing, Taiwan: A Chinese Village in Change*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
- . 1968. "Political Factionalism and its Impact on Chinese Village Social Organization in Taiwan." In Marc J. Swartz, ed., *Local-Level Politics*. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.
- Gallin, Bernard and Rita S. Gallin. 1982a. "Socioeconomic Life in Rural Taiwan: Twenty Years of Development and Change." *Modern China* 8, no. 2: 205-46.
- . 1982b. "The Chinese Joint Family in Changing Rural Taiwan." In Sydney L. Greenblatt, Richard W. Wilson, Amy A. Wilson, eds., *Social Interaction in Chinese Society*. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Lang, Olga. 1946. *Chinese Family and Society*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
- Mitchell, J. Clyde. 1969. "The Concept and Use of Social Networks." In J. Clyde Mitchell, ed., *Social Networks in Urban Situations*. New York: Humanities Press, Inc.
- Parish, William and Martin K. Whyte. 1978. *Village and Family in Contemporary China*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
- Watson, Rubie S. 1981. "Class Differences and Affinal Relations in South China." *Man* (N.S.) 16, no. 4: 593-615.
- Whyte, Martin K. 1979. "Revolutionary Social Change and Patrilocal Residence in China." *Ethnology* 18, no. 3: 211-27.
- Winkler, Edwin A. 1981. "National, Regional, and Local Politics." In Emily M. Ahern and Hill Gates, eds., *The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Wolf, Arthur. 1970. "Chinese Kinship and Mourning Dress." In Maurice Freedman, ed., *Family and Kinship in Chinese Society*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Wolf, Margery. 1972. *Women and the Family in Rural Taiwan*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.

Chen: Dowry and Inheritance

- Chen, Chung-min 陳中民 (Ch'en Chung-min). 1977. *Upper Camp: A Study of a Chinese Mixed-Cropping Village in Taiwan*. (IEASMSB 7). Taipei: IEAS.
- Cohen, Myron L. 1976. *House United, House Divided: The Chinese Family in Taiwan*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
- Freedman, Maurice. 1966. *Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwangtung*. London: Athlone Press.
- Goody, Jack and S. J. Tambiah. 1973. *Bridewealth and Dowry*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Lang, Olga. 1946. *Chinese Family and Society*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press.
- Rheubottom, D. B. 1980. "Dowry and Wedding Celebrations in Yugoslav Macedonia." In J. L. Comaroff, ed., *The Meaning of Marriage Payments*. London: Academic Press.

Chuang: Family Structure and Reproductive Patterns in a Taiwan Fishing Village

- Caldwell, J. C. 1976. "The Socio-economic Explanation of High Fertility." *Papers on the Yoruba society of Nigeria*. Canberra: Department of Demography, Australian National Univ.
- . 1982. *Theory of Fertility Decline*. New York: Academic Press.
- Chang, Ming-Cheng, 張明正 Ronald Freedman and Te-Hsiung Sun. 孫得雄 1981. "Trends in Fertility, Family Size Preferences, and Family Planning Practice: Taiwan, 1961-1980." *Studies in Family Planning* 12, no. 5: 211-28.
- Chuang, Ying-chang. 莊英章 1971. "Ch'i-lou: i-ko nan T'ai-wan yu-ts'un ti she-hui jen-lei-hsueh yen-chiu" 崎漏：一個南臺灣漁村的社會人類學研究 (Ch'i-lou: A social anthropological study of a southern Taiwan fishing village). M.A. thesis, National Taiwan Univ.
- . 1981. "She-hui pien-ch'ien chung ti Nan-ts'un chia-tsu: wu ko chia-tsu ti ko-an fen-hsi" 社會變遷中的南村家族：五個家族的個案分析 (The Chinese family in the midst of social change: analysis of five Nan-ts'un family cases). *BIEAS* 52: 1-31.
- Chuang, Ying-chang 莊英章 and Chen Chi-nan 陳其南 (Ch'en Ch'i-nan). 1982. "Hsien-chieh-tuan Chung-kuo she-hui chieh-kou yen-chiu ti chien-t'au: T'ai-wan yen-chiu ti i-hsieh ch'i-shih" 現階段中國社會結構研究的檢討：臺灣研究的一些啓示 (Review of the current phase of research into Chinese social structure: some lessons from Taiwan studies). In Yang Kuo-shu 楊國樞 and Wen Chung-I 文崇一 (Wen Ch'ung-I), eds., *She hui chi hsing wei k'o hsueh yen chiu*

- ti chung-kuo-hua 社會及行為科學研究的中國化 (The sinicization of social and behavioral science research). (IEASMSB 10.) Taipei: IEAS.
- Coombs, Lolagene C. and Te-Hsiung Sun. 孫得雄 1978. "Family Composition Preferences in a Developing Culture: The Case of Taiwan, 1973." *Population Studies* 31: 43-64.
- Coombs, Lolagene C. and Ronald Freedman. 1979. "Some Roots of Preference: Roles, Activities and Familial Values." *Demography* 16, no. 3: 359-76.
- Freedman, Ronald. 1981. "The Changing Family Network and Fertility in Taiwan." Research proposal.
- Freedman, Ronald, Albert I. Hermalin and Ming-Cheng Chang. 張明正 1975. "Do Statements About Desired Family Size Predict Fertility? The Case of Taiwan 1967-70." *Demography* 12, no. 3: 407-16.
- Freedman, Ronald, Baron Moots, Te-Hsiung Sun 孫得雄 and Mary Beth Weinberger. 1978. "Household Composition and Extended Kinship in Taiwan." *Population Studies* 32, no. 1: 65-80.
- Freedman, Ronald and Y. Takeshita. 1969. *Family Planning in Taiwan: An Experiment in Social Change*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.
- Gallin, Bernard. 1960. "Matrilateral and Affinal Relationships of a Taiwanese Village." *AA* 62, no. 4: 632-42.
- Hsieh, Kao-ch'iao. 謝高橋 1980. *Chia-hu tsu-ch'eng chieh-kou yu sheng-yu* 家戶組成結構與生育 (Household composition, structure, and fertility). Taipei: Kuo-li Cheng-chih ta-hsueh she-hui hsueh hsi.
- Inkeles, A. 1966. "The Modernization of Man." In M. Weiner, ed., *Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth*. New York: Basic Books.
- Li, Yih-yuan 李亦園 (Li I-yuan). 1975. "Ch'uan-t'ung wen-hua ying-su tui nan-ssu p'ien hao chi sheng-yu hsing-wei ti yin-hsiang" 傳統文化因素對男嗣偏好及生育行為的影響 (The influence of traditional cultural factors on son preference and reproductive behavior). *Chung-shan hsueh-shu wen-hua chi-k'an* 中山學術文化集刊 (Sun Yat-sen bulletin of learning and culture) 16: 1-4.
- Sun, Te-Hsiung, 孫得雄 Hui-Sheng Lin and Ronald Freedman. 1978. "Trends in Fertility, Family Size Preferences, and Family Planning Practice: Taiwan, 1961-76." *Studies in Family Planning* 9, no. 4: 54-70.
- Tang, Mei-chun 唐美君 (T'ang Mei-chun). 1978. *Urban Chinese Families: An Anthropological Field Study in Taipei City, Taiwan*. Taipei: National Taiwan Univ. Press.
- Wen, Chung-I 文崇一 (Wen Ch'ung-I), Hsu Chia-min, 許嘉明 Chu Hai-yuan 瞿海源 (Ch'u Hai-yuan) and Huang Hsun-erh. 黃順二 1975. *Hsi-ho ti she-hui pien-ch'ien* 西河的社會變遷 (Social change in Hsi-ho). (IEASMSB 6.) Taipei: IEAS.
- Wu, Ts'ung-hsien 吳聰賢 and Su Ya-chung. 蘇雅惠 1972. "T'ai-wan nung-chia she-hui ching-chi ti-wei chih ts'e-to" 臺灣農家社會經濟地位之測度 (Conjectures on

- the social and economic status of Taiwan's agricultural families). *Chung-kuo she-hui hsueh-k'an* 中國社會學刊 (Chinese social science bulletin) 2: 37-45.
- Yang, Kuo-shu 楊國樞 and Chu Hai-yuan 瞿海源 (Ch'u Hai-yuan). 1975. "Chung-kuo 'jen' ti hsien-tai-hua: yu kuan ko-jen hsien-tai-hsing ti yen-chiu" 中國"人"的現代化：有關個人現代性的研究 (Determinants, correlates, and consequences of Chinese individual modernity). *BIEAS* 37: 1-38.
- Yang, Li-hsiu. 楊麗秀 1980. "T'ai-wan ti-ch'u yu ou yu ling fu-nu lao-tung ts'an yu ch'ing-k'uang tui sheng-yu lu chih ying-hsiang" 臺灣地區有偶育齡婦女勞動參與情況對生育率之影響 (Influence on the fertility rate in Taiwan of labor participation conditions for married women of reproductive age). M.A. thesis, National Taiwan Univ.

Pasternak:

The Disquieting Chinese Lineage and its Anthropological Relevance

- Aberle, David. 1961. "Matrilineal Descent in Cross-Cultural Perspective." In David Schneider and Kathleen Gough, eds., *Matrilineal Kinship*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
- Ahern, Emily M. 1973. *The Cult of the Dead in a Chinese Village*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Baker, Hugh D.R. 1968. *A Chinese Lineage Village: Sheung Shui*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Befu, Harumi and Leonard Plotnicov. 1962. "Types of Corporate Unilineal Descent Groups." *AA* 64: 313-27.
- Bohannon, Laura and Paul Bohannon. 1953. *The Tiv of Central Nigeria*. London: International African Institute.
- Bohannon, Paul. 1963. *Social Anthropology*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.
- Chuang, Ying-chang. 莊英章 1973. "T'ai-wan Han-jen tsung-tsu fa-chan ti jo-kan wen-t'i—ssu miao tsung-ts'u yu Chu-shan ti k'en-chih hsing-t'ai" 臺灣漢人宗族發展的若干問題 — 寺廟宗族與竹山的壟殖型態 (Some problems in the development of Chinese lineages in Taiwan—temple, ancestral halls and patterns of settlement in Chu-shan). *BIEAS* 36: 113-40.
- Cohen, Yehudi A. 1969. "Ends and Means in Political Control: State Organization and the Punishment of Adultery, Incest, and Violation of Celibacy." *AA* 71: 658-87.
- Cohen, Myron L. 1967. "Variations in Complexity Among Chinese Family Groups: The Impact of Modernization." *Transactions of the New York*

- Academy of Sciences* 29: 638-44.
- 1969. "Agnatic Kinship in South Taiwan." *Ethnology* 8: 167-82.
- Coult, Allan D. and Robert W. Habenstein. 1965. *Cross Tabulations of Murdock's World Ethnographic Sample*. Columbia: Univ. of Missouri.
- Diamond, Norma. 1969. *K'un Shen: A Taiwan Village*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- 1975. "Collectivization, Kinship, and the Status of Women in Rural China." *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 1: 25-32.
- Eggan, Fred 1937. "Historical Changes in the Choctaw Kinship System." *AA* 39: 34-52.
- Ember, Carol R. 1975. "Residential Variations Among Hunter-Gatherers." *Behavior Science Research* 9: 135-49.
- Ember, Melvin and Carol R. Ember. 1971. "The Conditions Favoring Matrilineal Versus Patrilineal Residence." *AA* 73: 571-94.
- Ember, Carol R., Melvin Ember, and Burton Pasternak. 1974. "On the Development of Unilineal Descent." *Journal of Anthropological Research* 30: 69-94.
- Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 1940. *The Nuer*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Engels, Frederick. 1942. *The Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State*. New York: International Publishers.
- Fortes, Meyer. 1971 (1953). "The Structure of Unilineal Descent Groups." In N. Graburn, ed., *Readings in Kinship and Social Structure*. New York: Harper and Row Publishers.
- Foster, George M. 1965. "Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good." *AA* 67: 293-315.
- Freedman, Maurice. 1958. *Lineage Organization in Southeastern China*. London: Athlone Press.
- 1966. *Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwangtung*. London: Athlone Press.
- 1979 (1974). "The Politics of an Old State: A View from the Chinese Lineage." In G. William Skinner, ed., *The Study of Chinese Society: Essays by Maurice Freedman*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Fried, Morton H. 1957. "The Classification of Corporate Unilineal Descent Groups." *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* 87: 1-29.
- 1970. "Clans and Lineages: How to Tell Them Apart and Why—With Special Reference to Chinese Society." *BIEAS* 29: 11-36.
- Gallin, Bernard. 1966. *Hsin Hsing, Taiwan: A Chinese Village in Change*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
- Harrell, Steven. 1982. *Ploughshare: Culture and Context in Taiwan*. Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press.
- Hsiao, Kung-chuan. 蕭公權 1960. *Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth*

- Century. Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press.
- Hsu, Cho-yun. 許倬雲 1970. "I-Lan in the First Half of the 19th Century." *BIEAS* 33: 51-70.
- Hu, Hsieh-chin. 1948. *The Common Descent Group in China and its Functions*. New York: Viking Fund Press.
- Janelli, Roger and Dawnhee Yim Janelli. 1978. "Lineage Organization and Social Differentiation in Korea." *Man* 13: 272-89.
- Kirchhoff, Paul. 1968 (1955). "The Principles of Clanship in Human Society." In Morton H. Fried, ed., *Readings in Anthropology*. (Second edition.) New York: McCraw-Hill Book Co.
- Lewis, John Wilson. 1963. "The Leadership Doctrine of the Chinese Communist Party: The Lesson of the People's Commune." *Asian Survey*, XXIV, no.3.
- Murdock, George P. 1949. *Social Structure*. New York: Macmillan Co.
- Parish, William L., and Martin King Whyte. 1978. *Village and Family in Contemporary China*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
- Pasternak, Burton. 1972. *Kinship and Community in Two Chinese Villages*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- . 1973. "Chinese Tale-Telling Tombs." *Ethnology* 12: 259-73.
- Potter, Jack M. 1968. *Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant: Social and Economic Change in a Hong Kong Village*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
- Radcliffe-Brown, A. R. 1952. *Structure and Function in Primitive Society*. New York: Free Press.
- Sahlins, Marshall D. 1958. *Social Stratification in Polynesia*. Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press.
- . 1961. "The Segmentary Lineage: An Organization of Predatory Expansion." *AA* 63: 322-45.
- . 1972. *Stone Age Economics*. Chicago: Aldine, Atherton, Inc.
- Service, Elman R. 1962. *Primitive Social Organization in Evolutionary Perspective*. New York: Random House.
- Skinner, G. William. 1964. "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China, Part I." *Journal of Asian Studies* 24: 3-43.
- . 1971. "Chinese Peasants and the Closed Community: An Open and Shut Case." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 13: 270-81.
- Steward, Julian H. 1955. *Theory of Culture Change: The Methodology of Multilinear Evolution*. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press.
- Wang, Sung-hsing. 王崧興 1967. *Kuei-shan Tao: Han-jen yu-ts'un she-hui chih yen-chiu* 龜山島：漢人漁村社會之研究 (Kuei-shan Island: A study of a Chinese fishing village community). (*IEASM* 13.) Taipei: IEAS.
- Watson, James L. 1975. *Emigration and the Chinese Lineage: The Mans in Hong Kong and London*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
- Wolf, Eric R. 1957. "Closed Corporate Peasant Communities in Mesoamerica and Central Java." *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 13: 1-18.

- Wu: *The Conditions of Development and Decline of Chinese Lineage and Ritual*
- Ahern, Emily M. 1973. *The Cult of the Dead in a Chinese Village*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- 1981. "Introduction." In Emily M. Ahern and Hill Gates, eds., *The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Barth, Fredrik, ed. 1969. *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Chuang, Ying-chang. 莊英章 1973. "T'ai-wan tan-hsi chi-ssu-ch'un chih chien-t'ao" 臺灣單系繼嗣群之檢討 (An inquiry into Taiwan's unilineal descent groups). TW 11, no. 1: 28-33, 50.
- 1977. *Lin I-p'u—i ko T'ai-wan shih-chen ti she-hui ching-chi fa-chien shih* 林圯埔——一個臺灣市鎮的社會經濟發展史 (Lin I-p'u: The Socioeconomic history of a Taiwan township). (IEASMSB 8.) Taipei: IEAS.
- 1981. "Nan-ts'un ti yu-yeh fa-chan yu chia-tsu chieh-kou ti pien-ch'ien" 南村的漁業發展與家族結構的變遷 (Development of Nan-ts'un fisheries and structural change in the family). In Li Yih-yuan 李亦園 (Li I-yuan) and Chiao Chian 喬健 (Ch'iao Chien), eds., *Chung-kuo ti min-tsu, she-hui yu wen-hua* 中國的民族、社會與文化 (China's people, society and culture). Taipei: Shih-huo.
- Chuang, Ying-chang 莊英章 and Ch'en Yun-tung 陳運棟 1982. "Ch'ing-tai t'ou-fen ti tsung-tsu yu she-hui fa-chan shih" 清代頭份的宗族與社會發展史 (The history of lineage and social development in Ch'ing dynasty T'ou-fen). *Shih-fan ta-hsueh li-shih hsueh-pao* 師範大學歷史學報 (National Taiwan Normal University bulletin of historical research) 6: 143-76.
- Cohen, Myron L. 1969. "Agnatic Kinship in South Taiwan." *Ethnology* 8, no. 2: 167-82.
- 1970. "Developmental Process in the Chinese Domestic Group." In Maurice Freedman, ed., *Family and Kinship in Chinese Society*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- 1976. *House United, House Divided: The Chinese Family in Taiwan*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
- Diamond, Norma. 1969. *K'un Shen: A Taiwan Village*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Freedman, Maurice. 1958. *Lineage Organization in Southeastern China*. London: Athlone Press.
- 1966. *Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwangtung*. London: Athlone Press.
- 1970. "Ritual Aspects of Chinese Kinship and Marriage." In Maurice Freedman, ed., *Family and Kinship in Chinese Society*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Fried, Morton H. 1970. "Clans and Lineages: How to Tell Them Apart and Why With Special Reference to Chinese Society." *BIEAS* 29: 11-36.

- Harrell, [Clyde] Stevan. 1981. "Social Organization in Hai-shan." In Emily M. Ahern and Hill Gates, eds., *The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Hsieh, Jih-chang 謝繼昌 [Chester] (Hsieh Chi-ch'ang). 1981. "Chung-kuo chia-tsu ti ting-i: ts'ung i-ko T'ai-wan hsiang-ts'un t'an-ch'i" 中國家族的定義：從一個臺灣鄉村談起 (Definition of the Chinese family: discussed from the perspective of a rural Taiwan village). In Li Yih-yuan 李亦園 (Li I-yuan) and Chiao Chian 喬健 (Ch'iao Chien), eds., *Chung-kuo ti min-tsu, she-hui yu wen-hua* 中國的民族、社會與文化 (China's people, society and culture). Taipei: Shih-huo.
- Hsu, Chia-ming. 許嘉明 1973. "Chang-hua p'ing-yuan Fu-lao K'e ti ti-yu tsu-chih" 彰化平原福佬客的地域組織 (Territorial organization of Hoklorized Hakka in the Changhua Plain). *BIEAS* 36: 165-90.
- Hsu, Francis L.K. 許煥光 (Hsu Lang-kuang). 1982. "Forword." In David Y.H. Wu 吳燕和 (Wu Yen-ho), *The Chinese in Papua New Guinea: 1880-1980*. Hong Kong: The Chinese Univ. Press.
- Huang, Shu-min. 黃樹民 1981. "Ts'ung Tsao-ch'i Ta-chia ti-ch'u ti k'ai-t'o k'an t'ai-wan Han jen she-jui tsu-chih ti fa-chan" 從早期大甲地區的開拓看臺灣漢人社會組織的發展 (A look at the development of Taiwan Han social organization by looking at early era opening up of the Ta-chia area). In Li Yih-yuan 李亦園 (Li I-yuan) and Chiao Chian 喬健 (Ch'iao Chien), eds., *Chung-kuo ti min-tsu, she-hui yu wen-hua* 中國的民族、社會與文化 (China's people, society and culture). Taipei: Shih-huo.
- Lamley, Harry J. 1981. "Subethnic Rivalry in the Ch'ing Period." In Emily M. Ahern and Hill Gates, eds., *The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Pasternak, Burton. 1968. "Agnatic Atrophy in a Formosan Village." *AA* 70, no. 1: 93-96.
- . 1972. *Kinship and Community in Two Chinese Villages*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- . 1981. "Economics and Ecology." In Emily M. Ahern and Hill Gates, eds., *The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Potter, Jack M. 1970. "Land and Lineage in Traditional China." In Maurice Freedman, ed., *Family and Kinship in Chinese Society*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- See, Chinben 施振民 (Shih Chen-men). 1981. "Chinese Clanship in the Philippine Setting." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 12, no. 1: 224-247.
- . 1973. "Chi-shih ch'uan yu she-hui tsu-chih—Chang-hua p'ing-yuan chu-lo fa-chan mo-shih ti t'an-t'ao" 祭祀圈與社會組織——彰化平原聚落發展模式的探討 (Religious sphere and social organization: an exploratory model on the settlement of Changhua Plain). *BIEAS* 36: 191-208.
- Wang, Sung-hsing. 王崧興 1973. "Cho-Ta liu-yu ti min-tsu hsueh yen-chiu"

- 濁大流域的民族學研究 (An ethnological study of the Choshui and Tatu River Valleys in Central Taiwan). *BIEAS* 36: 1-10.
- 1981. "Lun ti-yuan yu hsueh-yuan" 論地緣與血緣 (A discussion of locality and consanguinity). In Li Yih-yuan 李亦園 (Li I-yuan) and Chiao Chia 喬健 (Ch'iao Chien), eds., *Chung-kuo ti min-tsu, she-hui yu wen-hua* 中國的民族、社會與文化 (China's people, society and culture). Taipei: Shih-huo.
- Willmott, W.E. 1970. *The Political Structure of the Chinese Community in Cambodia*. London: Athlone Press.
- Wu, David Y.H. 吳燕和 (Wu Yen-ho). 1973. "Kinship System of the New Guinea Chinese." Paper presented to the McQuary University Anthropology Colloquia, N.S.W. Australia.
- 1982a. *The Chinese in Papua New Guinea: 1880-1980*. Hong Kong: The Chinese Univ. Press.
- 1982b. *Ethnicity and Interpersonal Interaction: A Cross-Cultural Study*. Hong Kong: Maruzen Asia.
- Yen, Ching-hwang (Yen Ch'ing-huang). 1981. "Early Chinese Clan Organizations in Singapore and Malaya." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 12, no. 1: 62-92.

Cohen: Lineage Development and the Family in China

- Baker, Hugh D. R. 1968. *A Chinese Lineage Village: Sheung Shui*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- 1979. *Chinese Family and Kinship*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
- Beattie, Hilary J. 1979. *Land and Lineage in China: A Study of T'ung-Ch'eng County, Anhwei, in the Ming and Ch'ing Dynasties*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Cohen, Myron L. 1976. *House United, House Divided: The Chinese Family in Taiwan*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
- Freedman, Maurice. 1958. *Lineage Organization in Southeastern China*. London: Athlone Press.
- Parish, William L., and Martin King Whyte. 1978. *Village and Family in Contemporary China*. Chicago, Illinois: Univ. of Chicago Press.
- Pasternak, Burton. 1972. *Kinship and Community in Two Chinese Villages*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Potter, Jack M. 1968. *Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
- Spencer, Robert F., and S. A. Barrett. 1948. "Notes on a Bachelor House in the South China Area." *AA* 50: 463-78.
- Topley, Marjorie. 1975. "Marriage Resistance in Rural Kwangtung." In Margery

- Wolf and Roxane Witke, eds., *Women in Chinese Society*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Watson, James L. 1975. "Agnates and Outsiders: Adoption in a Chinese Lineage." *Man* 10, no. 2: 293-306.
- 1976. "Chattel Slavery in Chinese Peasant Society: A Comparative Analysis." *Ethnology* 15, no. 4: 361-75.
- 1977. "Hereditary Tenancy and Corporate Landlordism in Traditional China: A Case Study." *Modern Asian Studies* 11: 161-82.
- Watson, Rubie S. 1981. "Class Differences and Affinal Relations in South China." *Man* 16, no. 4: 593-615.
- Wolf, Arthur P., and Chieh-shan Huang. 1980. *Marriage and Adoption in China, 1845-1945*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.

Chu: The Impact of Different Religions on the Chinese Family in Taiwan

- Ahern, Emily M. 1973. *The Cult of the Dead in a Chinese Village*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Chang, Hsun. 張珣 1980. *She hui pien ch'ien chung Yang-chih hsiang chih i-liao hsing wei—i-ko i-yao jen-lei hsueh ti t'an t'ao* 社會變遷中仰之鄉之醫療行為——一個醫藥人類學之探討 (Medical treatment in Yang-chih township in the course of social change—A medical anthropological discussion). M.A. thesis, National Taiwan Univ.
- Chu, Hai-yuan 瞿海源 (Ch'u Hai-yuan). 1976. "Yen ts'un chu-min ti she hui t'ai-tu—i-ko nung ts'un ti kung yeh hua yu she-ch'u sheng huo yen-chiu chih-ssu" 岩村居民的社會態度——一個農村的工業化與社區生活研究之四 (Social attitudes of Yen villagers—one of four studies of agrarian village industrialization and community life). *BIEAS* 36: 141-64.
- 1981. "T'ai-wan ti ch'u t'ien chu chiao fa chan ch'u shih chih yen-chiu" 臺灣地區天主教發展趨勢之研究 (Study of the direction of development of the Catholic Church in Taiwan). *BIEAS* 51: 129-54.
- 1981. "Tai-wan ti ch'u Chi tu chiao fa chan ch'u shih chih ch'u pu t'an t'ao 臺灣地區基督教發展趨勢之初步探討" (Preliminary study of the development of the Protestant Church in Taiwan). *Chung-kuo she hui hsueh k'an* 中國社會學刊 (Chinese journal of sociology) 6: 15-28.
- Chu, Hai-yuan 瞿海源 and Wen Chung-I. 文崇一 1975. "Hsien tai hua kuo ch'eng ti chia chih pien ch'ien: T'ai-pei san ko she-ch'u ti pi chiao yen chiu" 現代化過程的價值變遷：臺北三個社區的比較研究 (Value change in modernization processes: a comparative study of three Taipei communities). *TW* 12, no. 5: 1-14.
- Day, Clarence B. 1969 (1940). *Chinese Peasant Cults: Being a Study of Chinese*

- Paper Gods*. Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co. Feuchtwang, Stephan. 1974. "Domestic and Communal Worship in Taiwan," in Arthur P. Wolf, ed., *Religion and Ritual in Chinese Society*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Grichting, W.L. 1971. *The Value System in Taiwan, 1970*. Taipei: Privately published.
- Hsu, Francis L.K. 許烺光 (Hsu Lang-kuang). 1971 (1948). *Under the Ancestors' Shadow: Kinship, Personality, and Social Mobility in China*. (Revised edition.) Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Jordan, David K. 1972. *Gods, Ghosts, and Ancestors: Folk Religion in a Taiwanese Village*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
- Li, Yih-yuan 李亦園 (Li I-yuan). 1976. "Cultural correlates of family size and son preference—A study on cultural factors influencing family size, son preference and fertility behavior in Taiwan." *Chung-shan hsueh shu wen-hua chi-k'an* 中山學術文化集刊 (Bulletin of the Sun Yat-sen Cultural Foundation) 17: 80-120.
- . 1978. *Hsin yang yu wen hua* 信仰與文化 (Belief and culture). Taipei: Chu Liu T'u-shu Kung-ssu.
- Lin, Yueh-hwa. 林耀華 1974 (1948). *The Golden Wing, A Sociological Study of Chinese Familism*. London: Kegan Paul.
- Ts'ai, Wen-hui. 蔡文輝 1968. "Tai-wan miao-yu ch an-p'u ti i-ko yen chiu" 臺灣廟宇占卜的一個研究 (A study of Taiwan temple divination). *TW* 6, no. 2: 85-88.
- Weber, Max. 1958. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. tr. by Talcotf Parsons New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Westoff, C. F. 1979. "The Blending of Catholic Reproductive Behavior," in Robert Wuthnow, ed., *The Religious Dimensions: New Directions in Quantitative Research*. New York: Academic Press.
- Wolf, Arthur P. 1974. "Gods, Ghosts, and Ancestors," in Arthur P. Wolf, ed., *Religion and Ritual in Chinese Society*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Wu, Chiu-chun 吳就君 et al. 1980. "Min-su hsin li fu tao ti ch'ung-chi li" 民俗心理輔導的衝擊力 (The impact of folk psychological counseling). *Chang lao shih yueh k'an* 張老師月刊 (Teacher Chang monthly) 6, no. 6: 12-38.
- Yang, C.K. (Yang Ching-k'un). 1961. *Religion in Chinese Society*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.

Jordan: Sworn Brothers

- Anderson, Eugene N. 1972. "Some Chinese Methods for Dealing with Crowding." *Urban Anthropology* 1, no. 2: 141-50.
- Borel, Henri. 1893. "Serment d'amitié chinois" (Chinese oath of friendship).

- T'oung Pao* 4: 420-26.
- Brewitt-Taylor, C.H. (Trans.). 1925. *Lo Kuan-chung's Romance of the Three Kingdoms*. Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh.
- CHHP. 1976. "Chih-shih ch'ing-nien hsin-li ch'u-hsiang" 知識青年的心理趨向 (Trends in the psychology of school graduates). In *Chung-hua hsin-pan ch'ang-shih pai-k'e ch'uan-shu* 中華新版常識百科全書 (Chinese desktop encyclopaedia, new edition). Taipei: Chung-hua Shu-chu.
- Hsu, Yu. 徐迂 1972. *T'ai-wan min-chien liu-ch'uan ku-shih* 臺灣民間流傳故事 (Traditional folktales from Taiwan). Tainan: T'ai hua t'ang.
- I.D. 1910. "Pobratimstvo u kitaitsev" "Побратимство у китайцев" (Sworn brotherhood among the Chinese). *Vestnik Azii* Вестник Азии 4: 186-87.
- Ivanov, L. ИВАНОВ, Л. 1914. "Tszin'-lan'-pu." "Цинь-лань-пу" *Vestnik Azii* Вестник Азии 30: 5-18.
- Freedman, Maurice. 1966. *Chinese lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwangtung*. London: Athlone Press.
- Gallin, Bernard and Rita S. Gallin. 1977. "Sociopolitical Power and Sworn Brother Groups in Chinese Society: A Taiwanese Case." In Raymond D. Fogelson and Richard N. Adams, eds., *The Anthropology of Power: Ethnographic Studies from Asia, Oceania, and the New World*. New York: Academia Press.
- Legge, James (trans.). 1872. *The She King*. (*The Chinese Classics* 5.) Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

Li: On Conflicting Interpretations of Chinese Family Rituals

- Ahern, Emily M. 1973. *The Cult of the Dead in a Chinese Village*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Baker, Hugh D.R. 1968. *A Chinese Lineage Village: Sheung Shui*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Chen, Chi-nan 陳其南 (Ch'en Ch'i-nan). 1980. "Ch'ing tai T'ai-wan she hui ti chieh kou pien ch'ien" 清代臺灣社會的結構變遷 (Social change in Taiwan during the Ch'ing). *BIEAS* 49: 115-47.
- . 1975. "Ch'ing tai T'ai-wan Han-jen she hui ti chien li chi ch'i chieh kou" 清代臺灣漢人社會的建立及其結構 (The establishment and organization of Chinese society in Taiwan during the Ch'ing). M.A. thesis, National Taiwan Univ.
- Chen, Chung-min 陳中民 (Ch'en Chung-min). 1967. "Chin-chiang ts'uo ti tsu-shen ch'ung-pai yu shih-tsu tsu-chih" 晉江層的社先崇拜與氏族組織 (Chin-chiang Ts'uo ancestor worship and clan organization). *BIEAS* 23: 167-94.

- Chen Hsiang-shui 陳祥水 (Ch'en, Hsiang-shui). 1973. "Kung-ma-p'ai' ti chi-ssu—ch'eng-chi ts'ai-fu yu tsu-shen ti-wei chih ch'ueh-ting" "公媽牌"的祭祀——承繼財富與祖先地位之確定 ('Ancestral tablet' worship—inheritance of wealth and determination of ancestor status). *JBIEAS* 36: 141-64.
- . 1978. "Chung-kuo she-hui chieh-kou yu tsu-shen ch'ung-pai" 中國社會結構與祖先崇拜 (Chinese social structure and ancestor worship). *Chung-kuo wen-hua fu-hsing yueh-k'an* 中國文化復興月刊 (Chinese cultural renaissance monthly) 11, no. 6: 32-39.
- Chuang, Ying-chang 莊英章 1985. "T'ai-wan tsung-tsu tsu-chih ti hsing-ch'eng chi ch'i t'e hsing" 臺灣宗族組織的形成及其特性 (The formation of Taiwan lineage organization and its distinctive functions). In Chiao Chien 喬健 (Ch'iao Chien), ed., *Hsieh-tai hua yu Chung-kuo wen hua yen t'ao hui lun wen hui pien* 現代化與中國文化研討會論文彙編 (Proceedings of the conference on modernization and Chinese culture). Hong Kong: Chinese Cultural University Press.
- Chuang, Ying-chang 莊英章 and Chen Chi-nan 陳其南 (Ch'en Ch'i-nan). 1982. "Hsien-chi-tuan Chung-kuo she-hui chieh-kuo yen-chiu ti chien-t'au: T'ai-wan yen-chiu ti i-hsieh ch'i-shih" 現階段中國社會結構研究的檢討：臺灣研究的一些啓示 (A discussion of contemporary research findings on Chinese social structure: some revelations from Taiwan studies). In Yang Kuo-shu 楊國樞 and Wen Chung-I 文崇一 (Wen Ch'ung-I), eds., *She hui chi hsing wei k'o hsueh yen chiu ti chung-kuo hua* 社會及行為科學研究的中國化 (The sinicization of social and behavioral science research). (*IEASMSB* 10.) Taipei: IEAS.
- Chuang, Ying-chang 莊英章 and Ch'en Yun-tung 陳運棟 1982. "Ch'ing-tai T'ou-fen ti tsung tsu yu she hui fa chan shih" 清代頭份宗族與社會發展史 (T'ou-fen lineages in the Ch'ing era and the history of social development). *Ti i chieh li shih yu Chung-kuo she hui pien ch'ien* (*Chung kuo she hui shih*) *yen t'ao hui* (*shang ts'e*) 第一屆歷史與中國社會變遷 (中國社會史) 研討會 (上冊) (First symposium on history and social change in China [Chinese social history], [volume 1]). (*Chung yang yen chiu yuan san min chu i yen chiu so ts'ung k'an* 中央研究院三民主義研究所叢刊 [Institute of the Three Principles of the People, Academia Sinica monograph series] 8.) Taipei: Chung yang yen chiu yuan san min hu i yen chiu so.
- Chuang, Ying-chang 莊英章 and Chou Ling-chih 周靈芝 1984. "T'ang-shan tao T'ai-wan: i ko K'o-chia tsung-tsu i-min ti yen chiu." 唐山到臺灣：一個客家宗族移民的研究 In *Chung yang yen chiu yuan san min chu i yen chiu so* *Chung-kuo Hai Yang fa-chan shih lun wen chi pien chi wei yuan hui* 中央研究院三民主義研究所中國海洋發展史論文集編輯委員會. (Editorial committee of the Institute of the Three Principles of the People, Academia Sinica for collected essays on the history of development of the China seas), ed., *Chung-kuo hai yang fa-chan shih lun-we chi* 中國海洋發展史論文集 (Collected essays on the history of development of the China seas). Taipei: Chung yang yen chiu yuan

- san min chu i yen chiu so.
- Cohen, Myron. 1969. "Agnatic Kinship in South Taiwan." *Ethnology* 8, no. 2: 167-82.
- Fortes, Meyer. 1965. "Some Reflections on Ancestor Worship in Africa." In Meyer Fortes and G. Dieterlen, eds., *African Systems of Thought*. London: Oxford Univ. Press.
- Freedman, Maurice. 1958. *Lineage Organization in Southeastern China*. London: Athlone Press.
- . 1966. *Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwangtung*. London: Athlone Press.
- . 1979a (1967). "Ancestor Worship: Two Facets of the Chinese Case." In G. William Skinner, ed., *The Study of Chinese Society: Essays by Maurice Freedman*. London: Frank Cass. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- . 1979b (1969). "Geomancy." In G. William Skinner, ed., *The Study of Chinese Society: Essays by Maurice Freedman*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Fried, Morton. 1970. "Clans and Lineages: How to Tell Them Apart and Why With Special Reference to Chinese Society." *IEAS* 29: 11-36.
- Harrell, [Clyde] Stevan. 1976. "The Ancestors at Home." In William H. Newell, ed., *Ancestors*. The Hague: Mouton Publishers.
- Hsu, Francis L.K. 許烺光 (Hsu Lang-kuang). 1963. *Clan, Caste, and Club*. Princeton: VanNostrand.
- . 1971 (1948). *Under the Ancestors' Shadow: Kinship, Personality, and Social Mobility in China*. (Revised edition.) Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- . 1979. "The Cultural Problem of the Cultural Anthropologist." *AA* 81, no. 3: 517-32.
- Li, Yih-yuan 李亦園 (Li I-yuan). 1976. "Chinese Geomancy and Ancestor Worship: A Further Discussion." In William H. Newell, ed., *Ancestors*. The Hague: Mouton Publishers.
- Pasternak, Burton. 1972. *Kinship and Community in Two Chinese Villages*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Potter, Jack M. 1968. *Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
- Wang, Sung-hsing. 王崧興 1972. "Pa Pao Chun: An 18th Century Irrigation System in Central Taiwan." *BIEAS* 33: 165-76.
- Wolf, Arthur P. 1964. *Marriage and Adoption in a Hokkien Village*. Ph. D. dissertation, Cornell Univ.
- . 1974. "Gods, Ghosts, and Ancestors." In Arthur Wolf, ed., *Religion and Ritual in Chinese Society*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- . 1976. "Aspects of Ancestor Worship in Northern Taiwan." In William H. Newell, ed., *Ancestors*. The Hague: Mouton Publishers.

Notes

Wolf: The Study of Chinese Society on Taiwan

1. I am thinking of the argument developed by Andrew Strathern (1972).
2. This statement is based on recalculations of data contained in volume 3 ("Statistics") of Buck's (1937)/Land Utilization in China./
3. For evidence of effect of education see Nancy J. Olsen (1975).

Hsu: Field Work, Cultural Differences and Interpretation

1. There are quite a few similar organizations which combine different surnames. Some examples: Chen, Hu, Yuan, and Ts'ai, Wu, Chou, Weng. The origin of the Lei, Fang, K'uang association is most interesting. During a civil disturbance when members of the Lei family were fleeing for their lives, the elder Lei ordered his three sons to assume three different surnames: Lei, Fang and K'uang. So now the descendants of the three clans in America have combined themselves into a Lei, Fang K'uang Yuan Tsung Kung Suo (Lei, Fang, Kwang Original Clan Association).
2. Even some Chinese Christians, whose weddings are officiated by ministers or priests, will go through a second, Chinese-style ceremony to satisfy their non-Christian parents and other relatives.

Wolf: Chinese Family Size

1. The chapter on population was written by Frank Notestein, who also supervised the analysis.

Hsieh: Meal Rotation

1. It seems that the first person to bring up the subject of Taiwan's meal rotation system was Bernard Gallin (1966: 44). A few of the many other authors who discuss meal rotation include Wang Sung-hsing (1967: 54-67), Li Yih-yuan (1967: 49), Chuang Ying-chang (1971: 20-23; 1972: 89; 1976: 72; 1981: 83-85), and Chen An-chih (1969: 97-113).
2. In this essay, the Chinese family is defined as "an economically independent group of persons living in the same space who are all related by blood or marriage." The family and household usually correspond, but not always. In a household importance is placed on spatial propinquity. In a family, importance is placed on kinship relationships (see Yanakissako 1979: 162).

Newell: Structural Conflicts within the Chinese Family

1. In Japan there are two forms of adoption. At 18 years or thereabouts a younger son who will not inherit transfers his registration to another household, taking that person's surname and usually marrying the brother-less daughter. This is a traditional and recognized form of upward social mobility and is known as *yoshi*. The second form of adoption is when a young child (usually one who has lost its parents) is fostered out to another family, sometimes keeping its own name. After the war a number of war orphans were handed over to farmers, who received an allowance from the state and used these children as cheap labor. There are many hair-raising stories of the ill treatment they received.
2. Among Teochiu women the rite of "opening the flower garden" is sometimes combined with the marriage ceremony. In the case of Teochiu men it is sometimes regarded as immoral to have sexual relations with a girl before marriage, as the man is considered not yet fully adult. Marriage is a puberty ceremony as well as affinal (Newell 1962: 211).

*Gallin and Gallin: Matrilateral and Affinal Relationships
in Changing Chinese Society*

1. The fieldwork on which this paper is based was done in Taiwan during several periods from 1956-58 through the summer of 1980. Over the years, we were assisted in our various research projects by support from the Foreign Area Training Fellowship Program, the Fulbright-Hays Foreign Scholar Exchange Program, the Midwestern Universities Consortium for International Development (MUCIA), the Asian Studies Center of Michigan State University, the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and the Pacific Cultural Foundation. We are indebted to members of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, for their longstanding cooperation in our research and for sponsoring us as Visiting Fellows on a number of occasions. Some of the people who were particularly helpful in facilitating our field research include Li Yih-yuan, Jerry Lai Chin-tun, Huang Shu-min, Yeh Ch'uen-rong and Anthony Lee. We wish to extend our thanks to all of them.
2. The first new election procedure "... in 1959, directed that the *hsiang chang* (district mayor) be elected by popular vote of the villagers instead of by *hsiang* council. The second change followed in 1961 and directed that each *hsiang* be divided into sub-districts, and each sub-district elect representatives to the council on the basis of population, rather than each village individually electing its own representative to the council" (Gallin 1968: 387).
3. See Croll (1981: 140) for a similar observation.
4. Equitability, of course, tended to be a function of families' economic condition. Families which were relatively poorer sometimes retained part of the bride price for their own use, sending their daughters to their new homes with a dowry worth less than the monies paid for them. Families which were relatively wealthier might send their daughters to their new homes with a dowry worth more than the monies paid for them. Most families, however, attempted to balance the worth of bride price and dowry.
5. See also Croll (1981: 88-93) for a discussion of class and marriage.
6. The frequency with which inter-class marriages occurred might be questioned. The data Whyte (1979) and Parish and Whyte (1978) present were collected from a self-selected

sample of emigrants to Hong Kong, a group that may have had a number of members who were of the former landlord class and, consequently, unsympathetic to the goal of the Chinese revolution. We recognize this limitation and the probability that inter-class marriages were limited in frequency. Nevertheless, it is the way in which such marriages were arranged by those involved that is important to our discussion, not their frequency. That is, within such marriages, it was more common for the woman than the man to have origins in the "exploiting class" and, accordingly, it was she who was considered to be "marrying up."

Chen: Dowry and Inheritance

1. Unless otherwise specified, the ethnographic data used in this paper are drawn from fieldwork conducted in Changhua and Tainan hsien. The Changhua study was done under the direction of Li Yih-yuan, while the Tainan study was done by myself in 1969-71. In addition, I visited these two communities several times between 1975 and 1981. Most material used here is from these two Hokkien villages.

Chuang: Family Structure and Reproductive Patterns in a Taiwan Fishing Village

1. I first wish to thank the National Science Council, Republic of China for funding my fieldwork. This essay reports research results from my participation in a project entitled "An Interdisciplinary Study of the Changing Familial Network and Reproductive Patterns in Taiwan." The project was under the overall direction of Ronald Freedman and Sun Te-hsiung. I wish to thank both for inviting me to participate in their project, and especially Ronald Freedman whose research proposal was used in formulating the research design of my Nan-ts'un study. I also wish to thank the Taiwan Provincial Family Planning Institute for coding the questionnaire. Finally, I thank my research assistants Wang Ying-ling and Hsieh Mei-chuan for help in interviewing and Lu Yu-hsia and Chiang Jo-min for handling the statistical data.
2. See Chuang (1982) for details.
3. This acceptance of contraceptives is prevalent throughout various levels of Taiwan society (cf. Sun *et al* 1978: 62).
4. According to investigations by the Taiwan Provincial Family Planning Institute the average ideal number of children for Taiwan was 4 in 1965, 3.8 in 1970 and 3.2 in 1973 (Chang *et al* 1981: 58).
5. According to data from four villages supplied by Li Yih-yuan (1975: 3), 93% of the respondents hoped to have two or more male children. According to Chang *et al* (1981: 219) the preference for male children in Taiwan has weakened, but not disappeared.
6. When using correlative models (without having dropped the cluster of variables for values) in the analysis of the samples of the above mentioned areas (Hsin Hsing, Chingmei, Shenk'en, Nants'un), it was found that the two variable values of husband-wife roles and perceptions of child mortality significantly influence the ideal number of children, and constitute a significant influence on the variable of religiosity on son

preference. This is very probably because the addition of urban areas (Ching-mei and even Shen-k'en) to the sample led to increased variability. For the same reason the values in the Nan-ts'un sample tend to be homogeneous, and this makes it difficult to explain differences in reproductive patterns.

Cohen: Lineage Development and the Family in China

1. I wish to thank James and Rubie Watson for having read and commented on this paper, and for having so generously permitted me to benefit from their knowledge and understanding of Chinese lineage organization.

Chu: The Impact of Different Religions on the Chinese Family in Taiwan

1. I use the term animist for lack of a better English language alternative. Also, I lump Buddhists with animists and Buddhism with Chinese folk religion for two reasons. First, many animists identified their religious persuasion on Grichting's questionnaire as Buddhist. That is, 42 percent of Grichting's total sample claimed to be Buddhist, and 37 percent claimed to be animist. In fact, the percentage of Buddhists is much lower. Most of those who describe themselves as being Buddhists are actually animists. Second, followers of these two religions showed themselves to be virtually identical in attitude and behavior in their questionnaire responses.
2. Grichting administered a questionnaire with 141 items Taiwan-wide in 1970, and used 1,882 completed questionnaires for his sample. Respondent sex ratio is 108.0. Grichting performed no statistical tests on his data, and only reports the percentages calculated for various items according to residence (urban versus rural), subethnicity, age, sex, religion and education. This essay attempts to perform statistical tests on the cross-tables data as a basis for discussing questions and testing hypotheses. It is not possible to reproduce here the many tables of percentages available in the original. I only provide tables which report the results of my bi-variate analyses of Grichting's tables of percentages. For the sake of clarity, I occasionally quote some of Grichting's more important percentages in dividualy.
3. The higher percentages produced in Ts'ai Wen-hui's (1968) study are probably due to a difference in data gathering methods rather than indicative of differences in behavior.

Jordan: Sworn Brothers

1. For their comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I am grateful to John L. McCreery, Chou Ying-hsiung, Chu Hai-yuan, Eleanor R. Gerber, Katherine Gould-Martin, Bruce Holbrook, Murray Leaf, Michael Meeker, and Elizabeth Perry, all of whom pointed out additional aspects of the problem and helped me to broaden my views about it. I remain responsible both for the errors that remain and for the stubbornness with which I resisted some very helpful suggestions.
The present study is based largely on interviews with four informants whom I knew in the mid-1960's when I was living in an agricultural village north of Tainan city, and upon interviews conducted in 1976 with many more informants in eight other sworn

brotherhood groups in Tainan, Taipei, and the same village. For financing the fieldwork on which this paper is based, I am grateful to the (U.S.) National Institute of Mental Health and the University of Chicago (1966-68), and to the Chinese Cultural Center of New York and the University of California (1976). And for their constant friendship and encouragement in all my fieldwork, I am much indebted to the members of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica.

2. Other Chinese fictive kinship statuses involve adoption across generations. They range from god-parent-like *i* relationships to step-parent-like *kan* relationships; but same generation relationships established in this way occur, in my experience, only as derivatives from the fictive parent-child ties (as when two adopted children share a same adoptive parent, making them "siblings"). One does not "adopt" a sibling directly in those forms. Similarly, an adoptive kinship idiom is used of religious masters and disciples or of master craftsmen and their apprentices (and hence co-disciples or co-apprentices are, reflexively, "siblings"). Sworn brotherhood differs in the explicit generational equality of the participants in the core relationship, vertical extensions, if any, being the reflexive ones.
3. A variant on the use of oaths is the exchange of cards bearing the names, addresses, and birth times of the parties to the oath, and sometimes genealogical information as well. This is called *oa-thiap/ua:thiap* in Hokkien (*huan-t'ieh* in Mandarin), and the parties to such an exchange are called *oa-thiap-e/ua:thiap*, or *oa-thiap/ua:thiap* brethren. Some informants maintain that it is not quite the same thing as sworn brotherhood and does not require full mourning for one's brother's parents. Others (including lexicographers) maintain that it is identical. (At least one informant was unaware that the two customs were related to each other.)
4. One sociological survey of recent Taiwan graduates (CCHP 1976: 933-88) asked who gave the most help or understood them best when they had problems. Although "father and mother" were far and away the highest scorers in this, siblings and friends came out very close to identical. The expectation may not be so much that sworn siblingship will make a relationship more intimate than it already is, but rather that it will prolong the relationship and clear away some obstacles to taking full advantage of its already existing intimacy.
5. Natural brothers share much or little depending in part upon whether they have partitioned the family estate or not. Even among brothers whose families have divided their estate, however, there are still expectations of generalized reciprocal exchange, particularly in time of trouble. Sworn brotherhood clearly implies a fairly exchange-prone model of brotherhood, as revealed in the very common observation of informants that sworn brothers are often both closer and more helpful than natural brothers.
6. Traditional China was in many ways a society dominated by hierarchy. Not only were kinship positions ranked, but hierarchy dominated most other institutions from the civil service system to the supernatural realms and religious orders. Given this strong and positive emphasis upon the idea of hierarchy itself, there is a possibility that many or most Chinese feel more comfortable in a hierarchical relationship to another person than in a relationship of equality. I lack the clinical evidence necessary to sustain an argument on this point, but it suggests the intriguing possibility that there may be limits to the potential intimacy of a relationship between equals such that, as friends become more and more intimate, certain strains begin to be felt which can be resolved only by shifting to a hierarchical pattern of interaction. If this is so, then psychological pressures entirely congruent with the cultural and economic ones just discussed make a hierarchizing device

such as sworn brotherhood the more inevitable in China.

7. Discussion of family problems outside of the family itself is regarded as very bad form in China. Informants tell me that this is because outsiders are likely to take advantage of a family's weaknesses, or at least to gossip, which will be detrimental to the family's prestige. Accordingly friends, as outsiders, have a limited ability to assist in family difficulties unless the difficulties are too obvious to be hidden. With the ideology of sworn brotherhood comes a suspension of the insider/outsider constraint on the flow of information. Note that an extension of the incest taboo to include the sworn sibling's family members also makes candor more possible both between cross-sex sworn siblings, and between men concerning their wives and daughters.
8. In his article on *Chin-lan p'u*, Ivanov translates the phrase as "golden pacts of brotherhood" (*zolyte akty pobratimstva*) (1914: 5), which probably wrongly segments the Chinese as gold orchid-registers rather than gold-orchid registers. His segmentation makes sense in view of his observation on page 7, where he distinguishes between *Chin-lan p'u*, or the texts of the oaths themselves, and *lan-p'u*, documents containing only the identification of participants without the text of the oath taken. I am unable to find any confirmation of this distinction, which may have been peculiar to the Vladivostok area where Ivanov lived, or even to one of his informants. *Lan-p'u* is regarded by most lexicographers as merely an abbreviation of the longer phrase. The abbreviated, simpler *lan-p'u* containing only names Ivanov associates specifically with civil servants. In Taiwan this simpler form, with names, addresses, and birth data only, is the commoner, and is often written as a human record, even though the oath itself is only oral.
9. An error or play on words may be involved. *Sheng Hui*, "Victory Association," is homonymous with *sheng-hui*, "magnificent assembly," a more common phrase sometimes used to refer to banquets of sworn brotherhood groups.
10. It is important to bear in mind that Borel's document may not have been composed by the parties to it, but may have been a more general form of sworn brotherhood oaths taken in Fukien in the late Ch'ing. Indeed, it is entirely possible that the subscribing parties were even ignorant of exactly what it said, the same way my village informant was ignorant of the terms of the oath he took in Kinmen.

Li: On Conflicting Interpretations of Chinese Family Rituals

1. Space does not allow an adequate review of the Chinese language anthropological literature on Chinese lineages on Taiwan. The more important publications include at least Chen Chi-nan (1975; 1980), Chuang Ying-chang (1982; 1985), Chuang Ying-chang and Ch'en Yun-tung (1982), and Chuang Ying-chang and Chou Ling-chih (1984).

Character List

Hokkien terms and expressions are identified with the letter H; all others are Mandarin.

<i>a-chek/a-ciek</i> (H)	Chen Yun-tung	<i>ch'ih huo-ch'iu</i>
阿叔	陳運棟	吃伙鬪
<i>a-chim/a-cim</i> (H)	<i>chhit niu-ma si</i> (H)	<i>ch'ih-huo-t'ou</i>
阿嬭	七娘媽生	吃伙頭
<i>Ah Q cheng chuan</i>	<i>chia</i>	<i>ch'ih i chia ti huo t'ou</i>
阿 Q 正傳	家	吃一家的伙頭
<i>a-peh/a-peq</i> (H)	<i>chia-chang</i>	Ch'i-nan
阿伯	家長	溪南
<i>a-so/a-sou</i> (H)	<i>chia-hu</i>	Ch'i-le-erh
阿嫂	家戶	奇勒爾
Chang Fei	<i>chia-miao</i>	<i>ch'in ch'i</i>
張飛	家廟	親戚
Chang-chou	<i>chia-t'ing</i>	Chin dynasty
漳州	家庭	金朝
Chang Ming-cheng	<i>chia-tsu</i>	<i>Ch'ing Ming</i>
張明正	家族	清明
Changhua	<i>chieh hun</i>	<i>Chin-ku ch'i-kuan</i>
彰化	結婚	今古奇觀
Ch'en Chung	<i>chieh-shou</i>	<i>chin-lan</i>
陳重	結首	金蘭
Chen An-chih	<i>chieh-pai hsiung-ti</i>	<i>chin-lan p'u</i>
陳安治	結拜兄弟	金蘭譜
Chen Chung-min	<i>ch'ih</i>	<i>chin-lan Sheng Hui</i>
陳中民	吃	金蘭勝(盛)會
Chen Hsiang-shui	<i>chih-erh</i>	Chin Sheng-t'an
陳祥水	侄兒	金聖嘆

- chi-ssu ch'üan*
 祭祀圈
chi-ssu kung-yeh
 祭祀公業
chi-ssu-t'ien
 祭祀田
Chiu-ju hsiang
 九如鄉
Chou
 州
Ch'uan-chou ts'uo
 泉州厝
Ch'uan-chou
 泉州
Chuang Ying-chang
 莊英章
Chu Hai-yuan
 瞿海源
Chu-lin ts'un
 竹林村
Ch'un-chieh
 春節
Chung-ch'iu
 中秋
Chung-she
 中社
Chung Tzu-chi
 鍾子期
Chung yang jih
pao fu k'an
 中央日報副刊
Chung-yüan
 中元
Chu-shan
 竹山
E-lun-ch'un
 鄂倫春
Fan Chiang-chun
 范將軍
- fang*
 房
Fei Hsiao-tung
 費孝通
fen
 分
fen-chia
 分家
fen-lei hsieh-tou
 分類械鬥
fu-hsi chi-ssu ch'un
 父系繼嗣群
fu/pa
 父 / 爸
hai-kha
 海脚
Hai-shan
 海山
Hakka
 客家
hang-yeh kung-hui
 行業公會
hoan-a kiat-pai/
huana kiat-pai (H)
 番仔結拜
Hokkien
 福建
hou-t'ou
 後頭
Hsiao Kung-chuan
 蕭公權
hsiao-ting
 小定
Hsieh Chen-min
 謝振民
Hsieh Chiang-chün
 謝將軍
Hsieh Jih-chang
 謝繼昌
- Hsin-chu hsien*
 新竹縣
hsing
 姓
Hsi-yuan
 西園
Francis L. K. Hsu
 許烺光
Hsu Chia-ming
 許嘉明
Hsu Cho-yun
 許倬雲
Huan-t'ieh
 換帖
Huang Chieh-san
 黃介山
Huang Shu-min
 黃樹民
Huang Ts'uo
 黃厝
Hu Hsien-chin
 胡先晉
hui-kuan
 會館
I-lan
 宜蘭
Iu Ieng Kong
 有應公
i/kan
 義 / 乾
jen-ch'ing
 人情
kan-ch'ing
 感情
Kao-hsiung
 高雄
ke (H)
 家
Kuan-Chung
 管仲

Kuan Yü 關羽	Lu Hsun 魯迅	P'u-hsing 埔心
Kuei-Shan Tao 龜山島	<i>lun</i> 輪	P'u-li 埔里
<i>kung-chih</i> 公祭	<i>lun huo-t'ou</i> 輪伙頭	San-hsia 三峽
<i>kung-so</i> 公所	<i>lun-li</i> 倫理	<i>San-kuo yen-i</i> 三國演義
Kwangtung 廣東	<i>lun huo-ch'iu</i> 輪伙鬪	Shanghai 上海
Lan-ch'i hsien 蘭谿縣	Lu Yu 陸游	Shantung 山東
Lanfang Kongsì 蘭芳公司	<i>Ma</i> 媽	<i>Shan-yüan</i> 上元
<i>lao-pen</i> 老本	<i>Mu</i> 母	She-liao 社寮
Lei I 雷義	Nan-t'ou 南投	Sheng-ken <i>hsiang</i> 深坑鄉
<i>li</i> 禮 (rites); 里 (district)	<i>Oa-thiap</i> (H) 換帖	Shen-kang 伸港
Li Ching-han 李景漢	<i>Oa-thiap-e</i> (H) 換帖兀	Shensi 山西
Liaoning 遼寧	<i>pai-shan</i> 拜山	Sheung-shui 上水
Ling-ch'uan 凌泉	<i>pai t'ien ti</i> 拜天地	<i>shih</i> 事 (to serve); 氏 (clan)
Lin Yueh-hwa 林耀華	Pao Shu-ya 鮑叔牙	<i>shih-hsi-ch'ün</i> 世系群
Liu, Kuan, Chang, Chao 劉、關、張、趙	Pa-tou-tzu 八斗子	Shih-lin 士林
<i>Liu-mang</i> 流氓	<i>pho-to</i> (H) 普渡	<i>shih tsu</i> 氏族
Liu Pei 劉備	Ping Shan 屏山	Shu-lin 樹林
Li Yih-yuan 李亦園	Pingtung 屏東	Shun-te 順德
Luo Kuan-chung 羅貫中	<i>po-fu</i> 伯父	Shih Erh 示兒
<i>lu-chu</i> 爐主	<i>po-mu/po-po</i> 伯母 / 伯伯	<i>siu-kia</i> (H) 收驚

- siu:-pieng* (H)
 賞兵
Sung-po-k'eng
 松柏坑
Sun Te-hsiung
 孫得雄
Sun Yat-sen
 孫逸仙
su-po hsiung-ti
 叔伯兄弟
Su Ya-hui
 蘇雅惠
Szechwan
 四川
szu-fang-ch'ien
 私房錢
ta chiao
 打醮
Tai Yen-hui
 戴炎輝
Tainan
 臺南
Taipei hsien
 臺北縣
tang-ki (H)
 童乩
T'an, T'an, Hsu, Hsieh
 譚、談、許、謝
Tang Mei-chun
 唐美君
T'ang Ti
 棠棣
Ta-tieh
 打鐵
ta-ting
 大定
Te-hua chieh
 德化街
Tho-te-kong (H)
 土地公
t'i
 悌；弟
ti-chu p'o
 地主婆
t'ien-chuang
 添妝
T'ien sheng chou pao
 天聲週報
Ting hsien
 定縣
ting-k'ou-sui
 丁口稅
t'ou-chi/tau-ki (H)
 投機
t'ou-ming
 頭名
Ts'ai wen-hui
 蔡文輝
tsu
 族
tsu-chang
 族長
tsu-chi
 祖籍
tsu-ts'u
 祖厝
tsung
 宗
tsung-ch'in hui
 宗親會
tsung-tsu
 宗族
tung-hsiang hui
 同鄉會
Wang Sung-hsing
 王崧興
Wen chung-I
 文崇一
David Y. H. Wu
 吳燕和
wu-fu
 五服
wu-lun
 五倫
Wu Ts'ung-hsien
 吳聰賢
C. K. Yang
 楊懋春
Yang-Chih ts'un
 仰之村
Yang Kuo-shu
 楊國樞
yang lao ti
 養老地
Yang Li-hsiu
 楊麗秀
Yen-p'ing ch'u
 延平區
Yu Po-ya
 俞伯牙

Index

- Aberle, David, 171, 182
 affinal kin, 111
 agnatically mixed settlement (community), 210
 agnatic group. *See* agnation
 agnatic kin, 131, 158
 agnatic organization. *See* agnation
 agnatic tie. *See* agnation
 agnosticism, 14, 222-230
 agnation: as group principle, 4-5, 75, 83, 138, 183-84, 186-87, 190; as personal tie, 212. *See also* lineage organization
 Ahern, Emily M., 103, 177, 183, 197, 198, 231, 265, 269-75
 ancestor, 265; benevolence vs. malevolence, 85; matrilineal, 266; focal, 178
 ancestor worship, 4, 14, 25, 75, 78, 93, 135, 198, 201, 203, 265-66, 272f, 275, 277; domestic, 266, 275; pai-shan (worship at graves), 203; sentiment component, 14
 ancestral estate, 7, 178, 185; authority component of, 14; domestic, 266; lineage, 266
 ancestral hall, 95, 184, 201-03, 211, 213-14
 ancestral trust, 170
 Anderson, Eugene, 242
 animism, 221-23, 225-233
 annual festival: *Ch'un-chieh*, 202; *Shang-yüan*, 202; *Ch'ing-ming*, 93, 202; *Chung-yüan (pho-to)*, 202, or ghost festival, 139; *Chung-ch'iu*, 202. *See also* individual festivals by name
 bachelor house, 213-14
 Baker, Hugh, 177, 185, 213, 278
 Barnes, J. A., 4
 Barrett, S. A., 213, 214, 217
 Beattie, Hilary, 216
 Befu, Harumi, 84, 182, 185
 bilateral kindred, 213. *See also* wu-fu
 Blau, Peter Michael, 103
 boat hand, 140
 Bohannan, Paul, 169, 174
 Borel, Henri, 252-253
 brideprice, 9, 89, 112-14, 117-18, 121-23, 126-27
 Buck, John Lossing, 36, 47
 Buddhist, 221-23, 226
 Caldwell, J. C., 128, 146
 Catholicism, 222ff
 Chang-chou, Fukien Province, 105
 Chang Fei (a hero of Three Kingdoms period), 250
 Changhua, Taiwan, 105, 268
 Chang Ming-cheng, 129, 131
 Chen An-chih, 73, 83
 Chen Ch'i-nan, 131, 279-282
 Ch'en Chung (Han dynasty scholar), 252
 Chen Chung-min, 9-11, 274
 Chen Hsiang-shui, 265, 272, 276
 Chen Yun-tung, 207
chhit niu-ma si (Chinese lover's day), 23
chia (family), 31-32, 50, 58, 86-87, 96, 194, 196, 204
chia-chang (family head), 202
chia-hu (household), 55
chia-miao (family temple), 203
 Chiao, C. M., 49
chia-t'ing (family unit). *See* *chia*
chia-tsu (family). *See* *chia*
chieh hun (wedding), 28
 Ch'i-nan, Taipei *hsien*, 184-85, 269, 273, 275, 277, 283
ch'in ch'i (matrilineal and affinal kin), 105-06, 109
 Chin Chow, Liaoning Province, 23
 Chinese Lunar New Year, 23
 Chin dynasty, 29
Ch'ing Ming (spring festival), 93, 202
Chin-ku ch'i-kuan (a book), 250
chin-lan (sworn brotherhood), 252
chin-lan p'u (Register of Gold and Orchids), 252, 256

- Chin-lan Sheng Hui* (gold and orchids victory association), 252
- Chin Sheng-t'an (scholar of Ching dynasty), 27
- chi-ssu ch'üan* (religious sphere), 196
- chi-ssu kung-yeh* (ancestral estates), 198
- chi-ssu-t'ien* (ancestral field), 196
- Chiu-ju *hsiang*, Ping-tung *hsien*, 70-71
- Chuan-chou *ts'uo*, Chang-hua *hsien*, 268
- Ch'uan-chou, Fukien Province, 105
- Chuang Ying-chang: on the family, 11-13, 52f, 131, 140, 194; on lineage, 184, 196-98, 200, 207, 279ff; on meal rotation, 77-80; on non-lineage ties, 10
- Chu Hai-yuan, 4, 15, 150, 221, 222, 227
- Chu-lin *ts'un*, Pu-li *Chen*, Nan-t'ou *hsien*, 71f, 81f
- Ch'un-chieh* (New Year festival), 202
- Chung-ch'iu* (autumn festival), 202
- Chung-she, Tainan *hsien*, 183-84
- Chung Tzu-chi (man of Eastern Chou dynasty). *See* Yu Po-ya
- Chung-yüan* (ghost festival). *See also* annual festival
- Chu-shan *chen*, Nan-t'ou *hsien*, 92, 95, 184, 269, 278
- Civil Code, 10, 61-64; emic terms on, 68
- clan, 4-6, 25, 82, 86, 95, 102, 174, 187, 194, 201-02, 205-09, 214, 280. *See also* lineage, beta
- Cohen, L. Myron, 6, 117, 197-98, 204
- collective ancestor tablets, 274
- communal rites, 275
- complex family. *See* family
- complex households. *See* household
- complex lineages. *See* lineage
- conditional nuclear family. *See* family
- conditional stem family. *See* family
- Confucianization, of the Chinese legal system, 61
- conical lineage. *See* lineage
- conjugal family. *See* family
- contractual tenancy, 211
- conventional family. *See* family
- Coombs, Lolagene C., 130, 132
- corporate estate, 5
- corporate estate segmentation, 211
- corporate rites, 275
- corporate unilineal descent groups, 167
- Coult, Allan, 171, 182
- descent: component, 14; group, 5-6, 165-72, 175-76, 178-81, 183-86, 189-91, 281; egalitarian, 176-77; *fu-hsi chi-ssu ch'ün* (patrilineal descent group), 194
- Diamond, Norma, 184, 191, 198
- Dickinson, Jean, 47
- diffuse religion, 221
- dispersed extended family. *See* family
- dispersed joint family. *See* family
- domestic altar. *See* family
- domestic ancestor worship. *See* ancestor worship
- domestic cycle. *See* family
- domestic development cycle. *See* family
- domestic group. *See* family
- domestic institutions. *See* family
- domestic organization. *See* family
- domestic rites. *See* family
- domestic unit. *See* family
- dominant kinship dyad: hypothesis of, 25
- dowry, 10-11, 89, 112-14, 117-19; "proper" 123, 126; fund, 126
- economic family. *See* family
- egalitarian descent group. *See* descent
- Eggan, Fred, 182
- elementary family. *See* family
- Ember, Carol R., 171-72, 182, 189
- Ember, Melvin, 171-72, 182, 189
- Emic term. *See* civil code
- Engels, Frederick, 169
- ethnicity: as group principle, 205-08; in identity, 193, 209; in relation, 193
- Evans-Pritchard, E. E., 4, 174
- extended family. *See* family
- Fairbank, John F., 30
- family (*chia*; *ke*), 12, 31, 82, 193-94, 199, 204-05; augmented elementary, 36, biological, 32; complex, 31-33, 36-37, 40, 42-43; conditional nuclear, 51; conjugal, 32; conventional, 50, 57; cycle, 13, 37-38, 41, 44; dispersed extended, 50-53, 55; dispersed joint, 140; division, 71-73, 86, 131 141, 147, 215; domestic altar, 87, 90-91, 93; domestic development cycle, 37; domestic group, 11, 75; domestic institu-

- tions, 46, 82; domestic organization, 44; domestic rites, 275; domestic unit, 57; economic, 50; elementary, 34ff; extended, 12, 31, 51, 57, 73f, 81, 198, 205; federal, 12; federated, 52-53, 140; *fen-chia*, 86; *frères*, 34, 36, 38-42, 44; grand, 12, 34, 36, 40-44, 131, 133, 145-46, 151; head, 141, 202; high-level, 50; high-level joint, 79; household group, 53; independent, 145; joint, 30, 37, 40, 64, 79, 85; joint style household group, 79; large, 30, 32, 44, 48, 136, 145; low-level, 50; low-level stem, 79; meal rotation, 52, 131ff; natal, 34, 117ff; natural, 50-51, 57; non-nuclear, 146f, 153; nuclear, 4, 50, 131ff; parental, 50, 57; religious, 5f, 57; rotating stem, 83; simple, 32-33; simple elementary, 36; small, 32, 42, 44, 136, 145; stem, 34, 38, 40-43, 131, 133, 145, 151; sub-elementary, 40; typical (usual), 38; uterine, 56
- family cycle. *See* family
- family division. *See* family
- family head. *See* family
- family ritual. *See* family
- fang* (natural family or parental family), 57, 201
- federal family. *See* family
- federated family. *See* family
- Fei Hsiao-t'ung, 4, 58, 114, 194
- Feng Tzu-kang, 48
- fen-lei hsieh-tou* (armed affrays among diverse types), 197
- filial tie, 34
- Forde, Daryll, 4
- Fortes, Meyer, 4, 14, 37, 168-69, 173f, 266
- Foster, George, 174
- Frankl, Viktor E., 26
- Freedman, Maurice: as academic ancestor, 3; contribution to China anthropology by, 4ff; on affinity, 103f; on ancestor worship, 14, 265, 268, 270, 275, 277; on Civil Code, 62f; on dowry, 10; on the family, 12f, 36-40; on family division, 56f, 72, 240; on inheritance, 69; on monogamy, 68; on lineage, 5-9, 102, 167, 170, 174f, 177, 179f, 182-83, 185-86, 188-92, 195-99, 202f, 210, 216
- Freedman, Ronald, 128-29, 130, 132, 150
- free market, 111
- frères*. *See* family
- Fried, Morton, 5, 6, 102, 104, 174-78, 182, 187-88, 200, 203, 279
- Fukien, 8, 64, 105, 195-96, 198, 202, 204-05
- Gallin, Bernard, 8, 25, 73, 101, 132, 184, 236-37, 242, 246, 254
- Gallin, Rita, 8, 25, 236-37, 242, 246, 254
- Gallins' typology, 236
- genealogy, 281, *See* corporation
- General Fan, 251
- General Hsieh, 251
- Geomancy, 278-79; grave, 95, 278
- ghost festival. *See* annual festival
- ginkyo bunke (retirement household), 92
- Goody, Jack, 9, 126
- grand family. *See* family
- grand lineage. *See* lineage
- Grichting, W. L., 221-22, 225-30
- gross explanatory power/value, 146, 151, 155; group model, 84
- Habenstein, Robert, 171, 182
- hai-kha* (boat hand), 140
- Hai-shan, Taipei *hsien*, 88
- Hakka, 88, 185-86, 188, 190, 195, 198-99
- Hammel, E. A., 32-34
- hall worship, 275
- hang-yeh kung-hui* (commercial guild association), 193
- Harrell, Steven, 90-91, 184-85, 199, 265, 272-73, 275
- Haye, L. Newton, 227
- hereditary inferiority, 215
- high-level family. *See* family
- high level joint family. *See* family
- high-order lineage. *See* lineage
- higher-order descent group, 188. *See also* higher-order lineage
- higher-order lineage, 3, 186, 189-90, 198, 206
- hoan-a kiat-pai/huana kiat-pai* (barbarian sworn brotherhood), 246
- Hokkien (minnan), 92, 105, 195, 237, 243
- Holbrook, Bruce, 243
- hometown association, 200-01
- Horie, Shunichi, 53, 56
- household, 46; classification, 32-34; complex, 31; division, 12, 71-73, 76; multiple, 32-33; size, 30ff, 45ff

- household group family. *See* family
- Hsiao Kung-chuan, 189
- hsiao-ting* (initial rite of engagement), 118
- Hsieh Chen-min, 61
- Hsieh Jih-chang, 11, 13, 50-53, 57, 72, 83, 194
- Hsin Hsing, Chang-hua *hsien*, 105
- Hsi-yuan, Taipei *hsien*, 185
- Francis L. K. Hsu, 24-25, 30, 69, 85-87, 193, 203, 231, 267, 269, 273
- Hsu Chia-ming, 196
- Hsu Cho-yun, 183
- Huang Chieh-san, 31, 86-88, 91, 213
- Huang Shu-min, 195-96, 199, 206
- Huang Ts'uo, Chang-hua *hsien*, 276
- Hu Hsien-chin, 187
- hui-kuan* (clan association), 200
- hypergamy: the status game of, 9
- I-lan, Taiwan, 183
- initial rite of engagement, 118
- inter-family ties, 101, 111
- inter-class marriage, 112-14
- inter-lineage relations, 104, 106, 213
- Iu Ieng Kong/Yu Ying Kung (a class of supernatural combining attributes of gods and ghosts), 269
- independent family. *See* family
- inheritance property, 265, 277
- Inkeles, Alex, 150
- Ivanov, L., 237
- i/kan (resemble adoptive relationship), 254
- Janelli, Dawnhee Yim, 180
- Janelli, Roger, 180
- jural authority, 266
- joint family. *See* family
- joint style household group family. *See* family
- Jordan, David, 16, 24, 231
- Kajiwaru, Michiyoshi, 46-47
- ke (H) (family), 88-89. *See also* family
- kinship, 5, 102-04, 107; group, 82
- kinship terms: *a-chek/a-ciek*, 243; *a-chim/a-cim*, 243; *a-peh/a-peq*, 243; *a-m/a-m*, 243; *a-so/a-sou*, 243; *chih-erh*, 11; *fu/pa*, 244; *mu/ma*, 244; *po-fu*, *po-mu/po-po*, 244
- Kirchhoff, Paul, 169, 176-78
- Kuan Chung (politician, Eastern Chou dynasty), 252
- Kuan Yü (a hero of Three Kingdoms period), 250
- Kuei-shan *Tao*, I-lan *hsien*, 51-53, 55
- Kulp, Daniel, 50-51, 57
- kung-chih* (regular worship and corporate feasting), 198
- kung-so* (clan association), 200, 202
- Kwangtug, 88, 104, 110, 195-96, 202, 205
- Lamley, Harry, 197, 199
- Lan-ch'i *hsien*, Che-chiang province, 48
- Lang, Olga, 4, 50, 69, 114, 125
- lao-pen* (old-age capital), 78
- large family. *See* family
- Lasslett, Petter, 32-34
- laternal sucession, 34
- Lei Yi (scholar of Han dynasty), 252
- Levy, Marion J., 33, 38
- Lewis, John, 191
- Li Ching-han, 47-48
- lineage (*tsu*), 4-9, 25, 82, 85, 101-08, 110, 139, 165-67, 171-85, 187, 193ff, 204, 210ff; alpha vs. beta, 6, 7; A type vs. Z type, 5, 7, 8, 210ff; branches, 212; complex, 170; conical, 187;
- corporation, 211; dispersed, stratified, 8; dominant 7, 214f; elders, 202; estate, 7, 216, 281; generalogy, 281; grand vs. minor, 207; heads, 202; identity, 139; interests, 213; localized, 203; lower-order 206; major, maximal, minor, and minimal, 174; organization of, 4-8, 75, 83, 167, 177, 183, 184, 186, 187, 190; segmentary, 9, 173; segmentation, 173ff, 211f; segmented, 183f; tie, 139; village made of, 192
- lineage ancestral estate. *See* lineage
- lineage branches. *See* lineage
- lineage corporation. *See* lineage
- lineage elders. *See* lineage
- lineage estate. *See* lineage
- lineage heads. *See* lineage
- lineage indenty. *See* lineage
- lineage interests. *See* lineage
- lineage organization. *See* lineage
- lineage segmentation. *See* lineage
- lineal succession, 34

- lineage tie. *See* lineage
 lineage village. *See* lineage
 Ling-ch'uan *ts'un*, Ping-tung *hsien*, 71ff, 75ff, 79, 81, 83
 Lin Yueh-hwa, 85-87
 little tradition, 276
 Liu Pei, 250
 Li Yih-yuan, 3, 5, 14-15, 51, 70, 129, 131-33, 144, 153-55, 158, 160, 231
 localized lineage. *See* lineage
 Lo kuan-chung (novelist, yuan dynasty), 250
 Lamphere, Louise, 11
 low level family. *See* family
 low level stem family. *See* family
 lower-order lineage. *See* lineage
lu-chu (master of the incense burner), 53
 Lu Hsun, 27
lun huo-t'ou (meal rotation), 70
 Lu Yu (poet, Southern Sung dynasty), 29

 maiden house, 214
 major lineage. *See* lineage
 major marriage. *See* marriage
 male adoption, 86
 marriage: major, 87f; minor, 87; polygynous, 68, 173; uxrilocal, 7f, 87, 90, 138
 matrilineal ancestors. *See* ancestor
 matrilineal and affinal tie, 8-9, 101, 107
 maximal lineage. *See* lineage
 McCreery, John, 23-24
 meal rotation (*ch'ih huo-t'ou*), 13, 70ff;
 benefactors in, 75; by lots, 13, 51, 70;
 circuit, 75; labor in, 75; participants in, 73;
 residence in, 74f; schedules in, 73f; in
 Shu-lin, Taipei *hsien*, 73; spending money
 in, 75
 meal rotation family. *See* family
 memorialism, 273
 minimal lineage. *See* lineage
 minor lineage(s). *See* lineage
 minor marriage. *See* marriage
 miscellaneous ritual, 23-24
 mixed surname association, 201
 monogamy, 68
 monotheism, 23
 mortuary tablet, 15, 93
 multiple household. *See* household
 Murdock, George Peter, 21, 166-67, 174-176, 202

 Nakane Chie (Japanese anthropologist), 84
 Nan-t'ou, Nan-t'ou *hsien*, 71, 269
 Nan-ts'un, Kao-hsiung *hsien*, 10, 77, 80, 133
 natal home, 9, 10, 15, 110
 natal family. *See* family
 natural family. *See* family
 Newell, William, 15, 22
 Niida, Noboru, 61
 non-corporate group, 6
 non-lineage tie, 9, 10
 non-nuclear family. *See* family
 non-tsu ties (non-lineage ties), 8, 106
 Notestein, Frank, 47
 nuclear family. *See* family

 occasional ritual, 23-24
 Okada, Yuzuru, 46

pai t'ien ti (the worship of heaven and earth
 in Chinese wedding ritual), 28
 Pao Shu-ya (man of Eastern Chou dynasty),
 252
 parental family. *See* family
 Parish, William, 113, 191, 214
 Pasternak, Burton, 4-5, 171, 182, 184, 186,
 189, 195, 198-99,
 Pa-tou-tzu, Keelung *shih.*, 46
 patrilineal descent principle, 176, 179
 patrilineal society, 131, 266
 Pearl River delta, Kwangtung Province, 213
 perspective: inward-oriented vs. outward-
 oriented, 102, 108, 116
 phratry, 174
 Ping Shan, New Territories, Hong Kong, 280
 Pingtung, Taiwan, 70f, 74f, 195, 198-99
 Plotnicov, 182, 185
 Ploughshare, Taipei *hsien*, 90, 185, 272
 politico-jural domain, 266
 polygyny, 68, 173
 Potter, Jack, 170, 177, 183, 185, 192, 198,
 209, 212, 280
 primogeniture, 180
 private money, 119, 122
 property-holding units, 5, 12
 Protestantism, 222-230, 233
 Psychosocial Homeostasis, 25
P'u-hsing, Chang-hua *hsien*, 276
 Pu-li, Nan-t'ou *hsien*, 71
 Puyen, Chang-hua *hsien*, 105

- Radcliffe-Brown, A. R., 4, 167-68
 ramage, 174
 ranked (conical) descent group, 176-78
 reburial, 92, 94
 reciprocal relationship, 107
 religious family. *See* family
 religious spheres, 196
 rich family cycle vs. poor family cycle, 40, 91
 rite de passage, 91
 Romance of the Three Kingdoms, 250
 Rosaldo, Michelle, 11
 Rotary club, 245
 rotating stem family. *See* family
 Russian Christians: Old Believers vs. the Reformed, 21
 Ryukyus, 15, 93-94
- San-hsia, Taipei *hsien*, 269
San-kuo yen-i (A novel about romance of the Three Kingdoms), 250
 Sahlins, Marshall, 169-71, 174, 182
 Saso, Michael, 21-22
 second rite of engagement, 118
 See, Chinben, 196, 200-01, 203
 segmentary lineage. *See* lineage
 segmented lineage. *See* lineage
 Service, Elman, 171-72
 Shamanism, 93-94, 268
 Shanghai, Kiangsu Province, 96
 Shantung, 8
 Shang-yuan (Lantern Festival). *See* annual festival
 She-liao, Nan-t'ou *hsien*, 269, 278
 Shen-ken *hsiang*, Taipei *hsien*, 71
 Shen-kang, Chang-hua *hsien*, 269
 Shensi, 8
 Sheung-shui, New Territories, Hong Kong, 280
shih-hsi-ch'ün (lineage), 194
 Shih-lin, Taipei city, 46
shih-tsu (clan), 194, 196
 Short, Rev. Robert L., 22
 Shu-lin, Taipei *hsien*, 73
 Shun-te, Kwangtung Province, 214
 sib, 174
 simple elementary family. *See* family
 simple family. *See* family
 single surname villages, 195
siu-kia (ritual to ward off frights), 23
siu-peng (rewarding the soldiers), 139
 Skinner, G. William, 165, 189
 small family. *See* family
 social interaction, 131, 141
 social mobility, 112, 216, 218
 social solidarity, 8
 social stratification, 9
 Spencer, Robert F., 213-14, 217
 stem family. *See* family
 Steward, Julian, 171-72
 stratified lineage. *See* lineage
 subordinate status, 215
 Sugimoto Yoshio, 84
 Sung-po-k'eng, Nan-t'ou *hsien*, 278
 Sun Te-hsiung, 46, 130
 Sun Yat-sen, 95
su-po-hsiung-ti (agnatic descendants from a common grand-father), 212
 Su Ya-hui, 135
 Sweeping the Ancestors' Graves, 23
 sworn brotherhood, 16, 24, 234-54
szu-fang-ch'ien (woman's private money), 119, 122
- (ancestral) tablet, 87, 89-91
 tablet worship, 277
 Tachia, Taichung *hsien*, 196
ta chiao (epidemic prayer meetings), 28
 Tai Yen-hui, 67-68, 78
 Tainan, 195
 Tainan Export Processing Zone, 140
 Taiwan Provincial Family Planning Institute, 128
 Takeshita, Y., 150
 Tambiah, Stanley, 9
tang-ki (spirit medium), 85, 271
 Tang Mei-chun, 8-9, 11, 22, 61, 69, 84, 86, 125
 T'an T'an Hsu Hsieh, 25
T'ang Ti, 251
 Taoism, 21-22, 221-22
 Tarama, 94
 Ta-tieh, Pingtung *hsien*, 183, 185, 195
ta-ting (second rite of engagement), 118
 Te-hua Chieh, Taipei city, 71
 Teochius, Malaysia, 88f
t'i (fraternal love), 241
ti-chu p'o (landlord wife), 113
t'ien-chuang (something to add to the dowry),

- 123-24
 Ting hsien, Hopei province, 47-48
 ting-k'ou-sui (population tax), 53
 Topley, Majorie, 214
 t'ou-chi (*tau-ki*) (get along well), 239
 t'ou-ming (head names), 54
 Tsai Wen-hui, 227
 tsu (lineage), 105-08, 110, 193-94, 196, 207
 tsu-chang (lineage head), 202
 tsu-chi (native place), 197
 tsu-ts'u (ancestral hall), 203
 tsung (large agnatic group), 196
 tsung-chin hui (clan association), 193
 tsung-tsu (lineage), 194, 196
 t'ung-hsiang hui (native-place association), 25, 193, 200
 type Z lineage. *See* lineage
 Uchida, Tomoo, 56
 unilineal descent. *See* lineage
 unilineal descent group. *See* lineage
 uterine family. *See* family
 uxoriolocality, 93
 uxoriolocal marriage. *See* marriage
 village: inter relations, 106-07
 virilocal residence, 130-31, 135
 Wang Sung-hsing, 11-13, 53, 80, 83, 184, 196
 wash bones, 92, 94
 Watson, James, 7, 213-17
 Watson, Rubie S., 88-89, 101, 104, 177, 212-14, 216-17
 Weber, Max, 4
 Wen Chung-I, 73, 130, 221,
 Whyte, Martin K., 110-14, 191, 214
 Westoff, C.F., 229
 Willmott, W.E., 199
 Wolf, Arthur, 22, 31, 45, 53, 82, 86-88, 91, 103, 213, 231, 265, 268
 Wolf, Eric R., 170
 Wolf, Margery, 56-57, 90-91, 116
 David Y.H. Wu, 3, 5-6, 16, 25, 193, 196, 205
 wu-fu (five mourning grades), 196, 213
 wu-lun (Confucian five relationships), 241
 Wu Ts'ung-hsien, 135
 Yang C.K., 221-22, 227
 Yang-chih ts'un, Shen-ken hsiang, Taipei hsien, 71-72, 78, 81
 Yang Kuo-shu, 150
 yang lao ti (old-age support land), 78
 Yang Li-hsiu, 130
 Yang Mao-ch'un, 69
 Yangtze River, China, 29
 Yen Chin-hwang, 202-03, 206
 Yen-ping ch'u, Taipei city, 71
 Yonaguni, 93-94
 Yu po-ya (musician of Eastern Chou dynasty) and Chung Tzu-ch'i (man of Eastern Chou dynasty), 251

中央研究院民族學研究所

專刊乙種第十五號

中國家族及其儀式行爲

定價 新台幣肆佰元正

編 者 謝 繼 昌・莊 英 章

出版者 中央研究院民族學研究所
臺北市南港區研究院路 2 段 128 號
電話：(02) 26523300

印刷者 長紅印刷事業有限公司
臺北縣中和市安樂路 153 號
電話：(02) 29431159

中華民國七十四年十月初版
中華民國九十一年十月三刷

中央研究院民族學研究所
專刊乙種第十五號

中國家族及其儀式行爲

謝繼昌・莊英章

中華民國七十四年十月初版
中華民國九十一年十月三刷
台北・南港